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 Abstract 
 
In this thesis I attempt to facilitate a fluid conversation between the ‘rhetorical turn’ in 
literary and critical theory, and the burgeoning historical interest in rhetoric in fields such 
as Classical and Renaissance intellectual history. I take issue with those empirical histories 
of rhetoric that tend to rehearse a canon of programmatic treatises from Aristotle to Cicero 
and Quintilian, identifying the historical significance of rhetorical practice with the explicit 
statements of its canonical authors. 
 
I argue, rather, that the historiography of rhetoric requires a genealogy from the perspective 
of its influence on the present and the complex sensibility and multiple orientations it has 
inspired in its adherents. Evoking critics, philosophers, and political theorists such as Jena 
Romantics, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Hannah Arendt as case studies, I argue that the public 
orientation of the rhetorical tradition has survived in the ambivalent conceptual persona of 
the orator or rhetor, inspiring a model of the intellectual as possessing a complex ethos and 
eclectic cultural competence. I argue that in the discourse of these theorists of modernity, 
the rhetor as communicator survives as a paradoxical possibility, an ethic of civic 
engagement and social intervention and a solitary, ‘untimely’ and transcendent figure 
beholden to no ideological standard or normative cultural code.  
 
I argue that the uncertain tonality of the modern figure of the rhetor reactivates the 
ambiguity of classical rhetoricians such as the Sophists who situate rhetoric somewhere 
between a mature and responsible social practice and a magical and subversive power of 
deception, the art of an arch-individualist. I conclude by suggesting that the recent formalist 
moment in literary theory and post-structuralism, with its advocacy of critical rhetoric, can 
be historically situated as revisiting the somewhat discontinuous ‘elements’ of rhetoric as 
a public-intellectual tradition.   
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Introduction: Rhetoric as Ethos and Paideia 
 
 
Is rhetoric an intellectual faculty, a science of persuasion, an art of speaking well, 
or a means of literary composition?  
George Kennedy1 
 
The historiography of rhetoric has reached a critical juncture, while the body of 
‘theory’ that advocates rhetoric's philosophical and analytical importance is uneasy, 
hesitant. This thesis attempts to facilitate a more fluid conversation between 
historiographical and theoretical interest in classical and post-classical rhetoric. I argue that 
post-classical rhetoric has transmitted to modern critical thought a varied ethos that 
alternates between tonalities material and transcendental, prudent and dynamic, inclusive 
and elitist. My thesis examines the way in which the ambiguities of the rhetorical legacy 
appeal to iconoclastic thinkers and their conception of critical representation, intellectual 
conduct, and the vitality of the public sphere.  I argue that rhetoric appeals to a strand of 
critical thinkers as a demand for the intellectual to communicate in complex ways, to 
exhibit not merely ideas but the resources of acculturation, to enact an affect-imbued ethos 
or persona as the exemplary power of a discursive model, rather than a doctrine or 
orthodoxy.  
My focus in this thesis is upon the discursive tendencies of rhetoric, the complex 
sensibility of rhetorically motivated thinkers. I suggest that in its origins and transmission, 
rhetorical modes of thinking evoke contradiction and paradox. I discuss how rhetorically 
exuberant texts are torn between a narrowly instructive mode and a far more generous 
exhibition of a paideia. By paideia, I refer to a continuing rhetorical fascination with the 
breadth of acculturation and depth of cultural knowledge that should inform the cultural 
                                                 
1 George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient and Modern 
Times, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, 3. 
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competence of the orator or rhetor, those whose art is persuasion, eloquence, heightened 
communication.  
For rhetoric offers both intensive modes of critical analysis and extensive displays 
of cultural resources. By intensive I talk of rhetoric as a determinate sociability with 
defined pedagogical aims, and by extensive I talk of a rhetoric chaotically eclectic and 
confused by its own enthusiasm for linguistic possibilities. Rhetoric’s sensibility, as bodied 
forth in the texts I discuss, often shuttles between these intensive and extensive registers, 
between what Friedrich Schlegel calls ‘enthusiasm and irony’. By paideia, then, I refer to 
the way in which an intensive pedagogical aim can generate an extensive dissemination of 
orientations that surge forth in rhetorically cognizant texts, from Aristotle to Cicero and 
Erasmus. 
I suggest that in its polysemic evocation of the possibilities of critical 
communication, rhetoric has been a powerful source of ideas for thinkers in and of 
modernity, from Friedrich Schlegel to Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. These thinkers desire 
a more pluralist and subtle critical imagination, an ethos capable of celebrating its own 
confusions and contradictions. Rhetoric, I argue, offers such thinkers a release from the 
tyranny of the sovereign will and its concomitant model of reason as linear and apodictic. 
Rhetoric promises the reinscription of the intellectual in the teeming fluidities of life and 
thought. I argue in this thesis that rhetoric is neither a cultural nor individualistic ideal but 
a heuristic idea of the complex interdependent relationship between thought and cultural 
situation. I shall discuss this interdependency in terms of ‘rhetorical acculturation’ or the 
critical appeal of a ‘rhetorical culture’. Rhetoric situates or places thought like no other art, 
yet this intensive drive is attended by the paradoxical possibilities of transcendence such 
‘interestedness’ provides.  
By a rhetorical ethos I refer throughout this thesis to a sensibility discernible in 
rhetorically influenced intellectuals that wavers between prudential aims and creative 
excess. I argue that this rhetorical sensibility is in turn often folded into the celebration of 
critical personae, encouraging a vision of the intellectual as a fertile cultural medium, 
pregnant with cultural materials. I argue that the figure of the rhetor that inspires thinkers 
like Friedrich Schlegel and Nietzsche is both intensive and extensive, an active social 
medium and an uncertain prophet of new values, a creator, an innovator.  
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The rhetorical ethos my thesis is concerned with responds feelingly to cultural 
exigencies and is greatly moved by circumambient stimuli. Yet the critical appeal of 
rhetoric is at the same time its capacity to transcend the given, its 'untimeliness' in 
Nietzsche's sense. As an ethos, rhetoric is material and sociable, but it is not normative. 
The rhetoric I speak of militates against convention and complacency. It is a pedagogy but 
not a didacticism or restrictive morality. By rhetoric, I talk in this thesis simultaneously of 
a reflective philosophy and grainy praxis. I discuss a tradition with a prehistory and later 
influence which is polymorphous and ethically varied, never authoritative or single-
minded.  
This thesis is not a history with a period focus. It is an investigation into the kind of 
sensibility and interests rhetoric has bequeathed as a challenging legacy and gift to 
critical thought, a sensibility more narrowly focused disquisitions on rhetoric fail to 
analyse in all its manifold influence.  I organise this thesis as a genealogy of classical 
rhetoric and its later critical evocation, a genealogy that takes the quandaries and 
divergent interpretations of the present as a necessary starting point. In the argument 
over whether rhetoric is a pragmatic critical mode or a transgressive speculative 
medium, the key to unfolding rhetoric's complex evolution and liminal status lies in its 
relationship to modernity. I argue from rhetoric's present uncertainties and dilemmas. I 
shall always talk of rhetoric as perplexing in its ethical mien and programmatic 
implications, neither a datum of history nor separable from its historical accumulation 
of a rich and varied sensibility. 
In the 'pragmatic' school of thought propounded by Richard Rorty, rhetoric's 
recovery is cathected to an urbane, comfortable, post-foundational philosophical 
disposition. Following the relaxed post-epistemic Sophists, the pragmatism of Rorty and 
Stanley Fish is the mode of a self-reflexive interpretative community aware of the 
limitations of all claims to knowledge and certainty. Pragmatic rhetoric embraces a variety 
of persuasive cultural media and perspectival forms in its 'conversational' ideal, it does not 
attempt a misguided foundational epistemological inquiry, essentialising questions as to 
who we are and how we know. Pragmatic rhetoric is a public-intellectual stance, 
repudiating the metaphysical and esoteric, inheriting a Ciceronian disdain for academic 
otium in favour of public activity or negotium. 
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On the other hand, in its poststructuralist guise, as elaborated most forcefully by 
Paul de Man and in the deconstructive readings of Jacques Derrida, rhetorical analysis is a 
speculative project, a form of irony, self-resistance and textual self-difference. Ideally, for 
de Man and Derrida and deconstruction and poststructuralism more generally, a rhetorical 
reading reveals abyssal tensions between linguistic form and intended content, it leaves us 
wondering about received notions of historicity and intentionality. Such rhetorical reading 
will distress the scholarly comforts of extra-textual reference, representation, and meaning, 
complicating rather than enabling critical consensus.  
My thesis suggests that such critical forks in the affective mien of rhetoric have 
historical significance. Rhetoric has always welcomed multiple sensibilities. Rhetoric is 
often the critical promise of immanence, a sign of intellectual longing to rejoin the vitality 
and enriching plurality of cultural habitats and their quotidian semiotics. The rhetor acts 
enjoins and acts on arts of communication rather than wasting time on the kinds of otiose 
reflection that are secluded from the pressing material needs of this world. Yet rhetoric has 
also historically manifested itself as an adventure of thought, a stylistic self-protection, and 
a celebration of dilemma, paradox, ludic digression, arts of self-fashioning whose 
relationships to social responsibility are far more tenuous. Rhetoric is always already this 
double promise, of a transformative critical practice rubbing against the grain of 
modishness and conformity, of critical languages not merely reactive but creative.  My 
thesis suggests that rhetoric has always subsisted as this in-between, this neither here nor 
there, generative and historically influential in unpredictable ways. 
 
The Historiography of Rhetoric 
 
 Despite a surge in scholarly interest over the last thirty years, the historiography of 
classical rhetoric tends to essentialise rhetoric, demarcating its boundaries according to 
projections of intentionality and disciplinarity. Too often, histories of classical rhetoric 
rehearse the legitimising self-representations of canonical rhetorical theorists from 
Aristotle to Cicero and Quintilian, without rigorously questioning whether the 
programmatic features of rhetoric have been the most effective means of its survival into 
our own time. My thesis suggests that no discussion of rhetoric as merely intensive, a 
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focused pedagogy and pleasant social ideal, can adequately convey its appeal to thinkers 
like Friedrich Nietzsche, desirous of evoking a fluid and contradictory model of critical 
discourse.  
Let us take a prominent recent example, George A. Kennedy’s A New History of 
Classical Rhetoric (1994). Kennedy wishes to discuss a ‘classical metarhetoric’, a ‘standard 
body of knowledge’ set forth in Greek and Latin rhetorical treatises that, once fully 
developed, remained ‘unaltered in its essential features’.2  Divorcing rhetoric from its 
cultural field and sensible dimension in favour of outlining an episteme allows 
essentialising gestures such as: 'Invention, arrangement, and style are the three most 
important parts of classical rhetoric’.3  Kennedy infelicitously reduces classical rhetoric to 
the theoretical divisions of rhetorical treatises. Sticking closely to the theoretical self-
representation of Cicero and Quintilian, Kennedy ignores the complex question of whether 
rhetoric’s pedagogical practices and cultural effects can be characterised as univocal and 
unambiguous.  
In Brian Vickers’ In Defense of Rhetoric (1988) classical rhetoric emerges as an 
uplifting social ideal, a worthy humanist tradition.4 Vickers discusses Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
in terms of its ‘remarkably open-minded spirit of enquiry’, suggesting that as ‘originally 
conceived’ rhetoric is intimately concerned with every aspect of human life.5 Vickers is 
comfortable with the Cicero/Quintilian notion of the orator as a culture hero, that the 
rhetorician needs to know ‘above all about life’, showing how ‘widely rhetoric can be 
conceived’.6 Establishing a myth of origins for rhetoric in its civilising breadth of cultural 
purpose, Vickers' appreciation of a rhetorical unity is further exampled in his discussion of 
rhetoric’s medieval ‘fragmentation’, thankfully recuperated by its Renaissance 
‘reintegration’.7 Despite commending classical rhetoric’s ‘openness’, competing models 
of its influence and significance receive remarkably short shrift. Modern analytical 
                                                 
2 George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994, 
6. 
3  Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 6. 
4 Brian Vickers, In Defense of Rhetoric, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. 
5 Vickers, 23. 
6 Vickers, 25. 
7 See Vickers, chapters 4 and 5. 
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rhetoricians invoking semiological and deconstructive methodologies are harshly 
denounced, for ‘fragmenting’ rhetoric and subordinating it to an ‘alien’ critical enterprise, 
a strange criticism given that Vickers acclaims rhetoric’s adaptability to any and all critical 
enterprises.8 In particular, Vickers frowns on any attempt to suggest that rhetoric permits 
a certain inconsistency and ethical duplexity, harshly criticising Paul de Man for neither 
accepting rhetoric as an ‘historical reality’ nor a ‘coherent system of communication’.9 
Indeed there is a plethora of historical works on classical rhetoric wary of any 
suggestion of originary uncertainty and ambivalence in classical rhetoric. A recurrent 
historiographical attempt to establish an intellectually worthy rhetorical theory can be 
found in Thomas Cole’s asseveration in The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (1991) 
that there is a ‘discipline’ of rhetoric arising from its philosophical elaboration in the fourth 
century BCE:  
... orientation towards a communicational goal distinguishes rhetoric from the type 
of verbal virtuosity in which the exploration or display of the resources of a given 
medium becomes an end in itself (my italics).10  
 
I argue to the contrary that the question of rhetoric's self-referential virtuosity and 
performative display, its extensive enthusiasms and divergence from stated aims, should 
not be sequestered as marginal to its operation and effects. Rhetoric’s influence and appeal 
cannot be reduced to intensive teleologies. I would also take issue with Thomas Sloane's 
reductive rendering of classical rhetoric as a model of sociable good will, that a particular 
road to truth, a mode of pro-con argumentation, is at the very core of rhetoric's 'conceptual 
identity'.11 Sloane talks warmly of Cicero's harmonious desire to 'unite knowledge and 
practice, thinking and speaking', projecting a model of classical and Renaissance rhetoric 
as a beneficent conciliation of ratio and oratio, reason and eloquence.12 
                                                 
8 Vickers, 447. 
9 Vickers, 470. 
10 Thomas Cole, The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1991, preface, ix. 
11 Thomas O. Sloane, On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric, The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997, 5. 
12 Sloane, 45. 
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Even sophisticated literary-critical practitioners of rhetorical theory such as 
Victoria Kahn desire to cathect classical rhetoric to a determinate morality and social 
purpose, evoking a tradition that acts beneficently on Renaissance humanism. In Rhetoric, 
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (1985) Kahn argues that the Ciceronian 
persona of the eloquent orator as a ‘good man’ or vir bonus, the rhetor as nurturer of a 
robust civil society, inspired Quattrocento humanism, its literary-critical ideals and ethical 
mien.  Kahn suggests that from Aristotle to Cicero, ‘prudence’, a standard of public 
decorum and socially motivated reflection and interpretation, was the driving force of 
classical rhetoric and its early Renaissance influence.13  
This originary model of rhetoric as a prudential pedagogy and civil propaedeutic 
leaves Kahn in some difficulties, however, when she confronts the greater skepticism of 
later humanists such as Erasmus, Montaigne, and Hobbes.  Kahn gestures towards de Man 
and concedes that the self-referential doubts of humanism, its skeptical denial of theoretical 
comprehension, may be an ‘allegory of the tensions constitutive of humanism from the 
very beginning’.14 Kahn recognises that idiosyncratic humanists such as Desiderius 
Erasmus pose thorny issues for the project of historicising rhetoric.  Erasmus’s explicit 
pedagogical aims would seem to be that of a prudential rhetoric, the desire to educate 
readers to acts of sociable judgment in their own lives, promoting rhetoric in its traditional 
guise as a civil-science. Kahn nevertheless concedes that a de Manian notion of rhetorical 
undecidability is applicable to Erasmus, whose De Copia is both ‘eclectic’ and ‘chaotic’, 
its pedagogical focus undercut by the latent irony of its profuse examples.15 Kahn, 
however, quickly recuperates an intentionalist model of Erasmian rhetoric, claiming that 
Erasmus’s ‘resistance to theory’, that is, to theoretical comprehension, is owing to his 
                                                 
13 Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1985, 36. 
14 Kahn, 27. 
15 Victoria Kahn, ‘Humanism and the Resistance to Theory’, in Patricia Parker and David Quint, eds, 
Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, 378-9. In a recent 
analysis of the many ‘personae’ adopted by Erasmus, David W. Baker points to an alternative interpretation 
of Erasmian rhetoric: Erasmus advocated the ‘Silenus’ figure, ugly on the outside but beauteous in soul, as a 
mask to protect the rhetor from the public gaze, for it would be imprudent for all linguistic strategies or senses 
to be displayed to the vulgar multitude. Baker suggests that Erasmus’s rhetoric allows for a pathos of distance 
on behalf of the individual as well as prudential civic responsibility. We shall encounter both intellectual 
desiderata in Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. See D.W. Baker, Divulging Utopia: Radical Humanism in 16th 
Century England, University of Massachusetts Press, Boston, 1999, 31, 37. 
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pedagogical call for ‘judgment and use’ rather than ‘slavish imitation’, allowing insight 
into his ‘reformist pedagogical program’.16 
It is unsurprising that the historiography of rhetoric shows symptoms of anxiety, when 
it confronts an influential strand of recent literary theory, the puzzling and disturbing 
version of rhetoric left us by Paul de Man. The following analysis suggests that the 
discontinuous elements of de Man’s critical personae have a strong relationship to ideals 
of a non-sovereign, pluralist discursiveness promulgated by rhetorical theorists since 
antiquity. I argue that de Man’s ‘rhetoricism’ is by no means ahistorical or anti-
historical, but a prism on the complexities of the rhetorical legacy itself. 
   
The Cultural Politics of Literary Theory 
 
I suggest that the hesitant state of current historiography on the tradition of post-
classical rhetoric, as it attempts to cope both with its historically vigorous public ethos and 
complex textual ruses, is symptomatic of the slowly filtering drop of poison introduced 
into historical enquiry by the work of Paul de Man.  With a disconcerting silent laughter, 
de Man in Allegories of Reading (1979) discussed worthy attempts to render rhetorical 
performance as an explicit theme of analysis: 
behind the recent interest in writing and reading as potentially effective public 
speech acts, stands a highly respectable moral imperative that strives to reconcile 
the internal, formal, private structures of literary language with their external, 
referential, and public effects.17 
 
In de Man’s evocation of the state of the disciplines in his famous ‘resistance to theory’ 
essay, ‘literary theory’ has become a legitimate concern of philosophy and history, but it 
cannot be ‘assimilated’ to them, either factually or theoretically. Literary theory, argues de 
Man, adds a subversive element of unpredictability, enacting itself as something of a ‘wild 
card in the serious game of the theoretical disciplines’.18 A rebel without an explicit cause, 
                                                 
16 Kahn, ‘Humanism and the Resistance to Theory’, 379, 382. 
17 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1979, 3. 
18 Paul de Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’ (first publ. 1982) in Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, 8. 
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theory inveighs against the ‘serene methodological self-assurance’ of the middle-brow 
disciplinary practitioner in literary criticism, philosophy, and history. These 
disciplinarians, as it were, are those who insist on ‘forcing ... upon us’ a ‘system of 
historical periodization’, who read texts through normative cultural codes and attempt to 
keep the rhetorical dimension of discourse ‘in its place’ as a mere adjunct, a ‘mere 
ornament within the semantic function’.19 As a critique of so called aesthetic ideologies 
and their correlatives in authoritarian political ideals, the locale of rhetorical reading for de 
Man is to be supra-institutional, a publicly interested perspective from which to critique 
the investments of knowledge production. As a critical persona, the rhetor wishes to 
provide a generous, extensive propaedeutic for social transformation: ‘It turns out that in 
these innocent-looking didactic exercises we are in fact playing for very sizeable stakes’.20 
What is discomforting about de Manian literary theory is its ambiguous register, its 
disturbing unwholesomeness. De Manian readings seem to offer an optimistically 
transgressive form of ‘ideology critique’ and a correlative figuration and self-positioning 
within a left pluralist imagination: literary theory as a ‘wild card’ opposing itself to a 
complacent establishment ‘serenity’ that ‘forces itself upon us’; militating against the 
weight of tradition in the form of historicist ‘periodization’; critiquing the bourgeois 
illusion of literature’s ‘aesthetic’ function; an almost feminist rejection of the masculinist 
rendering of rhetorical language as mere ‘ornament’.  
Yet de Man’s rhetorical readings seem equally determined to crush the ‘resistance’ 
they advocate in the name of an all-consuming masculinist impersonality, a 
functionalisation of reading disdainful of perspectival difference, a frightening 
doppelgänger of the publicly active de Man:  
It turns out that the resistance to theory is in fact a resistance to reading, a resistance 
that is perhaps at its most effective, in contemporary studies, in the methodologies 
that call themselves theories of reading but nevertheless avoid the function they 
claim as their object.21 
 
                                                 
19 De Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, 12, 14. 
20 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 15. 
21 De Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, 15. 
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A discourse of inevitability and remorseless fatality that seeks to crush all attempted 
evasions is the most prominent feature of this dry, impersonal, politically and culturally 
apathetic de Man. Here a reactive and conservative rhetorical formalism asserts its claims: 
the social and political critique of ‘contemporary’, that is, fashionable, literary studies is 
renounced as a delusive and hypocritical idealism, echoing a resonant shibboleth of the 
post-1960s right. Moreover the metaphorics of affective rebellion and the open and 
transgressive mode of ideology critique are dismissively shattered when de Man suggests 
that any notion of rhetoric as a generous praxis of civic communication makes ‘no 
allowance for modes of persuasion which are no less rhetorical and no less at work in 
literary texts, but which are of the order of persuasion by proof rather than persuasion by 
seduction’.22  
         The mise en scène of de Man’s rhetorical analytic would seem to shift decisively from 
a pluralist and transgressive intervention in the public realm towards the insular positivism 
of the specialised male scholar fearful of the siren of a feminised mass culture: 
Technically correct rhetorical readings may be boring, monotonous, predictable, 
and unpleasant, but they are irrefutable. They are totalising (and potentially 
totalitarian).23  
 
Indeed the depoliticising effects of rhetorical reading permit de Manian analysis an 
identification with an entirely different imaginary, both fascist and pathological: 
… with the critical cat so far out of the bag ... one can no longer ignore its existence, 
those who refuse the crime of theoretical ruthlessness can no longer hope to gain a 
good conscience. Neither, of course, can the theorists – but, then, they never laid 
claim to it in the first place.24 
 
The displacement of reading and its effects from the independent critical mind onto a 
totalitarian ur-spirit or ‘they’ would seem to vitiate any possibility of understanding 
rhetoric as providing space for critical interest in the sociology and historicity of rhetoric, 
its relation to gender, class, and the materiality of power. As Azade Seyhan argues of de 
                                                 
22 De Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, 18. 
23 De Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, 19. The italics are mine. 
24 Paul de Man, ‘The Return to Philology’ (1982), in de Man, The Resistance to Theory, 26. The italics are 
mine. 
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Manian deconstruction, ‘as a mere diagnostic insight, it lacks any ... conceptual mechanism 
to ... differentiate the various ideological underpinnings of discourses controlled by the 
contingencies of temporality and alterity’. Seyhan asks of de Man’s rhetorical mystification 
of authors like Nietzsche: ‘what does the identification of a rhetorical strategy patched 
together from different writings and divorced from the philosophical and historical context 
of the text contribute to a critical understanding of Nietzsche’s work?’25  
As Zhang Longxi points out, when allegory as a particular rhetorical device or trope 
tends to dissolve completely in the universal applicability of its name, ‘it is difficult indeed 
impossible to talk about allegory as a particular strategy or phenomenon with its own 
history and historicity’.26 Formerly faithful disciples of de Man such as Barbara Johnson 
now gloomily reinvent his significance, conceding that ‘he did nothing to unseat the 
traditional white male author from his hiding place behind the impersonality of the 
universal subject, the subject supposed to be without gender, race, or history’.27 The 
critical promise of de Manian rhetoric is now widely perceived as ahistorical sterility. 
Criticism seeks to escape de Man's claustrophobic construction of rhetoric, his fetid garden 
of stony aporias, his prison house of language. 
 
A Sociology of Deconstructive Rhetoric 
 
John Guillory’s influential reading of the institutionalisation of de Manian 
‘rhetoricism’ is symptomatic of deconstruction’s malaise. Guillory criticises de Man’s 
evocation of the rhetorical dimension of texts, both for its predictable simulation of 
undecidability and its totalising and determinist emphasis on the epistemology of tropes as 
the undoing of all reference. Guillory highlights the danger, voiced by Derrida, of 
                                                 
25 Azade Seyhan, Representation and its Discontents: The Critical Legacy of German Romanticism, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992, 20 and 150. 
26 Zhang Longxi, ‘Historicising the Postmodern Allegory’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, vol. 
36, no. 2, 1994, 217. See, for example, de Man’s most famous critical essay and manifesto, ‘The Rhetoric of 
Temporality’ (1969), where de Man argues that in allegory, rendered as the ‘painful knowledge’ of temporal 
difference rather than identification with nature, romantic literature finds its ‘true voice’. Reprinted in Paul 
de Man, Blindness and Insight, second edition, Routledge, London, 1993, 207.  
27 Barbara Johnson, ‘Poison or Remedy? Paul de Man as Pharmakon’, Colloquium Helveticum, vol.11/12, 
1990, 7-20. 
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‘rhetoricism as another logocentrism’.28 He argues that de Man’s ‘rhetoricism’ is both an 
analytic method stressing technical ‘rigour’ and the aura of a charismatic ‘master theorist’, 
indeed that the ‘charismatic persona of the master theorist is the vehicle for the 
dissemination of theory’ (179). In an insightful discussion influenced by the sociology of 
Pierre Bourdieu, Guillory discusses the ‘discursive operations’ by which de Man promoted 
rhetorical reading as a means of engendering institutional cultural-capital. De Man's 
rhetoricism is an institutionally motivated tactic, a successful design to ‘seed the profession 
with his disciples’ (178).  
Guillory suggests that de Manian rhetoricism is a ‘project of displacement’ that 
colonises other disciplines while deploying their terminology: disciplines such as 
linguistics (the trope as an always aberrant ‘signifier’), semiology, psycho-analysis (a 
discourse, displaced onto linguistic agency, of ‘transference’ and ‘resistance’), and 
feminist and Marxist discourses (ideology critique) (194). Guillory argues that by positing 
rhetoric as literature’s ‘transhistorical essence’, de Man’s version of rhetorical reading, the 
‘epistemology of tropes’, a ‘rigorously iterable technical procedure’ in his words, evacuates 
rhetoric as an historical discourse and an art that has specific social loci: in classical times 
public arenas such as the law court and forum (214, 232, 262). For Guillory and many 
contemporary readers, de Man’s epistemological version of rhetoric is tantamount to an 
ahistorical travestying of the classical, labile, public locus of rhetorical pedagogy and 
oratorical praxis (247).  
 Guillory’s telling point is that de Man is a conventional thinker whose rhetoric has 
an ‘early modern’ distaste for the contamination of epistemology by the historically 
contingent and discursive aspects of persuasion (220). Devoid of any discussion of the role 
of contingency, alterity, and power in the formation of rhetorical tropes, de Man secures 
the ‘routinization’ of his methodology by cathecting it to the ‘truth’ of the master teacher 
(243). 
Guillory has a by now familiar critique to make of the cultural politics of de Manian 
literary theory, which he sees as primarily conservative in its defense of the traditional 
canon, but with an opportunistic veneer of radical pretension. Guillory suggests that 
                                                 
28 John Guillory, The Problem of Literary Canon Formation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 1994, 180. 
13 
 
equating ‘literature’ in its most paradigmatic instances with self-undoing rhetorical tropes 
has the effect of ‘removing the ground of the traditional syllabus of literary study without 
at the same time moving beyond the category of the literary’ (215). Or: ’theory, in finding 
rhetoric, refinds literature’ (180). 
Guillory argues that de Manian rhetoricism ultimately ‘functionalises’ literary criticism 
as a specialist technical activity interested only in the ‘institutional autonomy’ of 
criticism rather than any political function for the literary critic. In the bleak and 
dystopian imaginary, without past or future, engendered by de Man’s rhetoricisation of 
literature, rhetoric has been ‘refunctioned’ by the same ‘technobureaucratic conditions’ 
responsible for the social marginality of literary criticism. The emergence of rhetoric as 
the avatar of literary critical method merely culminates literature’s decline as a form of 
high bourgeois cultural capital, de Man’s universal pretensions but the pathos of a 
passing moment of post-political despair (264). Once the ideal of a civic discourse, de 
Manian rhetoric is its own mocking parody, derailing rhetoric’s possible role as a 
situational propaedeutic, a contingent discursive form. 
I think the most damning charge that has been levelled at de Man’s reinscription of 
rhetoric as a method and a pedagogy is that de Man actively sought to limit the rich paideia 
of classical and Renaissance rhetoric, which advocated a broad humanistic education, a 
‘thick’ socio-cultural awareness (to loosely borrow Clifford Geertz’s anthropological 
term), an extensive interest in behavioural characteristics and psychological types.  
Yet de Man's ironic revisiting of a rhetorical pedagogy continues to haunt classical 
rhetoric's historical inquiry and philosophical elaboration today. 
I want to make a double gesture of my own in this thesis on the problem of de Man's 
rhetoricism, the import of the rhetorical analysis, pedagogical recommendations, and 
philosophical speculation he has left us. Firstly I want to make it clear that the de Manian 
moment of high theory and the derivative and highly formalistic reading practices it 
exercised in his disciples has passed as the signature orientation of literary theory. I 
consider the accusations of canonical conservatism, ahistorical universalism, reductive 
logocentrism and apoliticism to be just and vitally necessary criticisms of de Man’s critical 
methodology. However, I also think there are good reasons to consider de Manian 
rhetoricism more creatively, as an irritant and internal other, a pharmakon, both poison and 
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therapy, for those interested in the critical exploration of rhetoric in fields as diverse as 
literary criticism, intellectual history, philosophy, media theory, and sociology.  I propose 
an elaboration of de Man as a fragmented assemblage of critical personae rather than a 
sovereign master thinker intent on a redaction of rhetoric’s public locale. I suggest that the 
many imaginaries inhabited by de Manian rhetoric provide resources for its historical and 
theoretical exploration. 
I propose to disturb the current near consensus that de Man replaces a publicly 
effective and historically varied rhetorical theory and praxis with a narrow formalist 
methodology.  In what follows, I argue that de Man both theorises and performatively 
enacts the rhetorical legacy as bequeathing an ambiguous and often contradictory ethos 
that has no single locus or investment. In his reading practices and projections of textuality, 
de Man's multiple ethos moves between affective registers, at times technically dry, on 
other occasions openly discursive, a project moving between the highly normative and the 
eccentric. By theatricalising a rhetorical ethos, the diacritical de Man I speak of is at once 
public figure and solitary specialist, personless and personable, resistant to and excelling 
in received forms of erudition and cultural competence, derisory towards and deeply 
invested in historical awareness, utilitarian and relativist. 
 I argue, then, for an informed model of de Man's critical presence, not as the elitist 
high theorist with malign intent, but as a discontinuous, paradoxical critical ethos that 
opens onto the shrouded origins and polyvalent provenance of rhetoric. In de Man one 
witnesses the mysterious legacy of the Sophists, the moral enigma of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
the mixed register of Cicero. In terms of de Man's pedagogy, I think it time to rethink the 
paideia, the critical training and polymathic education, evoked by de Manian rhetorical 
reading in all its myriad curiosities and positionings. Like rhetoricians before him, from 
Aristotle to Cicero and Erasmus, de Man's evocation of rhetoric seeks to theorise and 
instruct, but it is also informed by a fertile energy, a desire to enact and display critical 
resources, genres of arguments, explications of sense and nonsense. I argue that de Man 
renews a Ciceronian copia, an extensive principle of abundance that exceeds all 
philosophical and moral paradigms, a subaltern yet powerful animus within rhetorical 
thought. In de Man’s qualitative mix of situational focus and extensive desires, we 
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rediscover rhetoric's perplexing lack of a guiding foundational principle or single line of 
development. 
 
De Man: Ethos and Paideia 
  
We should consider that de Man’s evocation of rhetorical reading veers unstably 
between different modes. There is the rhetorician as a technical pragmatist who treats the 
text as an internal structure in need of impersonal and purely immanent reading (criticism 
as a ‘function’). There is, however, an alternative theme, a conscious inheriting of a 
genealogy of generalist intellectuals vitally interested in rhetoric, including Friedrich 
Schlegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Walter Benjamin. On the one hand, suggests de Man, 
the textual critic pays detailed, immanent attention to the facticity of the text before one; 
here rhetorical reading offers a heterodox empiricism without reference to normative 
interpretative codes like genre, period, or presumptions of univocal authorial intention. Yet 
mere empiricism and methodological naiveté won't do, so one harks back to a critical 
tradition that emphasised rhetoric as an insight into the social dramaturgy and instability 
of representation, a perennial weapon against metaphysics and positivism. Here one 
situates oneself as reinventing subaltern intellectual histories, one's provocative anti-
historical gesture is revealed as a necessary yet only temporary qualification of a broader 
critical animus.29 
                                                 
29 In de Man’s groundbreaking manifesto ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, the recovery of rhetoric is tied to 
subverting the now dominant post-Romantic emphasis on the symbol and its protection of an intentional 
relationship between experience and its object. Here de Man praises contemporary trends in criticism, 
including the recent translation into English of Walter Benjamin’s Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels 
(1928) (The Origin of German Tragic Drama), a ‘rediscovery and reinterpretation of the allegorical 
emblematic style of the baroque’. Works like Benjamin’s are salutary according to de Man because they 
allow for the ‘possibility of a rhetoric’ that would no longer be normative or descriptive, raising the ‘question 
of the intentionality of rhetorical figures’ (188). Given that Benjamin’s reading of the baroque is by no means 
formalistic, celebrating the baroque’s febrile and unwitting assault on normative poetics, and its polymorphic 
inheritance of the colourful spectrum of Pagan allegory, de Man’s ‘non-intentional rhetorical figures’ would 
seem to include particular and historical aesthetic forms, as well as various ‘personae’.  
      For instance, strenuously arguing against anachronistic projections of a symbolist poetics, de Man derides 
later editors of Friedrich Schlegel for substituting the term symbolic when Schlegel claimed ‘alle Schönheit 
ist Allegorie’ in his ‘Gespräch über die Poesie’ (190). Friedrich Schlegel was well known for his love of the 
motley Pagan gods subtending classical aesthetics. Schlegel advocated an aesthetic and mode of critique that 
was digressive and enigmatic to itself, alternating between enthusiasm and irony, the material and the 
sublime. Elsewhere in the essay de Man will associate allegory with the self-divisions of ironic 
consciousness, a kind of performance, a rendering oneself as stupid that generates ‘self-duplication' and/or 
'self-multiplication’. De Man then evokes forms of comedy allowing such split consciousness, particularly 
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 While de Man's formalist statements about 'reading' might explicitly call into 
question our ability to historically thematise literary texts, in his reading practices de Man 
often parodies the transcendental pretensions of authors and translates their texts into the 
incidental and discontinuous characteristics of their culture, the narrative poetics, affective 
registers, and visceral ‘tastes’ of their age.30 
Consider de Man commenting on Condillac’s failed attempt in Essai sur l’origine 
des connaissances humaines (1746) to separate conceptual abstractions from figurative 
uses of language, the frivolity of mere metaphor: 
The story is like the plot of a Gothic novel in which someone compulsively 
manufactures a monster on which he then becomes totally dependent and does not 
have the power to kill. Condillac (who, after all, went down in the anecdotal history 
of philosophy as the inventor of a mechanical statue able to smell roses) bears a 
close resemblance to Ann Radcliffe or Mary Shelley.31 
 
Or consider de Man’s rhetorical re-description of the interplay of the Kantian faculties in 
the Critique of Judgment, imbricating Kant’s thought with the aesthetic proclivity of 
eighteenth century texts towards anthropomorphised dialogue and dramatic narrative: 
For one thing, instead of being an argument, it is a story, a dramatised scene of the 
mind in action. The faculties of reason and imagination are personified, or 
anthropomorphised, like the five squabbling faculties hilariously staged by Diderot 
in the Lettre sur les sourds et les muets.... What could it possibly mean, in analytic 
terms, that the imagination sacrifices itself, like Antigone or Iphigenia – for one can 
                                                 
praising the Italian commedia dell’arte and English pantomime (212, 213). We are not far here from Friedrich 
Schlegel’s evocation of the pantomimic philosopher, whose mood rises infinitely above all limitations, but 
whose social performance is that of the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian buffo (Friedrich Schlegel, 
Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1991, Critical 
Fragment 42). Hence allegory is a non-intentional figure or persona within the tradition de Man critically 
activates, brilliantly stupid, situated and transcendental, essentially paradoxical.  
Moreover it should be kept in mind that what for de Man initially distinguishes allegory from 
symbol, and complicates its referentiality, is its historicity - de Man pointing to the complex literary and 
emblematic inheritance of allegorical gardens in Rousseau and Daniel Defoe (202-4). If de Man’s evocation 
of allegory essentialises the pathos, the ‘painful’ knowledge, of an allegorical language constituted in 
temporal difference, he nevertheless remarks an historical interest in allegory as a non-intentional figure that 
disrupts normative and volitional projections of aesthetics and critical practice. Our discussion of de Man’s 
later interest in allegory as a ‘discursive mode’ indicates that de Man’s evocation of allegory is not ahistorical, 
nor reductive of allegory to the principal vehicle of an epistemology of tropes. 
30 As nuanced and incisive a reading as Guillory’s is, it seems content to determine the historical significance 
and sociological positioning of de Man’s rhetorical method according to his more explicit and programmatic 
theoretical statements; a suppler and more holistic reading of the complex positioning of de Man’s praxis of 
rhetorical reading is indicated.  
31 Paul de Man, ‘The Epistemology of Metaphor’ (1978), in Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology, The University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, 44. 
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only imagine this shrewd and admirable imagination as the feminine heroine of a 
tragedy – for the sake of reason?32 
 
De Man’s rhetorically imaginative reading revels in an irruption of social 
dramaturgy and contingent arabesque into a cautious philosophical representation; in de 
Man's reading, a transcendental philosophical inquiry is momentarily transformed into 
other sociolects and the overall positioning of the text, its orientation to the world, is 
transmuted into something other, a non-intentional figure yet to be recognised by canonical 
representations of Kant’s sovereign intentionality: 
The performative power of language can be called positional, which differs 
considerably from conventional as well from ‘creatively’ (or, in the technical sense, 
intentionally) constitutive.33 
 
When it comes to textuality, existence precedes essence, the energy and relational field of 
language, the many unwitting gestures it is capable of, resists premature circumscription 
as perlocutionary ‘deed’ or autochthonous, constitutive ‘genius’. For de Man, then, 
rhetorical reading requires a dual sensibility. The reader needs to be urbane and worldly, 
recognising the manifold contingent characteristics and genres of representation, and this 
requires a deep cultural competence and intensive focus. Yet such readings would also 
suggest a capacity for enchantment, for momentary digressions from serious intent; the 
reader is like an extemporising buffo figure suspending the linearity and conventional 
duration of an argument, with an extensive sensitivity to odd detail and fractured logics.34  
                                                 
32 Paul de Man, ‘Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant’ (1983) in Aesthetic Ideology, 86-7. 
33 De Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, 19. 
34 My reading of de Man’s evocation of the ‘enchanting’ possibilities of rhetorical reading engages with 
Jane Bennett’s valorisation of enchantment as both a refreshing and fertilising possibility of encounter and a 
psychical disposition. Bennett describes enchantment as involving a meeting with something ‘that you did 
not expect and are not fully prepared to engage’, both a pleasurable feeling of being charmed by the novel 
encounter and an unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being ‘torn out of one’s default sensory-psychic-
intellectual disposition’. Like de Man, Bennett is keen to creatively revisit the imaginary of Kantian reason, 
arguing that ‘in Kant’s world, reason possesses a fabulous degree of forceful and creative power’ by reference 
to the mysterious quality of the supersensible. Bennett, alert to Kant’s rhetorical, if not explicit, attachment 
to divine mysteries, identifies reason as the ‘first wonder in a Kantian world’, giving us a ‘prospect, not an 
explanation’. Likewise the effect of de Man’s readings is often to interrupt explanatory monologism in favour 
of a text’s more diffuse and aesthetically prospective moments. See Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of 
Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2001, 5, 42, 43. 
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When it comes to the paideia, the knowledges and orientation to history and society 
that provide a model for intellectual conduct, de Man evokes the rhetorician as a mixed 
type, positionally uncertain, a critical persona both enthusiastic and ironic, without 
definitive locale or apodictic methodology. As a dense ethos that does not know itself and 
its wants, the rhetorician cannot place himself within an authoritative tradition, an essence, 
a model of good will, definitively sociable. It is for these reasons that de Man problematises 
‘rhetoric’ as an historical term, drawing attention to ‘the gap that becomes apparent in the 
pedagogical history of the term’. For de Man, rhetoric is neither an unbridled post-
epistemological celebration of discursive performance nor a sound analytical school of 
thought. It is an uneasy movement between these possibilities. In a somewhat cryptic 
asseveration that I think is by no means detrimental to historical investigation, de Man 
proclaims rhetoric as ‘a text' that does not know what it is doing, neither activity nor 
episteme, whose motivations and ethical import are therefore unclear.35  
My thesis argues that attention to the complex ethos and positional uncertainties of 
rhetorically imbued texts allows a reconfiguring of intellectual history, an alertness to 
extensive discursive tendencies and critical intensities that stand in an oblique relation to 
explicit representation and conventional notions of intellectual identity and sovereignty. 
As an example of the kind of reconfiguration I'm suggesting, witness the intriguing 
conception of intellectual history proposed by de Man in Allegories of Reading: 
on the one hand, in Plato for example and again at crucial moments in the history 
of philosophy (Nietzsche being one of them), rhetoric becomes the ground for the 
furthest-reaching speculations conceivable to the mind; on the other hand ... it is 
the humble and not-quite-respectable handmaiden of ... oratory. Nietzsche ... points 
out this discrepancy ... with examples taken from Plato and elsewhere.36  
 
I agree with de Man that investigating the influence of rhetoric upon the history of ideas 
can greatly affect our image of thinking and the stimuli that animate and orient it.  
          De Man suggests that in the oeuvre of Plato and later thinkers like Kant and 
Nietzsche, the demands placed by rhetorical acculturation upon their language continually 
displaces the pathos of idealism, its lofty sentiments, in favour of a rhetorical ethos, an 
                                                 
35 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 131. 
36 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 130. 
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ethical tonality. For de Man, ethics or 'ethicity' as he calls it, arises not from a sovereign 
will or determinate morality, but from the ‘structural interference’ of distinct value 
systems, the positional 'confusion' inherent in language, which de Man describes as a 
'discursive mode'. The discursive mode of a rhetorical thinker can never issue from a single, 
theistic transcendental imperative, it is always produced in a 'confusion' of analysis and 
performance, indication and extensive gestures. Such a discursive mode is always 
imbricated in a multiplicity of orientations.37 
I would further suggest that de Man has an historical sense of a rhetorical culture 
in mind when he advocates the ethical potential of a ‘non-intentional’ rhetorical mode. 
Here de Man can be seen as reprising the rich classical milieux which demanded that the 
intellectual communicate through a sophisticated exhibition of forms, a culture inhabited 
by Plato and idealised by Nietzsche; in such a culture ideas were necessarily modified and 
affected by a variety of stimuli, inflecting a non-monotheistic, Pagan paideia into the 
texture of philosophical thought. A rhetorical culture, educated in the manifest pleasures 
of rhetorical arts, demands the display of a critical ethos of address, thereby ensuring even 
the would-be idealist possesses a worldly orientation.   
As in the insistent theatricality and rhetorical displays of Plato’s works which 
converge on the paradoxical ethos of Socrates, rhetorically influenced texts play a confused 
game of fort...da, now here, now there, with the world they find themselves in. Far from an 
intentional figure, the rhetorically influenced Plato both embraces and rejects cultural 
conventions, despising and emulating his rivals, the Sophists, and finding that his 
insistently pluralist acculturation conflicts with the theistic purity of universal ideals he 
would advocate. Rhetoricised thinkers cannot say what they mean, and may not know 
themselves, their interiority fragmented by the formal demands of cultural performativity. 
This thesis contends that de Man follows a long list of thinkers from Friedrich Schlegel to 
Hannah Arendt who have prized rhetoric as a subaltern approach to literary and intellectual 
history.  
The dynamic ethicity of the rhetor these thinkers sought was an alternative to a 
repressively moralistic and univocal model of thinking, a model abstracting thought from 
                                                 
37 De Man, Allegories of Reading, 206. 
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the inconsistencies of existence, a projection divorcing the imbricated contingencies of 
form from a pure ideational content. I seek to reposition de Man as the latest in a genealogy 
of thinkers who have valorised the rhetorical intellectual as a creatively confused 'mixed 
type', a non-intentional ‘figure’ that promotes the necessity of a varied paideia or 
cultivation in intellectual formation. 
  
The Origins of Rhetoric 
 
In this thesis I argue for the origins of classical rhetoric as, in Hannah Arendt’s 
terms, ‘crystallising’ a variety of contradictory elements, a multiplicity of affective 
positions and critical desires. Arendt’s idea, which she applied to thinking about the 
disparate origins of twentieth century totalitarianism, was in direct conversation with 
Walter Benjamin's 'epistemo-critical prologue' to the Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels  
(Origin of the German Mourning Play (1928) and his other writings on the philosophy of 
history. Benjamin argued that historians should not assume that they can recount an 
historical narrative like the ‘beads of a rosary’.  Instead historical thought should 
imaginatively ‘grasp the constellation’, the complex configuration of historical conditions 
which ‘one’s own era formed with a definite earlier one’. For something can only become 
historical ‘posthumously’, once it is represented, illuminated from the pregnant time of the 
present, the ‘time of the now’.38 I argue that this conception of historical imagination is 
particularly applicable to a rhetorical tradition whose public function and cultural effects 
are largely lost to us, recoverable only through an imaginatively projective genealogy that 
begins from the affective drives engendering rhetoric's present critical resurgence.  
 This thesis's methodology parallels Benjamin's historiography of aesthetics in 
arguing that rhetoric needs to be historicised as an often discontinuous multiplicity of 
‘ideas’. These ideas are best explained as the ‘extreme example of a form or genre’ and as 
such do not enter into the ‘history of literature’ as a conventional poetics or intentional 
                                                 
38 Quoted in Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks California, 1996, 64 and 96, n.8. The quotation is taken from Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the 
Philosophy of History’, Note A as appended to the English edition, edited in English by Hannah Arendt. 
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subject.39  It is of great moment that Benjamin’s methodological insights into a ‘discursive 
mode’ that has proved invisible to historicist representation are themselves drawn from a 
bombastically rhetorical artistic form, the florid declamations and figurative excess of 
seventeenth century German baroque drama.  
In this neo-Senecan rhetorical form, Benjamin discovered, in de Man's terms, a 
linguistic ‘confusion’, a dynamic ethicity that continued to display contradictory value 
systems. Such a form, Benjamin argues, would like to be tragedy but tends towards opera 
and melodrama. The baroque drama articulates a rhetorical ethos whose love of the 
artificial mechanisms of declamatory language nevertheless betrays a yearning for simple 
nature, sight, sound, and touch; a form whose immanent allegorical obsessions with the 
emblems of a post-lapsarian world might still redeem an homogenous, empty conception 
of historical time. In the baroque rhetorical form, Benjamin found non-intentional 
tendencies, ethical exigencies and linguistic dispositions irreducible to the transcendental 
imperative of a genre or poetics. Benjamin followed classical thinkers like Tacitus in 
describing a rhetoric whose tenor and purpose is confused by its vigorous acculturation: 
‘breadth of culture is an ornament that tells of itself even when one is not making a point 
of it: it comes prominently into view where you would least expect it.’40  I follow 
Benjamin in finding methodological impetus in the description of a rhetorical ethos that 
exhibits an extensive paideia, a reservoir of polymathic energies and acculturated desires.  
  This thesis argues that the origins of rhetoric are founded in ambiguity, for they 
are differential, uncertain in disposition. I argue that one finds traces of this originary 
fragmentation of purpose in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, partially a redaction of previous 
discourses on the art of speaking, including Sophistic rhetorical theory. Here Aristotle 
would seem to define rhetoric as an art or discursive power (dunamis) that affords rational 
demonstrative 'proofs' or enthymemes according to probability, rather than the certainty of 
pure logic. Early in his Rhetoric, Aristotle assures us that rhetoric is a counterpart to 
dialectics, a practical reasoning without primary interest in affect, sociology or audience 
                                                 
39 Walter Benjamin, ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John 
Osborne, Verso, London, 1996, 38. 
40 Tacitus, ‘A Dialogue on Oratory’ (around 101 AD), in Agricola, Germania, Dialogus, trans. M. Hutton, 
W. Peterson, Harvard University Press, Suffolk, 2000, 32:2, 317. 
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psychology: 'for the proofs alone are intrinsic to the art (of speaking) and all other features 
merely ancillary'.41  
In later sections however, Aristotle's Rhetoric consistently subverts this ontology 
of rhetoric as a pragmatic, utilitarian pedagogy. In lengthy and exuberant chapters with 
barely a hint of moral overtones, Aristotle discusses the range of human emotions, their 
differential social characteristics, and the astonishing plurality of argumentative 
commonplaces that rhetoric, as the art of invention, can afford. His allusions range wildly 
from myth and Homeric epic, to fables, folkloric maxims, popular sayings, philosophical 
proverbs, and a pleasurable evocation of fallacious arguments, the ruses and trickeries of a 
tactical and deceptive language.42 In Aristotle, prudential phronesis, rhetoric as a mode of 
practical reasoning, confronts a more archaic paideia with roots in the trickeries and 
deceptions of the Pagan gods, the ambivalent power of language or logos for both good 
and evil ends, and the ancient enjoyment of spoken language as theatre, agonistic struggle. 
Aristotle's Rhetoric and the dynamic instability of its ethos, its movement from worthy 
rationalist strictures to the ludic enjoyment of a pluralist propaedeutic, bears significant 
marks of the polysemic Sophists, figures of both social progress and the corruption of 
traditional norms, variously philosophers and charlatans, utilitarians and relativists, the 
personae of a non-intentional rhetoric.  
 I follow Bakhtin in attempting to recover rhetoric’s complex generic memory 
through an awareness of its pre-history and evolving social context: 
Always preserved in a genre are undying elements of the archaic. True, these 
archaic elements are only preserved in it thanks to their constant renewal, which is 
to say, their contemporization. A genre is always the same and yet not the same, 
always old and new simultaneously.43 
 
Following the suggestive thinking of William Connolly, I argue that the historiography of 
rhetoric is still encumbered by a secularist ideal of meaningful publicity, of those 
discourses that can be properly disseminated into the public sphere, tending to degrade 
                                                 
41 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred, Penguin Books, London, 1991, 1:1, 66, 67. 
42 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, sections six, seven, and eight on emotion, character, and common topics, 
see particularly 2:24,'Illusory Topics'. 
43 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1984, 106. 
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myth, theological structures of feeling, legend, and ‘folkloric energies’ into the private 
domain.44 I suggest that the theory of rhetoric should study its accumulation of 
dispositions from its emergence in a multiple and discontinuous pre-history that includes 
the non-volitional ethics of Paganism, the ambivalent attitude towards persuasive language 
and aesthetic deception in Greek thought, and the mixed personae of the first rhetors, the 
Presocratics. 
A rhetorical ethos recognises that ideas alone cannot ethicise human behaviour or 
generate critical practices. Rather the historiography of rhetoric needs to be alert to the 
creative densities and unvoicable energies of particular cultural moments.45 As Connolly 
argues, it is time to confront the anxiety that treats ‘recognition, common sense, and the 
upright character of thought as if they were apodictic’, the true historical conditions of the 
intellect.46 
I follow the political theorist Jane Bennett when she inflects the 
Nietzschean/Foucauldian elaboration of genealogical investigation with a respect for and 
curiosity about the enigmas, mysteries, and passions of thought, acknowledged as 
imaginative, sentient, and instinctive in unpredictable ways.47 I think the historical 
practice of rhetoric, which has a tendency to project beyond its limited rationale towards 
the ludic and fantastical, is amenable to Bennett’s theorisation of a ‘genealogical idealism’ 
alert to the extensive power of hopes, dreams, enchantments, illusions, elements of fantasy, 
as the very condition of a dynamic rhetorical ethos, a critical mien.48  
 
Approach 
 
My approach in this thesis is to read the rhetorical tradition through what Deleuze 
and Guattari have called ‘conceptual personae’, those thought-figures like Dostoevsky’s 
                                                 
44 William E. Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, 21. 
45 William E. Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality, Sage 
Publications, Newbury Park Cal., 1993, 89. 
46 William E. Connolly, ‘Refashioning the Secular’ in What’s Left of Theory? New Work on the Politics of 
Literary Theory, ed. Judith Butler, John Guillory, Kendall Thomas, Routledge, New York, 2000, 183. 
47 Jane Bennett, Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks Cal., 
1994, 111. 
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‘idiot’ who capture paradoxical orientations and lived manifestations in ways resistant to 
easy interpretation and historicist thematisation. A rhetorical ethos embraces 'conceptual 
personae', just as Aristotle as a rhetorician longed to exhibit a heady and expansive paideia, 
for here 'I am no longer myself but thought's aptitude for finding itself and spreading across 
a plane that passes through me at several places'.49 I argue that in its historical evolution 
the figure of the rhetor reveals 'possibilities of life' and 'modes of existence', and this 
immanent longing exists in productive tension with more programmatic imperatives.50 
I discuss the complex genealogy of the ‘orator’ or ‘rhetor’ as both idealised citizen 
and archaic trickster-figure and superhuman magician. Such personae are at once 
imbricated in the aspirations of their culture, yet perpetually homeless, enigmatic. I seek to 
discover in the rhetorical tradition a transmission of instincts and, in Connolly’s terms,  
‘infrasensible’ registers, characteristics of rhetoric real in their ‘effectivity but not actual in 
(their) availability’. Such registers are not self-sufficient, they are too multiple and ‘finely 
meshed’ to be captured in the ‘coarse nets of explicit identity, conscious representation, 
and public appearance’.51 One such characteristic of rhetorical thought I refer to 
continually in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, Nietzsche, and Hannah Arendt is a 'copious' 
drive to exhibit a rich paideia of affective and psychological characteristics, to combine 
overt pedagogical instruction with more subtle forms of critical acculturation, a need to, in 
Connolly's terms, honour a ‘variety of moral sources and metaphysical orientations’.52 
     
Thesis 
 
I organise this thesis in two sections, a discussion of the pre-history and classical 
evolution of rhetorical personae, and an evocation of the resumption of the personae of the 
rhetor in modernity. I discuss the impact of rhetoric's ambivalent ethos upon a particular 
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desire for critical and aesthetic representation as a non-intentional discursive mode, an 
image of thought I trace from early German Romanticism through to the political theory of 
Hannah Arendt.  
In chapters one and two, I attempt to recover a more archaic sense of logos as a 
rhetorical interest in the way the positional power of language can generate a critical and 
ethical orientation. I call attention to Hesiod’s Theogeny, and the genealogy of 
polymorphous ethical forces it evokes, as a pre-text for the emergence of rhetorical 
personae. I argue that throughout its evolutions rhetoric remains cathected to a pluralist 
Pagan imagination and a generous conception of ethical value.  
In chapter three, I discuss the first rhetorical conceptual personae, the Presocratic 
figures of Thales and Heraclitus. I suggest that they crystallise in secularised form the 
fragmented narratives and ethical ambivalence of Greek Paganism. I discuss the figure of 
Heraclitus as emblematic of the multiple positionings of logismos, a linguistic power that 
Heraclitus evokes as both a rational mode of explanation and universal comprehension and 
an extensive paideia, a situational sensitivity to mythic powers and archaic forces. I suggest 
that Heraclitus evokes logismos as a medial point between different cultural exigencies, 
such as lawful restraint and transcendental freedoms, rational optimism and mystical 
concessions to fate. 
In my fourth chapter, I discuss the sociological and anthropological narratives of 
the Presocratics, a forerunner of the mythos of rhetoric as a civilising force. I draw attention 
to the anthropological narrative ascribed principally to the Presocratic and rhetorician 
Democritus. I suggest that Democritus offers a dualistic vision of how linguistic 
representation should function in a dynamic society.  Language, Democritus argues, should 
both be rooted in a material environment and its ethical exigencies, while providing the 
means for transforming conventional assumptions and generating paradoxical values. 
Language is rhetorical because it is both situated and transcendental, intensive and 
extensive. I suggest that Democritus will imbue the rhetorical notion of representation with 
pragmatic and creative functions. 
In chapter five I discuss the first generation of Sophists, who I take to inaugurate 
rhetoric as a theoretically explicit tradition, but whose legend and divergent structures of 
feeling will continue to complicate the rhetorical project up until the present day.  I assess 
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the diverse representations, the very different moralities and actions attributed to the 
Sophists, rendered as both tricksters and heroic citizens. In Protagoras, arguably a 
humanist, relativist, pragmatist, skeptic, and utilitarian, I seek a proto-persona for the 
complex rhetorical sensibility we inherit from Renaissance thinkers such as Erasmus. 
In chapters six, seven, and eight, I turn my attention to the early German Romantics 
or Frühromantiks, and Friedrich Schlegel's recommendation of a ‘materialist rhetoric’, as 
a polymathic public-intellectual ethos and critical method. I evoke the paradoxes of this 
term, both situated and sublime in orientation, material and ideal. I discuss Friedrich 
Schlegel’s parallel conception of ‘Witz’ or higher wit as a form of vigorous partisanship 
that demands philosophy intensively reflect on its cultural investments, its situation and 
locality. Complementing this cultural materialism, I argue, the materialist rhetoric of Witz 
also seeks to restore an extensive paideia, to enlarge the imaginative capacities and 
affective possibilities of critical discourse.  
I argue for the early German Romantics as avatars of a non-intentional rhetoric, a 
discursive mode torn between the impossibility and necessity of complete communication, 
between the relishing of cultural habitat and a taste for the sublime. In particular I discuss 
Friedrich Schlegel’s theory of the Romantic novel as both ironic and sociably enthusiastic, 
a combination of desiderata, a rhetorical ethos influential in the thought of Nietzsche and 
Arendt. 
 In chapters nine and ten I move on to discuss Nietzsche’s projection of the 
intellectual as a ‘higher’ rhetorical persona, as exemplified in his evocation of the 
‘untimely’ Schopenhauer in Untimely Meditations.  In Schopenhauer, Nietzsche repudiates 
philistine expediency but also calls for a thinker imbricated in the fluid energies of lived 
existence. Nietzsche would have the intellectual as a contrast of form and content, a 'mixed 
type' imbued with partisan polemical worldliness and a simultaneous beatific utopianism, 
transcending sectarian divisions. I discuss Nietzsche’s Schopenhaurean thought-figure as 
reinventing the rhetor’s dynamic ethicity, their contradictory values, torn between worldly 
imperatives and untimely longings. 
In the following chapter I discuss Nietzsche’s lectures and essays on classical 
rhetorical theory. Here Nietzsche renders rhetoric as an art and discourse capable of re-
introducing those ‘middle-degrees’ of thought and critical praxis so often missed by a 
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conceptual language that lurches towards binarised conceptual polarities and shallow 
universalisms. I argue that for Nietzsche rhetoric was a liminal ethos, a relationship 
between the sincere and the artistic requiring extensive cultivation. 
Finally, I discuss Hannah Arendt’s political theory as inspired by a rhetorical 
conception of political action. I discuss Arendt’s notion of a political ethos that combines 
vigorous activity with theoretical sobriety. I argue that Arendt evokes the value of pluralist 
cultural milieux and an affect-imbued ethos in her discussion of the formation of Gotthold 
Lessing and Rosa Luxemburg’s political modus vivendi. I conclude with a discussion of 
how literary, cultural, and political theory can converse by renewing a dynamic rhetorical 
ethos and extensive paideia for the life of critique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: The Myth to Logos Thesis 
  
 
Logos, the language of ‘reason’, is frequently said to have emerged in the 
philosophical discourse of the Greek Presocratic natural philosophers. Here I explore the 
‘myth to logos’ narrative commonly used to characterise this emergence, and offer a 
critique of that thesis. My purpose, in this chapter, is to suggest an alternative approach: I 
argue that the Greek signifier logos needs to be historically situated in sociological and 
aesthetic terms rather than assumed to be a self-evident antecedent to Enlightenment ideals 
of rationality and objectivity. I ponder why histories of philosophy tend to equate logos, a 
term that first emerges in ancient Greece, with epistemology, a universal language of 
reasoned analysis and objective explanation that is secular, present to itself, and 
teleological in orientation.   
I argue that the rationalist determination of logos offers a helpful insight into the 
‘imaginary’, the affective investments and mental geography of post-Enlightenment 
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reason, its desires and repressions. I hope to synthesise some interesting revisionist 
critiques of the ‘myth to logos’ narrative in order to construct an alternative sense of logos 
as polysemic, a constellation of themes and meditations that forms the historical pre-text 
for classical rhetoric’s ambivalent ethical tonality and its promotion of an extensive paideia 
with archaic roots. I seek to suggest a rhetorical version of logos as a discourse that has 
deep affinities with mythic narratives, cultural memory, thematic eclecticism, and ethical 
pluralism. 
 
The Progressivist Myth of Origins 
 
The Platonic-Aristotelian redaction of logos inaugurates a critical tradition I will 
term progressivist, premised on the assumption that the explanatory mode of logos 
represents a decisive break with myth as both an erroneous epistemology and an 
historically superseded manifestation of a benighted culture. A recent collection of essays, 
edited by Richard Buxton, has usefully labelled this historicist teleology the 'From Myth 
to Reason' thesis, which suggests that the advent of Greek rationality represents a decisive 
break with mythic fabulations.53 This thesis has had a profound influence on historical 
accounts that seek to detail the emergence of the detached, truly philosophical animus in 
Western thought. It is a narrative of foundations that has premised its progressivist 
narrative upon the rejection of myth as a valid mode of reasoning and philosophical 
interrogation. 
Myth or muthos has been widely regarded as an assemblage of traditional or sacred 
narratives, a sociomorphic projection of communal values and collective memory for the 
primary purpose of social reproduction. This homeostatic understanding of myth as 
functionally preserving social equilibrium has been strengthened by anthropological 
shibboleths about the primitive and fantastical mentalities of oral, pre-logical cultures. 
Primitive awe and wonder in the face of overwhelming natural forces discharges itself in 
Pagan idolatry. In his influential book From Mythos to Logos (1940) Wilhelm Nestle 
extends this idea by opposing myth and logical thought as two different forms of 
                                                 
53 Richard Buxton (ed.), From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999. 
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consciousness or 'mental life'. Mythical thought is imagistic and involuntary, creating 
through the unconscious, while logical thought is conceptual and intentional, analysing 
and synthesising by means of consciousness.54 
J.P. Vernant suggests that representations of the significance of logos' emergence 
have long been imbricated in the ideal of Western modernity as critical and transcendental, 
upholding the reflexive value of argued demonstration as opposed to the inflexibility of 
traditional narrative exposition. Whereas oral myth relies on formula and repetition, as in 
the Homeric epithet, written composition is combinatory, varied, and adaptable, enabling 
a more rigorous, nuanced, and recursive analysis of conceptual material. If the 
argumentative structure of logos is imbued with readerly literate prose qualities, analytical 
and cognitively demanding, the poetic exuberance of oral narration implies a ceremonial 
rehearsal of affective communion, a theatricality that the critical logos wisely foregoes.55  
For adherents of the progressivist thesis, logos is paradigmatically non-mimetic of 
sensible forms, it does not invite emotional participation, it appeals to the individual’s 
critical intelligence, reciprocally fashioning the independent rational subject. According to 
progressivist accounts, logos is an indicator of the democratising force of literacy and civic 
rationality; as written law, for example, it must explain and account for itself in the public 
sphere, suggesting logical criteria for its instantiation. C. Jan Swearingen suggests that the 
rise of literacy in ancient Greece enabled an experimental 'logosophical discourse directed 
at finding, defining, testing, and proving concepts rather than at representing events'. Logos 
differentiates itself from an oral noetic economy or mindset which is 'held in place' by 
mnemonic devices such as rhythm, song, and narrative formulae, and is therefore heavily 
reliant on mimetic repetition. Only by such differentiation can logos be conceptualised as 
the principle by which one makes 'independently true statements', placing a premium on 
innovation, interrogation, skepticism, analysis, debate, but also on standards of authority 
and proof.56  
                                                 
54 Wilhelm Nestle, From Mythos to Logos: The Self-Development of Greek Thought from Homer to the 
Sophists and Socrates, Stuttgart, 1940. Quoted in Glenn W. Most, ‘From Logos to Mythos’, in From Myth 
to Reason? 27.  
55 J.P. Vernant, Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1981. 
56 C. Jan Swearingen, Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1991, 38. 
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For the ‘from myth to logos’ adherents, it is of great moment that the literate logos 
replaces an oral, musical paideia or pedagogy based on sung verse and dance. Swearingen 
argues that the static sensuousness of the paideia is now supplanted by the 'analytic spirit' 
and 'dissecting eye' of logocentric reasoning, the objectivising videological animus 
promoted by the visual patterns of letters and words.57  
As a foil for a logos coterminous with the post-Enlightenment ideal of analytical 
objectivity, participatory rationality and epistemic universality, it is unsurprising that 
muthos has been relegated to the circumstantial, the particular, and the subjective by 
historians of early Greek philosophy. While logos is the mature power of modernist self-
presence and conceptual identity in thought, confident and prospective in its interrogations, 
muthos is evoked as a childish past which promotes fears of atavistic regression and stasis: 
‘The transition from myth to science consists in stripping off the historical, in rejecting 
chronological narration, and in reflecting upon the Unchangeable. The first science was 
obviously an investigation of nature’.58  
I would argue that the progressivist valorising of logos only serves to render it 
paradoxically mythical, ironically invested in a heroic narrative, that of logos' patricide 
against its mythic ancestry and its subsequent dominion over other discursive registers; 
here the primitive and chthonic other, myth, remains a necessary foil for rationality's 
proselytising violence. I think this is symptomatic of the contradictions of the post-
Enlightenment rationalist imaginary, unable to assert its universal claims without betraying 
desires, anxieties, and libidinal projections. Rationality, identified with the assertive 
presentism of conceptual prose, has been denuded by historians of philosophy of the 
narrative and figurative confusions generated by affect and imagination.  
The historicist claims of the ‘myth to logos’ thesis rest on an anthropomorphised 
and heroic narrative of domination and elision; the narrative projects a mythic violence 
that the rational calm of the logos would seem to exclude.59 Rationalism is an imaginary 
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of exclusion, and rhetoric’s appeal in the present critical landscape is as a challenging 
alternative to rationalist constructions of critical discourse.  
I now discuss two prominent exponents of the ‘myth to logos’ thesis, evoking the 
cultural biases and anachronistic assumptions that inform their model of critical discourse. 
By a close textual reading of the metaphorical logic implicit in their accounts of the 
emergence of Western epistemology, I indicate that there can be no neutral model of 
critical representation, but only historically contingent projections of the powers and 
imperatives that it will serve. 
 
Barnes: The Colonial Adventure of the Presocratic Logos 
 
In his introduction to a prominent English language translation of the Presocratic 
fragments, Jonathan Barnes argues that the Presocratic theorists, beginning with Thales of 
Miletus, should be regarded as phusikoi, physicists, observers (‘students’) of nature. 
Barnes delimits the epistemic terrain of the Presocratics as the ‘study of nature’.60 
Phusikoi is an Aristotelian term suggesting a kind of proto-physicist, a student of causes 
and effects in natural phenomena. Barnes, following the Aristotle of the Physics and 
Metaphysics, is concerned with determining the purview of the Presocratics as primarily 
materialists and proto-scientists. We learn that although ‘there are ethical and logical parts 
to some of their works ... their chief interest was physics’.61 Aristotle was influential in 
canonising the Presocratics as the first philosophers of physical causality, speculators on 
the origin or arche of the universe, and the material processes that animate it, its nature or 
phusis.62 By thus ‘naturalising’ the terminology of the Presocratics, post-Aristotelian 
histories of philosophy will continue to determine the Presocratic logos as a universally 
                                                 
the reflectiveness of art...’ One might speculate on the basis of the mythically supremacist imaginary I have 
evoked, that aesthetic projections and narrative schemas are irremediable aspects of thought, at their most 
dangerous when unaccompanied by formal reflection. 
60 Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1987, 13. 
61 Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, 13 
62 Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, 13. 
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applicable, cognitively motivated language of phenomenal explanation and taxonomy 
appropriate to a delimitable field of research and investigation.63 
Barnes argues that Aristotle was correct in demarcating the fictive 'mythologists' 
from the Presocratics as the first naturalistic 'philosophers', despite superficial similarities 
between Presocratic accounts and poetic/mythological narratives of the nature and origin 
of the universe, such as Hesiod’s Theogeny (15, 16). Barnes suggests that 'philosophy', 
apparently an unproblematic category, owes its origin to that 'special way' of looking at 
the world, 'the scientific or rational way' (17). For Barnes, the history of the emergence of 
Greek philosophy is a creation story, 'the history of the conceptual understanding of 
explanatory schemes', requiring an abstract terminology which 'had to be invented' (18).  
What interests me in this account of the unique historical significance of the 
Presocratics, their contemporary exceptionalism, is a post-Aristotelian idea of the method 
by which conceptual reason, as self-originating and ‘self-enclosed’, develops its symbolic 
capital. Reason develops its particular purchase by dispensing with a mythical and 
aestheticised lexicon, establishing its autarkic credentials. This achievement is the work of 
‘the intellectual adventurers of early Greece’, the ‘heroes of this book’, ‘men of genius’ 
(14, 16). Exploring the etymological derivation of certain key explanatory terms in 
Presocratic thought, Barnes indicates the progressive achievements of their 'scientific 
struggle' as a task of pioneering exploration, simultaneously requiring the erasure of fictive 
modes of understanding (18).  
It is noteworthy, Barnes reminds us, that Presocratic thinkers such as Heraclitus 
chose to designate the universe, the totality of what is, by the noun kosmos. Derived from 
a verb which means 'to order', 'to arrange', 'to marshal', kosmos appears in Homer’s Iliad 
referring to the Greek generals marshalling a host of troops for battle; it has the functional 
sense of an orderly arrangement. Also, in 'ordinary Greek' the term suggests an adornment 
('cosmetic'), a pattern that beautifies and is pleasant to contemplate (19). By giving the 
term an 'essentially scientific aspect', the Presocratics ensured that the kosmos could now 
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be liberated from both practical and aesthetic contexts, and be understood as the ordered 
universe in its entirety, the sum of what is, a principle of universal explanation. 
For Barnes, a rationalist vocabulary must make a conceptual and ontological leap 
beyond historical specificity and the vernacular constraints of 'normal conversation’. The 
ontological potential of the abstract noun necessitates a transcendence of socio-historical 
context, of performative usages and contextual functions. The rational lexicon or logos 
aims to suppress any linguistic trace of the subject of enunciation and its indigenous social 
environment.  
The language of reason must forget a certain density of memory, affective 
impressions and cultural usages in order to proceed in the ‘brave new world’ of Presocratic 
rational thought (16). As the allusion attests, a metaphorical logic of colonisation is 
operative in Barnes’s account, requiring both a narrative of original foundations and an 
exploitation of pre-existent cultural knowledges. One could also argue that a colonial 
‘adventure’ informs Barnes’s narrative of the emergence of the philosophical concept of 
arche, originally a Greek word for an office or magistracy. Barnes suggests that the 
Presocratic physicists, focussed on the demands of cosmological explanation, drew upon 
the polyvalent sense of the term in vernacular usage to conceptualise the arche or origin of 
the universe as both a principle of commencement and a continuing mode of governance 
and order. An example would be Thales' famous doctrine that the earth and its atmosphere 
both originates in and continues by the condensation and rarefaction of water: hence water 
and its associated processes is the earth’s arche as both origin and primum mobile, the 
earth’s phusis. 
 Barnes sees little reason to question whether this tropological ‘turning’ of such 
terms entirely superseded their contextual, legal, and ethical applications for the 
Presocratics. He does not ask how a word with a cultural resonance of practical governance 
(archon – leader, king) was put to the purely theoretical task of creating omnipotent, 
universal knowledge, without discursive remainder. Barnes does not ask how the 
Presocratics' radical tropological leap from the customary to the abstract was received by 
a contemporary audience alert to diverse codifications. It seems that the 
colonising/progressivist imaginary of logos hesitates to admit the value of inter-idiomatic 
reciprocity. This is the case even when a term’s philological history seems to suggest such 
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an acknowledgment, or at least further inquiry into its lexical and grammatical 
transformations during this period, the sixth and fifth century BCE. 
If Barnes is little interested in the possible activation of idiomatic senses in key 
Presocratic terms, it might be because the Presocratic logos should ideally guarantee a 
cognitive profit for its expenditures. For Barnes, Presocratic explanations are 'economical' 
in their terminology, using few terms and assuming few 'unknowns', certainly rejecting 
theological interventions into the workings of nature. Presocratic rationalisations, its logoi, 
are ‘internal: they explain the universe from within, in terms of its own constituent 
features’ (17). The sixth century BCE philosopher Anaximenes, for example, explains the 
thermodynamics of matter and the formation of the human soul in terms of a single material 
element, air (17). 
 Given that the natural world exhibits an 'extraordinary variety' of phenomena and 
events, it is apparently imperative 'that the variety must be reduced to order, and the order 
made simple – for that is the way to intelligibility'. It is this 'desire to explain as much as 
possible in terms of as little as possible', which informs ‘both...ancient and ... modern 
endeavours' (18). Barnes’s historicism, his celebration in the Presocratics of an efficacious 
rationalism anticipating the modern Western episteme, reproduces the received sociology 
of what must constitute Enlightenment, an encyclopedic, secularising enthusiasm for 
taxonomy and rational explanation. Barnes’s portrait is redolent of bourgeois 
triumphalism, evoking the Presocratics as confident individualists, utilitarians, expansive 
colonialists, and universal humanists. Before questioning these anachronistic projections I 
will discuss Eric Havelock’s more detailed sociological and materialist account of the 
Presocratics' ‘linguistic task’, which also relates the Presocratic achievement to the values 
of Western culture. 
 
Havelock: The Austere Task of logos 
 
Eric A. Havelock, an influential scholar of Presocratic thought, offers a detailed 
materialist and sociological explanation for the emergence of rational thought in sixth-
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century Greece.64 Havelock dispenses with Barnes’ reification of individual heroics and 
constructs a narrative that interleaves the emergence of the philosophical attitude with a 
social transformation that includes the beginnings, in the Greek city-states, of the rule of 
civic law and the rise of literacy. Havelock recognises that Presocratic thinkers such as 
Heraclitus and Parmenides never classed themselves as 'philosophers', a term that only 
became extant in the work of Plato. For Havelock Presocratic ideas are less a definite 
school of thought, more a group of thinkers united by a particular animus, a kind of moral 
fervour.  
Havelock suggests that in contradistinction to most poets of their intermediate 
period of Greek history (6th century BCE), the Presocratics did not wish to please or 
entertain, 'only to instruct'.65 The Presocratics were less self-invented in Barnes’s terms 
than a manifestation of a profound cultural upheaval, the transition from oral to literate 
technologies of writing and documentation. Through this transition, the extraneous 
requirements of a successful narratological performance, such as the invocation of a muse, 
will be gradually supplanted by the efficacious rigour of prose assertion, its standardisation 
and accountability.66  
In an interesting anthropological excursus, Havelock claims that 'oral memory' can 
only accommodate a language that describes the acts of persons and the happening of 
events, it is 'unfriendly' to abstract and conceptual speech.67 Havelock indicates that the 
oral reliance on narrative exposition means that myths can only describe what is in terms 
of its coming to be, offering the following narrative infelicity as an example: 
Instead of stating that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it prefers 
to say that 'the triangle stood firmly, its two legs astride the ground, stoutly 
defending its two right angles against the attack of the enemy'.68 
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In Havelock's view, mythic speech or mutho is incapable of statements of definition, the 
basis of rational analysis and propositional logic. It seems that metaphorised myth, with its 
abundance of figures and syntactical qualifications, threatens the copula, the ontic power 
of the ‘is’. Muthos explains the universe only mediately, in the 'guise of stories that 
represent it as the work of agents: that is, gods.'69 In contrast to the familiar communal 
rehearsals of oral narrative, when thought is committed to writing the logos is rendered as 
an artifact, an object 'separate from the describer's own consciousness'. Literacy affords 
the historical opportunity and generates the rational desire to make the object explicit, to 
'tie it down' as a system or structure instead of a series of events issuing from the mouth of 
a poet or muse.70 To enact itself, logocentric discourse will eschew performative 
exuberance, the theatricality of genre and ceremony, and the contextual mise en scène that 
genre and performance usually entail. For Havelock, the subject of reason needs to be 
appropriately individualised, her/his explorations divorced from collective mediations. 
 A specular or narcissistic moment is envisaged in Havelock’s originary mise en 
scène of literate discovery. Now the emergent Western cognitive subject recognises its 
individual substantiality as reciprocal with the power to present an object to itself without 
mediation. In some awe, the Western subject of reason becomes truly cognizant of its 
environment, and is released from the narcissistic auto-identification of myth. The 
cognitive subject becomes aware, in its maturity, of the 'external world', as if for the first 
time.71 Once again, Havelock’s attempt to narrate the distinctive emergence of a rational 
language lapses into a mythic creation story. Havelock evokes the Presocratic rationalist 
imaginary according to the value of the modern scientific worldview: phenomenologically 
open ended, innocent, transcending the given, and intentional, redolent of Edmund 
Husserl’s idea of the temporal ‘now’, separable from past and future, which anchors 
epistemological self-presence.   
Havelock argues that only on the basis of ancient Greece’s technological and social 
development and the psychological awakening it enabled, did the Presocratics conceive a 
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conceptual and linguistic ‘task’. Rationality presupposes a phenomenological 
transformation from mythic passivity; it is the intentional development of a language of 
being. How was this ontological vocabulary to be achieved? As in Barnes’ account, the 
lexicon of Homer and Hesiod, context-dependent and historically particular, will need to 
be 'stretched and extended' by the ingenious Presocratics, enabling a 'cosmic’ rather than a 
‘particular' reference.72 
Havelock suggests that while the traditional 'storehouse' language of muthos is 
constrained by its own contextual immanence, its contingent dependence on particular 
stories and poetic images, the permanence of writing in the form of legal and political 
codifications suggests a socio-historical evolution towards the flexible appreciation of 
abstract values. The advent in the fifth century BCE of a detached, experimental interest 
in the ontological scope of grammar established the preconditions for propositional 
statements to be distinguished from mythical formulae. Havelock cathects this 
propositional linguistic capacity to the formation of new desires, in particular the 
Presocratics' philosophical monism, their inquiries into ultimate causes, the idea of the 
unity of the many in the One. Julius M. Moravesik succinctly describes this transition from 
localizable muthos to the transcendental desire of logos as the passage from immanent 
myth to philosophical ‘speculation’.73  
For Havelock, the literate logos is faced with a stern but sure and achievable task: 
to instruct the masses, misled by the aesthetic excitations of the oral paedeia, in a version 
of intelligence which is austere, rigorous, and self-denying, enacting the lonely journey 
'from story to statement', from affective communion to solitary reflection.74 Havelock 
proposes Heraclitus as an exemplary figure of the new logocentrism, enframing his 
apothegmatic sayings as a proselytising conversion of idolatrous pluralisms: ‘Intelligence 
consists in listening not to me but to the statement (logos) and then to concur-in-stating 
that all (things) are one’ (B50).75 
                                                 
72 Havelock, ‘The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics’, 21. 
73 Julius M. Moravesik, ‘Heraclitean Concepts and Explanations’, in Language and Thought in Early Greek 
Philosophy, 136. 
74Havelock, ‘The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics’, 12. 
75 Quoted in Havelock, ‘The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics’, 23, my italics. 
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Havelock postulates that Heraclitus' reader/auditor is enjoined to follow the ex 
cathedra statement rather than the 'inspired voice of bard or muse', to begin to forget the 
concrete semiotics of a paideia of dance and song, of cultic ritual and performance. 
Knowledge must be divorced from cultural function. Intelligence and authority about the 
external world are to be recognised as distinct from the speaker who pronounces it, while 
that speaker is invested with an authority to utter critical truths on a basis which is 
heteronomously ontological and privately received, rather than sociable, rhetorical, and 
familiar. Heraclitus’s radical source of moral authority, his attempt to morally purify a 
corrupt society, is similar to the radical purifying messianic desires of the Jewish prophets. 
Knowledge is a monotheism. Havelock’s Heraclitus offers Logos as a monotheistic 
experience of the total environment, a sense of the unifying power behind all being. 
Havelock is confident that the Heraclitean critique of the ignorance of his 
contemporaries is directed towards transforming a blighted moral economy, an oral 
habitus. Heraclitus must redress 'oral habit as well as oral speech', a mentality which is 
experiential and 'active', but not 'reflective'. The stakes are high, for to 'accept and absorb 
the new language and mental habits of logos is to accept a new way of life'.76 In Havelock's 
emplotment of the emergence of post-mythical critical agency, Heraclitus' proselytising 
desire for conversion must vehemently oppose his pedagogical rivals and their 
demagogical effect on mob opinion, and this explains his polemical tirades against the 
demotic mood:  
What sense or wit is theirs? They are persuaded by the bards of the people and take 
the talking crowd to be their instructor not knowing that the majority are no good 
whereas the good are few (B104).77   
 
For Havelock’s Heraclitus, logos would appear to sound an elite commitment to rational 
discussion and civic virtue, instantiating rationality as a permanent bulwark against 
seductive rhetorics. Havelock quotes Heraclitus’s logos as promoting constitutional law as 
a protection against the dangerous vacillations of the popular mood: 
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It is necessary to be a follower of the combinatory/common (xynus). My statement 
(logos) is combinatory/common, but most live as though possessing an intelligence 
private to themselves (B2).78  
 
We can summarise by discussing certain, representative features of Havelock’s 
rationalist imaginary, the role reason is to play within a socius of complex forces. Havelock 
imagines Heraclitus' instructive logos as a necessary stage in the epistemological, legal, 
and moral progress of the West in its movement beyond the oral/nomadic stage of human 
civilisation. Logos is that providential task for philosophical language that unites stable 
governance with intellectual dynamism, objective detachment with inquisitive desire. 
Rationality is founded upon the Western literate paideia and its legal and political 
codifications, literate objectivity taken as the propaedeutic of independent, rational modes 
of scrutiny.  
In Moira Gatens’s terms, the Presocratics' philosophico-linguistic project, as 
evoked by Havelock, is to inaugurate a masculinist public sphere where men engage in 
rational and transformative activity, as opposed to the natural and instinctive realm of 
mythopoeisis.79 For both Barnes and Havelock, the ‘natural’ language of myth, although 
inferior, subtends and services abstract thought.  Presocratic language is what it ought to 
be according to liberal-capitalist imperatives, a masculinist activity supported by a 
hypostatised nature, an eternal feminine.80 
 I repeat that it is a narrative axis alone, a mythic creation story, which guarantees 
this desired continuity between ancient Greek and post-Enlightenment models of 
intelligent language. For upon the continual invocation of this continuity hinges the 
Western project of reason and civilisation. The ‘myth to logos’ narrative is informed by 
discourses ranging from the utilitarian and productivist, androcentrism, colonialism, and 
the modern desire to police disciplinary boundaries. Enlightenment secularism is called 
upon, but so is the comforting ethical framework of Judeo-Christian monotheism and its 
                                                 
78 Quoted in Havelock, ‘The Linguistic Task of the Presocratics’, 17. 
79 Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1991, 43. 
80  For Barnes and Havelock, ‘myth’ is analogous to the immanent sphere of female activity understood as 
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purifying ethical tasks. We might say that the rationalist imaginary has discontinuous 
‘mythemes’.  
The next section discusses recent intellectual histories that attempt philologically 
to recover the polyvalent idiolect, the field of cultural usages and mythico-historical 
evocations, that imbricated Presocratic terminology. I try to give a sense of a Presocratic 
intellectual discourse that adapts itself to the vitality of its ambient popular culture, its 
religious, political and performative codes, while forming an idea of how critical discourse 
is to displace and transcend the conventional. I suggest that this mixture of popular 
embeddedness and critical resourcefulness enables an environment in which rhetorical 
theory, practice, and desire will flourish. 
 
A Philological Perspective on the Presocratics 
 
In the last twenty years there has arisen a postmodern suspicion towards 'meta-
narratives', a doubting of anthropological approaches to myth and oral societies, an 
interdisciplinary and post-colonial interrogation of the discursive and material violence 
implicit in Western rationality, and a growing interest in different forms of critical 
expression. The current critical climate has promulgated a revisionist interest in 
dismantling the subordination of muthos to logos, or at least greatly complicating their 
historical relationship. Glenn Most has suggested that investigations into myth must be 
freed from rationalist and romantic projections. Myth has been imagined as a transmitted 
body of stories, suited to material requirements and usually localisable in a particular 
historical context, hence accessible to the sociological gaze. Or mythologies have been 
studied as the vanished numinous quality of the 'mythic', attributable to the aura of a 
people's lost religious identity, reassuringly prehistoric and without the arbitrary 
conditioning of ideology.81 The critical wheel has turned on these condescending 
trivialisations, and a more pluralistic idea of Greek reason has emerged which suggests 
                                                 
81 Glenn W. Most, ‘From Logos to Mythos’ in Buxton, From Myth to Reason? 44. 
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that mythical narratives have their own rich and complex logic(s) and are capable of 
generating speculative comportments and subtle philosophies of self and world.82 
In a later chapter, I reinscribe mythical narratology as a valid discursive alternative 
to conceptual presence and univocal value. As a philosophy elaborated through multiple 
genealogies, Hesiod's Theogeny inculcates an awareness of persistent patterns of violence 
and concord, progress and cyclical repetition. As Richard Buxton argues, it is a text which 
insists on the trace of the past in the present, cumulatively indexing the persistence of 
opaque, chthonic powers and the irreducibility of fate, allegorising a law of eternal return, 
of perpetual madness and error to be juxtaposed with the benign civic justice and prosperity 
promised by the contemporary reign of Olympian Zeus. Humanity is to be positioned as a 
medium between the chthonic earthly realm and the blessed divinity of the gods, forever 
negotiating different moral codes, secular and divine, private and social. The mobile 
symbolism of narrative exposition, I will argue, lends myth a kind of diacritical or 
temporised coherence that should not be adjudged inferior to the assertive ontological 
presence of the philosophical concept.  
In these terms the ancient Greek ‘Enlightenment’ of the Presocratics and later the 
Sophists should not be judged according to the more recent standard of rationalist 
aggression towards myth. Rather it can be conceived as a supple adaptation and 
codification of the philosophical pluralism inherent in polytheistic genealogies and the 
existential dilemmas of tragedy. 
 Questioning the historicist narrative of a logically motivated logos' erasure of 
mythic forms, Buxton asks for a rhetorical investigation into the differential and 
simultaneous usages of logos and muthos in their archaic and Hellenistic contexts: 'Would 
it not then be preferable, instead of speaking of a "shift", to think in terms of a constant to-
ing and fro-ing between the mythical and the rational?'83 Barry Sandywell, intrigued by 
the mythical matrix of early European theorising, suggests that the 'relationship between 
mythos and logos is a dialogical rather than a simply chronological or empirical-causal 
connection.... As a dialectical trope, ‘mythos-logos’ symbolises the presence of conflict 
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and struggle at work in ancient Greek culture.’84 Tejera suggests that the 'literate 
revolution in Greece' and the genealogy of its critical terminologies are a philological and 
historical, rather than philosophical, matter.85 
 I would endorse Tejera and Sandywell's suggestion that philosophical 
appropriations of Presocratic thought, deeply invested in the ‘myth to logos’ thesis, have 
tended anachronistically to naturalise their terminology, following Aristotle in translating 
terms such as arche and phusis as purely material and physical principles of causality and 
development. By drawing attention to specific semantic contexts, philological 
investigation promises to re-ambiguate Greek concepts, restoring their discursive usages 
and their historical relationship to the dialogical language of Greek mythology, in 
particular the cosmogonic speculations of Hesiod. 
In his sociological study Presocratic Reflexivity Sandywell offers an alternative 
genealogy of arche. We know, says Sandywell, that Aristotle's term 'arche' was a later 
interpretive construct superimposed upon a more Archaic expression: 'However complex, 
arche did not, in either everyday or poetic usage, have the meaning of "causality" or the 
first term of a causal sequence in the modern sense of these terms.’ Sandywell suggests 
that the 'causal' meaning was a later innovation, popularised by the philosophical texts of 
Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle.86 Before gaining a more abstract significance in the 
fourth century BCE, arche would seem to have encompassed a far less determinate 
semantic cluster invoking the notion of a secure foundation or starting point for a family, 
dynasty, or polis, the gods often providing the sense of the eternal arche of the human 
order, the indestructible, immutable, and eternal order of things (143). Arche was also an 
organic metaphor, the source, origin, or root of things that exist; the arche of a plant lies 
in the soil from which it is nourished (142).  
One should not, therefore, necessarily associate arche with the rather ‘thin’ 
conception of cause and rational sequence, but assume a varied cultural inflection, of arche 
as a divine or animate ‘matrix’, a sense that becomes relevant when we discuss Hesiod’s 
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Theogeny (147). Arche is also a commonplace trope for commencing an action, making 
something begin, generating something in quotidian contexts (143). Sandywell suggests 
that arche for the ancient Greeks often intimated both the origin and first cause of human 
societies, their customs and laws, so by extension it suggested power, sovereignty, and 
domination. The human embodiment of a ruling principle, a ruler, leader, king or tyrant 
was known as an archeon or archon (144). As a symbol of authority, arche shades into 
older or pre-polis notions of the authority vested in customary rules and tribal ways, or 
themis (145). Hence debates around the term, such as attempts to modernise its significance 
or challenge one of its particular determinations, suggested social and political struggles 
for legitimation and symbolic capital. Any transformation of the term’s significance into 
more abstract domains such as philosophical principles of causality would need to operate 
by analogy, thereby reactivating an ongoing social drama about legitimate power, 
sovereignty and ruling principles, a conversation which it could not refuse to take part in 
(145). Alert to the possible reactivation of vernacular codes in Presocratic terminology, 
Sandywell suggests that ‘we can anticipate a great deal of semantic overlap between the 
idioms of myth, epic poetry, and the early experiments in philosophical abstraction’ (142).  
Sandywell also critiques the Aristotelian standardisation of the semantic polysemy 
of phusis for the purposes of metaphysical inquiry. Sandywell explores the pre-
metaphysical purchase of phusis, a term whose contemporary significance is the objective 
analysis of the structure and dynamic principles of ‘physical nature’ (147). As Sandywell 
argues, the objective, physicalist viewpoint was unavailable to early Greek thinkers, who 
would have relied on the older Homeric sense of the word as an everyday term for birth, 
growth, and development, something’s natural course or immanent organisation, that 
which makes things what they are, their peculiar dynamic (147). Phusis is a trajectory of 
something’s natural growth and functioning; even when hidden, phusis has the natural 
power to manifest itself or come into the light. It is a general term for one’s status in 
society, one’s family genealogy, high or low birth, underlining the traditional pre-
democratic system of arête, innate and inherited virtue based on aristocratic lineage (148, 
149). Invoking a sense of ‘character’ and ‘disposition’, Socrates speaks of the noble and 
philosophical phuseos of Theaetetus, his characteristic disposition to wonder (thaumazein) 
and question; phuseos speaks of what is proper to a particular nature, what constitutes the 
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often hidden essence of human beings, the ‘phusis that loves to hide’ (Heraclitus, B123) 
(151). Like arche, a site of social struggle, an ethical debate surrounds the invocation of 
phusis, which will frequently be opposed by the early Greek Cynics and Stoics to the 
corruption and artificiality of social laws (nomos) and mores. 
 
                                      Conclusion   
 
My philological exercise queries the progressivist notion that the Presocratics bring 
an innocent perception to their inquiries, a familiarly modern, neutral, detached, objective 
mode of scientific observation. The Presocratics’ phenomenological innocence would be 
ideally unencumbered by social construction and history, an early exemplar of 
philosophical rigour according to the rationalist ideals of Barnes and Havelock. I’ve also 
cast some suspicion on their idealisation of Presocratic terminology as an intentional, 
instrumental language that can be opposed to the pre-conscious or ‘instinctive’ fabulations 
of myth. My philological reading presses for the structural acknowledgment that key 
Presocratic terms like arche and phusis must activate and adapt to existing religious and 
cultural themes and narratives and the rich critical explorations that they allow. As we shall 
see, thinkers like Anaximander, Empedocles, and Heraclitus continue to inscribe their 
cosmological and ethical understandings within a divine, mythical, and tragic social 
dramaturgy, reinventing the polytheistic drama of conflicting forces and paradoxical first 
principles and matrices. Presocratic language, prior to modern epistemic specialisation, is 
content to be sociomorphic and undifferentiated as to whether its inquiry is physicalist, 
ethical, or sociological. This language deploys a number of idioms and thematic 
frameworks in its discussion of cosmology and anthropology, rejecting the inert facticity 
of modern materialism. In the following chapter, I resume this philological spirit and give 
a careful and necessarily incomplete recontextualisation of logos as it functioned in the 
fifth and fourth centuries BCE, as a paradoxical medium, inscribed within polytheistic and 
tragic philosophemes.  
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Chapter Two:  The Historical Inflections of Logos 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the plurality of significations the word logos evoked for the 
ancient Greeks. I suggest that the ambiguities and dilemmas posed by logos are the matrix 
from which rhetoric’s fascination with language’s copious potentialities will develop. I will 
explore an equivocal logos, an understanding of language as therapy and poison, blindness 
and insight. I argue that rhetoric will occupy a healthy tradition of meta-linguistic 
discussion, arguing for language as a medium for social dialogue, a profligate power 
requiring an open-ended ethics.  
In myth and its tragic interpretation, the desire for logos, for explanation, order, 
truth, imbricates the subject in conflicting forces, good and evil, rational investigation and 
magical transfiguration, secular humanism and religious pessimism. I suggest that in the 
ancient Greek milieu, logos invokes those ‘conceptual personae’ who embody its 
ambiguous power and ethical complexities, from Odysseus to Oedipus. In contradistinction 
to the ‘economical’ rationalist imaginary, I discuss a rhetorical ethos that forms itself from 
multiple nodes of interest, the rich potential of myth, narrative, aesthetic representation.  
 
Recovering a Pre-Aristotelian Logos 
 
I now discuss Barry Sandywell's suggestive inquiry into the polyvalency of logos 
in archaic and fifth and fourth century BCE Greek culture.87 An abstract verbal noun, 
logos derives from the verb legein, one sense of which signifies to collect or gather 
together. This as yet undeterminable potential for articulation can certainly be rendered in 
the familiar terms of rationality, as a language of explanation, an account of the reason, 
cause, or principle of something; in geometry the logos of a figure would refer to its ratio, 
proportion, or rule, its regular arrangement or proportionate order. By the usual process of 
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tropological abstraction, logos accrues a more conceptual significance, to give the logos 
for something in later Greek usage is to uncover its 'reason' or underlying structure.88  
By the early decades of the fifth-century BCE, on the threshold of the age of Plato 
and Aristotle, the words logos and logike are used in a general sense to register the presence 
of intelligible structure or 'form' in a subject matter. One of the central meanings of the 
term by the fourth century is as a synonym for the presence of 'reason' or 'rationality', 
elaborated in the writings and teachings of Aristotle and his school.89 In Plato's 
metaphysics, logos suggests a meaningful, intelligent discourse, justifying its account of 
things, defending its version of what is by reason and argument, while assuming the 
dialogical context of an urbane, interactive exploration of opinions and beliefs. 
Claude Calame offers a detailed account of the descriptive purchase of logos in 
Plato’s dialogues. He suggests that in the dialogues logos is successively likened to 
discourse appropriate to promulgating opinion, to enumeration of the constituent elements 
of the object of opinion, and to formulation of its distinctive characteristics. This modality 
of characterisation is evidenced in the Republic where social hierarchy and its historical 
establishment in the form of an idealised city are worked out through the mediation of 
logos, as ratio and rule. The Platonic/Socratic logos which sifts through opinions and 
details essential characteristics is superseded by the restricted, formal definition offered by 
the Aristotle of the Prior Analytics: ‘The syllogism (sullogismos) is a form of reasoning 
(logos) in which, certain things being posited, something other than those premises 
necessarily follows, by the mere fact of those premises.’ 90  
By the time of Aristotle, then, logos is coterminous with logic, the ontological 
criteria of rational discourse, it is synonymous now with the limits of intelligibility, 
instantiating what counts as knowledge and what does not.91 This brief genealogy suggests 
that it is only with the advent of Aristotelian metaphysics that logos as a mode of 
intelligence loses all reference to an interactive context of opinion formation and diffuse 
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dialogical processes.92 In the accounts of Barnes and Havelock we recognise the post-
Aristotelian redaction of logos as ontology and logic, policing intelligible discourse, 
militating against its opposites. 
 By Aristotle logos has become primarily constitutive and efficacious, instituting 
categories, establishing identities and hierarchies of being through the medium of 
propositional thought, logical steps, and processes of ordering and enumeration.93 In the 
usages of Plato and Aristotle, logos as explanatory utterance is opposed to the term ergon, 
an act or deed. This allows for the binarised dyad logos/ergon, the originating paradigm 
for the theory/practice polarity in Western thinking.  
By the age of Plato and Aristotle, then, logos as theoretical comprehension can be 
opposed to empirical perception, essence and appearance part ways. The logos had been 
formalised, now indicating a language of essential ideas and metaphysical taxonomies.94 
My reading of Barnes and Havelock has indicated the extent to which histories of 
philosophy have continued to reproduce an instrumental, efficacious model of logos as the 
very ground of binary thinking and logical operations. Such a model, as Sandywell's 
investigations suggest, obscures the alternative semiotic resource of logos, as a material, 
performative power of language, a sensory and affectively imbued medium. 
 Sandywell reminds us that in archaic Greek usage, logos has a formal significance 
as a particular genre of utterance, enunciation. Dating from the age of Homer, logos might 
simply mean a speech, anything said or written. It pertains to the act of saying, from legein, 
to 'act' or 'say', a coherent, articulated utterance, story, narrative, or account of something. 
A logos is, according to this aspect of the term, the material form of any conceivable 
discourse; it is the voice, the word, that by which the thought is expressed, its relation to 
ideality can be suspended, discussed, explored. We turn to the language of fifth century 
tragedy for examples. 
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An Epic and Tragic Logos 
 
 Fifth century BCE tragedy provides many instances of the evocativeness of the 
signifier logos. In tragic contexts, logos enables reflections on a variety of dilemmas. Logos 
leads into the abyssal problem of the permanent uncertainty of mortal knowledge in the 
divine scheme of things, a favourite philosophical theme of the Hellenistic world. One 
functional consequence of this resilient idea of the Greeks is an emphasis on humanity's 
sentient vulnerability to the earthly embodiments of divine deception, the material power 
of persuasive eloquence, eternally sacralised in the figure of the goddess Peitho or 
Persuasion. Richard Enos suggests that by the Homeric age, the ambiguous power of 
persuasion and oral discourse was a subject of interrogation and philosophical dilemma, 
illustrated by Homer’s constant exploration of the aesthetic power of oratorical speech.95  
Enos argues that Odysseus was a model of ‘inventional language and deception’ 
for Homer’s early Greek audiences.96 He is an ambivalent yet popular figure, a ‘verbal 
magician’ in W.J. Verdenius’s terms, signifying ancient Greece’s ‘admiration for skilful 
deceit’.97 He is guileful, a trickster figure, constantly transforming situations and deferring 
dire outcomes, warding off the voracious Cyclops with his play on the ambiguous term 
‘Nobody’. He is Odysseus the ‘rhetor’, expert in tactical deception, cunning stratagems, 
physical and linguistic disguise.98 In other contexts of the Homeric epics, however, his 
persuasive skills are diplomatic, political, aimed at achieving collaboration and consensus; 
consider Odysseus’s gentle persuasions to a sulking Achilles in book nine of The Iliad.  
Odysseus also reinvents an older collective cultural function, that of the singer of 
epic tales, the master of the bewitching power of song – ‘a minstrel who has been taught 
by the gods to sing words that bring delight to mortals, and everyone longs to hear him 
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when he sings’ (Od. 17: 518-20). Skill in persuasion and its complex discursive qualities 
is ultimately a gift of the gods, themselves masters of deception like Zeus, Hermes, and 
Pallas Athena. Persuasive power imbues its possessor with sacred qualities, it is awesome, 
reverential, and therefore inspires fear and respect.99  
Analogous to the protean and metamorphic activities of the gods on earth, eloquent 
language has a fluent power of transformation. In the case of the Cyclops episode, language 
is capable of averting certain death by Odysseus’s resourceful play on words; or consider 
Penelope’s ‘bewitching’ words to her predatory suitors in Od. 18.282-3, a deception that 
delights the disguised, eavesdropping Odysseus.100 Eloquent language, the affective 
power of appearances, will always be ascribed the capacity, both salutary and dangerous, 
to change the logic of a situation, to defer or transform a seemingly inevitable outcome, to 
miraculously alter the balance of power. Odysseus comments on the difference between 
brute force and an alternative set of values emanating from the distinctive, eternally 
improbable, powers of eloquent speech: 
A man may be insignificant to look at but the god can grace his words with charm: 
people watch him with delight as he speaks unfalteringly with winning modesty. 
He stands out in the gathering and is stared at like a god when he passes through 
the town. Another may be as handsome as an immortal, yet quite deficient in the 
graceful arts of speech. (Od. 8:169-175).101  
 
Persuasive discourse has an important pragmatic function, establishing collective 
agreement and civic discipline, protecting a public space for discourse and reflection. 
Odysseus holds the court of Alcinous spellbound with the force of his storytelling: 
‘Odysseus’ tale was finished. Held in the spell of his words they all remained still and silent 
throughout the shadowy hall’ (Od. 13.1.ff.). Persuasion softens individual anger and ill-
will, it reminds one of civic duties and customary law, inducing kindliness; witness Priam’s 
persuasive pathos as it leads to Achilles’ noble, self-transcending surrendering of the body 
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of Hector.102 Persuasive power is a necessity, irreducible, hence sacred. In The Iliad the 
furious quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles in Book 1 is prompted by 
Agamemnon’s lack of persuasive power. Sandywell comments that persuasion is a 
fundamental function of language in Homeric epic, possessing the power to ‘bewitch’ and 
‘transfigure’ its audience for both transformative and conservative ends.103 
By critiquing the brute realities of power, the regimes of domination established by 
the forces of the obvious, given, and empirical, the nuances of logos already inspire 
humanist celebration in the Homeric age. Nonetheless it is suspected as a fatal possibility. 
For logos can act in inflammatory ways, igniting the senses and the libidinal urges of the 
imagination; so the young Euryalus replies to Odysseus’s provocative criticisms by 
acknowledging the piercing power of speech to arouse destructive and competitive 
energies, even against one’s best interests: 
You have stirred me to anger with your inept remarks ... in spite of what I have 
gone through, I’ll try my hands at the sports. For your words have stung me and put 
me on my mettle. (The Odyssey 8: 178-185). 
 
Sandywell notes the ambivalent power of persuasion in The Odyssey. Odysseus, so often 
the practitioner of deceptive speech, nevertheless finds himself a prisoner on the island of 
Calypso, beguiled by her soft and bewitching words. The siren voice of persuasion will 
make Odysseus forget Ithaca, his homeland, and his wife Penelope (Od. 1.55-7).104 Logos 
is multivalent. It protects civic traditions, but it is also the vanishing of memory and 
continuity, it portends a frightening year zero. 
 Logos appears in different fifth century BCE tragic plays as 'tales', 'deceptive 
words', 'words that cure the disordered mind', 'piercing words', 'pleas', it is therapy and 
poison, remedy and destruction. Logos is a pharmakological performative power, as 
Derrida argues with philological verve in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’: 
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As a pharmakon, logos is at once good and bad; it is not at the outset governed 
exclusively by goodness or truth. [Before Plato’s determination of logos as a 
structure or order] we are in the ambivalent, indeterminate space of the pharmakon, 
of that which in logos remains potency, potentiality ... is not yet the transparent 
language of knowledge.... one would have to speak of the 'irrationality' of living 
logos, of its spellbinding powers of enchantment, mesmerizing fascination, and 
alchemical transformation, which make it kin to witchcraft and magic.105 
 
Derrida suggests that before the Platonic-Aristotelian determination of logos as a univocal 
language of truth, one might comprehend logos as a kind of reportoire of qualities, 
dispositions, and effects. As I’ve argued, cultural personae who embody the persuasive 
power of language are less unified subjects than figures who activate a variety of traits, 
bringing the joys and dangers of the logos before a knowledgeable audience.106 Derrida 
suggests of Socrates that he is persuasion’s pharmakological power: ‘Alternately and/or 
all at once, the Socratic pharmakon petrifies and vivifies, anaesthetizes and sensitises, 
appeases and anguishes.’107 
 One will find the ambiguous potentiality of logos as a running theme of fifth 
century BCE tragedy. For in tragedy, humanity does not master its representation, rather 
language is symbiotic with errant trajectories, misunderstandings, perfidies, and dramatic 
ironies – 'it is I who will bring the criminal to light', says Oedipus in Oedipus Rex. In the 
semiotics of tragedy, logos is the shocking language of revelation bringing about disastrous 
reversals of fortune. It is less the deliberative instrument of utilitarian activities, as the 
medium that discloses, over time, the complex configurations of destiny.108 Without 
losing its valency of explanation, a tragic fashioning of logos emphasises its functioning 
as a catalyst of narrative reversal, of the unexpected. As a medium of explanation, logos 
retains an essential mystique, since it confronts human reason with the enigmatic 
intelligence of the divine.  
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As a potential reserve of themes, dilemmas, questions, logos activates a differential 
dramaturgy, a reflection on the discrepancies between appearance and reality, between the 
desires of mortals and the will of the gods. I  follow Vernant’s analysis of Sophocles' 
Oedipus Rex. Interviewing the prophet Tiresias, the tragic hero Oedipus finds himself at 
the precipice of the logos, this dangerous edge of speech, on the brink of a complete 
reversal of fortune. It is the gods, the fates, who send his words ‘I will bring the criminal 
to light’ back at him, deformed or twisted around.109 According to Vernant, what the 
dramatic ironies of tragedy convey is that within the words men exchange there exist areas 
of opacity and incommunicability. Spectators to tragedy as well as the tragic protagonist 
himself or herself must become aware of the ambiguity of words, of meanings, and of the 
human condition.110 This logos, this appalling explanation, will ineluctably unfold the 
truth of Oedipus’s past, with disastrous consequences.  
Remember that it is Oedipus' ethos, his heroic concern for his adopted city, his 
persistence and acumen that has brought him into conversation with the empirically blind 
yet apophantic prophet Tiresias. It is Oedipus' uncompromising resolve and Tiresias' 
certain knowledge of his king’s future doom, their discursive confrontation, which finally 
reveals the horrific truth of his own patricide to Oedipus. The dialogical process of 
gathering this shocking intelligence is of dramatic interest, for two orders of evaluation, 
rational and prophetic, the detective and the oracular, will need to combine, culminating in 
chiastic reversals of fortune and substitutions of roles. 
 Oedipus is an exemplar of lucid and independent intelligence, a commanding 
detective figure. He is a figure of the logos as a medium of truth disclosure, as it involves 
accountability, ascribing responsibility for past deeds. Having solved the riddle of the 
sphinx to become the king of Thebes, he is confident in his power of investigation and 
disclosure, ready to reveal the unknown cause of Thebes' devastating plague. As Vernant 
and Vidal-Naquet suggest, Oedipus, an empiricist, has nothing but scorn for the supposed 
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insight of the aged diviner Tiresias, his eyes permanently closed to the light of the sun.111 
For Oedipus, knowledge is not a paradox. 
As Vernant and Vidal-Naquet argue, Oedipus, in many ways exemplary of a newly 
confident modern man, must learn that logos, in oracular fashion, always delays revealing 
its full meanings. In tragedy, the oracle is always enigmatic but never lies. Far from offering 
empirical closure, an oracle affords maximum opportunity to err. To Oedipus' question, are 
Polypus and Merope my parents, Apollo will not answer, confirm, or satisfy, rather he 
provokes a catastrophic chain of events with his prediction: you will sleep with your mother 
and kill your father, a truth Oedipus is ultimately helpless to evade.112  
Oedipus Rex encourages a recursive attention to the temporal repetitions of the 
riddling logos. For far from mastering the riddle of the Theban Sphinx, giving it the closure 
he had thought, Oedipus, it emerges, has unwittingly repeated the travesty of generational 
separation his seeming solution to the Sphinx’s riddle had intimated. Oedipus has confused 
and collapsed the roles of child and husband, brother and father. The specification and 
division of logos has been mocked, parodied, confusion reigns. The tragic agent finds he's 
unable to arrest the expansive movement of oracular signification; rather, by the ordained 
will of the gods, his role in their theatre of the absurd has yet to unfold its full significance. 
Moreover, Oedipus’s initially aggressive desire to overcome the discreet silence of Tiresias 
on the question of his genealogy suggests that there are mysteries that should be left 
untouched. The free will of the rational agent encounters the qualifying forces of deeper 
necessities, the power of Ananke, retribution, which the blind Tiresias recognised only too 
clearly. 
 The prophetic, riddling logos of the Apollonian oracle engenders the tortuous 
journey of Oedipus through both abomination and redemption, tormented and ultimately 
sublimated by a forbidden contact with the terrible light of the divine. Later, Oedipus will 
share the paradoxical gift of second sight with the prophet Tiresias he once despised. Now, 
as Vernant and Vidal-Naquet suggest, Oedipus is an intermediary between humanity and 
the gods, his very name a signifier of many fates. Oedipus’ name is a riddle which suggests 
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the torsions of his destiny, an opposition of will and fate, human omniscience and chthonic 
destiny: 'The double meaning of Oedipus is to be found in the name itself, in the opposition 
between the first two syllables and the third, Oida; I know: this is one of the key words on 
the lips of Oedipus triumphant, of Oedipus the tyrant. Pous: foot: the mark stamped at birth 
on one whose destiny is to end up as he began, as one excluded like the wild beast whose 
foot makes it flee, whose foot isolates him from other men.... The whole of the tragedy of 
Oedipus seems to be contained in the play to which the riddle of his name lends itself.’113 
Is Oedipus himself intelligible as a character, an ethos, without the complex which bears 
his name?114 
Readings of the play such as Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 's argue for the dramatic 
temporality of expansive recognition, where the meaning of events in the light of a partial 
human understanding, and their true or divine significance, are palpably opposite and 
exclusive to each other. Tragedy announces a semiotics, a formation of logos as the site of 
a struggle between rational inquiry and fatal necessity, intention and complex structuration; 
logos points to a contestation or perpetual agon, between the city and its laws, and a bloody 
familial inheritance and the destiny it inscribes.115 Again, we should note that the 
explanatory power of logos is revealed in Greek tragedy through an unpredictable process, 
a clash of temperaments, drives, desires, in an environment of crisis, it is an explosive 
return of the repressed, and it creates worlds upside down. 
Logos is a resource, not a substance. It is achingly, painfully full of significance, 
but it may be empty, ethereal. As Iocasta reminds her and Oedipus' similarly ill-starred son 
Eteocles, bent on preserving his monarchical power in Euripides' Phoenissae (Phoenician 
Women): 
 'Is admiration precious? It is an empty gain. 
  This wealth you long for – what advantage comes with it? 
  For a mere name (logos), it brings you endless trouble... 
  We hold in trust, as stewards, what belongs to the gods, 
  Who, when they will, in turn take from us what is theirs.  
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  (Phoenissae 550-55)116  
One does not own logos, yet its mesmeric power of appearance promises the world. For 
logos is a structure of feeling, an impossible, transcendental desire that is the prerogative 
of the gods alone as Antigone reminds us: 
Come, Nemesis, 
Come, violent thunders of Zeus, 
Come, white-hot lightnings! 
When man’s proud speech swells beyond measure, 
You lay his boasting to rest.  
(Phoenissae (190-95)  
Euripidean tragedy emphasises in nominalist fashion that language is both promise 
and ultimate deception: 
    If men all shared on judgement of what’s noble and wise, 
    All wordy quarrelling would vanish from the earth. 
    But as it is, there’s no such thing as ‘equal right’ 
    Or ‘justice’. These are words; in fact – they don’t exist.  
   (Phoenissae  498-502) 
 
The tragic chronotope problematises the dramatic ironies and deceptive immediacy of 
language, interrogating an earthly existence that is transient and cyclical. Human existence 
will always be situated between dual inheritances, divine powers of knowledge and 
deception, skepticism and hope. I will term this meta-theory of the fraught relationship 
between language and subjective volition, appearance and reality, as a tragic code that 
argues for the ever-present power of deception, by language, divine ordinance, and fatal 
inheritance, in the realm of mortal affairs. I now step further back in time and discuss the 
sixth century BCE Theogeny of Hesiod. I seek to relate the ambiguous potentiality of logos 
to Hesiod’s pluralist evocation of creative and critical principles, his genealogy of the 
paradoxical conditions of culture and civilisation. 
 
Hesiod, Genealogy, Paideia 
 
My reading of Hesiod’s Theogeny is interested in its genealogical form, and more 
particularly, the paideia, the fluid repertory of formative principles it presents as necessary 
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to the creation of civilisation, law, and artistic endeavour. I suggest that the abundant 
narrative episodes of the Theogeny encourage an appreciation of the many dispositions, 
contestations, and transformations necessary for a critical sociology. Hesiod’s is a 
philosophy of ‘complex assent’, inscribing the manifold knowledges, experiences, and 
equivocal processes needed to engender the logos, logismos, as a socialised power of 
explanation. 
Hesiod's Theogeny is a sequence of creation stories, telling of divine rivalries, 
familial violence, periodic convulsions of war and peace, of violent discord and prosperous 
monarchies. As we shall see, it implies a poetics of accumulation and iterative recurrence, 
demanding close attention to the complex web of relationships between the actors of its 
vast cosmological theatre. The imaginary world the Theogeny constructs is inhabited by 
natural powers, moral abstractions and psychic drives, and these hybrid figures constantly 
overlap and cross paths.  
The Theogeny’s chronotope moves fluidly between the eternal time of the gods as 
cosmological first powers and a social drama of procreation and familial discord. Barry 
Sandywell suggests that Hesiod belonged to a pre-Aristotelian thought-world of Milesian 
cosmology soon to produce the speculative theories of Anaximander. Such a world was yet 
to demarcate physical and sociological observation, the ontic from the ethical. In 
constructing a cosmo-social chronotope, the Milesian Hesiod moved fluidly between 
idioms, evoking a ‘self-differentiating pantheon of elemental forces, Gods, Titans, and 
suffering mortals all bounded by the horizon of Sky and Earth'.117 
 Hesiod’s is a self-differentiating pantheon, because it owes its origin to a 
primordial Chaos that allowed the divine Cosmos to be rent from it: ‘The first power to 
come into being was Chaos. Then arose Gaia, broad-bosomed earth.’118 Chaos is without 
attributes; it is no-thing. Yet Chaos comes into being, it is neither being nor nothingness, a 
portent of the paradoxes that are to follow. As the originary progenitor, Chaos is the fluid 
matrix of different ontic possibilities: gods, cosmological powers like day and night, 
geographical features like the Earth and the Heavens, and ethical abstractions such as love 
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(Eros), war (Eris), and necessity (Ananke). If Chaos is the non-being that conditions being 
it does not inspire a logic of creative design, it cannot be ontologically recognised or 
appealed to. Chaos provides a horizon in which the ontic, that which is, is relative, open to 
dissemination, its identity dependent on relationships with what is opposite and other. The 
paradox evoked by the impossible arrival and being of Chaos is repeated in the antithetical 
parentage of light: ‘And out of Chaos black Night and Erebos came into being, and out of 
Night then came the brightness of Aither and Day.’119 
Rather than polarity, Hesiod's narrative exposition suggests reciprocation and inter-
relationship. Chaos is, then, an arche, an infinite first principle of generation and 
governance, which signifies texture rather than offering an originary subject or an efficient 
cause. Anterior to any distinction between nature and culture, Chaos engenders a 
miraculous chronotope that interpellates natural history with social and existential allegory: 
 
The first power to come into being was Chaos. Then arose Gaia, broad-bosomed 
earth, which serves as the ever-immovable base for all the immortals who dwell on 
the peaks of snowy Olympos: and then shadowy Tartaros deep in the wide-wayed 
earth; and then Eros surpassing every immortal in beauty, who, a loosener of limbs, 
brings all immortals and mortals under his power and makes them unable to think 
as they should.120  
 
Eros is the fourth created power in the Theogeny, born from the phallus of the murdered 
and dismembered Ouranos, forming the flesh of Aphrodite and after her Eros, desire, lust. 
Associated with the nurturing foundations of chthonic Earth, Eros emerges as an immanent 
and interiorised psychosomatic force, born prior to any hint, in the Theogeny, of 
subjectivity or conscious life. Eros is not a subject; it is a fertile power present from the 
beginning of the world. Eros elaborates the dramatic tensions of the psyche, the vital life-
principle of human beings, and here it acts as an ambiguous power of both preservation 
and destruction. Eros is an arche, an originary generative principle, the cosmic source of 
the most pervasive oppositions in human life - pleasure and pain, union and separation, 
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birth and death; a power of binding and gathering, but also dispersion and opposition – 
‘wherever there is difference (differentiation) there you also find Eros’.121  
On the one hand Eros weakens knowledge and remembrance, dissolving social and 
psychic boundaries, clouding reason and instilling wayward passion. A potent potential for 
transformation, Eros rules at will the gods (Sophocles Trachiniae 441-3), conquering even 
Heracles who has never yielded to any enemy (Trachiniae 488-9).122 On the other hand 
Eros is the procreative matrix of the personified forces of Law (Themis) and Memory 
(Mnemosune), primordially linked with Mnemosune as a capacity for binding, unification, 
and the mobilisation of forces.123 Aristotle suggests that Hesiod discovered Eros as a 
complex philosophical principle, an arche implying that there must be in the world some 
cause to move things (dispersion) and combine them (Metaphysics 984b30).124  
Eros attends the powerfully ambiguous goddess Aphrodite, born, as we noted, from 
the bloodied foam or 'aphros' that was spilt from the violent castration of Ouranos, Heaven, 
by his son Kronos. Hesiod’s narrative juxtaposition of blood lust and amorous passion 
suggests the libidinal investments of violence: the love Aphrodite offers and guards retains 
the genetic trace of Ouranos' dismemberment, Olympian civil serenity confronts the 
vengeful cry of a bloody inheritance. Aphrodite, Hesiod tells us playfully, is also called 
'Philommedes' because she arose from the medea or genitals. A dialogical force, she will 
signify visceral sexuality and the cohesive power of love, deceptive speech and winning 
persuasion, sweet delicacies and violent passion: ‘these were her honors: flirtatious 
conversations of maidens, smiles and deceits, sweet delight and passion of love and gentle 
enticements’.125 
 Eros is always in excess of conceptual determination, a mixture of qualities, a 
repertoire of possible outcomes. Eros is allegory rather than symbolic identification. Eros 
is time, difference, the prompting of varied memories, many stories held in reserve. Eros 
suggests that mortals exist in a medial state between heaven and earth; they suffer from 
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and forever require the power of deception and charming appearances. Moreover, Eros, 
presiding over the birth of Law (Themis) and Memory (Mnemosune), is an element in 
paideia of forces which parent civilised values. Eros is a dialogical power in the foundation 
and governance of the life of humans and gods, binding together and destroying, a potential 
for both stability and revolution. As tender desire and aesthetic charm, Eros harmonises 
and appeases, as a visceral psychosomatic drive Eros overrules even the reason of Zeus, 
thereby allegorising the tenuousness of the newly won civic order and prosperity under 
Zeus’s aegis. 
Homer's Iliad as an example of the power of Eros to distribute differential effects, 
to create narrative oscillations between the forces of unity and separation. Eros is the prime 
motivation for the bloody siege of Troy, its resultant disasters and victorious exultations. 
While Eros offers the epic-historical grandeur of an unprecedented pan-Hellenic military 
collaboration, uncontrollable desire also sets the scene for Achilles' petulance and rage 
when Agamemnon seizes his captured slave-girl Briseis in book 1 of The Iliad.  
Eros is the horizon of that intermediate world where lustful gods and mortals 
intermingle, creating hybrid formations, mésalliances. Eros lends itself to both fertile 
collaborations and catastrophic tensions. It enables the marriage and divorce of Heaven 
and Earth, and the stormy, perennially threatened union of Hera and Zeus that generates 
such refractive strife for mortals below. Hesiod's reader is encouraged to keep in mind that 
Zeus’s erotically driven fecundity and philandering indiscretions paradoxically create 
many of the artistic and civic powers, the Muses, Orderly Government, Justice, and 
Peace.126 As the paradoxical condition of civilised attainments, Eros is similar to the 
persuasive force of language or logos, permanently suspended between the material and 
the ideal, earth and heaven, poison and cure, continuity and instability. 
The paradoxes of Hesiod's mythic universe and the first principles it introduces are 
such that the sense of the ontic it cultivates precludes definitive exclusion, the pure 
exteriority of one power or element to another. If Chaos suggests an interaction of being 
and not-being, a coming to be of what never was, it exemplifies a paralogical play of unity 
and difference, a form of coincidentia oppositorum. Unlike the progressivist ‘myth to 
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logos’ thesis, Hesiod limns a philosophy that suggests that no mode of understanding can 
be autonomous, transcendental; rather there is always relation, structuration, a plurality of 
formative powers to keep in mind.  
Deconstruction, with its admiration of text, texture, the necessary relationship 
between signifiers, suggests that univocal intentionality - the dream of authorship - 
undermines itself by necessarily drawing on a reserve of ambiguous forces, figures, 
metaphors, but also stories, mythemes. I would argue, contrary to its own practitioners' 
claims, against the idea of deconstruction as a methodology; rather it revisits the formative, 
creative gods of the Pagan imaginary, a polysemic paideia of forces, the paradoxes of 
civilisation and law. 
Hesiod leaves us in no doubt that genealogy is a philosophy of co-existence and 
paradoxical creations. Violence constitutes a general condition of creative trajectories: the 
castration of Ouranos by his son Kronos/time is a precondition for the appearance of Light, 
in turn enabling the cultural aspirations of human beings, symbolised by fire and the 
communal hearth. The near catastrophic war with the Titans, featuring yet another 
patricide, that of Zeus over Kronos, produces the more benevolent and enlightened 
Olympian order presided over by Zeus. That order is indelibly marked with a history of 
violence, which continues in the suppression, yet never the extinguishment, of the Titans' 
chthonian powers of bloodlust, darkness and vengeance.127 
Hesiodic genealogy is fascinated by the differential characteristics of protean gods, 
their conceptual personae. Hesiod articulates the way a god can embody both the 
modernising functions of the nomos, the civil law, and serve as a reminder of more ancient, 
divine codes of justice that record the exigency of barbarism and transgression in the 
founding of civilisation. Pallas Athena, the goddess of civilising love, also presides over 
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war and destruction; Hermes, a mischievous trickster figure, the illegitimate son of Zeus, 
also figures the modern technologies (technê) of writing and the numerical arts.  
Hermes is the well-disposed messenger god, the god of guidance and prosperity. 
The prototype for Odysseus, he is also an ingenious god, skilled in trickery and deception, 
having stolen from and fooled his own brother and then evaded judgment for the deed. 
Hermes is a persona of the intellect, for he is the god of mêtis, prudent and guileful, always 
preferring persuasion to weapons. The patron of orators, he is also a musician, seducing 
with his charms. Embodying a multiplicity of cultural functions, desired and dangerous 
like all mischievous trickster figures, Hermes represents the crossroads of fortune, 
apportioning both good and ill luck in his turn.128 
The relationship between the present prosperity of a civil hierarchy, and the mythic 
memory of recurring cycles of violence and retribution, is suggestive of Hesiod's 
genealogical method, citing histories of the body, of affects and impulses, that compete 
with and disturb emerging humanist celebrations of the nomos, the social contract and rule 
of law in the city-states which were replacing tribal and customary law by the sixth century 
BCE. Consequently, both Eros as unity and differentiation, and Eris as envy, competitive 
urges and productive rivalry, are persistent figures in the Hesiodic imaginary, allowing 
holistic analyses, a complex assent to those forces that perpetually threaten optimistic 
modern ideals, that recall a more archaic paideia of vital desires, of struggle, conquest, 
revolution, sacrifice. 
Hesiod’s genealogical interrogation of the normative is manifested in the uncertain 
valency of the King of the gods, Zeus. Zeus is not simply made manifest by the sky; he is 
hidden by it. He is not simply the regular, periodic cycles of the season but the opaque 
unpredictability of the wind, clouds, and lightning, an affective focus for celebration and 
terror. Zeus in turn must recognise his own emplotment, the texture of forces by which he 
is positioned, the primordial powers he must remember and respect. In Homer, Zeus is 
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depicted bowing down in reverential awe towards primordial Nux, or night. Heraclitus, 
emphasising the polytheistic field of contestations that modify ambitions, assures us that if 
the sun-king oversteps his mark, the Erinyes, enforcers of fate, will visit vengeance even 
upon him.129 
The historical necessity of violent acts of transgression, and the equally assured 
reparations that need to be made for them, haunt the Hesiodic paideia. In Hesiod there is a 
historicity of differential forces, but no wholesome tradition, no assured source of moral 
appeal and imitation. The story of Prometheus, his theft and subsequent punishment, 
instead potentialises tactical means, insisting that the provisional, contingent, and 
deceptive are intrinsic to Pagan sacrality.  
J.P. Vernant suggest that the story of Prometheus' deception of Zeus elaborates an 
ambiguous logic of rivalry and discord.130 In the Theogeny, Prometheus is defined by his 
mêtis or guile, which is closely associated with his dolie technê, his skilful trickery, 
technical capacities, cunning, foresight, and deception. Prometheus decides to rival Zeus' 
omnipotence and steal the best meat of the ox by disguising it, concealed in the paunch; in 
a second act of concealment, Prometheus steals for humanity the sacred hearth, the 
weariless fire of the Olympian gods, hiding it in the hollow of a fennel stalk.   
As Hesiod's narrative unfolds, it emerges that Prometheus' trickery is in fact part of 
Zeus' greater mêtis, a premeditated plot to bring evil as well as good to mortals, as 
punishment for human hubris. We are reminded of the cyclical interplay, to be theorised 
by Presocratics like Anaximander and Empedocles, between the cultural necessity of finite 
and partial desire, and the infinite reparations that must be made for such violence and 
transgression against the holistic unity of the Cosmos. At work in Prometheus’s story is a 
contagion of human and divine characteristics, a complex mimesis of deceptive wiles. 
Hesiod’s figures, his gods and men, activate an extensive paideia of social roles and tactical 
qualities. 
In exchange for the fire stolen, Zeus invents a necessary evil, woman, disguised in 
beautiful adornments, described in a language which insists upon this incident's similarity 
                                                 
129 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. Jeanette Lloyd, Harvester Press and 
Humanities Press, Brighton and Atlantic Highlands NJ, 1980 (first publ. Paris 1974), 112. 
130 See Vernant, Myth and Society, 168-81. 
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to Prometheus' earlier deceptions, with a narrative reversal, the trickster tricked. Despite 
the crude misogyny of this mytheme, the arrival of woman and the unleashing of the direful 
contents of Pandora's box inaugurates a narratological emphasis on complex exchanges 
and distributions for the common man: 'throughout his life evil and good alternate 
endlessly' (609). A lot of good and bad helps to define the medial status of humanity 
between animal and divine, the contingency of earthly appearance and the divine promise 
of eternal truth.  
Prometheus’s transgression has enabled technological development and provision 
of the hearth, the site of civilised community. In exchange, the arrival of woman has 
signified the post-lapsarian appearance of anxiety and labour, but also the solace of 
marriage and the means of procreation: the corrupting supplement is also a precondition. 
For the masculine reader of Hesiod's mythemes, the man who is fated to marry, good and 
bad are counterparts rather than opposites, signifying the ambiguity of woman as 
intellectually distressing, affectively consoling, and materially necessary. The gifts of the 
gods in their magical, deceptive appearance are irresistibly beautiful and must be accepted, 
yet are often evil in their consequences. Already a topos of the ambiguous effects of 
charming deception is in place.131 
 The tension between appearance and reality cannot be resolved, deception cannot 
be wished away.  Woman is linked by an associative field to the power of eloquence, the 
deceptive mien of the gods, the cultural importance of transfigurative charms and 
bewitchments; she is the mêtis that both gives and takes away, an equivocal force. 
The Promethean myth does not constitute an imperative to act or decide, it is not 
prescriptive in the manner of the Judeo-Christian tradition, for both gods and men are 
derivate from forces and principles that are themselves equivocal, non-identical. The chaos 
of cultural memory is a matrix and a haunting. I think the genealogical method of Hesiod 
opens an imaginary of virtual dispositions and personae awaiting contextual discussion, 
celebration, and problematisation. There is no release from immanence, no command 
morality. Hesiod’s focus is intensive, a materialist rendering of somatic forces and violent 
creations, but its philosophy is extensive, pluralist, allegorical, and enigmatic. 
                                                 
131 See The Poems of Hesiod, lines 535-616. 
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                                     Conclusion  
 
My critique of the progressivist thesis has argued that logos, before its 
determination by Plato and Aristotle as apodictical rational method, invoked narrative and 
dramatic codes, recalling a multiplicity of stories, drawing on a cultural memory of 
ambiguous figures like Odysseus, Prometheus, Pandora, and Zeus. The revised logos I’ve 
intimated activates dialogical forces, a mysterium of non-intentional figures and allegories. 
In future chapters I argue that rhetoric as an ethos, as a means of critical invention, as a 
philosophy of communication, continued to activate and meditate on the potential field of 
logos. In so doing, rhetoric discovers mixed forces, it argues for semiotic forms that were 
both pragmatic and transfigurative. Rhetoric discovers itself not as an episteme, but as a 
medium between the protection of collaborative forms and an inventive desire to move 
beyond legalistic norms. Rhetoric’s theoretical power comes from embracing its 
discontinuous elements, the mixed inheritance, rational and magical, of logos’s protean 
genealogies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Rhetorical Personae of the Presocratics 
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In this chapter, I argue that a rhetorical ethos, a particular discursive tendency, is 
given initial historical form in what Barry Sandywell has called the ‘logological form of 
life’. I argue that the conceptual personae of the Presocratics are formed in relation to the 
life-spheres of work, technology, law, ethics, and religion. A body of representations, 
consisting of biographical detail, anecdote, rumour – what is called the ‘doxographical’ 
tradition – helps to engender the conceptual personae of the Presocratics, the way in which 
they address themselves to society, their habits, lifestyle, idiosyncrasies. The conceptual 
personae of the Presocratics are contradictory and inconsistent, responsive to a polyphony 
of voices, foci for a plurality of hopes, projections, fears; they are a culture’s unconscious, 
its need for both heroes and mystics. 
The close relationship between Presocratics such as Empedocles and Democritus 
and the first rhetoricians – the first practitioners and theorists of persuasive speech, Gorgias 
and Protagoras – is strongly suggested by the doxographical testimony. Empedocles is 
famed to have taught Gorgias, and is himself renowned as a rhetorician, a master of a 
magical and enchanting logos. Although unverifiable, Democritus and Pratogoras are said 
to have been closely associated as natives of the Greek colony of Abdera. Democritus, like 
Protagoras, was interested in language in its grammatical and persuasive functions, its 
origins and social purpose. In this chapter I expand on the close association of Presocratic 
and rhetorical personae, with reference to two Presocratic thinkers, Thales and Heraclitus. 
I argue that the personae of both thinkers draw attention to three forms of critical 
representation appropriate to a dynamic public-intellectual. These are:  invention, a 
resourceful and transformative deployment of cultural materials, open to paradoxes; 
paideia, the importance of a polymathic combination of knowledges and breadth of 
experience; and ethos, a self-exceeding tendency, eternally ambivalent in the way it 
addresses society, a texture of qualities rather than a unified ego.  
I argue that Thales and Heraclitus prefigure the ambivalence of the rhetor towards 
culture and politics. They seek to protect public discourse and democratic spaces, while 
radically critiquing popular assumptions. They are a figure of constructive activity, of a 
positive cultural praxis, yet they are misanthropes, moral enigmas. I argue that these proto-
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rhetorical personae are equivocal because they are constituted within, given subjectivity 
by, diverse and contingent representations, in anecdote, aphorism, episodic narration, 
dialogue and dramaturgy. As Tacitus reminds us in the introduction, rhetors cannot speak 
without exceeding themselves, they are a copious tendency, a miscellany of traits, an entire 
cultural complex. The rhetor is a medium of dispositions, inventive strategies, challenging 
performances, theatrical gestures; the rhetor is logos’s diverse cultural memory, its non-
identity with itself. 
 
Thales – Between Praxis and Theory 
 
I begin my discussion with the Milesian philosopher Thales, his social 
accomplishments, and his intriguing eccentricities. We have no reported sayings or 
biographical details whose validity we can be absolutely certain of. Therefore our reception 
of Thales is mediated through reportage, hearsay, legend, and folklore, what I will refer to 
as doxographical testimony, a miscellany of opinion and rumour. The doxography’s 
secondary and selective filtering of memory is of considerable interest. As a body of 
reportage passed down over hundreds of years, it is not only interested in Thales' theoretical 
doctrines, but his practical achievements. In particular, the doxography is intrigued by 
Thales’ conduct and attitude in various situations, interpellating him into different 
chronotopes and narrative frames. The portrait emerging of Thales is protean; he variously 
embodies the role of civic hero, legislator, ambassador, inventor, prophet, and misanthrope.  
According to the testimony of the third century Roman biographer Diogenes 
Laertius, in his Lives of the Philosophers,  Thales was known as a successful politician and 
ambassador, advising the federation of Ionian cities, and successfully dissuading his city-
state Miletus from what turned out to be a disastrous military collaboration with Lydia. 
Biographers such as Laertius, content to chronicle diverse genealogies and perspectives, 
portray Thales as inventor, technical innovator, mathematician, geographer and 
astronomer. Thales is the first to discover the period between one solstice and the next, of 
immense importance for calendrical standardisation. Thales' characteristics converge on 
the figure of a successful and timely practitioner, a military hero, his city-state’s saviour, a 
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cunning merchant and proto-capitalist.132 Thales’ philosophical reputation is intimately 
related to his intensive endeavours, his situatedness and timeliness, borne out in his local 
activism, civic projects,  and architectural construction projects.133 
Tejera suggests that in archaic Greece, Thales' wisdom (he is commonly recognised 
as one of the Seven Sages) or Sophia was considered a 'versatile competence', a savoir-
faire, a technê. By the age of Plato and Aristotle, Sophia will gradually lose its eclectic 
implication, its inscription in social processes and life-spheres, instead becoming its 
inactive result.134 Practice and Theory part ways. Sandywell argues that the doxography 
of Thales loves to dramatise his critical speculations or ‘logological’ investigations, as an 
extended and differential activity within a social context. Thales, embodying the cultural 
function of the logos, engenders texts and discourses, and these are communicated in 
particular communities to specific audiences.135  
As Sandywell suggestively argues, 'Thales' is less significant as a real person than 
as a sociological index, an allegory of Miletus' burgeoning technological development and 
growing mercantile economy. Sandywell argues that the many and sometimes 
contradictory frames in which Thales' character appears emblematises the excitement of 
technical, geographical, and astronomical discoveries in the sixth century Greek city-states. 
'Thales' serves as a focus for the social consequences of increasing knowledge-
specialisation; he projects the desires and anxieties of the new technê.136 
For classical biographers such as Diogenes Laertius, scientific theory was not a 
completely distinct field of inquiry, or a discipline orientated towards objective knowledge 
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and general laws. Thinkers like Laertius see science, in its classical guise as natural 
philosophy, as a significant cultural pursuit with material effects. For the doxographical 
tradition, the ethos, the character and disposition, of philosophical endeavour was of great 
interest. In what we would call sage-literature, the ethos of the sage can accrue a variety of 
characteristics and mannerisms. ‘Thales’ is not egocentric or psychologically consistent, 
but a picaresque character, a protagonist of different situations. The chronotopes that 
situate him as a diverse figure and that dramatise and trial his ideas are not dissimilar to 
the eclectic episodic form of Menippean satire.137  
The adventurer and naïf of many situations and episodes, ‘Thales’ is alternately 
noble and opportunistic, practically minded and abstracted. He is an exemplary citizen of 
the polis, its representative ambassador and occasional hero, but is said to have lived a 
solitary life, without children, rebarbative towards those who enjoin him to lead a settled 
middle-class lifestyle. His pregnantly laconic and double-edged responses to such inquiries 
indicate that the figure of the intellectual and the logological desire he embodies, will, like 
an oracle, eternally tease, yielding few empirical satisfactions: 
Some say that he married and had a son...others that he remained a bachelor but 
adopted his sister's son. When he was asked why he had no children he replied, 
'Because I love children'. When his mother pressed him to marry he said, 'It's too 
early'. When he had passed his prime and she insisted again, he said, 'It's too 
late'.138 
 
What piques the collective memory of the doxographical tradition in an oft-cited exchange 
such as this? 'Thales’ is the enigma, the paradox that continues to fascinate; his dry, 
occasionally cynical aphoristic wit burgeons into a popular tradition of gnomic wisdom 
that will include luminaries such as Marcus Aurelius (Meditations) and the Pascal of the 
Pensées. Fragmented in space and time, constituted only in traces, in representations, 
rhetorical deportment challenges normative discourse, and disseminates itself as ever more 
curious legends, commentaries, attempted imitations, and genealogies. 
Cryptic Thales is an equivocal symbol of the ‘texture’ of an evolved society that 
has begun to discuss and debate its achievements and future direction. Thales represents 
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the intellectual as both marginal and essential to a vital civil-society. By his acumen, his 
polymathy and diverse research capacities, Thales the generalist increases the cultural-
capital of Miletian society. Yet Thales is also a secretive, introspective thinker and 
speculative ethicist, mysteriously propounding water as the arche of the universe, 
cryptically enjoining humanity to 'know itself'. In one genealogy he will inaugurate the 
anti-materialist vocabulary of fifth century Socratic moral philosophy. Thales figures the 
theoretical moment in early Greek thought, but not as something that definitively arrives, 
is present, beyond myth’s ambiguities and equivocations. Such ambiguities and 
equivocations are the 'pitfalls' of theoretical endeavour: 
He is said to have been taken from his house by an old woman to look at the stars, 
and to have fallen into a ditch: when he cried out, the old woman said: 'Do you 
think, Thales, that you will learn what is in the heavens when you cannot see what 
is in front of your feet?'139 
 
 One can talk of both comic interest and anxiety over the thaumazein, the distracted 
attitude of wonder that was held to characterise the ethos of the speculative philosopher. 
This a logological attitude Socrates argues for in Platonic dialogues such as the Theaetetus: 
the philosopher transcends the quotidian, its everyday concerns, its ephemera. 'Thales' is 
here the dreamy, aloof individualist whose pursuit of a rarefied existence is destined to 
threaten social coherence.  
Perhaps the doxography remarks Thales within another genealogy, as a progenitor 
for the state assassination of Socrates, who dared in a democracy to abstract himself from 
social participation and normative protocols of behaviour. Thales’ refusal of domesticity 
and children is a mock-serious, yet irreversible, 'fall' from shared foundations, from a 
common nurturing life-world and its natural cycles. The logological attitude emerges as 
the distinctive power of the rhetor (Odysseus, Hermes) to defy coercive logics, and to 
inaugurate their own values and imaginative projections. 
 
Heraclitus 
 
                                                 
139 Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy 67. 
70 
 
I now discuss the three rhetorical principles of invention, ethos, and paideia in 
Heraclitus’s Peri Phusis (On Nature), which was written around 500 BCE. I argue that for 
Heraclitus, logos, the language of critique, should be understood as inventive and 
transformative. Heraclitean critical praxis attempts to renew a social imaginary burdened 
by cognitive errors, partial desires, mob prejudice, and a lack of nuance, an absence of 
dilemma. Heraclitus’s logos inveighs against false ontologies and encourages appreciation 
of the play of difference and unity within the concept. Heraclitus evokes logos as 
paradoxical, paralogical, a post-normative semiotic resource that invokes the differential 
power of representation, its extension across times and spaces. 
I then discuss Heraclitus’s methodological emphasis on an extensive paideia, a 
polymathic education and critical training in a plurality of life-spheres. I focus on 
Heraclitus’s interest in comparative method, particularly his analogies between the human 
and animal worlds, and his theological allusions. In Heraclitus, a combination of 
knowledges is indicated; anthropology and sociology meet theology, cosmology, ethics, 
and linguistics. I argue that the figure of the rhetorical polymath is born from a combination 
of attitudes, a crossing of materialism and idealism. 
Lastly, I discuss Heraclitus’s ethos, his enactment of a logological form of life. 
Here, Heraclitus is concerned with the wise power of folly, the vitality of gnomic 
insouciance, and the need to inhabit a world upside-down. The logos, I argue, finds 
fulfilment as an ethos, it is not an innate rationality, but a creative reinvention of popular 
conventions: a recursive energy and vigorous display of acculturation. As a medium of 
many situations, the logological ethos can never entirely know itself; it is oracular, 
performative, without telos. 
 
 
Invention 
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Let us begin with Heraclitus' attack on the cognitive malaise of his contemporaries: 
‘Of this account (logos) which holds forever men prove uncomprehending, both before 
hearing it and when first they have heard it. (B1).’140  
 Heraclitus articulates logos as a counter-intuitive dynamism, whose suggestions 
and traces haunt and provoke. The signifying power that is logos refuses the immediacy of 
appearance, it demands reflection and representation, it is not a phenomenological essence. 
The iron logician Aristotle was puzzled by this sentence, for the adverb 'forever' (aiei) can 
equally apply to the proud eternity of the logos or its perpetual opacity to human 
understanding. No grammatical reading will ever resolve the teasing ambiguity of this 
grammatical crux, which Charles Kahn aptly describes as a 'more than Delphic delight in 
paradox, enigma, and equivocation'.141  
At any event, one will never comprehend the logos without sensitivity to linguistic 
form; older oral authorities, the epic singer, the charismatic minstrel, are decisively 
displaced from their positions of authority: ‘It is wise, listening not to me but to the logos, 
to agree that all things are one’ (Kahn, XXXVI). Let us further contemplate Heraclitus' 
diagnosis of the contemporary state of human knowledges: ‘most people do not understand 
the things they meet with, nor do they know when they have learned; but they seem to 
themselves to do so’ (B17). Knowledge deficits, error, ignorance, are symptomatic of the 
wider evil of demotic complacency, indolence, and the perennial human desire to quash 
rather than nourish further reflection. Heraclitus reminds his fellow Ephesians that they 'do 
not know how to hear or even to speak' (B19); uncomprehending, 'they hear like the deaf. 
The saying is their witness: absent while present' (B2).142 Here, Heraclitus alludes to a 
popular witticism, a paradox, in order to intensify his attack upon the obtuseness of crude 
empiricism. 
What emerges in Heraclitus’s irritation with sensualism is a portrait of alienation, 
for the human condition is characterised by a fragmentary phantasmagoria of images and 
partial notions: 'Bad witnesses for men are the eyes and ears of those who have foreign 
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souls' (B107). The comforting relationship of empirical experience to understanding has 
been displaced, for now the senses are revealed as an index of the desensitising, destructive 
operations of prejudice. The previously assured subject now inhabits a dystopia of unco-
ordinated sensual delusions, particularly vulnerable to the materiality and aesthetic power 
of language: the 'foolish man is put in a flutter at every word' (B87).  
Heraclitus relishes this fantastic and grotesque imaginary, the dislocated world of 
fools and madmen that he has posited in the signifying space previously occupied by 
empirical certainty. For it is an imaginary where the vertiginous inversions of analogy can 
replace conceptual norms and usual assumptions: 'a man when he is drunk is led by a boy, 
stumbling, not knowing where he goes, his soul moist’ (B117). It is a world upside-down, 
but this folly and inversion is not temporary or regenerative. Humanity is trapped in its 
own absurdity. The atavistic madness, the stuttering sickness of the moist intoxicated soul, 
requires the medicinal attentions of the logos. Logismos, the active process of logological 
reflection, is a restorative method, a critical alertness to the sustaining relationship between 
mind and body, between psychosomatic and environmental conditions. Heraclitus 
recommends a ‘dry soul’ as wisest and best, a remedy to the wild 'fluttering' of ideas, 
inscribing reason as a calm feeling, possible in the absence of acute environmental 
impingements.143 
Heraclitus's logos assumes a therapeutic power in a world whose values have been 
reversed, exchanged: 'immortals are mortals, mortals immortals: living their death, dying 
their life' (B62). Previously stable nouns now inspire a lively intellectual economy, 
paradoxical play displaces the banal and the normative. Looking back to Hesiod we can 
say that the logos  refuses predication, it is an ana-logic, a declension of simultaneous 
possibilities, a philosophy of necessary coexistences. Such an extension of ‘sense’ is 
possible only when nature and culture constantly cross, in a world of allegories and hybrid 
chronotopes. For Heraclitus, the horizon in which the subject will now comprehend itself 
is figurative, emblematic, generic. The human situation now needs enframing by a variety 
of fictional and thematic strategies. In this world, unexpected signifying tactics, such as an 
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allegorical tableau vivant, might arrest any ready calculus: 'Lifetime is a child at play, 
moving pieces in a game. Kingship belongs to the child.'144 
Logos and logological intelligence act in a world necessitating representation, 
generating a play of relationships that always exceeds the knower, as frightening as it is 
exhilarating. Logological method might restore balance and equilibrium, but it is also a 
desire, an analogical appetite, a hunger for a copia of discursive resources, a breadth of 
sensibility. The metaphorical texture of logos is riven by alternating desires: it wants to be 
a subtle reinvention of conventional assumptions, a transcendence of the given, a kind of 
meta-language; however, it is also a mode of social analysis, in touch with the life of 
society, timely, appropriate, a medium of cultural exigencies. Heraclitus’s displacement of 
a language of certainty creates logos as an economy of desire, a permanent ambivalence. 
 
Paideia 
 
Heraclitus puts logological intelligence in touch with contemporary trends, 
particularly the burgeoning market economy of Ephesus, which encourages the circulation 
of values: 'fire is an exchange for all things, and all things are an exchange for fire, as goods 
for gold and gold for goods'.145 The figurative texture of the logos, a form capable of 
flexible allusion and indication, easily inhabits salutary social forces and popular idioms, 
their dynamism and common sense. The logos is also a medium of historicity, it mediates 
myth, archaic memory, complex creation stories. 
Sandywell offers us intriguing insights into the duality of fire's significance for the 
ancient Greeks. Fire combines and fuses the most elemental opposites. As life-giving 
warmth it symbolises the hearth, civilised rituals, the altars of the city, technical 
knowledge, and culture. However, fire is also the universal conflagration of war, a scourge 
on people and cities. Fire is a volatile and undecidable medium between life and death; as 
stolen from the gods it will bring both hope and technological progress, but in exchange 
punitive retribution, grief, toil, an inescapable state of delusion. Fire is modern optimism 
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and genealogical pessimism.146 Fire, in archaic Greek representation, is a holistic figure, 
Heraclitus’s equivocal metaphor for the cosmic intelligence and cyclical justice that will 
'discern and catch up with all things' (Kahn, CXXI).  
Logismos, in the plurality of its aspects and functions, is a semiotic breadth, 
encouraging comparative frames of reference and profound historical erudition, a varied 
paideia, a thick cultural memory. It is a pluralist imaginary, poised to critique partiality, 
sectarianism, and their correlatives in ontological assumptions and specious claims to 
identity. Heraclitus derides cultic practices of deity worship for their sectarian prejudices. 
He suggests that those who riotously celebrate Dionysus for the god's life-affirming virility 
need to recognise his identity with Hades, lord of the Underworld, god of the dead and god 
of death, an equivocal god, both malign and hospitable (B15). Licentiousness, obscenity, 
ritual, cultic violence, need to be confronted by a theological ecumenicism, diverse modes 
of religious sublimation. Here Heraclitus’s thought will anticipate the tolerant monism of 
Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise, its philological and textual sensitivities, its 
anti-foundational recalling of the bible’s own differential genealogies. Logological 
erudition challenges immediacy, an economy of relationships confronts self-presence, a 
multiplicity of senses converses with foundational logics. 
Heraclitus’s logos wishes to protect public space, to affirm a robust civil society 
that recognises varied attributes. An entire conception of political agency is opened in the 
interstices of the finite, the partial, and the self-identical: ‘the best choose one thing in 
return for all: ever-flowing fame from mortals; but most men satisfy themselves like beasts’ 
(B29). The mob are unprincipled, hedonistic creatures of nature, a consequence of the 
confused impingement of a multiplicity of locally motivated desires and fears on their near 
bestial imagination. Problematic politically is that the mob exist in a perpetual present of 
utility and greed, not a salutary basis for a civil society seeking to found itself on the 
memory of legality and constitutional principles. The want of a cosmopolitan moral 
imagination and of enduring principles of conduct and reflexivity is the source of a political 
malaise in the city-state. Heraclitus bears anguished witness to the intolerant identity 
politics of democracy: 
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The Ephesians deserve to be hanged, every adult man; and abandon their city to the 
young.  For they exiled Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying: 'Let no one 
of us be best; if there is such a man, let him go elsewhere and live among others' 
(B121).147 
 
Logological insight into the problem of identity politics requires exercises in perspective, 
pointed allegories that alert us to other spheres of life, to the material appetites and sensual 
reflexes of animal behaviour: 'Dogs bark at those they do not recognise' (B97).148  
            Intolerance, parochialism and ressentiment are revealed as reactive pathologies, 
sensualisms, which can only be remedied by a therapeutic logos that insists on a much 
more extensive, textured matrix for cognition and ethical deportment. The fierce emotions 
of personal prejudice need to be moderated by methods of deliberation and analogical 
invention that promise a far broader and more inclusive image of commonality, a 
community of logos:  
you must follow what is common/universal (xynos). But although the account 
(logos) is common, most men live as though they had an understanding (phronesis- 
'understanding', 'intelligence', 'thought') of their own (B2).149  
 
Heraclitus’s logological methodology protects the political and forms itself as a medium 
of deliberation and communication, regulating diverse interests. As a consequence, logos 
encourages a recognition of what is ‘common’, not as an epistemological reflection but as 
a feeling for affective dispositions which allow both public spiritedness and a necessary 
distancing from the coercions of identity. The community of thought nurtured by logos 
despises tribal or cultic identifications and innate social hierarchies, and most importantly, 
does not subscribe to disambiguated moral values, purported to exist outside of 
representation, intellectual debate, and exercises in perspective. Logismos enhances a 
pluralist imagination. 
Heraclitus’s logological intelligence encourages recognition of laws and customary 
sociability, the nomos of the city-state. The nomos, emerging as written law by the sixth 
century BCE, guarantees a civic constitution, a channelling of agonistic energies into civil 
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life, a post-tribal, post-aristocratic political possibility. To protect a politics of difference, 
the logos need to pay sustained attention to its own condition of possibility, its material 
means. Contradicting the progressivist thesis, I would say the logos is not objective or 
transparent, but a recursive celebration of discursive idioms, of particular sociabilities, 
forms and ceremonies that guarantee critical participation. As Heraclitus says: 'The people 
should fight for the law as for the city wall' (B44). The logos requires the protection of 
legal power in its infancy, a fierce emphasis on commonality and tradition: '(to) speak with 
understanding, one must hold fast to what is shared by all, as a city holds to its law' (B30). 
The logos inscribes itself in social processes, it is not a universal, it does not exceed the 
local and historical as such. In this guise it is intensive, alerting us to the ‘places’, the 
situation of discourse, its genres, and necessary themes. 
 We have seen that Heraclitus’s logos equivocates: it consolidates interactive forms, 
it prescribes roles and duties for the health of critical discourse, but it is also a tendency 
towards expansive reflection, archaic memory, mystical symbolism. A mythical, tragic 
sense of the paradoxes of fate guides the representations of logos, destabilising the 
humanist subject as the sole principle of critical discourse about justice and the operations 
of law: 'for human nature has no insights, divine nature has' (B78). 
The knowledge of an oracular legality as constraining as it is indecipherable 
converses constantly with the civic optimism of nomocentric rationalism. The logos 
augments mental life as a kinetic movement between plenitude and lack, between grasping 
the whole, and feeling it stray from one’s grip: ‘It is not good for men to get all they want' 
(B110). Logological symbolism, after reminding us of the contemporary importance of the 
institutional and the social, also wishes us to be attentive to an extensive archaic paideia, 
as in the aleatory power of Zeus: ‘The thunderbolt steers all things’ (B64). 
Heraclitus' sayings, having mobilised fire as the economic motor of civic 
development, commercial exchange, and cosmopolitan sensibility, now recuperates the 
double aspect of the King of the Olympian pantheon, Zeus ‘the thunderbolt’, a terrifying 
power. Zeus is both the omniscient modern patriarch who governs over a domesticated 
nature, and the demonic god who effects an incomprehensible tragic justice for mortals, 
remorseless and pitiless. 
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Even Zeus, the great sun god, must recognise a law of constraint, the retributions 
of ancient Dike: 'the sun will not overstep its measures, otherwise the Furies, ministers of 
justice, will find it out' (B94). It emerges that xynus, the value of what is common and 
shared, not only requires culturally specific communicative procedures but a cosmological 
chronotope, a sense of the indefeasible cycles of transgression and retribution, of divine 
distributions of love and strife: 'God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, 
satiety and famine' (B67).  
Heraclitus reminds us not only of a Hesiodic mythical demonology but also of a 
mystical natural philosopher, Anaximander, and his concept of phusis – that all things must 
give justice and pay retribution to each other according to the ordered process of time. That 
which is generated must suffer the retribution of being finite, pay the penalty of being’s 
originary injustice and violence, a violence nevertheless creative and essential for culture 
and civilisation.150 A logological sense of the ‘common’ must refer to both immediate 
social conditions and a historicity of being that stresses unfathomable cycles, the 
inextricable relationship of good and evil, dizzying relativism: 'Sickness makes health 
sweet and good, hunger plenty, weariness rest' (B111). 
 Heraclitus' logos  is committed to civic order, but insists on the role of violence in 
cultural development. Logological considerations are a matrix for rhetoric’s ambivalence 
and inability to embrace a single-minded ethics or programmatic theory. Logological 
discourse, the discourse of what is ‘common’, mediates, enables.  It is a combination of 
deliberative optimism, the search for civic values, and the memory of violent means, of 
revolutionary violence, insurgent transformations. The logos is a pharmakon: ‘We must 
know that war is common (universal) and justice (dikê) is strife and that all things come to 
be through strife and necessity' (B80).151 Heraclitus’s evokes logological intelligence as 
a work-ethic, a process, forever dissatisfied with the concealed barbarism of present norms, 
yet incapable of moral solution, codified morality, ontology, identity. Logological 
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intelligence, inventive yet recursive and situated, initiates debate, dilemma, it fuels future 
rhetorical representations. 
       
Ethos 
 
Logological thinking, the orientation of logos, is an energetic problematisation of 
the acculturation of the intellect, a question of how thought and life are imbricated. A 
number of Heraclitus’s apothegms, his wise aphorisms, prescribe the practical experience 
and generalist inclinations required by a critical subject: 'Men who love wisdom 
(philosophoi andres) must be inquirers into many things indeed' (Kahn, IX).  
Later, Tacitus’s dialogue on Oratory (Dialogus de Oratoribus) will delineate the 
oratorical type as someone who, while they ought to drink deeply at certain springs of 
knowledge, should also wet his lips at them all, receiving a ‘tincture’ of literature, music, 
and mathematics.152 Heraclitus suggests that to enter the mysterium one must feel the 
texture of surfaces, for then, what insight is gleaned can be 'set apart from all' (Kahn, 
XXVII). The rhetor figures subtle nuanced critical approaches. The rhetor’s materialism, 
his intensive focus, creates extensive and subaltern modes of understanding, crossing many 
trajectories, summoning hidden possibilities. 
In his biography of Heraclitus in Lives of the Philosophers Diogenes Laertius 
suggests the equivocations of the logological attitude, a narrative of social involvements 
and strategic distancing. Heraclitus is both culture-hero and separatist philosopher, a man 
of praxis and strange speculation. According to Diogenes, Heraclitus was from an eminent 
family, and flourished as a competitor in the sixty-ninth Olympiad (504/501 BCE). He was 
asked by the Ephesians to write laws for them but refused because of their wicked 
constitution, preferring to retire to the temple of Artemis and play dice with children.  
The rhetor always evokes diverse traditions and positional possibilities. In the end 
Heraclitus became a misanthrope, leaving the city and living in the mountains where he 
fed on plants and herbs. When, now suffering from dropsy, he returned to the city he asked 
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the doctors in riddling fashion whether they could change a rainstorm into a drought.153 
The passage from sociability to exile becomes characteristic. Later we will encounter this 
mixture of open dialogue and self-imposed attenuation in the Platonic thought-figure of 
Socrates.  
Heraclitus speaks through dramatis personae, he assumes the ethos of the cryptic 
oracle, who 'neither declares nor conceals, but gives a sign' (Kahn, XXXIII). Heraclitus 
explores a number of ‘conceptual personae’ and their modes of life, interrogating the 
constitutive power of sexual difference, the role of feminine knowledges and mantic 
inspiration in gathering critical intelligence: 'The Sibyl with raving mouth utters things 
mirthless and unadorned...and her voice carries through a thousand years because of the 
god who speaks through her' (Kahn, XXXIV).  
The logos channels many voices, like Oedipus it mediates the realm of the gods, 
but only as a paradox, blind to common appearances but a medium of what is material and 
vital in life. The logos speaks through the socially marginalised, such as children, innocent 
carriers of gnomic wisdom: 
Men are deceived in the recognition of what is obvious, like Homer who was wisest of 
all the Greeks. For he was deceived by boys killing lice, who said: what we see and 
catch we leave behind; what we neither see nor catch we carry away (Kahn, XXII).  
It is historical lore that Homer, reputedly the wisest of the Greeks, died at the mercy of a 
childish riddle he was unable to answer, yet the anecdote also trades on the paradox of 
Homer as the blind, visionary poet. In logos and the community of discourse it founds, the 
hierarchical positions of child and adult, margin and metropole, visibility and invisibility 
are fluidly exchanged. The logological ethos is performed as both naivety and insight, 
innocence and sophistication, populism and elitism. In the characteristics of the logological 
ethos, one discovers the fate of critique: 'Man's character (êthos) is his fate (daimôn, 
divinity; fortune for good or evil)' (Kahn, CXIV).  
The logological ethos is not an innate capacity, it is rather configured by erotic and 
destructive urges, imbricated in and inextricable from the complex proportioning of 
fortune. As the next chapter suggests, the ethos of the rhetor must surrender to experience, 
to conflicting impulses. A rhetorical ethos is not egological but like Heraclitus’s conceptual 
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personae susceptible to a multiplicity of impingements, circumstances, re-presentations, 
and diverse traditions. The rhetor never exists in the neutral and homogenous time of 
progressivist rationality; his or her inventive resources, extensive paideia and complex 
ethos conduce to dynamism, wondrous sociable sympathies, self-excess, to intensive 
pragmatism and extensive desires. 
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Chapter Four: Rhetoric, Cultural Development and the Public Sphere 
 
 
 In previous chapters I’ve argued that a classical discourse about persuasive 
language has reproduced itself through conceptual personae. These personae mediate 
enthusiasm and disquiet about the relationship between performative language and its 
social effects. As an allegory of the ambiguous power of language, personae from Odysseus 
to Thales and Heraclitus embody conflicting extremes, they are magicians, civic heroes, 
misanthropes, mysterious oracles, and tricksters. They are the paradoxical figures of a 
language held to be dangerous and miraculous, and as such they import a plural spectrum 
of affective qualities into conceptions of public discourse. 
 In this chapter, I wish to extend our understanding of rhetoric’s contribution to a 
non-normative conception of the public sphere. I want to discuss a creation story, a 
narrative of the origins of society and the role of language and associated cultural media in 
the formation of a robust and diversified civil society. The sociological narrative implies a 
philosophy of complex assent, suggesting that a culture formed through multifarious 
representations continues to allow the co-existence of different values, ways of life, and 
possible sensibilities. It argues that a polity formed from rhetorical representations - from 
a multiplicity of persuasive modes - will harbour diverse tendencies, conservatively 
guarding its laws and procedures while allowing for the possibility of re-evaluation and 
radical insurgencies. A rhetorically formed culture will protect both identity and that which 
exceeds it. 
 There is copious textual evidence that classical rhetorical theorists from Isocrates to 
Cicero and Quintilian argued for the crucial role of persuasive language in the formation 
of political entities, and they did so by invoking an already well-worn theory of 
socialisation. Cicero, in his De Inventione (c. 87 BCE), argues that rhetoric is supposed to 
have taught men, when society was still unformed, that they must work for the common 
good (1.2.3). Asserting control over a scattered people, the ‘wise control’ of Cicero’s 
mythologised orator protects civil rights, brings help to the suppliant, and provides for the 
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safety of the entire state. (1.8.30-4). The orator’s charisma and breadth of understanding is 
a powerful mode of social discipline. But it also softens dispositions, a civilizing function 
that leads ‘scattered humanity’ out of its brutish existence, creating social communities, 
laws, tribunals, and civic rights (De Oratore 1.8. 32-3). Quintilian later concurs with this 
appraisal, arguing that ratio and oratio elevate us above the beasts, and that the orator, 
excelling in reason and persuasion, is the highest realization of humanity (Institutio 
Oratoriae 2.16.17).  
 Both Roman rhetorical theorists are almost certainly drawing on a stream of earlier 
Greek thought, exemplified by Isocrates. Isocrates argued that while in natural ability we 
are often deficient to animals, slower and weaker, our capacity for persuasive speech has 
helped us to found cities, establish laws, and invent arts. Isocrates suggests that our speech 
is a flexible mode: by reasoned, deliberative speech we educate the ignorant and inform 
the wise by the charismatic power of epideictic speech (a language of praise and blame), 
we refute the wicked and praise the good (Nicocles, 5.ff, Antidosis, 253 ff.)154 Society is 
formed in the interstices of rational discipline and imaginative invention; it needs a mixture 
of qualities. 
 As Eric Havelock and Thomas Cole have argued, Isocrates, then Romans like the 
Epicurean philosopher Lucretius and later Cicero and Quintilian, are drawing on the 
sociological precepts of the Presocratic Democritus in attributing the origin of human laws 
to human speech (logos), and to persuasion (peithein). As a thoroughgoing historicist of 
language and society, Democritus evokes the power of logos as both a gentle mode of 
consensus and a masterly exercise of social control.155 For Democritus, the logos is a 
reserve of qualities, it is humanity’s potential, but not its essence. In this chapter I trace the 
influence of Democritus’s evocation of logos, the developmental power of performative 
and critical languages, upon Hellenistic and Roman thought. I suggest that Democritus’s 
logismos, logological method, enunciates a subtle rhetorical subject-position, polymathic 
and inventive, later activated by philosopher rhetoricians like Seneca. 
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 Eric Havelock in The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (1957) argues that whereas 
Plato and Aristotle focus on humanity as an ideal type, rational and moral, intelligent and 
just, anthropologists like Democritus were interested in acculturation as a contingent 
achievement requiring a complex analysis of the relationship between people, their 
environment, and their means of representation. Intrigued by the brutish state of early 
humanity, Presocratic anthropologists like Xenophanes, Anaxagoras and Democritus did 
not rationalise civilisation as the effect of humanity’s fully formed cognitive powers or 
innate disposition to morality. Civilisation has not been pre-ordained, people have not 
simply developed their innate, god-given capacities.156 
 Xenophanes asserts that humans did not originally receive any demonstration from 
the gods on everything pertaining to their needs.157 This anthropological topos of 
humanity's initial ignorance and incomplete moral and cognitive faculties can also be 
found in Anaxagoras and Democritus. Their genealogy argues for a genetic scenario of 
early humanity’s desperate need, disunity, of their scattered and planless existence. 
Language and intersubjective media are not innate or given but the miraculous overcoming 
of natural alienation, a tremendous complex achievement of the human intellect. 
 Peter Rose argues for the continuing appeal of the Presocratics' frightening pre-social 
scenario in fifth century BCE tragedy. Rose argues that Sophocles’s Philoctetes is a 
detailed meditation upon the pre-social struggle for survival, incarnated in Philoctetes’ 
lonely habitation of the wild and desolate island of Lemnos. Through Philoctetes’ lengthy 
laments upon the theme of his acute loneliness, the pathos of pre-social isolation is 
relentlessly displayed before the audience.158 Philoctetes must survive in complete 
isolation from other human beings, without material aid, prey to wild beasts, harsh weather, 
formidably rocky terrain, the difficulties of finding food, and access only to the most 
primitive herbal medicine. Sophocles' play, according to Rose, is a dramatic reinvention 
of contemporary anthropological theories about the condition of early humanity.159 
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Sophocles play reflexively stresses that in a state of nature, human beings suffer greatly 
from the absence of four life necessities: fire, shelter, clothing, and a steady food 
supply.160 Social isolation betokens a dearth of material means. Later Cicero will credit 
persuasive speech as a medium of collaboration, coterminous with the development of 
these same preconditions of social prosperity.161 
 The protagonist of Presocratic anthropology has the genetic heritage of a worm, fish, 
and barbarous savage, an animal whose life and instincts are biologically and 
environmentally determined. This early human type requires a materialist analysis; it can 
be traced back to the generation of organic life from inorganic materials, from swamp, 
slime, moisture, and mud.162 Humanity always retains the elemental constitution of its 
heritage according to Xenophanes, since everything that is born and grows consists of earth 
and water – humanity has a materially based arche and phusis.163 
 The species career of early human beings accords with the instinctive imperative of 
organic life to grow and flourish. Its phusis, its principle of generation and continuance at 
this stage, is a herd mentality of self-protection, a purely immanent response to brutal 
exigencies. Early humanity’s struggle is the automatic striving of all life to survive under 
harsh conditions. 
 The extraordinary development that fascinated the anthropological speculations of 
the sixth and fifth century BCE went something like this: how do human beings, closely 
related to the immanence of animals whose actions and fate are inextricably bound to 
environmental pressures, become, through an historical transformation, socialised and 
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intelligent beings capable of forming their own laws (nomoi) and transcending 
environmental contingencies? How has human weakness in the face of more powerful 
animals become mastery of the environment, and burgeoning scientific and technological 
capabilities? How has an earlier defensive stage of communitarian severity towards 
outsiders and internal transgressors been succeeded by an affirmative ethos of pluralism? 
What has enabled human cultures, initially driven by the need to survive, to develop 
‘superfluous’ leisured arts such as music? How is that we can now appreciate aesthetic 
qualities such as form, rhythm, and ludic play? How has a formerly defensive and punitive 
creature come to enjoy dramatic deceptions?  
 The Presocratic thesis, which resonated throughout the rhetorical theories of 
antiquity, is that persuasive language was the medium through which human cultures (1) 
met their most vital needs in order to survive, and (2) became ever more ‘plastic’, 
producing an expanding abundance of arts, theories, and spiritualities. The Presocratics 
therefore reflect on representation as a protean cultural function, an evolutionary force. 
Democritus’s genealogy of social formation is fascinated with the many liminal 
circumstances and sensibilities that have engendered a sophisticated intersubjective mode 
of representation. It is a genealogy that argues for a layered cultural memory and an 
acceptance of change as integral to cultural life. 
 
The Role of Language in Group Formation and Collaboration 
 
 It is need, a biological imperative to survive, which creates the first and most 
rudimentary kinds of collective human interactions and symbolic communications between 
people. Under pressure from the threat posed by larger animals and the anarchic dangers 
of individual self-interest, early humans instinctively seek shelter and protection in caves. 
These aggregations of people are called systêmata. It is this rudimentary proximity of 
bodies alone that constitutes the necessary conditions from which people learn to identify 
shared needs and similar biological characteristics (typoi), to recognise themselves as a 
type, an object of prediction and planning. The rudimentary language of the aggregation is 
driven, under pressure of survival, to draw attention to commonality rather than difference. 
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  Language, reflexively inaugurating typologies, gradually persuades an aggregate of 
people that they have common needs, and helps them develop the forethought and the 
planning necessary to meet those needs. Language becomes the condition under which 
talent can be pooled and increasingly sophisticated technologies developed. Tools 
empower weak hands, enabling early forms of agriculture. Weakness becomes strength; 
accidental discoveries are consolidated into genres of discussion, collaboration, and 
research. Lucretius argued that logos, as rational speech, enables communication and the 
sharing of discoveries.164 
 The first steps towards civilised life receive a huge catalyst from the discovery of 
fire, perhaps first sighted in a burning tree trunk struck by lightning, or some flaming grass. 
Its discovery is critical for early humanity, enabling more elaborate technologies, the 
forging of tools, and building and agricultural programs. Fire, moreover, requires tending 
at all times, elaborating a rudimentary division of labour, a pooling of talents. An early 
technology and motor of sociability, fire requires planning, memory, and the capacity to 
learn from experience, to further seek out this ‘warmth’ one once accidentally enjoyed. 
The type is formed within the sociality of representation, it evokes collaborative moods, 
inculcates a disposition to share and co-operate. 
 Language, suggests the Presocratics, is homologous with the effects of fire, since it 
is also a technique that reminds one of the benefits of collaboration, promoting the formal 
consolidation of effective intersubjective experiences and actions. Diodorus Sicilius argues 
that language enables technical achievement by creating collaborative vocabularies, 
vocabularies that increasingly differentiate and specialise in response to the development 
of sophisticated technologies. Xenophanes had earlier suggested that the alphabet was a 
technology, traceable to the Egyptian need for monetary records.165 Language is 
imbricated in social technologies and craft; it enables place and habitat.  One can also think 
of the comparison of language and fire from a mythic perspective as evoking the guileful 
Prometheus who steals fire from all-powerful Zeus, a revolutionary act that generates new 
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trajectories for humanity, language as a hubris one is doomed to be punished for, a 
necessary transgression of one’s allotted place and boundary.  
 If language is a means of social progress, it is because it is dynamic and alert to 
changing requirements: it is capable of producing new symbols and types in accordance 
with immediate exigencies. Signification responds fluidly to chance events in an ongoing 
process of empirical trial and error. The narrative’s oft-repeated genetic chronotope is a 
cry of terror overheard by a passer-by. Proving experientially successful in mobilising aid, 
the cry is subsequently formalised as a rallying-cry for the tribal unit. Or in another 
example, the weaker members of a grouping successfully band together while under threat 
of external attack, later using an emblematic representation to once again mobilise a 
defensive assembly. These symbola are then used in different spheres of social life by a 
process of analogical extension, the method of logismos.166 It is a diacritical mise en scène 
of discovery and consolidation, particularisation and extension, birth and maturation; here 
spoken and written languages are not inherently superior to visual and aural symbols, icons 
and gestures, all are cultural media invoking circumstantial necessities. It is enough that 
speech proceeds forth in the manner best suited to catch the attention of others.167  
 In the classical creation story, language is viewed as the essential medium of the 
entire process by which humans secure the advantages of co-operation. As new forms of 
communication arise in critical situations, language ensures their codification and 
typological characterisation, cumulatively creating points of articulation within social 
collectivities. As societies develop, so does the variety of symbolic media, new types and 
topologies, new modes of life and languages of expression are recognised and thematised. 
These representations function as diverse rallying points, as increasingly subtle foci for 
collaboration and critical engagement. The narrative reminds us that as social beings we 
are adaptable animals, that our history is a process responsive to many contingencies.168 
 Evolving newer and more subtle nodes of articulation and sympathy, language 
enables human groupings to evolve from small defensive aggregations, systêmata, through 
to tribes with a positive sense of cultural identity who exercise the rule of law, to larger 
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regional civilisations such as city-states, called êthne. Isocrates celebrated persuasive 
language as the capacity to enlarge sympathies and create broader notions of belonging, a 
force for regional alliances and pan-Hellenic confederations such as that under the aegis of 
Athens. Isocrates, in an irenic appeal for fairness and justice during the Peloponnesian war, 
On the Peace (355 BCE) celebrated the golden age of Athenian imperium, when it made 
the term ‘Greek’ synonymous not with a race, but a way of life, a sympathy of values that 
might unite geographical entities.169 Rhetorical representation for Isocrates combined the 
normative and projective, it referred one to the pragmatic recognition of unifying power 
while allowing for an unfolding conversation about identity and difference. 
 Democritus’s narrative of persuasion and representation refers to power and social 
control as formative necessities, a means of protection, order, and discipline. Under the 
constant threat of external aggression, justice will be necessarily severe in rudimentary 
societies. One must think of these societies as comparable to the cruelty of various animal 
species that punish, by killing, the transgressions of their own. Far from judging ‘primitive’ 
coercions and cruelties, Democritus, the most important of the Presocratic anthropologists, 
affirms the continuing relevance of this punitive scenario for the modern city-state. 
Democritus argues for the state’s right to kill those who kill their fellow citizens, 
suggesting that for human societies, one should destroy at all cost anything that offends 
against justice. For example, argues Democritus, anyone who kills a highwayman or a 
pirate should be free from penalty.170  
 For Democritus, a ‘softening’ of the legal and moral codes of society is only possible 
under particular, that is to say, prosperous conditions. Even in this instance, Democritus 
suggests, a society will always revert to harsh justice to protect itself under duress. The 
rhetorician, understanding social norms, argues that idealistic tendencies must be tempered 
by pragmatism. Only when released from scarcity and technologically capable of 
generating an abundance of material means, can symbolic media like music, art, and drama 
help the linguistic subject to develop pluralist curiosities and aesthetic sensibilities. 
Democritus argues that logismos, political discourse, only replaces bia, brute force and 
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tyrannical power, when rhysmos, the social harmony of different but equal individuals, is 
sufficiently strong.171 
 Democritus explains that music is a young art, as a distinct technique it was not 
separated off by necessity but came into being from superfluity.172 For the mouth could 
not flourish as a distinct organ of communication and aesthetic pleasure until it was 
released from the brutal immediacy of survival.173 The function of language is diversified 
in its post-necessity phase. Only in conditions of surplus does representation begin to 
inform the imagination and project beyond immediate exigencies and circumstances. 
Language now stands on the threshold of a new chronotope that demands novelty and 
diversity. Democritus argues that in the post-necessity phase of human societies a genuine 
public-spiritedness develops, an affirmative sociability that is preferable to the defensive 
mentality and repressive constraints characterising earlier phases of social development. 
To use a more recent political terminology, Democritus envisages the transition of society 
from negative to positive freedom, a movement towards civic participation and political 
discourse. 
 Representation affects sensibility. Now recognising the law as a positive virtue 
guiding civic well-being, humans in the post-necessity phase actually mean to do good, for 
they recognise their own virtue in the law and they acknowledge that from concord comes 
great deeds.174 Sociability, care for others, interest in the public welfare, becomes so 
strong that anyone who neglects public affairs gets a bad reputation, even if they steal 
nothing and commit no injustice.  
 Considered an entire sensorium of symbolic forms, as ceremony and convivial 
dialogue, language, according to Diodorus Sicilius, enhances affective bonds between 
people, promoting a common culture.175 One can say that in the post-necessity phase of 
social evolution there is no ‘isolation’ in either the material or mental life of a people. 
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Instead, there is companionship, mutual defence, concord among the citizens, and other 
good things that Democritus describes as too many to enumerate.176  
 Enlarged sympathies abound once the sociality of representation has taken hold: 
those in power actually take it upon themselves to lend aid and patronage to the poor. 
Again, whereas among early humans the leader was usually the strongest and initially ruled 
by force (bia), a prosperous humanity firmly diverges from the species-career of animals. 
Their leaders now respond to the transcendent idea of a ‘people’ and seek their approval; 
even an old man can now rule by moral persuasion, his people willingly rallying to defend 
him – a marvellous defiance of brute power that only a society of eloquence is capable, as 
argued by Odysseus, responding to Euralyus, in The Odyssey.177    
       
 
The Impressionable Origins of Rhetoric 
 The story of the origins of sociality tends to evoke the qualities that enable civilised 
life as paradoxical, a combination of active and passive dispositions. Democritus’s creation 
story evokes a subject that is nascent, liminal, lacking in a sovereign ego, impressionable 
and sympathetic. S/he is partly a naïf, with a tendency to mimesis, to copy the world around 
her. At issue is the formative role of open sensibilities, those with the power of discovery 
and creativity, those sympathetic to the whole of created life.  
 For Democritus it is alacrity of mind or anchinoia that allows early humanity to 
capitalise upon the study of immanent behaviour and accidental discoveries. This is made 
possible by sensitivity to a variety of phenomena, a sympathy or isonomia with the range 
of creation. Democritus holds that we are the pupils of animals in all the important things 
– of the swallow in building, of the songbirds in singing.178 ‘Primitive’ wonder, the desire 
to emulate, allows architecture to suggest itself in the spontaneous copying of the solidity 
of a cave, weaving to announce its possibility in the woof and warp of a spider’s web, 
transportation from the close study of the swift feet of a hare.179 The Presocratic 
                                                 
176 Barnes, 277, see B253 and B255. 
177 Cole, 90. 
178 Barnes, 262, quoted from Plutarch, On the Intelligence of Animals, 974A. 
179 Cole, 51. 
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Archelaus desired an enlarged sense of affinities between human and animal, a 
comparative approach to behavioural traits unfettered by complacent anthropocentrisms.  
 For Democritus, representation is often born of gentle moods and naïve mimetic 
inclinations; on the other hand the appreciation of music and artistic representation requires 
sophisticated, detached modes of generic appreciation. The social subject constituted 
within logos becomes interested in interstitial spaces and non-existences, rhythm, illusion, 
fiction, deception. Democritus’s influential theory of atoms is a social allegory. It is a 
monistic philosophy that the world and the way we perceive it is constituted by 
constellations of minute realia, or atoms. Although the stuff of everyday objects, atoms are 
capable of ever more complicated configurations, and in so doing they materially affect 
human sentience, ensuring it develops modes of complex assent, discerning rhythmic 
wholes (rhysmoi), harmony, and cycle where once there was only empiricism, obvious 
sensualism, a grasping for identity, a hatred of difference, a fragmentary confusion of 
partial ideas.180 For Democritus and later Roman theory, logismos is an invention 
(huerêma) that reduces strife and increases agreement and harmony (homonoia).181 
 Thomas Cole reminds us that in Democritean theory logismos, the verb form of logos, 
rational and persuasive speech, replaces bia, brutal force, immanent necessity, when 
rhysmos is sufficiently strong.182 That is, logos as a praxis of deliberation among different 
possibilities desires interstices, lacunae, configurations of elements, conversational 
exchange, alternations of agreement and robust difference.  
 Classical logismos pertains to different temporal and spatial possibilities. As rational 
dialogue, logos creates the space for opinions and perspectives to be exchanged, for 
negotiation and in law courts and oratorical assemblies; its representations belong in the 
marketplace where commercial transactions takes place.183 Logismos is an idea of time in 
classical thought, for it defers hasty judgment; it is the moment of pause between different 
viewpoints, a cross-cultural medium. In the minds of its advocates, logismos succeeds the 
chaotic flux of bia, affirming and protecting civil interaction. In this aspect logos is the 
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182 Cole, 119. 
183 Havelock, 189-92. 
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patient, leisured, time of deliberation, and the regulated and predictable time of procedure. 
Yet logos retains the memory of threshold moments, times of crisis and discovery, so it is 
also an inventive, opportunistic temporality, seizing the moment, engaging quickening 
desires, alert to when previous conventions must be exceeded.  
 
Roman Theories of Eloquence 
 Classical rhetorical theory never hesitates to resume the contradictory orientations of 
the logismos, its intensive and extensive dimensions, by which I mean the imbrication of 
language in material necessity and progressive imagination. Tacitus’s Dialogus, staged as 
a dispute about the genealogy and relevance of oratory, reminds us of the ‘cradle’ of 
eloquence, of a sublime persuasive language that won favour with men as the soul of 
poetry, of bards and oracles (12:2-3). Oratory, suggests this mytheme, was born in the 
communion of a golden age, before the depraved condition, the alienation, of modern 
social divisions. Eloquence recalls an idyllic habitat, a sympathetic belonging, a discourse 
of equals. It is inescapable in a democratic society where able speech conveys opinion, 
where different viewpoints must publicise themselves – it is a ‘sheer necessity’ (36:6-8).  
 One can say that in this mytheme the art of eloquent language maximises contact 
with real life; it deals intimately with good and evil, virtue and vice, justice and injustice. 
The art of eloquence is knowledgeable about a vast array of topics: it makes a full study of 
and is a fortiori isonomic with ‘human nature’, for to mollify the resentment of a judge 
one must understand anger, and have compassion. One needs to ‘feel the pulse’ of an 
audience. The art of eloquent language is in this aspect recursive, a studious behaviourism, 
a ‘craft’ adaptable to many purposes and whose knowledges and skill never fail to express 
and display an abundant and sympathetic paideia (31:1-4). 
 In Tacitus, we find a further relay of oratory’s perennially mixed mythology, its shall 
we say inherent Paganism. We are reminded of the self-fashioning of the rhetor, his 
luminosity and autarkic achievements. In a sense, eloquence is also a ‘gift’, a mysterious 
ability, with a hint of ‘supernatural power’, one to which the plain man in the street points 
in awe; the orator is a man whose attainment of high position knows no ready genealogy 
of ascension, no innate wealth, no aristocratic virtue. The orator, rather, climbs to the top 
through ‘sheer intellectual capacity’, an assemblage of qualities that resist easy 
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interpretation (7:4-8:2). Oratory surmounts hierarchy and identity, it is always in excess of 
its own talents and attributes, its luminosity speaks miracles. 
 If we turn our attention at this same period, around the first century A.D., we discover 
subtly varied velleities in another polysemic dialogue about eloquence and oratory, 
Cicero’s De Oratore. It is a dialogue about oratory’s requirements (natural or learned?), 
set in a country villa outside Rome, similar to the country estate of Cicero’s mature 
writings. It is a text that draws loving attention to the leisured chronotope of oratorical 
debate, a dilatory otiose scenario stimulated by the abundance (copia) and health of both 
natural and cultural largesse. Cicero’s dialogue partly suggests that eloquence serves 
cultural memory; it reminds us of our more natural habitats, of convivial relationships 
outside of the insanity of court politics and inane fashions.  
 Cicero’s setting also reminds us of the ‘superfluous’ time necessary for discursive 
health; the debate over the orator acknowledges the orator’s transcendental aura and 
miraculous achievements, in large part due to the copious representational means at his/her 
disposal.184 Rhetoric is recursive and situated discourse but it is also fascinated by its own 
non-normative capacities, reflective about its materiality and historicity while equally 
aware of its potential for magic, daring, bold action. 
 
Stoic Methodology 
 It is well known that Roman philosophy was keenly aware of the methodological 
possibilities of rhetoric considered as a means of argumentative composition, an inventory 
of tropes and figures, and an ethos of presentation. Less clearly charted is the way rhetoric 
articulated a copious ethos, a subject-position whose drive to display acculturation 
conflicted with its more programmatic ideological imperatives. By analysing the hortatory 
                                                 
184 For an excellent discussion of the evocation of oratorical copiousness in De Oratore, see Terence Cave, 
The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1979. Cave argues that in Cicero and Quintilian copia dicendi, copious speech was a ubiquitous synonym for 
eloquence, Cicero defining eloquence as ‘wisdom speaking copiously’ (5,6).  Under the aegis of copiousness, 
Cave points out, one can argue for an oratorical ethos that is both situated and dynamic. Cicero’s dialogue 
makes much of its affluent country-estate where images of plenty abound, situating the dialogue’s setting as 
analogues to the orator’s copia argumentorum, his rich ‘store’ of arguments, his reserves of natural 
abundance (6). Cave indicates an ambiguity in the principle of eloquent copiousness, however, for by the 
Renaissance, which resumed the notion of copia dicendi with gusto, it had become unclear whether fertile 
speech could be said to embrace res, the object of discourse, such was the excessive power and luminous 
autonomy of this rhetorical value (15). 
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letters of Seneca, we can make tentative steps towards restoring the horizontal relationship 
of rhetorically exuberant philosophers to the multifarious discourses of their time. Seneca’s 
nuanced advice to Lucilius, nominally recommending Stoic responses to life’s ills, 
demonstrates different moods: it is both a sincere and sympathetic examination of the 
vagaries of human nature, and a self-referential display of inventive critical resources, a 
discursive eagerness to displace conventional ideas and legislate new values. 
   In Seneca’s Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium, logos, the medium of philosophical 
argument, explanation, hypothesis, and example, is tropological, it takes conventional 
signifiers and extends or ‘turns’ their application into unexpected and paradoxical 
domains.185 Consider the paradoxical flavour and chiastic involutions of logic in the 
following aphorisms:  
 
‘To win true freedom you must be a slave to philosophy’ (VIII); 
‘Acknowledging one’s failings is a sign of health’ (LIV); 
‘Rest is sometimes far from restful’ (LVI); 
‘Show me a man who isn’t a slave; one is a slave to sex, another to money, another 
to ambition; all are slaves to hope or fear’ (XLVII). 
 
The Stoic logismos volatilises representation and the philosophical subject emerges as an 
effect of its energetic operations and imaginative reach: s/he is capable of deflationary 
irony, supreme skepticism towards given identities, and a sensitivity to the paradoxes of 
true wisdom. The vocabulary of place, identity, and property on which juridical and 
political vocabularies depends is again inserted, Heraclitus-like, into a subaltern imaginary, 
a world upside-down. The term ‘slave’ is now potentialised, which is to say defamiliarised, 
rendered applicable to a variety of situations, now gesturing gleefully towards the 
seemingly powerful and complacent. Logismos reverses a materialistic and utilitarian 
calculus, and it does so with verve and style. 
  The frequency of striking analogies and inverted metaphors is so pervasive in 
Seneca’s writings, so prominently displayed, that his rhetorical artifice dissuades us from 
                                                 
185 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Letters from a Stoic (Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium), trans. Robin Campbell, 
Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969. 
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regarding Roman Stoicism, of which he is its chief practitioner, as a doctrinaire insistence 
on rational moderation, emotional apathy, and complete autonomy from external 
impingements. The following exhortations of Seneca, himself a bombastic and 
declamatory playwright, situate the philosophical desire to suicide in a differential theatre 
of enthusiastic spectatorship and enjoyable plot twists: 
As it is with a play, so it with life – what matters is not how long the acting lasts, but 
how good it is. It is not important at what point you stop. Stop wherever you will – 
only make sure you round it off with a good ending.’ (LXXVII) 
 
Seneca’s logismos encourages ambivalent sensibilities, suggesting that through 
representation there is a pleasure in pathos, an exquisite Schadenfreude of heroic 
performance. Indeed it is important that one’s acculturation, one’s capacity for fictional 
exemplifications, consoles even while dying in one’s bed: 
There is room for heroism, I assure you, in bed as anywhere else. How much scope 
there would be for renown if wherever we were sick we had an audience of 
spectators! Be your own spectator anyway, your own applauding audience.186 
(LXXVIII) 
 
  The ethos of logismos suggests diverse aesthetic dispositions, the capacity to 
translate oneself into a number of life-spheres, to play subtle variations on familiar themes; 
one will secrete to oneself many sensibilities, heroic, solemn and playful. The Stoic subject 
is an ethos addressing itself to its own wayward desires, enjoying the spectacle of self-
immolation, inventing new positional strategies, new relationships of self and other, and 
self and self. The rhetorical subject reaches out to contemporary idioms and historical 
examples, evoking a nuanced paideia of analogies, allusions, and moral precepts. 
 Situated within a rhetorically educated culture, the Stoic subject can affirm his/her 
horizontal desires, his/her extensive conception of culture. Seneca celebrates rhetorical 
skill and its copia dicendi as the ‘common property’, the sensus communis of a public 
sphere of discussion otherwise sharply differentiated in its philosophical doctrines and 
political ideals: 
                                                 
186 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between Seneca’s bombastic dramaturgy and the heroic mise 
en scène of the Stoic subject in the philosophical writings, see Gordon Braden, Renaissance Tragedy and the 
Senecan tradition: Anger’s Privilege, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. 
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Quite possibly you’ll be demanding to know why I’m quoting so many fine things 
from Epicurus rather than ones belonging to our own school. But why should you 
think of them as belonging to Epicurus and not as common property? Think how 
many poets say things that philosophers have said – or ought to have said! .... Think 
of the quantity of brilliant lines to be found lying about in farces alone! (VIII) 
 
A kind of textual ethnicity, a love of other cultural personae and of a bricolage of aesthetic 
forms, is more valuable to Seneca than dogmatic moralising. Logismos provides an 
intersubjective discursive space in which a number of modes of life can converse with each 
other, and a variety of argumentative forms can display themselves.  
         Seneca’s bonhomie, his celebration of rhetorical arts as the possibility of a certain 
kind of convivencia between different opinions, anticipates the complex sensibility of a 
later rhetorical theorist, Desiderius Erasmus.187 For Seneca, as for a tradition of dialogical 
rhetorical treatises, one can affirm and celebrate the rhythms and diverse bricolage of 
rhetorical representation, as a sphere of collaboration and reflexive meditation larger than 
one’s own partialities, opinions, and intentions.  
  
                                                 
187 Cf. Walter M. Gordon, Humanist Play and Belief: The Seriocomic Art of Desiderius Erasmus, University 
of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990, 3: ‘While his opponents were pummelling each other over questions of 
works and salvation, Erasmus was playing with the disputants and their ideas, inveighing against 
interdenominational strife.’ 
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Chapter Five: The Sophists – Forever the Stranger 
 
 
In this chapter I want to resume my analysis of the varied discourses of classical 
rhetoric. I discuss the first explicit teachers, theorists, and practitioners of the art of 
persuasion, the first generation of Sophists (fifth and fourth century BCE). I argue that the 
fragmented personae of the Sophists crystallise rhetoric’s ambiguous provenance and 
discontinuous future traditions. The mixed mythology, the re-presentable personae of the 
Sophists, provoke plural critical orientations: intersubjective dialogue, communication 
theory, relativism, skepticism, charismatic authoritarianism, and aesthetic play. The 
Sophists render essentialising historicisms, notions of an authoritative rhetorical tradition, 
misleading, insensitive to rhetoric’s inexhaustible contexts and frequent changes of tone 
and emphasis. 
I principally discuss the rhetor and philosopher Protagoras as a projective allegory 
of rhetoric’s multifarious usages and the complex discourses that surround issues of 
language, persuasion, and performance. Protagoras’s reflexivity, caution, and sociological 
curiosity suggest that the discourse of persuasion adapts itself to prudential concerns, that 
the logos is a moderate and medial power, establishing procedures for communication and 
dialogue, a force for good governance and wise counsel. There is a non-normative 
Protagoras, however, who exhibits critical language through bold and audacious gestures, 
encouraging discourse to sharply delineate its characteristics, to assume a provocative 
social role, disdainful of complacency and narrow legalism. Here I extend Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s suggestion that the Sophists desire to maximise various perspectives, treating 
incommensurable epistemologies as a motivation to performatively enhance the inherent 
‘sense’ of an opinion or argumentative genre, turning accepted values upside-down as they 
did so. 
I reambiguate the Sophists as permanent ‘strangers’, in the sociologist Georg 
Simmel’s sense of the term.188 The ‘stranger’ is an inconsistent conceptual persona, an 
                                                 
188  See ‘The Stranger’ in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. and trans. Kurt. H. Wolff, The Free Press, 
Glencoe, Ill., 1950. 
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ethos illuminating thought’s immanent possibilities and paradoxical contradictions. The 
stranger is both an important participant in society and a perpetual wanderer, helping to 
constitute the inside and self-identical while remaining outside, alone, glancing with 
detachment at all norms and assumptions. The stranger is pharmakon, a salve and a 
corruption, a stingray and a balm. I argue that by association with the stranger/rhetorician 
and the pharmakological logos, thought become estranged from itself, improper, 
exoticised, decadent, with an uncontrollable desire for the other. The rhetorical stranger 
affects one from within, ensuring that apodictic thought becomes vulnerable to an archaic 
paideia, to the ancient memory of violent creation and hybrid genealogies. 
 
Protagoras 
 
Protagoras was born around 490 BCE, in the Greek colony of Abdera in Thrace, 
and is reported to have died around 421 BCE. His remarkable longevity for ancient times, 
while it cannot be compared to the centurion Gorgias, indicates vigour and health, an 
almost superhuman robustness, which continues to intrigue a doxographical tradition 
deeply invested in the symbolic portent of these seeming incidentals. Like earlier 
Presocratic personae such as Heraclitus and Thales, conceptual personae expressive of pith, 
vim, and critical energy, Protagoras’s copious output and legendary longevity has 
allegorical significance, figuring the rhetor as variously experienced, polymathic, and 
resourceful. 
Protagoras life-story signifies defiance, challenging social prejudices and 
engineering new paths for the minority and outsider, an important feature of the mythology 
of the orator. In Plato’s eponymous dialogue Protagoras, Protagoras is reputed to have 
made his innovative yet controversial educational methods and his status as an itinerant a 
virtue, a necessary cultural function. Protagoras proclaims himself the first Sophist, 
signifying rounded experience, versatility, and eclecticism. Protagoras' biography 
illuminates one of his most famous principles, the ability to make the weaker argument the 
stronger, to engineer the revolutionary act or accident of history as a new genre of 
argument, a respected discursive position. Protagoras is the path breaker, a figure of 
progressive transformation, successfully defying aristocratic ideals of innate excellence, a 
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self-made man. Protagoras, as G.B. Kerferd argues, is heralded in his own time, the second 
half of the fifth century BCE, and throughout Hellenistic antiquity, as the most famous of 
the Sophists, his life a spur to legend, folklore, and collective memory.189 
 By 444 BCE, Protagoras is a well-known educator and intellectual in Athens, where 
he was to spend the duration of his life. His fame is mostly due to his association with the 
general Pericles (495-429 BCE), Athens' undisputed leader until the 430s, and reputedly 
one of history’s great statesmen. Protagoras, along with Pericles’ Milesian mistress 
Aspasia, and the Presocratic philosopher and rhetor Anaxagoras, are generally taken to be 
the crucial players in Pericles’ ‘liberal-circle’ of free thinking associates.  
Pericles selected his friend Protagoras to frame a democratic constitution for a new 
Greek colony at Thurii in southern Italy, around 444 BCE.190 Protagoras’s involvement 
with Pericles, in the role of advisor and discussant, is credited with giving the Athenian 
statesman extraordinary powers of speech and understanding, marvellous eloquence and 
great sympathy with the common people.191 Protagoras is said to have praised Pericles 
‘philosophical attitude’ towards the death of his illegitimate sons, anticipating a later Stoic 
ideal of wise and moderate counsel to one’s friends.192  
Protagoras’s friendship with Pericles adumbrates one of his historical legacies, the 
legend of a public-intellectual and civic activist. Aristotle, in On Education, records 
Protagoras as the inventor of the shoulder-pad that helps porters carry their loads.193 
Protagoras’s involvement with Pericles, famed for such civic projects as the Athenian 
building programme of 440s and 430s (including the Parthenon), records him as a social 
constructivist. Protagoras’s salutary influence on Pericles’ oratorical abilities imbricates 
his teaching and advice with Pericles’ famous funeral oration to the mourning Athenian 
people, dramatised by the historian Thucydides. As Nicole Loraux argues, Pericles' 
rhetorical tour de force attempts to substitute a collective civic encomium to the 
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achievements of Athens' citizen-soldiers for a previously private lamentation for individual 
‘heroes’. Pericles' epideictic logos, his epitaphos to the dead, intends to displace the 
remaining vestiges of the Homeric age of the heroes, when individual combatants were 
given private eulogies.194 Pericles’ motivational logos, and the public ceremonial 
surrounding it, substitutes collective exaltation for private mourning, invoking a 
recognition of civic bonds and desire for public participation.195  
Thanks to the rhetorical theories of Sophists, by the Periclean age, there is, Loraux 
argues, a fascination with the political dimension of the symbolic, the unifying power of 
political oratory.196 Protagoras, often figured within the doxography as keenly involved 
in robust dialogue and topical disputes, elaborates a language of representation that 
explores alternatives, a leisured and deliberative logos. Protagoras’s deliberative rhetoric 
desires a broad cultural conversation about pressing social issues, associating him with the 
liberal legal reforms Pericles is famous for: the full enfranchisement of Athens’s propertied 
males, and the establishment of a citizen’s jury, the Aeropagus. 
  In a famous dialogue reported by Plutarch, Pericles and Protagoras debate the 
attribution of responsibility for a crime: 
...when a competitor in the pentathlon, without meaning to, struck and killed 
Epitimus of Pharsalus with a javelin, [Pericles] spent a whole day with Protagoras 
trying to decide whether, according to the most correct judgment, one ought to 
regard as the cause of the mishap the javelin or the man who threw it rather than 
the directors of the games.197 
 
This aporetic discussion figures Protagoras as a political liberal interested in 
contextualising criminality. The famous Protagorean principle of rhetoric as enabling the 
means to attack any given thesis or opinion might also be construed as democratic, 
encouraging a capacious understanding of the law and legal dialogue within a democratic 
society as protective of individual rights against the majority. Protagoras also seems to 
suggest that the harsh logic of individual punishment needs to be socialised, there must be 
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collective redress, and the law should not be blind to socio-economic differences and 
adventitious circumstances.198 
The Protagorean idea of translating weakness into strength, the overarching theme 
of Pericles’ funeral speech (individual death translates into collective consciousness), 
would seem to example Democritus’ diacritical conception of a sophisticated logos 
invoking social harmony, a sense of commonality that insistently refers to its necessary 
conditions of social equity and material abundance. 
We believe that psychosocial types have this meaning: to make perceptible, in the 
most insignificant or most important circumstances, the formation of territories, the 
vectors of deterritorialisation, and the process of reterritorialisation.199 
 
The Protagorean persona, considered as a psychosocial type, deterritorialises certain 
traditions and assumptions. Protagoras’s logos is politically dynamic, abandoning 
aristocratic, patriarchal and pre-political modalities in order to form more imaginative and 
relational notions of community and critical discourse. Protagoras’s peripatetic movements 
enacted the expansive rhythms of his logos: leaving Abdera, settling in Athens, and leaving 
again for Thurii to establish the conditions of its democracy. Protagoras prescribes the 
stranger’s mobility and flexibility, a continuum of perpetual displacements and picaresque 
journeys. From a life of some pathos emerges the stranger’s ethos, his desire for social 
participation and conservative emphasis on constitutional law. 
  In creating the concept of the ‘stranger’, drawn from the margins of a society into 
its centre, Georg Simmel suggested the unstable potentiality of social types such as the 
migrant, transient, and homecomer. Simmel articulates the way in which a society both 
expels and introjects difference, the way it incorporates otherness as a function of its 
identity, both promise and threat. We are here within the ambiguity of the pharmakological 
ritual, the expulsion of the stranger that is not without gratitude for and fascination by their 
magical powers.200 Simmel’s stranger is a paradox, their wayward journeys founds 
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territory and institutions. The stranger has a long history, the Native American trickster 
whose obscene and rapacious acts founded sacred tribal land, the dripping phallus of 
Ouranos as procreative of new gods, sacrilegious Oedipus’s foundation of Athens, 
wandering Aeneas discovering Rome. 
Protagoras is the paradox of the stranger. Never a citizen of Athens, unable to vote 
or fight in its wars, he is the most prominent intellectual of his day, feted by aspiring young 
aristocratic men, memorialised even by his nemesis Plato as irrevocably woven into the 
texture of Athenian life. Protagoras’s mythos is as an originator. According to Diogenes 
Laertius, Protagoras is the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments (logoi) 
opposed to each other, he is said to have invented the method of eristic questioning. It was 
Protagoras who initiated what we now take to be the Socratic method of dialysis – 
interrogating normative ideas and assumptions by a dialogical process of question and 
answer, aiming for a rigorous dialectical definition of the concept in question.201 
Protagoras’s rhetoric prefigures the search of the grammarian for a purified propositional 
language; it makes language into a propaedeutic for transcendental philosophical inquiries. 
Protagoras is the first to distinguish the tenses of a verb, the first to divide speech 
into performative modes: entreaty, question, answer, command. His project is prosaic; it 
takes the fluidity of a poeticised language and argues for rigorous examinations of its 
suasive effects, revealing the sociological habitus of performative language. Eric Havelock 
suggests that the early Sophists understood the function of logos as a ‘communication 
between human beings about their joint affairs ... an organised discourse presenting ideas 
and channelling emotions in a more effective form’.202 
According to Quintilian, sourcing Cicero’s Brutus, Protagoras is the first to discuss 
general arguments (loci communes), those ‘places’ of argument without which legal 
advocacy, political deliberation, and topical debate could not continue.203 Protagoras 
initiates a sense of discourse as material location; he founds a site where representation 
begins to reflect on itself, to engender collaborative research on its sociological forms. 
Protagoras is a figure of praxis, of practical success and effective public-intellectual 
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activities. He initialises a discourse that is fit or appropriate to circumstance (te prepon), to 
the requirements of this place, this time. Protagoras is a technocrat and methodologist; he 
provides social infrastructure and an effective school of behavioural studies and cultural 
materialist analyses. 
The stranger is also a cosmopolitan, knowledgeable about other cultures, their ideas 
and customs. Introducing the idea of dissoi logoi, that there are two arguments or 
perspectives on any issue, Protagoras argues for a moderate, relativistic understanding of 
different cultural customs and perspectives, none of which are commensurate, appropriate 
to any one standard of judgment. The anonymously authored but undoubtedly Protagorean 
influenced treatise called Dissoi Logoi, written towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, 
extensively details cultural epistemes, which vary due to a variety of circumstance, 
customs, and beliefs. The Dissoi Logoi can be seen as a landmark of the Sophists' 
enlightened relativism and humanist curiosity, their sensitivity to a paideia of situated 
knowledges.204 
John Poulakos aptly describes the first generation Sophists as ‘restless importers 
and exporters of intellectual goods’, figuring the deterritorialising power of a robust 
exchange economy.205 Protagoras figures a certain trajectory for rhetoric in the Western 
tradition, that of a mediator between cultures and customs, circulating ideas, promoting 
dialogue and perspectival exchange, extensively describing the idiosyncrasies of culture, 
historicising representation. 
Protagoras, in one tradition, is the migrant who argues strongly for social justice 
and egalitarian principles, as an outsider he must place a premium on education and 
acculturation to ameliorate inherent prejudices. To this effect his great speech in Plato’s 
dialogue Protagoras  (320d to 328d) argues that justice is a virtue acquired through 
acculturation and that all must have access to contribute to its ongoing definition 
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(323e).206 Protagoras argues that he is a holistic pedagogue with the city-state’s best 
interests at heart. He therefore teaches students prudence in their own affairs, so that they 
may manage their own household and consequently the affairs of the city, as both a speaker 
and man of action (318d-319a). Protagoras is the utilitarian interested in the effective 
distribution of happiness. 
The most comprehensive representation of Protagoras’s philosophical attitude is 
his narrative of the origins of justice and political society in Plato’s Protagoras. It will 
strike us as familiar, presented as a blend of mythos and logos, genealogical narrative and 
critical argument, hybrid and situated. Its theoretical paradigm is Democritean; it seeks to 
evoke the different habits, communicative media and cultural requirements that have 
helped to engender political subjectivity and the desire for mutual justice. It is a narrative 
that valorises both technical rationality and aesthetic imagination as valuable media of 
socialisation. Its idea of political community is capacious enough to tolerate both elite 
knowledges and the need to democratise political participation, for the city-state will not 
prosper if only a few share political virtues (322d, 323a). Like Democritus, Protagoras 
points out that while technical ineptitude is risible, as in not knowing how to play the flute, 
violation of civic virtues is punishable by death or exile: political virtues are necessary for 
the existence of the state (327a-d). 
Consequently Protagoras elaborates a narrative of the subject's political, legal, and 
artistic education, evoking a holistic paideia that encourages both civic discipline and 
critical transformation. The narrative is an allegory of the affects and capacities required 
by the public sphere, as Democritus’s theory of ever expanding atomic configurations was 
a trope for the complex values (rhysmoi) of an evolved society. Protagoras argues that the 
initial language a child is instructed in is necessarily strict and unambiguous, a language of 
right and wrong. The fear of punishment conditions correct behaviour in the child. Later in 
school the educational process balances technical instruction in writing and music with an 
attempt to make children expand on their capabilities through the imitation and emulation 
of great artists and writers. The child learns and imitates the epideictic poems and stories 
of good poets, their admonitions and eulogies to legendary heroes. After prolonged 
                                                 
206 All references are to The Protagoras, in Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Penguin 
Classics, London, 1956, 27-100. 
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imitation of musical masters, the subject finally learns to appreciate rhythm and melody 
(325e-326b), developing a desire for articulation and interstitial moments, a post-
ontological perspective. 
Protagoras suggests that the political subject should respond to the law like a child 
who learns to write by following the outline of the master as a guide: one is punished if 
one steps outside these lines, but such emulation is never mechanical. One recognises that 
the line/law is convention and guide for behaviour; one also contributes to its evolving 
definition and may possibly modify it (326d).  
Lyotard is illuminating on this point. He argues that what has been called the 
conventionalism of the Sophists ‘was probably not conventionalism, but rather an 
awareness of the fact that not only are there laws given, but that there must be laws’. 
Lyotard’s Sophists play (seriously) a language game, that there must be commands and 
obligations in relation to those commands, but the question of who is authorized to issue 
laws is left hanging, for the narrative of Zeus dispensing justice is, after all, a playful 
genealogy, a mythos. I agree with Lyotard that one can talk of Sophistic obligation to 
commands and norms as a ‘pragmatic relation’ rather than fixed content – the logos always 
signifies relationship and relative contexts.207 For Protagoras, like Heraclitus before him, 
political vitality is an ethos suggesting a complex structure of feeling: an immanent need 
for coercive social conventions and constitutional law, a dialogical enthusiasm for dynamic 
conversation and novel approaches. The elective chronotope of the rhetor is mythic, hybrid, 
a spectrum of forces. 
Heeding the Democritean association, one can talk of a distinct tradition emanating 
from Protagoras’s life and teachings. He is an anti-essentialist and progressive social agent. 
Sensitive to the authoritarian implications of utopianism, he disagrees with the geometers 
that there is any such thing as ‘perfection’, reviling the ‘repugnant’ terminology of 
mathematics.208 Like Empedocles and the entire tendency of Presocratic philosophy, 
Protagoras inveighs against the injustices of the finite, praising a more harmonious 
cosmology, while as a cautious realist acknowledging the role of violence and discipline 
                                                 
207 Jean - Francois Lyotard and Jean - Loup Thébaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich, in series Theory 
and History of Literature, vol. 20, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 64-5. 
208 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 22, B7, B7A. 
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in acculturation.  He is a polymath, mapping the significance of burgeoning new spheres 
of knowledge, writing works in areas as far afield as debating, government, Human Errors, 
Contradictory Arguments. He signifies the coming philosophical eclecticism of humanism, 
much later a liberal emphasis on multiculturalism and cultural pluralism. Protagoras shines 
as a great intellectual generalist, urbane pragmatist, and civic hero. Plato, in his Meno, 
records Protagoras as dying honourably, after forty years spent in his profession, his 
reputation still undiminished.209 
 
Protagoras – The Secretive Skeptic 
 
However, the representations and quotations attributable to Protagoras are not 
univocal, it is equally plausible to fashion a version of him less amenable to humanism and 
democratic thought. We must further mine the figure of the stranger. The stranger is the 
outsider who provokes curiosity and excitement, appreciated for the knowledges s/he 
imports. But the permanent outsider also threatens what is inside with corruption and 
degradation. The stranger is forever doomed to expulsion or even death in a time of crisis. 
Diogenes Laertius' Lives casts a grave shadow over the ultimate fate of Protagoras. 
He is reported to have been expelled by the Athenians near the end of his life, his books 
burned in the marketplace, contradicting Plato’s account. Philostratus also reports that 
Protagoras was banished from Athenian territory, eventually sinking at sea, like Athens’s 
navy during the Peloponnesian war.210 Pratogoras is drawn into the fate of Pericles, who 
died, under attack from all sides, from the plague in 429 BCE, having drawn Athens into 
the calamity of the Peloponnesian war.  
One thinks of Gorgias, who taught the notorious Alcibiades, flamboyant aristocrat, 
ambitious demagogue and oligarch who attempted to overthrow Athenian democracy. 
Protagoras’s fate, retrospectively considered, prefigures the state assassination of that other 
noted ‘Sophist’ and corrupter of youths, Socrates. The democracy Protagoras manipulated 
swallowed him up; the ambitious youths to whom he appealed ended up denouncing him. 
                                                 
209 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 9, Meno (91D). 
210 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 4, B1, 6, B2. 
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Rhetoric is a fatal power, distributing dire fortunes, cycles of avarice and decay; it is the 
means by which a democracy implodes into sedition, tyranny, and mob rule. The foreigner 
and outsider, rhetoric prevents consensus over its legacy. 
 Philostratus suggests that Protagoras made the acquaintance of Persian magi at the 
time of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece. It is perhaps from this instruction in Eastern heterodox 
belief that Protagoras questioned whether the gods exist or not, for the magi acknowledge 
their gods in ‘secret rites’. This is the esoteric Protagoras, the stranger who acknowledges 
the outward forms of society but keeps his secrets, and continues furtively to practise his 
beliefs, prefiguring the dual allegiances of the Jewish marrano, the minority threatened by 
mainstream beliefs.211 A more despairing Protagoras feels the dilemma of the 
disenchanted individual, arguing that there is much to prevent knowledge of the gods, 
stressing the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of one’s life.212 Mario 
Untersteiner’s imaginative The Sophists argues for the existential pathos of the Sophists, 
theorising at a time when the ‘objective’ world of epic values had diffused into the 
subjective uncertainties of lyric poetry, announcing a ‘tragedy of the intellect’, a sense of 
both insecurity and wonder, and an emphasis on aporia and dilemma.213 
            Rhetoric, then, pertains not only to democratic optimism but also to sceptical and 
unsettled ages; it is the end of certainty. 
Protagoras is perhaps a sorcerer or magician, identifying himself in Plato’s 
eponymous dialogue as a modern Orpheus, whom Protagoras cheekily suggests was a 
Sophist avant la lettre. Protagoras enchants, like Gorgias who ‘played the wizard’ with 
another Orphic poet-philosopher Empedocles, Gorgias who enchanted and amazed the 
Athenians upon first hearing.214 Protagoras animates those around him, but his self-
identifications also suggest privation, exile, and death, a loner’s tale. Protagoras exhibits 
the need for new forms of individual ‘self-fashioning’, inventing his own heritage as both 
populist and esoteric. While ascribing to his rhetorical arts the ‘religious rites and 
                                                 
211  For an excellent study of the history of Jewish marranos after their expulsion from Spain and Portugal, 
see Yirmiyahu Yovel, The Marrano of Reason, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1989. 
212 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 4, B1. 
213  Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954, 26, 34-5. 
214 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 32, B3. 
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prophecy’ of an Orpheus, Protagoras also shrewdly identifies with the communal voices of 
Homer and Hesiod in poetry, and with the musical talents of Agathocles. A voice of the 
people perhaps, but all these men also deployed their arts as a pleasing guise with which to 
avoid the malice of state power.215  
Suggestively, Susan Jarratt argues that the Sophists align themselves in 
genealogical terms with the poet and minstrel, those who in mythic times transmitted 
cultural knowledge into all areas of life, acting as elite prophet, political leader, teacher, 
and master of the religious sphere.216 The Sophist will not affirm that the gods exist, but 
his atheism is expressed as a doubt or query, in order to avoid putting his views in ‘too 
forceful a way’.217 Protagoras, the stranger, cautious of the vulgar and political authorities. 
Protagoras fathers less benign traditions. He is held by Diogenes Laertius to parent 
the ‘present shallow tribe of quibblers’, the later generations of Sophists infamous for their 
unscrupulousness, shallow opportunists who created an iniquitous culture of litigation and 
provided a theoretical justification for the cruelties of worldly power and success.218 Here 
Protagoras insinuates himself only through trickery, he is a self-proclaimed  ‘master of 
wrangling’, and is this not the force behind the degradation of Athenian morals and its 
disastrous involvement in the Peloponnesian war?219 A keen competitor, Protagoras the 
democratic discussant shades into the fierce Protagoras of many Olympic oratory 
competitions, a trickster intent on scoring cheap points, whose interactions are simply 
performance, mere display, empty exercises. As chronicled by Diogenes Laertius, 
Protagoras’s reported ‘wrangle’ with a student over a fee poses interpretative problems: 
A story is told of the time [Protagoras] demanded his fee from Euathlus, a pupil of 
his. Euathlus refused to pay, saying, ‘But I haven’t won a victory yet.’ Protagoras 
replied, ‘But if I win this dispute I must be paid because I’ve won, and if you win 
it I must be paid because you’ve won’.220 
                                                 
215 Plato, Protagoras in Protagoras and Meno, trans. W.K.C. Guthrie, Penguin Books, London, 1956, 316D-
317A. 
216 Susan C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured, Southern Illinois University 
Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1991, 34. 
217 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 15, B23, fragment of Diogenes of Oenoanda. 
218 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 4, B1. 
219 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 5, B1. 
220 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 6, B6. 
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Protagoras is a figure of skilful evasion and transformation; his nous for escapism can be 
traced back to the tactical cunning of Odysseus. Protagoras steals what is proper to 
someone else, like Hermes from Apollo, like Prometheus from Zeus. His rhetoric is the 
artificial deformation of nature; it is hubris. To the first academics, intent on developing a 
sound epistemology, Protagoras parents every kind of specious relativism. Aristotle chides 
the Protagorean confidence in making the ‘weaker argument stronger’ as simply false, an 
obstruction to logical argument, ethics, and metaphysics. The metaphysician shows 
impatience and anxiety over the mysterious atopia and polysemy of Sophistic discourse, 
its legitimation of the modish and ephemeral.221 
Protagoras acquired the reputation of an atheist. He is in the company of those later 
Skeptical and nominalist philosophers who ‘do away with every standard of judgment’ 
according to Aristotle.222 Protagoras will make every certainty, every fixed idea, shudder 
violently in his solipsistic utterance that: ‘man is the measure of all things’. Plato in his 
Gorgias (462 ff.) will associate the rhetorical enterprise begun by Protagoras with a mere 
knack rather than an art. Rhetoric is a sort of cookery that uses a hodge-podge of 
ingredients, a cosmetic technique that gives the unworthy argument a convincing 
appearance, a mere technique without propriety or ontological worth. Plato himself knows 
arts of representation; he takes every advantage of the Athenian perception of the Sophist 
as stranger and foreigner, as unnecessary supplement, corruption and perversion, 
portending a horrifying multiplicity that endangers order and homogeneity. A vigorous 
dialogue about the merits of oratory, Tacitus’s Dialogus raises the prospect that eloquence 
is no quiet and peaceable art, no discourse of prudence and moderation, but a ‘foster-child 
of licence, an associate of sedition, a goad for the unbridled populace’, devoid of genuine 
discipline (40:2).   
 
Historiography and the Circumstances of Sophistry 
 
                                                 
221 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 13, B 21; Aristotle’s Rhetoric II, 24, 1402A23. 
222 Sprague, The Older Sophists, 18, F1, Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters VII, 60.   
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Edward Schiappa is perhaps understating the case when he remarks that there is 
considerable disagreement over just how Protagoras’s contributions should be 
characterised. Criticism that attempts to situate his legacy continues to confront a cultural 
persona that inaugurates different genealogies. As Schiappa remarks, Protagoras can be 
viewed as the first positivist, the first humanist, a forerunner of pragmatism, a Skeptic, an 
early utilitarian, and a subjective relativist.223 Schiappa remarks that Protagoras belongs 
to an age when discourse was not neatly divided into academic categories, and when there 
was primarily one audience for public discourse, rather than the contemporary sphere of 
specialised academic discussions.224 Hence there are lingering questions: is Protagoras a 
responsible thinker or the consummate performer, philosopher or magician? Too often 
historiography has attempted to decide, which can only preclude a complex interpretation 
of rhetoric’s diverse traditions and often surprising sources or critical appeal. A more recent 
trend in historiography has argued for the multifarious circumstances of Sophistic teaching 
and ideas as a key to their contradictory evaluation. 
  One needs to consider that the same ancient source, including such a rigorous and 
systematic thinker as Aristotle, becomes inconsistent in assessing the Sophists' 
significance. C.J. Classen argues that while Aristotle is extremely critical of the fallacious 
subtleties of Sophistic argument in On Sophistical Refutations, he is at the same time 
prepared to acknowledge that at times the Sophists' devices may be useful or necessary for 
the elaboration of a mode of practical reasoning or phronesis. Such Aristotelian texts 
internalising Sophistic theory would include the Topics  (111 B32-112A15), with its 
methodological emphasis on acquiring an eclectic range of argumentative commonplaces. 
We could also mention the many tropes and argumentative strategies of the Rhetoric, a text 
whose uncertainties and polysemy we have already discussed.225 One might wish to 
                                                 
223 Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, University of South 
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dismiss the Sophists, but fluid circumstances say otherwise; in a rhetorical culture one has 
to adjust oneself to differing tempos and conditions and the Sophists speak to that need.  
Plato is by no means unequivocal on the subject of the Sophists, a function of his 
subtle dramaturgy with its energetic characters. While portraying Protagoras as somewhat 
pompous and loquacious, the Protagoras is prepared to concede Protagoras’s 
contemporary fame, genial good manners, and the sociological significance of his theories. 
The Sophists are key participants in Plato’s most humorous and open-ended early dialogues 
such as the Euthydemus.226 As vigorous polymaths and intellectual experimenters they 
encourage Socrates to display his considerable critical dexterity and discursive competence 
– they ‘bring out the best’ in him if you will. His virtuoso reading of a poem of Simonides 
in the Protagoras, an exuberant philological exercise and demonstration of rhetorical 
prowess, exemplifies Socrates' need to emulate Sophistic resourcefulness and display in 
the early dialogues. Discourse needs to define its characteristics in a rhetorical culture, but 
Plato hopes this concession to the Sophists' energetic self-promotion is only temporary.227 
Jacqueline de Romilly focuses on the crux of interpretation the Sophists pose to 
historians of ideas. The Sophists are progenitors of multiple philosophical traditions. They 
argue for the logos as critical and procedural reasoning while acknowledging the realities 
of a democracy that desired ‘ardently’ to debate political, legal, and moral problems. The 
Sophists understood the excitement generated by access to discourse, putting a premium 
on striking and vivid genres of argument, and tendentious forms of assessment.228 Mindful 
of this dual aspect of Sophistic ideas, de Romilly suggests that the Sophists inaugurate both 
transcendental forms of philosophical critique and immanent social and political 
discourses, a hybrid of speculative and prudent techniques. 
                                                 
226  As Jacqueline de Romilly puts it, the Sophists are in the ‘least austere’ of Plato’s dialogues, and are 
integral to the ‘intellectual adventure’ being played out in those dialogues, mirroring contemporary Athens. 
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De Romilly makes the point that like the Presocratics before them, the Sophists 
spoke to an audience yet to be differentiated by the division and specification of 
knowledges, an audience as interested in the phenomenal aspect of argumentation as its 
content. Isocrates, the first rhetor to create a stationary academy for teaching rhetoric, 
suggests that even one’s most sincere convictions needed to be supplemented by the 
theatrical display of a range of discursive skills and novel displays, issuing in the somewhat 
meretricious Sophistic practice of outwitting normative assumptions.229 
De Romilly suggests that the unified intellectual theatre (of aesthetic form and 
rational argument) of ancient Athens is the generative medium of salutary and pernicious 
Sophistic traditions. On the one hand, the Sophists responded to the fluid society of which 
they were a part by a rigorous and non-judgmental examination of human behaviour, 
resuming anthropological and sociological study of human cultures and types, and a diverse 
interest in human technological capacities – borne out in the historiography and tragedy of 
the period.230 On the other hand, the desire to manipulate and show off to a loving public 
becomes too tempting, generalist self-confidence easily segues into braggadocio, the 
boastful Sophistic claim to explain everything and have knowledge of all possible 
topics.231 Gorgias, emboldened by adoring audiences, comes before the Athenians and 
boldly dares them to ‘suggest a subject’ on which he will instantly discourse, apparently 
demonstrating that he ‘knew everything’.232 This empty boastfulness, discernible in first 
generation Sophists and satirised by Plato in the Protagoras, probably engendered the 
fatuous obsession with verbal display and oversubtle technique in later generations of 
Sophists. It also prepared for a philistine horror of speculative philosophy prominent in 
later rhetoricians like Cicero, who thought of rhetoric as the practical and effective civic 
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art of negotium, antithetical to esoteric and useless philosophical otium, metaphysical 
abstraction.  
 John Poulakos has explored the different chronotopes, the different temporal and 
situational exigencies, from which multiple strands of Sophistic thought will diverge into 
different critical traditions. In ‘Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric', Poulakos 
suggests that the Sophists conceived of rhetoric as a social technique whose medium is 
logos, and whose double aim is pistis, belief, and terpsis, aesthetic pleasure.233 The 
Sophists translated their dramatic flair in Olympic competition and public speaking into an 
ethos of address suitable for the burgeoning public-spheres of the agora, the courthouse, 
and the democratic assembly.234  The Sophists thereby translated supple performative 
gestures and sensibilities into the legal and deliberative sphere. They produced discourse 
models shaped by a ‘logic of circumstances’, an ‘ethic of competition’, and an ‘aesthetic 
of exhibition’.235 The Sophistic development of the public sphere incorporates arts that 
are both prudent and performative. Critical interiority refashions itself into response to a 
changing world, discourse is always both directed at an object of knowledge and a mode 
of display, it is critical logos and performative ethos at once.236 Rhetoric, suggests 
Poulakos, will emerge from the rich and varied milieux the Sophists inhabited as both an 
art of personal expression and a dynamic response to social trends. For Poulakos, Sophistic 
rhetoric is a complex ethos; it encourages tonal shifts, attending to the kairos (the opportune 
moment), to prepon (the appropriate), and to dynaton (the possible).237 
Lyotard also points towards a logic of situation, of the desire to enhance a particular 
chronotope as a guide to the Sophists' diverse theorems and techniques. The Sophists' 
bolder claims, such as Protagoras’s atheism and cognitive pluralism, belong to a world 
requiring vivid critical gestures, a world that needs folly, naïveté, and madness. Lyotard 
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suggests that the Sophists ‘maximise’ their claims, unsettling common opinion, giving all 
possible chances to subaltern opinions and minority sensibilities. Ideas and perspectives, 
no matter how scurrilous, are maximised in a kind of language game or rhetorical conflict 
that despises the false assuredness of so called rational premises. To maximise a logos, a 
genre of argument, in a labile world, is to lend it an ethos, and to create paradoxical modes 
of recognition: it is precisely because you say that it is always the stronger who beat the 
weak, that I did not beat this weaker individual. Wisdom is now folly, folly wisdom, but 
as Christ would later exhibit, such audacious naïveté and performed idiocy is the road by 
which tyranny and legalism are overthrown.238  
 
Sophistic Legacies 
 
Cicero’s works argue for the complex legacy of Sophism. One can see in Cicero 
sudden changes of tone, rapid oscillations between the practical and theoretical, 
movements in and out of various chronotopes or logics of circumstance. Let us take 
Cicero’s Topica (‘Topics’ 44 BCE), modelled on Aristotle’s similarly titled work 
influenced by Sophistic argumentative devices or commonplaces. In many ways this is the 
work of the leading courtroom orator of his day, a man of action and practical success. The 
commonplace arguments it suggests are redolent of the immanent inventiveness and 
combativeness of the advocate, always in need of a fresh supply of tactical arguments. If 
statutory law is against you, appeal to natural law; if there is no question of one’s client's 
guilt, try translative pleading, arguing that this jurisdiction has no right to try this case. And 
do the reverse if one is a prosecutor. As Tacitus reminds us, the chronotope of rhetorical 
pedagogy is that of danger, crisis, of fluid circumstances and shifting loyalties: 
… but when danger hurtles around your head, then surely no sword or buckler in 
the press of arms gives stouter support than does eloquence to him who is imperilled 
by a prosecution; for it is a sure defence and a weapon of attack withal, that enables 
you with equal ease to act on the defensive or to advance to the assault, whether in 
the law courts, or in the senate house, or in the Emperor’s cabinet council 
(Dialogus, 5:7)  
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Yet it is fascinating how suddenly a shift in emphasis and implied chronotope can affect 
supposedly immanent and practical texts, introducing more reflective and speculative 
blends into the mix. For the rhetor’s hard won successes, their very malleability, 
inventiveness and role-playing élan, argues for the theoretical significance of rhetoric, for 
example in suggesting a contradictory and historically minded assessment of the law. 
Cicero argues that any orator acquainted with the copious ‘places’ or genres of argument 
will recognise the law in polylogical terms: one can understand the law partly as a matter 
of current statutes, partly a much broader matter of equity and natural law, and partly 
recognition of time-honoured customs. Cicero’s descriptive pragmatism or 
‘conventionalism’ exhibits a certain humour towards the law’s authority and origins.239 
Circumstantial praxis generates transcendental inquiry, the orator estranged from himself 
through sheer immanence, is capable, upon mature reflection, of offering thought a 
profound paideia, an account of its own historicity and generative means.  
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Chapter Six: Jena Romanticism: Rhetoric and Representation 
 
There is a material, enthusiastic rhetoric that’s infinitely superior to the sophistic 
abuse of philosophy, the declamatory stylistic exercise, the applied poetry, the 
improvised politics, that commonly go by the name. The aim of this rhetoric is to 
realize philosophy practically and to defeat practical unphilosophy and 
antiphilosophy not just dialectically, but really annihilate it. 
(AF 137). 
  
In this chapter I discuss Friedrich Schlegel’s critical ideal of a ‘materialist rhetoric’ 
and the philosophy of representation that it entails. An historically conceived rhetoric 
enables Schlegel to form a varied image of criticism, as material practice and 
transcendental exploration, of intensive and extensive orientations. As Walter Benjamin 
argues in his thesis on the Jena Romantics, ‘The Concept of Criticism’ (1920), it was 
Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich von Hardenberg – pseudonym Novalis – who treated the 
criticism of art as a ‘philosophical problem’ in their theoretical vehicle, the bi-annual 
Athenaeum journal (1798–1800).240 I argue that the mosaic of discourses evoked by 
rhetoric, its rich paideia, offers these aspiring young intellectuals a mode of critique that is 
neither negative nor didactic, but, in Benjamin’s words, ‘objectively productive, creative 
out of thoughtful deliberation’. 241  
            For Friedrich Schlegel, rhetoric will remotivate philosophy and aesthetics as 
public-intellectual traditions. Rhetoric is the political imperative of a practical philosophy; 
it is the need to problematise the interdependent relationship between intellectuals and their 
society.242 
                                                 
240  Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’ in his Selected Writings, Volume 
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For the Frühromantiks, classical rhetoric’s appeal is that of a communicative 
situation, a public theatre and life-world for discourse that both moderates and invigorates 
the aims of critique. A materialist rhetoric, responsive to a broad audience, is intensive, 
reflexive and circumspect; it refers thought to its circumstances of production. Erudite, 
deeply impressed with popular culture and folklore, a materialist rhetoric imbues the 
language of ideas with historicity, cultural memory, genealogical sensitivity; rhetoric 
dissociates representation from a narrow referential function. A materialist rhetoric is 
innately inclusive, it defies the ego, the critical urge to dominate and survey. Rhetoric is a 
discursive tendency that describes the ‘producer along with the product’, announcing a 
recursive, a ‘cyclical’ rather than linear, philosophical form (AF 238, AF 43). Rhetoric is 
a horizontal drive, expansive, an ana-logic, an assent to co-existence. An intensive rhetoric 
critiques a bloodless, homogenous abstract thought, it despises shallow universalism, 
callow philosophical systems, its temporality is layered, diffuse, rather than empty and 
neutral. 
For Friedrich Schlegel, rhetoric also suggests an extensive form of representation, 
semiological media that are magical, allegorical, sublime. Rhetorical irony succeeds 
sociality, thought vexes and evades normative commitments, and the play of language 
gives a teasing glimpse of the unconditioned, the absolute. This rhetoric is not a given 
subjectivity but a liberal ethos, a texture of orientations renewing rhetoric’s classical fealty 
to paradox, to the folly of wisdom, the magnificent power of deception. Schlegel’s post-
intentional rhetoric is a complex structure of feeling; a diachronic and hybrid chronotope 
rather than applied art, or improvised technique. It is a rhetoric divided, in conversation 
with itself. A materialist rhetoric is always two-fold; it is the immediacy and excitement of 
public performativity and its mature comprehension, an urbane critical conduct and ethical 
generosity.  
           My analysis supplements Jean Luc-Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
important work on Jena Romanticism, The Literary Absolute  (1978), which argues that 
                                                 
hundred and twenty five fragments written in 1797, one hundred and fourteen of which were published under 
the title Pollen in the journal Athenaeum at Easter 1798. LFI refers to ‘Logological Fragments 1’, an 
unpublished manuscript dating from the end of 1797 to mid-1798. LFII refers to a section of Novalis’s 
notebooks dating from between May and July 1798. By Schlegel, I refer to Friedrich Schlegel unless stated 
otherwise. 
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the Jena Romantics sought a cultural-materialist and literary organon to generate Idealist 
reflection and project a sense of the unconditioned or ‘absolute’. Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe functionalise Jena Romanticism as a predominantly philosophical response to the 
crisis of representation inaugurated by the Kantian Critiques. While acknowledging the 
Jena Romantic search for a more acculturated Idealistic organon, my emphasis is on the 
historical sophistication of the Athenaeum, its nuanced revival of the rhetorical mosaic as 
a critical method, creative principle, and discursive ethos.243 
 
The Athenaeum: Intercepting Modernity 
 
The time has come to move beyond a powerful historiographical caricature, a 
reductio ad absurdum, which depicts the young German Romantics, and Friedrich Schlegel 
in particular, as purveyors of velleities, dreams, fantasies of escape. A certain tradition 
stretching from Madame de Staël to Kierkegaard, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Carl Schmitt 
depicts the Jena Romantics as aesthetes and eclectics who adjudge all religions, creeds, and 
political beliefs by their capacity to stimulate the imagination.244 Nietzsche condescends, 
describing post-Kantian Romanticism and its love of the suprasensible as a sign language 
of febrile adolescent emotions, that ‘innocent, rich, still youthful era of the German spirit 
… [a] high spirited and enthusiastic movement, which was really youthfulness’. The 
Idealism of Kant and Fichte, claiming to have discovered moral and aesthetic faculties of 
mind, appealed to the ‘noble idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artists, the three-quarter 
Christians and the political obscurantists’.245 This historiographical theme can be found 
earlier in Kierkegaard, who argued in The Concept of Irony (1841) that the Romantic Irony 
                                                 
243 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in 
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of Friedrich Schlegel freed itself from ‘actuality’, its sorrows ‘but also … its joys’, for all 
its affective postures, irony, Christianity, republicanism, idealism, were merely for the sake 
of a ‘supreme poetic enjoyment’.246 
Carl Schmitt in his Politische Romantik (1925) is more severe, accusing the 
Frühromantiks of subordinating religion, history, and politics to aesthetic ends. Traces of 
this velleity model can also be found in Simon Critchley’s recent work Very Little … 
Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (1997), where he suggests that the ‘naïveté 
of romanticism’ is the belief that the modern world can be addressed in the form of art, an 
‘organicist fantasy of the overcoming of the state and an end to politics’.247  
Certainly it is not easy to characterise the outpouring of whim and vim bodied forth 
in the aphorisms, dialogues, and cheeky reviews of the Athenaeum journal. This is probably 
why a certain laziness and clichéd conception of Romantic ‘subjectivism’ comes so easily 
to substitute for sympathetic critical comprehension of Frühromanticism. I do think it 
possible, however, without detracting from the history of ideas, the genealogies of aesthetic 
and critical forms that informed the writings of the Frühromantiks, to inscribe the 
Athenaeum within the historical circumstances of the Jena circle. This gesture is important 
since the lively conversations, readings and collaborations of the Jena Romantics, their 
conviviality, were the raison d’être of the Athenaeum journal, tirelessly enthusiastic about 
the joys of critical dialogue and the possibility of art and writing as a mutual craft, a co-
operative ethic: 
Perhaps there would be a birth of a whole new era of the sciences and arts if 
symphilosophy and sympoetry became so universal and heartfelt that it would no longer 
                                                 
246  Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, With continual reference to Socrates, trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1989, 279-81.  
247  Simon Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature, Routledge, New York, 
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be … extraordinary for several complementary minds to create communal works of art. 
(AF125) 
 
I take my cue from a point made by Iain McCalman in relation to English Romanticism, 
that Romanticism ‘cannot be reduced simply to an ideology’, a single movement, for it is 
always negotiating the material forces of its age and in that sense Romanticism arises from 
collective ideals and historical vicissitudes.248 Likewise, (mis)appropriating the 
anthropological method of ‘thick’ description I cathect the imaginative pluralism and 
mediatory desires of the Jena Circle to the friction of different worldviews, cultural 
traditions and ideologies typifying their cultural moment, the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. 
By Frühromanticism or Jena Romanticism, I talk of the years between 1797 and 
1802, when a group of writers, aestheticians, theologians, and philosophers met in the home 
of A.W. Schlegel in Jena, and the literary salons of Henriette Herz and Rahel Levin in 
Berlin.249 August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) was a literary historian, philologist, and 
translator of Dante and Tasso into German, lecturing at the university of Jena; his wife 
Caroline Schlegel was also a keen participant in the group’s activities and contributor to 
the journal.250 The group also included A.W. Schlegel’s younger brother and Renaissance 
man Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), the writer Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853), the 
philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1845), the theologian Ernst Schleiermacher (1767-
1834), and Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801), known by his nom de plume Novalis. 
The twice-yearly Athenaeum journal is the fruit of their discourses and a commentary on 
their relations with each other. 
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August Wilhelm’s younger brother Friedrich Schlegel was perhaps the group’s 
driving force and most significant theoretical mind. He was classically trained, a philologist 
and theoretician, with burgeoning philosophical interests in the wake of Kant’s Critiques 
(1781-90) and Fichte’s succeeding On the Concept of the Science of Knowledge (1794). 
At the close of the eighteenth century Friedrich Schlegel is enjoying a prominent 
relationship with Dorothea Veit, a leading salonniere; he is part of a feminised salon culture 
that brings together Jew and Gentile, praising Enlightenment and Emancipation. In the 
1790s and early nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel, a dynamic young man with a 
brilliant reputation, is an urbane cosmopolite and enthusiastic republican. 
In Berlin in 1796 Schlegel writes ‘one of the most progressive political writings’ of 
1790s Germany, ‘An Essay on the Concept of Republicanism’.251 He argues for the 
enfranchisement of women, against male primogeniture, for the rights of the poor, in favour 
of democratic political participations, and looks towards a cosmopolitan federation of 
states.252 Philosophy, he argues, is a political and sociological imperative. The ego has 
the ‘capacity of communication’ in regard to other individuals, it should be communicated, 
not left isolated, as an empirical or rationalist datum.253 Practical philosophy is political 
philosophy. 
In 1797, Schlegel meets Schleiermacher and Tieck at the salons of Henriette Herz. 
Ludwig Tieck, popular storyteller and forger of the German genre of dramatic irony, was 
then engaged in translating Shakespeare and Cervantes’ Don Quixote. Schleiermacher was 
becoming interested in the role of religious faith and infinite intuition in the Aufklärung; 
one cannot live by reason alone. Schlegel would continue, over the next few years, in the 
urbane spaciousness of his writings, to discuss the merits of both pantheism and irony, to 
discuss the irenic possibilities of a new religion and the worldly aesthetic joys of parabasis, 
of an aesthetic digressive and fragmented. Schlegel’s thought bears the traces of dialogue 
in a milieu without contemporary academic divisions, where knowledges and approaches 
                                                 
251  Beiser, Political Writings, 95. 
252  Beiser, Political Writings, 95-112. 
253 Friedrich Schlegel’s  ‘The Concept of Republicanism’ (1796), in Political Writings, 100. 
122 
 
coalesce.254 In his lectures on transcendental philosophy at the University of Jena over the 
winter semester of 1800-1801, Schlegel, now of more moderate political views, still argues 
that a ‘practical philosophy’ should not construct the ideal of an individual person, but the 
ideal of the whole, of society, of a genuine emancipation that is only generated by 
intersubjective encounter, a proximity of different personalities, perspectives.255  
Friedrich Schlegel and many other members of the Jena circle exemplify the 
humanistaat ideal, the German version of the Enlightenment, prevalent before Napoleon’s 
invasion of Prussia in 1806. This movement sought to bring together the disparate 
knowledges of art and science, philosophy and literature, logic and imagination, historical 
continuity and political progress. A characteristic of German political liberalism in the 
1790s is its absence of nationalism, its cosmopolitanism.256 As David Simpson argues, in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, German critics were very aware of the 
relative paucity of precursors in their own language and culture. They were, in response, 
especially eclectic and internationalist in their understanding of their aesthetic and critical 
traditions.257 Almost the entire Romantic circle, except the more conservative A.W. 
Schlegel, had cheered the storming of the Bastille and the end of the ancien regime.258 
Many of the circle were translators and classicists. Schlegel as a younger man was a well 
known Hellenophile, adoring Greek literature, inspired by Wincklemann’s pioneering 
work on the nobility and simplicity of ancient Greek art. 
Another significant contributor to the journal and member of its inner sanctum was 
Novalis, Friedrich von Hardenberg, a close friend of Friedrich Schlegel, mystic poet, 
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philosopher, ecumenical Catholic, amateur geologist and natural philosopher. In ‘Faith and 
Love’ (1797), Novalis, celebrating the accession of Friedrich Wilhelm III, attempts to 
reconcile republicanism and monarchy, a participatory body politic identifying itself in the 
elite symbolism of the king and queen. The spirit is reformist, conciliatory, open to 
tradition, suspicious of a rationalist year zero. His ‘Grains of Pollen’ will appear in the very 
first volume of the Athenaeum produced in 1798, setting the tone for its avowed poetics of 
the fragment as an annunciation of new births. 
  Also in this ecumenical circle is the Pietist theologian and philosopher Friedrich 
Schleiermacher as well as J.W. Ritter, the chemist and leading practitioner of ‘romantic’ 
naturphilosophie, a short lived generalist movement which conceived of nature as vital and 
dynamic, capable of affording analogical insights into mental powers and human morality. 
Analogues abound, no form of knowledge is for itself, interested in its own teleology alone. 
Kant’s argument in The Critique of Judgment (1790) for the importance of aesthetic taste, 
of a sensus communis, to moral ideas still resonates in the Jena circle.  
Within this polymathic group, different elements continue to collide and form 
promising constellations of speculation and synthesis within an early Enlightenment 
crucible of intensive sociability, a sphere of discussion, debate, readings, and 
entertainments. As Kathleen Wheeler points out, from such a hybrid milieu we shall receive 
a modern conception of art as multifarious, sentimental, fantastic, marvellous, grotesque, 
and thoroughly historical, always in excess of itself.259 The atavistic terror, materialism, 
mob violence, and atheism brought about by the corrupted ideals of the French Revolution 
temper faith in majority rule or a normative commitment to reason, an idea so horrifically 
abused by the Jacobins and Robespierre. Rather, Jena talk is often urgently historical, 
renewing the proud tradition of German historicism, attempting to situate and 
‘characterise’ historical tendencies and political ideologies. There is the question of 
reconciling individual freedoms and social equity within a framework of tradition and 
continuity.260 Religion is in the air, not as doctrine or received truth, but as affect, 
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sensibility, a feeling for the infinite, an empowering of the idea as unconditioned, without 
limitation. Secularism has failed to end the nightmare of history; it is blind faith in disguise. 
The group are outsiders to the exhilaration and terror occurring in France, and they 
want to make use of that distance, to comment wryly on fanaticism, to discern historical 
patterns where there are now claims to new beginnings, to certainty, truth. Novalis sets the 
tone, remarking on the ‘paradoxes’ of the times, noting that Edmund Burke has written a 
‘revolutionary book against the Revolution’ (MO115). Friedrich Schlegel suggests that the 
‘paradoxes’ of the ‘French national character’ are revealed by the revolution (AF 424), its 
alchemical power illuminating contradictory social forces: ‘Paradox is everything 
simultaneously good and great’ (CF 48). 
Many of the group, particularly Friedrich Schlegel, are Spinozists, fans of his 
mixture of rationalism, pantheism, rigorous historico-philological criticism, and acerbic 
critique of dogma and religious zealotry.261 As Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd note, 
‘politics, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind are interwoven in 
[Spinoza’s] works’.262 Spinoza had intriguingly suggested that the mind was the ‘idea’ of 
the body, reflecting the body’s persistence and flourishing in a world of ‘difference, 
diversity, and experimentation’ without telos or final cause.263 Spinoza had stressed the 
positive role of imagination in ‘even the highest forms of intellectual life’.264  
The trajectory of Spinozistic critique was to move from the collectivity down to the 
individual rather than in the other direction, to argue for the self as taking on an inner 
multiplicity that mirrors the ‘complex affective interaction of bodies’. Sociability, for 
Spinoza, was ‘inherently affective’, reliant on a mixture of intellect, emotion, and 
imagination.265 Human beings don’t live from the dictates of reason alone, their freedom 
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is grounded in a sociability strengthened by ‘sharing forces’ with external bodies that affect 
us with joy.266  
            The formation of selfhood is collective for Spinoza, the ego is communicated, 
multiple, textured, immanent to historical tendencies rather the dictates of opinion alone. 
The Jena circle interpret their own time of ferment and revolution in such Spinozistic terms:   
The French Revolution, Fichte’s Philosophy, and Goethe’s Meister are the greatest 
tendencies of the age…. Whoever cannot take any revolution seriously that isn’t 
noisy and materialistic, hasn’t yet achieved a lofty, broad perspective on the history 
of mankind. (AF 216, 1799) 
 
The formation of the subject involves memory, imagination, not just present perception 
and immediate exigencies.267 The self is communicated and communicating, borne of 
dialogue; it is also a paradox, subsisting in the contradictions of time, acceding to its own 
multifarious conditions of being. Frühromantik Spinozism is political, but it is wary of the 
coercions of a general will, the violence of state power, the caprice of mass opinion.  
The Athenaeum returns to the rhetorical tradition to theorise the paradoxical 
energies required by the public sphere. It constructs a sense of rhetorical representation that 
moves beyond the confirmation of the isolated ego in ideology, moralism, and didactic 
sentimentality. As David Simpson argues, for Friedrich Schlegel, rhetoric’s skilful 
evasions and suspensions of meaning are always veering towards its opposite pole in 
absolute commitment, complete sympathy, infinite communication.268 Romantic affects 
or dispositions, as theorised and enacted, always resonate with the collectivity, they never 
come simply from the top down, the apodictic will; they are the salutary materials of a civil 
society that retains an historical sensibility and pluralist imagination. Schlegel’s materialist 
rhetoric echoes with conversation, experimentation, diverse experience, and the need, in 
life, for bricolage. 
 
Witz 
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For Friedrich Schlegel and his intellectual confidante Novalis, ‘Witz’, a higher form 
of humour, needed to be theorised as both an important critical disposition and ethical 
tonality. Witz allows philosophy and aesthetics to converse; it is a discursive tendency, a 
humour, which might subtend a range of intellectual work, an interdisciplinary mien. In an 
illuminating discussion, Jean-Luc Nancy describes Witz as a polymorphic idea, a genre of 
utterance or witticism, but also applicable to silences, ironies, lacunae (such as the black 
page in Thomas Sterne’s Tristram Shandy). Witz is also the psychological faculty capable 
of such productions, the English wit, the French esprit; it is the general form of these 
productions, an association or combination of elements, a mélange, a transcendence of 
partiality.269  
Witz has a layered etymology, in Old and Middle High German, Witzi had 
designated sagacity, a natural power of discernment, part of the whole family of savoir, to 
know. Later, however, Witzi will be associated more with ‘cunning’, savoir-faire, technical 
skill, strategy, especially in the arts of magic and war. Witz draws to itself Wissen, 
knowledge that can by possessed, systematised, and wisdom as refinement, yet it will 
always remain closer to a keen mind that is discerning and nimble, its knowledges not 
accessible to easy acquisition or proof.270  
Witz is theory’s intuition. Witz is intellectual spice; it is an often provocative 
juxtaposition of ideas that quickens reflection. It arouses thoughtfulness and intellectual 
pleasure in its audience; it is figure, trope, rhetorical invention, translation. For the 
Frühromantiks, Witz is the ethos of a ludic avant-garde desiring to shock and provoke its 
audience. Yet for historically minded theorists such as Friedrich Schlegel, Witz will not 
play the role of an applied affectation that separates one critical school from its more staid 
rivals. Witz is not a style or marker of cultural capital, it should never be reified into a 
fashion or taste. 
Witz is a response to the hybrid desires of early German Romanticism, now seeking 
a form of representation fusing earthy humour and ironic ethereality, the grotesque and the 
idyllic: 
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One is often struck by the idea that two minds really belong together, like divided halves 
that can only realize their full Potential when joined…. I would like to see Jean Paul 
(Richter) and Peter Leberecht (Tieck) combined …. (Richter’s) grotesque talent and 
(Tieck’s) fantastic turn of mind would … yield a first rate romantic poet (AF 125). 
 
Witz is a complex tendency that surpasses the finite work or officially sanctioned genre. 
Witz is not a poetics. Schlegel sounds the new approach by noting that ‘all classical poetical 
genres have now become ridiculous in their rigid purity’ (CF 60). Walter Benjamin remarks 
that Schlegel’s concept of criticism seeks to achieve freedom from heteronomous aesthetic 
doctrines. Schlegelian critique seeks criteria of aesthetic appreciation distinct from 
classical rules of form and propriety, namely the criterion of an  ‘immanent structure 
specific to the work itself’. Witz is contemptuous of any external decorum; it seeks energies 
and representational forms invisible to conventional modes of interpretation, 
historicisation.271 
Witz is a linguistic power, a characteristic, mannered form of utterance, 
communicating evanescent whim and ethereal desire. Witz, as distinct from its empirical 
description in the single work of art or critical essay, is a text’s cultivation and universality; 
it can be resolutely opposed to a ‘thin watery’ form of reason. Witz, Schlegel tells us, is an 
acute ‘sense’ for the representative worth of the absurd, sordid and ridiculous, it is 
knowledge emerging from communication, from interaction: ‘a definition which isn’t witty 
is worthless, and there exists an infinite number of real definitions for every individual’ 
(AF 82). Witz, sublimating collective engagement, fertile sub-cultures, re-evaluates, 
legislates new forms of life, affirms regions of existence, enjoys, in empirical fashion, the 
wealth of human nature.272 
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For Friedrich Schlegel and the Athenaeum, Witz is the matrix, the ur-disposition of 
critical theory. It is an organon of textual production as well as a disposition to be affected 
in myriad ways. Witz, for instance, speaks of an urbane receptiveness to the ‘interest’ of a 
discursive encounter, an enjoyment of conceptual personae like the buffoon, the 
harmonious bore, the ‘brilliantly stupid’, with traces of the popular love of the fool figure. 
Witz avoids rancorous or personalised polemic; it artistically sublates individuals who are 
‘classic’ and have lasting merit. Witz revels in a post-traditional modernity with a classicist 
temperament, and this aloofness creates ‘ideal prototypes of objective stupidity and 
objective foolishness’. These behavioural types are ‘infinitely interesting’, worthy of the 
highest form of polemic. (CF 81) Witz is a rhetorical disposition: it is both intellectually 
piquant and culturally inclusive; it belongs, simultaneously, in the realm of rich sensuous 
appearance and critical reflection. It is an active catalyst (pot-stirrer) and leisurely 
spectator.  
Witz, like oratory, needs a capacious chronotope; it belongs to a spacious and fluid 
collective theatre of discourses, where anything might happen: 
Just as with blood-horses it takes a roomy track to show their mettle, so orators 
need a spacious field in which to expatiate without let or hindrance, if their 
eloquence is not to lose all its strength and pith (Tacitus, Dialogus, 39:2, 339) 
 
Witz, in its diverse experience and a-teleological praxis, understands that ‘nobody is 
uninteresting’ (AF 81). Witz glimpses the unconditioned, combining ‘absolute rigor’ with 
‘absolute tolerance’. In the aphorisms of Novalis, Witz is associated with a pictorial and 
hieroglyphic language of pure gesture, naïve dramatisation, a passive medium of new 
births, heteroscopic empiricism: 
Who invented wit? Every characteristic or mode of conduct of our spirit that is 
consciously reflected upon is in the truest sense a newly discovered world (MO 35). 
 
The highest sense would be the highest receptivity to the particularity of human nature 
(MO 72).  
 
Witz is post-egological, it requires a ‘sacrifice of the self’ that is the ‘foundation of all true 
exaltation’ (MO26). Witz is akin to a hieroglyph, an allegorical sign that lends 
representative worth to the natural world, that translates sensuous particularity into 
129 
 
mystical comprehension. Witz is a generous Phenomenality, but it secretes hidden depths, 
an oracle, a conceptual persona: ‘I would acquire mediated and immediate knowledge and 
experience of the thing at the same time – it would be representative and not representative 
… my own and not my own’ (LF1 72). 
For the Jena Romantics, Witz is not the instrument of a subject. Witz is the 
historicity of affect, habit, cultural practice; it surpasses the possession of an individual, 
the whim and caprice of the isolated genius, the expressivist subject of the Sturm und 
Drang.273 For Schlegel, Witz’s interest is not psychological but linguistic and theoretical. 
Ambiguous in its mien, Witz is both fragmentary and holistic. It is the artistry of a particular 
personality, but it is also necessarily unwitting, encompassed by a sociable tendency: ‘the 
objects of social intercourse are nothing but means to enliven it. This determines their 
choice – their variation – their treatment…. Each human being is a society in miniature’ 
(MO 42). 
 Witz ‘grasps the idea at a glance’ but it also cultural memory, subaltern tradition, 
rising above official vocabularies.274 In ‘Miscellaneous Observations’ written around 
1797 and published in the Athenaeum in 1798, Novalis suggests the necessary temporal 
disposition for the theory of humour; it is only for the weak person that the 'fact of this 
moment’ can become an ‘article of faith’ (MO 23). Jean-Luc Nancy provides valuable 
insights into the many chronotopes of Witz. Witz figures the dashing virtu of l’homme 
d’esprit, the worldly courtier and dynamic Renaissance individual on the model of 
Castiglione. It can also signify the urbanity and élan of the man and woman of taste; it is 
the characteristic tone of the ‘salon’, the discursive lubricant of bohemian and artistic 
circles, an urbane principle of conversational selection, an intimacy, a nuance.275 
                                                 
273 René Wellek comments: 'But Schlegel can say that he is "disgusted with every theory which is not 
historical"’. Wellek argues that Friedrich Schlegel’s most significant intellectual breakthrough was his 
movement away from a standard of ‘prescriptive nature’ based on an ideal model of the Greek classics, 
towards a pluralist appreciation of modern art and the diverse tendencies inscribed within it. See René 
Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism, The Romantic Age: 1750-1950,Jonathon Cape, London, 1955, 7. 
274 Nancy, ‘Menstruum Universale’, 253. 
275 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Menstruum Universale’ in The Birth to Presence, 257. See also Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: ‘Witz, then, is not merely a “form” or a “genre” ... 
although it is indeed ... the preferred genre of conversation, of sociality ... the genre of a literature that would 
be the living and free exchange of opinions, thoughts, and hearts in a society of artists, in a group like that of 
the authors of the Fragments’ (53). 
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 For the historically invested Frühromantiks, Witz should be disentangled from 
theories that functionalise humour as sentiment, or that bring it into the service of the 
powers that be. Witz is its own value, it neither ‘substitutes for an impossible happiness’ 
in the manner of the cynical Chamfort, nor is it the touchstone of human truths or a means 
of moral ennoblement as commended by the Earl of Shaftesbury. To say that Witz is either 
cynical or moral is a ‘vulgar prejudice’: ‘Wit is its own end, like virtue, like love and art’ 
(CF 59).276  
Witz suggests a certain immediacy in its act of performance that makes it 
inseparable from what utters it. It is the force of language itself, the power of brevity, the 
electricity of an interruption or startling idea: ‘Wit is like someone who is supposed to 
behave in a manner representative of his station and instead simply does something’ (AF 
120). Witz is an interloper, a scandal, a corruption of standards. Witz is forceful rhetorical 
power, an Aristotelian dynamis that concentrates all eyes on the exercise of a talent, the 
felicity and forcefulness of a style, the power of a strategy, the extremity of a point.277 
Witz is monstrous, hybrid, it gives birth to a miscellany of genres, it is dialogue, fable, 
aphorism, and anecdote. Witz is an interpenetration of genres and a carnivalesque social 
space.278 Witz is an acerbic rhetorical force and an abundant gratitude for life. Witz is an 
imaginative, multiply situated praxis and a theoretical mode, interested in typologies of 
characteristics and pluralist histories.  
Friedrich Schlegel distances Witz from any specific intention or animus: ‘one 
should have wit, but not want to have it. Otherwise you get persiflage, the Alexandrian 
style of wit’ (AF 32). Witz is not utilitarian: ‘to use wit as an instrument for revenge is as 
shameful as using art as a means for titillating the senses’ (CF 51). Witz is the sustaining 
                                                 
276 Despite Friedrich Schlegel’s mild condemnation, Shaftesbury’s idea that truth is best served by the robust 
interrogations of humour and the refraction of an idea through multiple media undoubtedly anticipates the 
Frühromantik concept of Witz as an intuitive and intersubjective medium. See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury, ‘Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend’, 
in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 30: 
‘Truth, it is supposed, may bear all lights, and one of those principal lights, or natural mediums, by which 
things are to be viewed, in order to a thorough recognition, is ridicule itself, or that manner of proof by which 
we discern whatever is liable to just raillery in any subject’. 
277 Nancy, ‘Menstruum Universale’, 257. 
278 Nancy, ‘Menstruum Universale’, 255: 'Witz; the uncontrolled and uncontrollable birth, the jumbling of 
genres ... literature and philosophy, neither literature nor philosophy, literature or philosophy’. 
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condition of sociable discourse, but it cannot be appropriated: ‘A sense for the witty 
without the possession of wit is the ABC of tolerance’ (CF 71). Witz’s paideia is the 
enchantment of bodies and substances, it gives birth to paradoxes: 
A witty idea is a disintegration of spiritual substances that, before being suddenly 
separated, must have been thoroughly mixed. The imagination must first be satiated 
with all sorts of life before one can electrify it with the friction of free social intercourse 
so that the slightest friendly or hostile touch can elicit brilliant sparks and lustrous rays 
– or smashing thunderbolts’ (CF 34). 
 
Witz is exercised by combination, interaction, sociable habits, sumptuous display, and in 
that sense it exceeds all principles heretofore. Witz, the principle of cosmic affinities, is at 
the same time the menstruum universale, a universal solvent, a power of chemical 
decomposition into simple elements and raw materials (MO 57). One might say that Witz, 
as a tendency, inhabits Erasmus’s De Copia and brings it to excess. Erasmus’s text is both 
a gentle, erudite propaedeutic of suasive forms and an energetic display of rhetorical 
resourcefulness and stylistic extremes, with a proclivity to irony, obscenity, and 
carnivalesque copiousness of sensual forms.279 Witz refers us back to Protagoras, to his 
valorisation in discourse of the appropriate and the opportune, his suggestion that ‘timely’ 
communications, transformative verbal acts, are usually the product of repetitive discursive 
exercises and experience in communicative arts. Witz is the mystery of the Sophists. 
 
Witz: Disturbance and Restoration 
 
I now turn to Friedrich Schlegel’s Dialogue on Poetry (1799-1800), published in 
the first volume of the Athenaeum’s 1800 edition. It is a dialogue, a symposium in the genre 
of Plato, where characters modelled on the men and women of the Jena circle debate the 
history and theory of art, a kind of roman à clef. At the outset the participants agree to 
disagree as the preliminary conditions for the amicable expression of a diversity of views. 
                                                 
279  Erasmus’s rhetorical textbook was influenced by Cicero’s thematisation of oratorical copiousness 
(copia) in De Oratore, a dialogue which suggested that the practicality of the orator should nevertheless be 
subtended by a paideia, an historical understanding of rhetorical style and characteristic modes of ethos, also 
a prevalent theme of Cicero’s Brutus. 
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The dialogue will be a ‘festive occasion’ in which the battle becomes quite hot, as otherwise 
‘there is no hope for a perpetual peace’.280 Witz is a vigorous extreme and irenic 
possibility. The very extremity of wit, its power of novelty, can nevertheless restore and 
renew, rediscovering a forgotten sociability or relationship of elements: ‘many witty ideas 
are like the sudden meeting of two friendly thoughts after a long separation’ (AF 37). As 
Novalis comments: ‘[Wit] is at once the result of a disturbance and the means of its 
restoration’ (MO 30).281 
Witz shatters egoistic complacency only to create the possibilities for civil 
dispositions: ‘Wit is absolute social feeling, or fragmentary genius’ (CF 9). One thinks of 
witz as the discharge of enforced restraint, as the sudden outburst pertinent to a confined 
space, the sudden revivification of a period of torpor, the interruption of a staid monologue, 
the evanescent moment of release after a period of irritation: ‘Wit is an explosion of 
confined spirit’ (CF 90). For Novalis it is in witz that ‘imagination and judgement touch’, 
or where freedom and restraint converse. As Benjamin argues of the Jena Romantics, Witz 
is a desired mode of critical representation because it suspends all limitations by resting on 
those limitations, it is where immanence and transcendence combine, it is the paradox of 
genuine sociability. Witz, as a form of critical representation, transforms ‘positively’ 
formal moments into ‘universally’ formal moments. By relating the individual work to the 
collective idea of art, Witz affords a sociable basis for judgment, a subtle propaedeutic.282 
Benjamin, with heuristic flair, describes Witz as an undogmatic or ‘free formalism’ 
that grounds the validity of forms independently of the ideal of determinate structures.283 
Witz derives not rules, educative precepts, or demonstrable concepts from its aesthetic 
awareness and theoretical sensibility. Witz rather highlights the creative formal principles 
of folly, licentiousness, absurdity, theatricality, and paradoxicality. Witz mediates these 
energies, it is their prism, it cannot itself be historicised by essentialist gestures, it is 
                                                 
280  Friedrich Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms (1799-1800), trans. Ernst Behler and 
Roman Struc, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1968, 56. 
281  One thinks here of the rhetorically acerbic and sarcastic Erasmus (witness the Praise of Folly) who 
advocated defending the broad church of Catholicism against the splintering effects of Lutheranism. In 
rhetorical sensibilities one often encounters linguistic intensity and philosophical pluralism, contrasts of form 
and content, as our analysis of Nietzsche will suggest. 
282  Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 156. 
283 Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 158. 
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linguistic intensity and philosophical pluralism. Witz is the irony of classicism, the wisdom 
of folly, the organon that is not, that is yet to arrive, that is in reserve: ‘wit in all its 
manifestations is the principle and the organ of universal philosophy ... the value and 
importance of that absolute, enthusiastic, thoroughly material wit is infinite’ (AF 220).284  
 
Rhetoric and the Public Sphere 
 
What is a public? How can thinking be enriched by a collectivity without 
succumbing to state power, public opinion, or the current arbiters of taste? The philosophy 
of the Jena Romantics differentiates itself from the interior a priori faculties of mind 
heralded by Kant, as well as Fichte’s idea that epistemology is enabled by the absolute, 
non-negotiable positing of an originary ‘I’. Fichte was interested in how a purely logical I 
posits itself and then progresses towards a subject of practical reason and aesthetic 
imagination by positioning differences and obstacles it must dialectically incorporate. 
Benjamin, limning his own ideal of an immanent critical method, argues in ‘The Concept 
of Criticism’ that Schlegel and Novalis oppose an ‘infinity of connectedness’ to Fichte’s 
infinity of continuous dialectical advancement.285 Benjamin suggests that for the 
Romantics the matrix or midpoint of reflection is the immanent representations of art, not 
the originary ‘I’.286  
For Jena Romanticism, the public is neither a guarantor of one’s rectitude nor a 
prügelknabe for Enlightenment rationality. It is more a matter of considering critical and 
aesthetic dispositions that are engendered through an ambivalent relationship to the public 
sphere: ‘To want to judge everything is a great fallacy, or a venial sin’ (CF 102). The 
Critical Fragments of 1798 often point to the venality of lower critical and aesthetic genres: 
‘carrying on a polemic against an individual has something petty about it, like selling retail’ 
(CF 81); ‘isn’t everything that is capable of becoming shopworn already twisted or trite to 
begin with?’ (CF 118). Good writing does not predicate itself on an identifiable audience, 
                                                 
284 cf. The Literary Absolute, 55: ‘the truth of the organon becomes accessible in geniality’, a Frühromantik 
philosopheme traceable to Shaftesbury. 
285 Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 126. 
286 Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 134. 
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genuine sociability is more subtle: ‘every honest author writes for nobody or everybody. 
Whoever writes for some particular group does not deserve to be read’ (CF 85). The 
pedagogical aggression of the Enlightenment receives similar notice: ‘the function of 
criticism, people say, is to educate one’s readers! Whoever wants to be educated, let him 
educate himself’ (CF 86).287  
The Frühromantiks repudiate a Voltairean mandate to polemicise and moralise. To 
write for the public in fact devalues one’s efforts to the level of the empirical and 
importunate: ‘People who write books and imagine that their readers are the public and that 
they must educate it soon arrive at the point not only of despising their so-called public but 
of hating it’ (CF 69). Thought is not a normative calculus: the ‘analytic writer’ who aims 
for a ‘proper impression’ is surpassed by the ‘synthetic writer’ who imagines a reader ‘alive 
and critical’ and discreetly demurs from making a ‘particular impression’, heralding a 
relationship with the reader which is that of deepest ‘symphilosophy’ (CF 112).  
So what is a public that is not simply present and objectifiable as a set of reified 
interests? What is the public that continues to enrich and subtilise art rather than exhaust 
its possibilities? How to describe that idea of the public that allows historicity in discourse, 
that opposes itself to demagogic opportunism, that is not the greed and envy of the 
multitude? Schlegel plays the nominalist out of irritation with vapid, ahistorical 
vocabularies:  
One sometimes hears the public being spoken of as if it were somebody with whom one 
had lunch at the ... Leipzig Fair. Who is this public? The public is no object, but an idea, 
a postulate, like the Church. (CF 35) 
 
Novalis, one of Catholicism’s great theoreticians after Augustine and Erasmus, is also 
around this time theorising a spiritualised, internationalist conception of the public, 
resonant with the affective complexity and lost opportunity of an idealised Christendom. 
This public subtends critical discourse in the manner of a powerful popular religion, the 
‘comprehensive suppleness and rich substance of the Catholic faith’. One can rhetorically 
articulate this theistically imbued public, it animates a discourse that is ‘lively and 
                                                 
287  One can only be bemused by Frederick Beiser’s argument in Political Writings that the Romantics were 
‘preoccupied with the need to determine the standards of good taste and literature’ (xii). 
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effective’, spiritually profound yet appealingly superficial.288 Novalis conceives of 
Catholicism and its lost Christendom as a paradoxical possibility rising from the diverse 
relations of a collectivity, engendering multiple sources of appeal and forming itself from 
the diverse tendencies of a people: ‘The people is an idea ... A perfect human being is a 
people in miniature. True popularity is the highest goal of humanity’ (MO 47).  
A public culture’s copious aspect, its joy and sadness, its material life and power 
of fancy, inform one’s own critical values. The public is an idea, a paideia, surpassing 
one’s own will, engendering the self as a multiplicity. Such a public should condition all 
one’s initiatives. Novalis is blunt on this point: ‘Flight from the common spirit is death’ 
(MO81). The public diversely stimulates both in its individual characteristics and as infinite 
horizon: ‘The public is an infinitely large, diverse, interesting person – a mysterious person 
of infinite worth – the actual absolute stimulus of the artist’ (LF II, 34).  
The public is not organic, it is not yet the nation, it does not simply exist in history, 
it stimulates rhetorical desires; it fragments logic into inclusive deliberation, exercises in 
perspective, a speculative mien without logical origins or aims: 
The more perfectly and variously we can produce something, execute it, the better 
we know it. We know it perfectly if we can communicate it, arouse it everywhere 
and in all ways (LF II, 37). 
 
We are reminded of the Earl of Shaftesbury’s ironic ‘conventionalism’. Shaftesbury argued 
that it is only men of ‘slavish principles’ who affect superiority over the vulgar and despise 
the many. The lovers of mankind ‘respect and honour the conventions and societies of 
men’, and this acknowledgement of a sensus communis means that we shall ‘grow better 
reasoners by reasoning pleasantly’, without rancour, dogma, or narrow mindedness.289 
Schlegel enthuses about a philosophic tenor that is always in media res (AF 84), variously 
conditioned inter alia rather than ex cathedra, a philosophy of human nature. 
The diversity of a public teaches us that the author is not an ego or homogenous 
theoretical territory, but an itinerant thinking, an immanent variety of individual activities 
and desires: 
                                                 
288 Novalis, ‘Christendom or Europe’ (1799) in Philosophical Writings, 141, 151. 
289 ‘An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour’, 36-37. 
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Only then do I show that I’ve understood an author: when I can act in his sense, when I 
can translate him and transform him in diverse ways, without diminishing his 
individuality’ (AF 287).  
 
The public Jena Romanticism posits as its organon is demanding. It would like not 
only virtuosity and paradox, but also cultural materialism in its discourse:  
Might there not be something to be said for the everyday person, who has recently 
been so much abused? Does not persistent mediocrity demand the most strength? 
And is the human being to be more than one of the popolo? (MO 44) 
 
It takes strength to be mediocre. The formal variety and historicity of one’s milieu suggests 
new critical tasks, reinventions, re-positionings, and translations into new idioms. In one 
sense the thin rationalism of the Enlightenment was for the Frühromantiks merely reactive, 
weak, pallid and afraid, demonstrating an inability to cope with energetic stimuli, the 
rigorous requirements of a materialist rhetoric, a communicative art form. The thinker who 
would be a rhetor must forego certainty and completion: ‘might it not be the same with the 
people as with the truth: where, as they say, the attempt is worth more than the result’ (AF 
73).  
 To postulate a pluralist public that subtends one’s thinking is to admit that ideas 
and their genres of presentation are fatally imbricated, in excess of each other: ‘Formal 
logic and empirical psychology are philosophical grotesques. For whatever is interesting 
...  in an experimental physics of the spirit can surely only derive from a contrast of form 
and content’ (AF 75). 
When, like Witz, philosophy experiences that combination of creative freedom and 
situational restraint that characterises popular genres and conversational conventions, it can 
be remarked upon as double: 
Wherever philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues – and is not simply 
confined into rigid systems – there irony should be asked for and provided ... There 
are ancient and modern poems that are pervaded by the divine breath of irony 
throughout and informed by a truly transcendental buffoonery. Internally: the mood 
that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all limitations...; externally, in its 
execution: the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian buffo (CF 42). 
 
Philosophy’s new era is paradoxical. One talks now of a ‘logical sociability’ (CF 56), a 
‘scientific wit’, a ‘logical beauty’, a ‘brilliant stupidity’, of Socrates as urbane buffo, of the 
137 
 
many roles of the conceptual persona. Thought has a material form or comportment, it is 
‘characteristic’: ‘manners are characteristic edges’ (CF 83). Thought is the interplay of the 
material and ideal, it enacts the logos as Janus faced, logical desire and aesthetic form, 
always supplemented, dangerously, by an ethos.  
Heeding these imperatives, Schlegel calls for a poetry that combines 
‘transcendental raw materials’ and the preliminaries of a theory of ‘poetic creativity’ with 
the expansive power of ‘artistic reflection’, of an inventive logos and a fragmented paideia. 
He talks of an aesthetic form that would be simultaneously ‘poetry and the poetry of 
poetry’. Schlegel argues that if symphilosophy and sympoetry become universal and 
heartfelt, it will no longer be anything extraordinary for complementary minds to create 
‘communal works of art’ (AF 125).290 If the artist is become an expert in his field and 
‘understands his fellow citizens in the kingdom of art’, then he will have to become a 
philologist as well (AF 255). Criticism is both inspired and mundane, it is art and method, 
its propaedeutic is at once pragmatic, soberly historical, and infinitely imaginative.291 The 
republic of letters is now within, the ego communicates with itself, introjects a number of 
social and critical practices.  
Rhetoric – with its ambivalent mythology of rhetorical personae, its excitement and 
anxiety over the eternally problematic relationship of language to the human condition, its 
anthropo-sociological valorisation of language and cultural media as a-teleological motors 
of social formation – suggests to the Jena Romantics a critical ethos that is immanent to 
the instability and materiality of representation as communicated affects, roles, habits, 
collective memories.  
                                                 
290  In other words, the ecstasies of poetic praxis must be recuperated by the sober restrictions and 
articulations (decompositions, characterisations) of theory. The infinitude and affirmative contingencies s of 
lyrical subjectivity finds both its necessary displacement and consummation in the sound formalist 
methodologies and intensified philosophical consciousness afforded by critique. Benjamin, ‘Concept of 
Criticism’, 152, 153: ‘criticism is therefore the medium in which the restriction of the individual work refers 
methodically to the infinitude of art’ (my italics), ‘for the Romantics, criticism is far less the judgment of a 
work than the method of its consummation’ (my italics). 
291  One should consider this ambiguity of the rhetorical critic, as technician and speculative theorist, before 
prematurely circumscribing the aims of Paul de Man’s well-known manifesto ‘The Return to Philology’ 
(1982) as merely reductively technical and institutionally aggrandising, as suggested by Guillory in The 
Problem of Literary Canon Formation (1994). De Man, in the role of pedantic specialist and critical 
egalitarian: ‘Attention to the philological or rhetorical devices of language is not the same as aesthetic 
appreciation’, in The Resistance to Theory, 24. Note de Man’s interest in rhetoric and philology as a 
propaedeutic or ‘prosaics’, influenced by Jena Romanticism. 
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Rhetoric, which can function as a circumstantial practice and an enthusiasm for 
embellishment, magical fictions, and enhanced affective states, inaugurates the Romantic 
ideal of a ‘prosaics’, a continuum of forms. Walter Benjamin argues that for the 
Frühromantiks the ‘idea of poetry is prose’, that prose is the ‘creative ground of poetic 
forms’. 292 Rhetoric, a tendency, an excess, fragments representation into a copia of 
possible tonalities, ideas, themes, motifs, characteristic drives. It is the jumbling of genre 
(philosophy, poetry), the mixed ethos (‘inspiration and criticism’) (AF 116). The rhetorical 
drive of Witz, and its ambiguous relationship to public life, suggests a critical topos that 
resurges in Nietzsche and Arendt, the problematic of the living, socialised intellectual 
restrained and emancipated by their involvement in the world: 
… wherever one does not restrict oneself, one is restricted by the world, and that 
makes one a slave, because even what seems irrational or supra-rational, one’s 
unlimited free will, must at bottom be simply necessary and rational. (CF 37).  
 
We must now turn to history, to the idea of a rhetorical culture, a teasing idea, the 
basis of a very different philosophy of history. 
    
 
                                                 
292  Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 173-4. Benjamin argues that the reflective medium of poetic 
forms is prose understood as a rhetorical mixture of elements without rule. In prose, all genres and ‘all 
metrical rhythms pass over into one another and combine into a new unity, the prosaic unity’. Rhetoric, which 
is an extension of forms, is therefore enunciation’s ‘canonical creative ground’ (174). 
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Chapter Seven: The Frühromantik Philosophy of History 
 
Our intention here has ... been to sow the idea that the spontaneity, freedom, and 
fantasy attributed to Plato in his legend of Theuth were actually supervised and 
limited by rigorous necessities.... [We concern ourselves] with the fact that Plato 
has not merely borrowed a simple element.... we... point to the internal, structural 
necessity which alone has made possible such communication and ... contagion of 
mythemes.293 
 
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. [It puts] poetry in touch with 
philosophy and rhetoric.... so that many artists who started out to write only a novel 
ended up providing us with a portrait of themselves ... a mirror of the whole 
circumambient world, an image of the age. (AF 116) 
 
In this chapter I analyse how the Jena Romantics recuperate classical rhetoric as a 
philosophy of history and an ideal of socialisation. I argue that the Frühromantiks conceive 
of rhetoric as an acculturated ‘tendency’, an urbane disposition that subtended the different 
artistic and philosophical schools of antiquity.  
 Understood as a hybrid chronotope, rhetoric allows the Frühromantiks to 
‘fragment’ history by translating historical time into what Benjamin in ‘The Concept of 
Criticism’ calls ‘potentiated’ or ‘representative’ forms rather than the essentialised cultural 
periods of later historicisms. I follow Benjamin’s suggestion in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ 
that the Frühromantiks conceive of the past as a relative rather than absolute unity; there is 
an interpenetration of past and present, historicity and experimentation. The relative unities 
of the past, suggests Benjamin, ‘are so far from being shut up in themselves and free of 
relations that through the intensification of their reflection (potentiation, romanticisation) 
they can incorporate other beings, other centers of reflection, more and more into their own 
self-knowledge’.294  Benjamin argues that ‘progredibility’, the progressiveness of 
Romantic art and critique, should in no way be understood by the modern ideology of 
‘progress’. The Romantic idea of history is not some ‘merely relative connection of cultural 
                                                 
293  Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, in Disseminations, trans. Barbara Johnson, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1981, 85. 
294  Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’, in Selected Writings, Volume 
I. 1913-26, ed. Michael W. Jennings, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
1996, 146. 
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stages to one another’, it is the past enacted through the present, an ‘infinite process of 
fulfilment’, neither mere becoming, nor nostalgia or tradition.295 
 I suggest that the Frühromantiks argue for an historical form that realises ‘all that 
is practically necessary’. The idea is that the rhetorically acculturated intellectual cannot 
speak simply, apodictically, as a self-identical subject, as a benevolent, present interiority. 
A rhetorical culture is the mixed elements of the collectivity, its genealogies, mythemes, 
poetic images, vernaculars, rising up within thought itself, constituting thought as an 
immanent confusion, a contagion of thought in the idioms and affects of social life. For the 
Jena Romantics, a rhetorical culture promises mixed sensibilities, prudent and artistic 
orientations. Romantic historicity is the precursor to Benjamin’s philosophy of history, it 
redeems or ‘crystallises’, for the present, the fragments of historical time, the repressed, 
marginalised, and excluded. 
    
    Plato: A Free Formalism 
 
           In the previous chapter I analysed the Frühromantik articulation of Witz as an 
ambivalent rhetorical principle of representation, fragmentary and holistic, intuitive and 
theoretical. In Witz one can celebrate ‘superficiality’: popular technique, sensuous 
immediacy, the pleasures of spectatorship, a proclivity for character type and genre. One 
could also celebrate ‘profundity’: ironic evasiveness, allegorical mysteries, a speculative 
organon, a transcendence of the ego. Schlegel and Novalis embed the complex disposition 
of rhetoric, as propaedeutic and immediacy, within the historical question of the sort of 
                                                 
295  Benjamin, ‘Concept of Criticism’, 168. One finds an earlier statement of Benjamin’s desire for a ‘unity’ 
of historical knowledge and critical imagination in the essay ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’: 
‘but there is a unity of experience that can by no means be understood as a sum of experiences’. See Walter 
Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-26, ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’, 108.  John 
McCole discusses this youthful essay as the beginnings of Benjamin’s increasing attention to elaborating a 
philosophy of history.  Benjamin, interested in Kant’s sophisticated critique of experience, disagreed with 
Kant’s tendency to conceive of knowledge as a relation between the entities of subject and object, a 
propaedeutic for epistemology. McCole argues that Benjamin sought to exceed this antithesis through a 
philosophical comprehension of myth, theology and the historicity of language, philology.  Noteworthy is 
McCole’s argument that Benjamin’s attempt to enrich a philosophy of experience with ‘mythic forms’ was 
an attempt at recapturing, for the critical subject, the full range of experience ‘from the vitalist right’. One 
can argue that Benjamin displaces organic, nationalist historicist fantasies with a dynamic and fragmented 
historical sensibility. See John McCole, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1993, 76. 
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public habitus, the pedagogy, audience expectations, and discursive tendencies that 
generates rhetorical personae. Here Frühromanticism looks back (or perhaps forward) to 
classical culture. Schlegel and Novalis want to comprehend Greek and Roman art, 
philosophy, historiography, and literature within a sociological and genealogical analysis 
of a rhetorically flourishing public sphere. Friedrich Schlegel enthusiastically theorises a 
convergence of archaic polytheism, ethical generosity, and a philosophical tendency 
towards public display as the configurative elements of a rhetoricised culture. 
Schlegel and Novalis are interested in those historical cultures that demanded 
urbane and elastic dispositions and inclusive methodologies as the preliminary conditions 
of deliberative reasoning. They will look to Greek and Roman antiquity as an avatar, a 
model of formalist acculturation. The Jena Romantics are fascinated by the ‘tendency’ of 
rhetoricised cultures, their subtle intersubjective energies and communicative imperatives, 
to articulate the classical intellectual, to evoke in the subject multiple and contradictory 
desires, a structuration of feeling. We shall see this exemplified in a favoured thought-
figure of the Jena Romantics, the foolishly wise, the sublime and ‘mediocre’ Socrates.  
            The Frühromantiks conceive of Plato’s early dialogues, which featured Socrates as 
a multi-accented dramatis persona in discursive competition with other thinkers and 
philosophical approaches, as displaying a broad sensus communis: ‘Novels are the Socratic 
dialogues of our time. And this free form has become the refuge of common sense in its 
flight from pedantry’ (CF 26). The critical agenda of Plato was not of interest to Schlegel, 
whose contemporary quarrel with the slavish neo-Kantians was predicated on a firm 
opposition to a hermeneutics of intentionality and consistency: ‘The tacitly assumed and 
real postulate … of the Kantian evangelists reads as follows: Kant’s philosophy must be in 
agreement with itself’ (AF 107). Schlegel’s philosophy of history, predicated on the 
rhetorical animus of classical thought, displaces the Fichtean I and the celebrity of the 
Kantian master theorist. Schlegel and Novalis’s meditative crux is the form of public 
culture and its embodied dispositions that could constrain Plato: constrain his artistic form 
to reflect the abundance of his circumambient culture; to reflect the materiality of the 
portrayer as well as the ideas portrayed.  
 There are a number of aspects of a rhetorical culture. Schlegel is interested in those 
acculturated tendencies that generated Plato’s flair for theatrical scenography, constrained 
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him to invoke and harness the power of various performative genres and critical techniques; 
witness Socrates’ mastery of various kinds of rhetorical exercises, logography, epideixis, 
aporia, dialectical reasoning. The Frühromantiks are interested in Plato’s relationship, 
constraining and liberating, with a classical ‘public’ imaginary, that desired vivid, oblique, 
earthy, paradoxical, broad, nuanced modes of representing ideas. A rhetorical public sphere 
is imbued with genealogy and mytheme, so that argumentation must, as Derrida argues, 
necessarily negotiate a repertoire of ethical valencies and creative principles, realising 
itself as a plurality of forms. Schlegel discusses the impact of polytheism on the language 
of ideas: 
An ideal is at once idea and fact. If ideals don’t have as much individuality for the 
thinker as the gods of antiquity do for the artist, then ideas [are] ... hollow phrases, 
a brooding intuition of one’s own nose.... The great practical abstraction is what 
makes the ancients – among whom this was an instinct – actually ancients.... of this 
only a mind is capable that contains within itself ... a plurality of minds and a whole 
system of persons (AF 121).296 
 
The motley gods of Paganism are the semiotic instinct of antiquity, itinerant characters of 
many narratives, they individuate thought; prevent it from resting in the noun, the self-
same, the empty generalisation.297 In Paganism and its many mythemes, various creative 
principles or ethical genii, Eros, Eris, texture the critical subject as an immanent ethos, a 
genealogically sensitive set of practices. 
                                                 
296  Also: ‘Speculation en détail  … beget(s) the whole substance of scientific wit … the principles of higher 
criticism’ (AF 121). 
297  See Jean-Francois Lyotard, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1994, 40: 'These stories have no origin. They treat origins in terms of stories that presuppose 
other stories that in turn presuppose the first ones. And so the gods can become, like human beings, like 
Ulysses, the heroes of numerous, almost innumerable narratives.... They become like a species of proper 
name whose corresponding bodies change.... a pagan ideal that occurs again and again in various forms.... 
the ideal of games and masks: 
the awareness that the relation between the proper name and the body is not an immutable one. This 
bars the way to the notion of a subject identical to itself through the peripeteia of its history ... '(the 
italics are mine). Samuel Weber also examines the appeal of polytheism to the modern imaginary: 
‘the polytheism of the mythical world, in which no clear hierarchy permits an unambiguous 
identification of authority’;  
See Samuel Weber, ‘Genealogy of Modernity: History, Myth and Allegory in Benjamin’s Origin of the 
German Mourning Play’, MLN Vol. 106, no. 3, April 1991, 480. 
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  Novalis offers an interpretation of Pagan mythopoesis as a popular natural religion, 
mimetically responsive to a diversity of environmental stimuli that it allegorises and 
sublimates:  
A mind is needed where the spirit of poetry and the spirit of philosophy have saturated 
each other in all their fullness. Greek mythology is in part such a translation of a natural 
religion. The modern Madonna too is such a myth (MO 68).  
 
Catholicism, suggests Novalis, is an historically syncretic theology that has acceded to the 
popular demand for a natural religion replete with iconography and synaesthesia, 
fragmented into erotic and devotional personae such as the Madonna and the various 
Saints. A popular religion wants a distribution of narratives and cultural functions, it wants 
spiritual media who embody both sensuous superficiality and Elysian mysteries, and it 
wants paradoxes, man gods, and the sensuality of the sacred. Popular religions want an 
historically layered, practical theology, in media res, without authoritative genetic origins. 
In Novalis’s genealogy, Catholicism succeeds Paganism because both are rhetorical, 
sociably effective, immanent to the diverse needs of a life-world, evoking the potentiality 
of forms and intermediaries: ‘applied Christianity, a faith that had come alive.... 
Christendom must again become lively and effective’.298 
 Paganism, anterior to modern conceptions of the unitary subject, suggests a 
heterodox assemblage of affective characteristics, traits, and mannerisms. Polytheism is a 
linguistic and representational drive, analogous to Witz. It is the fragmentary wisdom and 
psychological valencies, folkloric, habitual, and miscellaneously accrued, of a human 
nature translated across many cultures: 
                                                 
298  Novalis, ‘Christendom or Europe’, 151. Given the Frühromantik assault on historicism, which evokes 
the aesthetic movement as epiphenomena of a cultural period, one must be suspicious of sweeping efforts at 
contextualising the Christianity of Jena Romanticism according to anachronistic projections of 
Romanticism’s pietistic revolt against rationalism. David Simpson falls into this trap: ‘It is common wisdom, 
that, for example, the German romantics are frequently engaged in a philosophical or aesthetic legitimation 
of Christianity against the challenges of scepticism or paganism’, German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, ed. David Simpson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
UK, 1984, 19. But what, for early German Romanticism, is Christianity? Is it self-identical, at one with its 
institutional history? Or is its potential that of a Pagan generosity to, in the Humean/Deleuzean sense, the 
plurality and habituality of human nature? This reconfigured and genealogically imbued Christianity would 
agree with Simpson’s more apposite statement that Romantic theory is suspicious of the ‘extremes of 
subjective enthusiasm of Schwärmerei' (19). Romantic religiosity is not interiority; its wisdom is that of an 
historical propaedeutic, a paideia of social affections. 
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In investigating ancient Greek mythology, hasn’t too little attention been paid to the 
human instinct for making analogies and antitheses?.…  In that old remark of Aristotle 
that one gets to know people through their gods, one finds not only the self-illuminating 
subjectivity of all theology, but also the more incomprehensible innate spiritual dualism 
of man (AF 162). 
 
 In the Dialogue on Poetry, mythology is related to the dualism of Witz as a 
‘perennial alternation of enthusiasm and irony’. In an a-teleological popular and natural 
religion, happy with its creative fictions, without claim to the truth of history and morality, 
human characteristics and sociable desires are still visible. For the Jena Romantic 
philosophy of history, Paganism’s semiological bathos was contagious even for the higher 
ideals of an emergent philosophy: ‘Might not the cyclical nature of Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
supreme being be the personification of a philosophical mannerism?’ (AF 161). If Pagan 
mythology is a self-referentiality, then, as Kevin Newmark argues, it should be understand 
less as the grand Romantic project than as a ‘naive profundity’ that allows the semblance 
of absurdity and madness, stupidity and foolishness, to shimmer through.299 Pagan stories 
and their confused and immanent chronotopes, mixing human and divine dramatis 
personae, infusing social and sacred narratives, transplants us back into the ‘original chaos 
of human nature’.300 
 Inhabiting a culture whose polytheistic instincts index thought to a genealogy of 
creative characteristics or genii, Plato’s dialogues exhibit, for Schlegel, a productive 
tension. Plato announces a philosophical program, an intended ‘content’ of conceptual 
idealism, anti-democratic elitism, rational purification of myth, and a contrast of 
philosophy and rhetoric as authentic knowledge and shallow opportunism. Plato’s form, 
however, is rhetorically intricate, polyphonic, constrained by a culture of display and 
generic eclecticism to horizontally display a rounded ‘common sense’, to complicate 
extensive universal truths with intensive, localised cultural materials. As Andrea 
                                                 
299 Kevin Newmark, ‘L’absolu litteraire: Friedrich Schlegel and the myth of irony’, in MLN, Dec 1992 
v107, n5. Newmark is responding to the historicism of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe who in La Fiction du 
Politique argues that the Nazi project of a nationalist aestheticism can be derived from Friedrich Schlegel’s 
call for a ‘new religion’ that would unite thought with a concrete imagery and cultural poetics. Newmark’s 
excellent article casts doubts on the historicist narrative that sees the foundation of national mythologies in 
the Romantic project. 
300  Dialogue on Poetry, 86. 
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Nightingale argues, Plato is well aware of a genre’s context of performance and the ways 
in which it is embedded in the social and political institutions of Athenian democracy.301  
Plato knows the democratic force of rhetorical genres (Gorgias ‘amazed’ his 
audience) and their thriving personae, so, as Nightingale suggests, in order to create the 
specialized discipline of philosophy, Plato had to distinguish his own brand of idealism 
‘from all other discursive practices that laid claim to wisdom’. Hence a diacritical medium, 
dialogue, assessing typological or characterological differences, was needed whereby Plato 
set out to define and defend a new and peculiar mode of living and thinking.302 In his 
construction of a multi-accented persona, Socrates, who offers an exacting and specialised 
mode of philosophical thought, Plato was playing an intricate game of fort … da with a 
robust and generalist concept of wisdom, the broad cultivation of the sophoi. Plato both 
draws on and attempts to exceed that eclectic form of wisdom practised by Presocratic 
intellectuals, poets, lawgivers, and other men of skill and wisdom who enhanced the 
thinking of the age.303  
For the Jena Romantics, Plato’s critical condition is rhetoric’s imaginary, where a 
rhetorical pedagogy, a broad cultural repository, interferes with more singular aims; where 
conceptual language finds itself alluding recursively to a phenomenally vivid typology of 
philosophical mannerisms and performative gestures; where linear argumentation conflicts 
with allusive and digressive rhetorical modes; and where the affectless universal idea and 
the relational tonalities of scenography, mise en scène, are in perpetual tension.  
Plato’s conversational dramas are supreme works of art in the Romantic sense 
because, perhaps unwittingly, they capture a cultural moment in all its situational 
complexity, its running themes and ongoing debates. Plato’s novelistic awareness of plural 
voices and diverse genealogies offers another window into a classical representational 
matrix that is a realm apart from mere polemic, persiflage, didactic stricture, and 
moralisation. Constrained and liberated by his florid rhetorical culture of display, Plato 
offers a detailed materialist rhetoric, a ‘mode of representation conforming to the actual 
                                                 
301  See Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue, Plato and the Construct of Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge UK, 2000, 9. 
302 Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue, 10-11. 
303 Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue, 10-11. 
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object', where the ‘moment described can emerge alive from a story’, where an almost 
‘mathematical exactness of topical detail is necessary, communicating the “how” of it to 
the reader, painting "word-pictures"' (AF 177).  Plato, as we shall see, exhibits for the Jena 
Romantics the fruitful division of the rhetor between a natural outpouring of eloquence, a 
mimetic claritas of heightened perceptions, a ‘naïve’ isonomic sympathy with the plurality 
and contingencies of one’s environment, and a sophisticated narratological mode, a savoir-
faire, a cunning, strategic interest in artifice, embellishment, ornatus: 
It is the notorious delights of speech-making that I am enumerating … that are not 
so obvious … known only to the orator himself. If he comes out with an elaborate 
oration which has been carefully rehearsed, his feeling of satisfaction, like the 
discourse itself, has about it something solid and abiding…. But quite the most 
exquisite delight comes from speaking extempore, in bold fashion and even with a 
touch of daring; for the domain of the intellect is like a piece of ground under tillage 
– though you find pleasure in (cultivation), yet the growth that comes by nature is 
more pleasing still (Tacitus, Dialogus, 6:6, 245).304 
 
Plato, whose sensibility is qualified by the eclecticism of the social, becomes for the 
Frühromantiks a medium of embedded generic types:  
In Plato we find unmixed all the pure types of Greek prose in their classic individuality, 
and often incongruously juxtaposed: the logical, the physical, the mimical, the 
panegyrical, and the mythical. The mimical style is the foundation and general 
component of all the rest (AF 165). 
 
              Mimesis is a foundational disposition because it is a complex structure of feeling, 
it does not know itself or what it wants; it is a contradictory combination of enthusiasm 
and irony typical of Witz. Mimesis is an obligation to emulate and respectfully copy that 
exists in tension with the creative power of adaptation. Mimesis desires fidelity and 
                                                 
304  For an excellent discussion of the mixed senses of the rhetorical figure of ornatus in Cicero and 
Quintilian, see Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge UK, 1996, 49-50. Skinner argues that as one of the classical rhetorical figurae or ‘shapes’ 
of speech, the orator’s capacity for ornatus suggests not only a power of ornament, the copious discursive 
means of an extemporising speaker, but preparedness for battle, someone possessing the accoutrements of 
war. From the moment Plato must assume a rhetorical posture, he will not know himself, he has begun a war 
with the Sophists, but not with weapons of his own choosing, a conventional disciplinary idiom, a language 
of pure concepts. Cf. Derrida, in  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 142-3, speaking of Plato: ‘He seems to want to 
substitute logos for myth, discourse for theatre, demonstration for illustration. And yet, within his very 
explanations, another scene slowly comes to light … just as tense, just as violent as the other, composing … 
an artful, living organization of figures, displacements, repetitions’. 
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documentary transcription only to generate a new form or a display of innovative skill and 
initiative. Mimesis is the urbane mood, the robust Witz that looks, simultaneously, towards 
the sublime, and recursively, to a collective source of inspiration in popular conventions. 
Mimesis is the desire to surpass and exceed that must nevertheless rely on its opponent and 
what has come before it to do just that. Mimesis is the aspirational logos that folds back 
into the imbricated tissue of a performative ethos, it is the idea returning to its personality 
and chronotope. Mimesis expels by introjecting, competes by emulating.305  
             Here we draw on Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ essay discussing classical rhetoric 
as philosophy’s pharmakon, its poison and cure, Derrida suggesting that philosophy, 
indebted to a reserve of representations that can never exclude rhetorical persuasion and 
formal mimicry, is condemned never to succeed in its two-millennia-old desire to pass from 
scenography to ideational discourse, mythos to logos. In Plato, the ‘meshing of the 
mythological and the philosophical points to some deeply buried necessity’.306 In these 
terms Plato is a secret Spinozist – affect must enhance reason, thought’s freedom and 
invention rely upon a sociality and a proximity of bodies and ideas that its universalism 
overtly rejects. Plato writes, and writing is constrained by the forms and contingent 
representations of an historical situation. As Derrida argues, its truth cannot be discovered 
‘in ourselves, by ourselves’. Writing is not the object of a science but of a history that is 
recited, its forms re-presented, it is ‘a fable that is repeated’. Because of the constraining 
equivocality of its mythic forms, writing, as representation, sounds an estrangement from 
any single origin.307  
The rhetor is the external become internal, the uncertain interaction of intellect, 
affect, imagination in a diacritical time and space. Derrida will follow Benjamin in 
opposing an authoritative ‘History’ of truth that has been produced in its entirety in the 
philosophical difference between mythos and logos. This progressivist historicism can no 
                                                 
305 For an insightful probing of the problem of mimesis in the history of philosophy, with particular attention 
to Plato, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, trans. Christopher 
Fynsk, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1998,  ‘Typography’, 124. Lacoue-Labarthe argues 
that mimesis has ‘always been an economic problem’, tending towards a ‘generalised depropriation, the risk 
of a polytechnics or of an uncontrollable polyvalence, the exacerbation of desire, the appetite for possession, 
the triggering of rivalry and hatred’. 
306  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 86. 
307  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 74. 
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longer be sustained if Plato is to be read in terms of his relation to the alterity of a rhetorical 
imaginary, its excess.308  
For Schlegel, rhetoric is a mixed sensibility, a soil organic and cultivated. The 
mimetic tendency of rhetoric suggests not only naturalism but craftsmanship, artifice: 
‘whoever has imagination, or pathos, or a gift for mimicry ought to be able to learn poetry 
like any other mechanical art’ (AF 250) Plato’s texts evoke a paideia of discourse practices, 
exercises in genre and theme redolent of the Sophists’ cultivation of discourse’s 
relationship to its situation. From the historicity of a relational Plato, immersed in a 
rhetorical culture, the Jena Romantics can theorise another philosophy, inherently recursive 
and thematically sophisticated, attentive to its inventive commonplaces: 
... the representation of philosophy consists purely of themes – of initial propositions – 
principles.... The analytical exposition of the theme is only for those who are sluggish 
or unpractised... Attentiveness is a centripetal force (LF 1, 3).  
 
If an acknowledgement of discursive situation and theme is a hallmark of classical 
philosophy as the Frühromantiks conceive of it, one can thank the contagious power of the 
Sophists, as disease and cure, magic, pharmakon, excess: 
The mistakes of the Greek sophists were errors more of excess than omission. Even the 
confidence and arrogance with which they presumed and pretended to know everything 
has something quite philosophical about it: not intentionally but instinctively. For surely 
the philosopher has only the choice of knowing everything or nothing ... no philosophy 
worthy of the name tries to teach only some particular thing or mélange of things (AF 
164). 
 
In countering local Sophistries, a critical philosophy, like Plato, must acknowledge not 
only their speculative ambitions but also the pragmatic nodes of discourse they established, 
their polymathy, urbanity, and their intensive pedagogical emphasis on intellectual labour 
as requiring micrological and lapidary qualities: 
Until philosophers become grammarians, or grammarians philosophers, grammar 
will not be what it was among the ancients: a pragmatic science and a part of logic 
(AF 92) 
  
                                                 
308  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 86. Also: ‘The cure by logos, exorcism and catharsis, will thus eliminate the excess. 
But this elimination, being therapeutic in nature, must call upon the very thing it is expelling, the very surplus 
it is putting out’ (128). 
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Only a man who knows or possesses a subject can make use of the philosophy of 
that subject (AF 252). 
 
 The Jena Romantics loved Socrates, a figure of Witz, for he embodies a rhetoric in 
conversation with its bombastic proclivities. Socrates will use all the resources of a 
materialist rhetoric to argue with the pomposity, hyberbolisms, selfish individualism and 
anti-philosophical pragmatism of which Sophistry and rhetoric is capable: ‘Whoever 
doesn’t pursue philosophy for its own sake, but uses it as a means to an end, is a Sophist’ 
(AF 96). Schlegel also favourably contrasts the ‘sublime urbanity’ of the Socratic muse to 
the ‘sophistic abuse of philosophy’ and the ‘declamatory stylistic exercise’ (AF 137). 
The Frühromantiks savour the earthy, pragmatic Socrates of Plato’s early 
dialogues, seeing them as a response to the sophisticated exegetical interests of the 
Sophists. Here Socrates is the lover of verbal jousts, the grammatologist and philologist of 
the Protagoras who relishes the semantic minutiae and aporias of poetic criticism. Here 
Socrates enacts the enthusiastic critical tendencies of his age, a mode in need of renewal: 
‘the doctrine of the spirit and the letter is so interesting because it puts philosophy in touch 
with philology’ (AF 93).  For the sake of a future philosophy, the Frühromantiks rejoice in 
the overlapping of persona and disposition in Socrates, the sublime philosopher as low 
comedy buffo intimated in the lively Aristophanic comedy, The Clouds, which satirically 
confuses Socrates the sage with his Sophistic rivals. The philosopher must be legend and 
myth, confused, qualified, genealogically hybrid, folkloric. Both effect and critic of the 
Sophistic legacy, the agonistic Socrates directs philosophy towards a deepening of its 
scenography, a review of its creative instincts, its relational capacities, its needful recovery 
of a rhetorical surplus, potentiality. 
  For the Jena Romantics, the most significant thinkers of the classical world arouse 
a field of associations and diverse commentaries that signifies their functioning within a 
diverse milieu. The classical milieu is an outstanding model of Eclecticism, positioning the 
philosopher within a rich scenography of possible critical styles and individually performed 
characteristics.  
             For Jena Romanticism, an ecumenical assessment of the present possibilities and 
genealogical sinews of classical critical inclinations, including those of the Cynics, takes 
priority over a top-down or teleological intellectual history:     
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If the essence of Cynicism consists of preferring nature to art, virtue to beauty and 
knowledge ... focussing entirely on the spirit; of absolutely despising every economic 
standard and political pomp, and maintaining the rights of an independent will: then 
Christianity is really nothing but universal cynicism (AF 16) 
 
In such writing one glimpses the defiant, ramshackle Socrates of the Apology theatrically 
repudiating politics and officialdom, refusing to save himself if it means acceding to the 
law, reprising that overt, performatively rich hostility to legal norms so ‘characteristic’ of 
the Cynics. As Luis Navia suggests, the Cynics developed a philosophical style in which 
actions and succinct declarations were the chief medium of the philosophical message they 
sought to communicate. Communicate the Cynic did, teaching by the example of his life 
and his immediate verbal and behavioural reactions to specific situations. The rhetorical 
vividness of Cynical exhibitionism left a rich formal legacy of anecdotal representations, 
‘a graphic record of what Diogenes, Crates, and other Cynics did and said’.309 Rhetoric 
impresses itself on history from below, not as pomp, ideology, officialese, but as an 
astonishing individual act, or the higher sympathy, the transcendence, of a committed 
critical style.310 
          For the nostalgic classicist turned progressive political theorist Friedrich Schlegel, 
the philosophy emanating from a rhetorical imaginary elucidates holistic scenographies 
and social issues rather than isolated belief systems.311 For the Jena Romantics, the 
rhetorically acculturated intellectual can only communicate by oscillating between the 
extremes of vivacious performance, pithy tendentiousness, and profound situational 
engagement, the imbrication of their particular sentiment within a unity of representations: 
‘one should really be able to communicate (something) and share it with somebody, not 
simply express oneself’ (CF 98).  
                                                 
309 Luis E. Navia, Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study, Greenwood Press, Westport CT, USA, 1996, 9. 
310 Cf. Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee, University of Texas 
Press, Austin, 1987, ‘The Problem of Speech Genres’, 63: ‘any style is inseparably related to the utterance 
and to typical forms of utterances, that is, speech genres. Any utterance … in any sphere of communication 
… is individual and therefore can reflect the individuality of the speaker … it possesses individual style … 
The least favourable conditions for reflecting individuality in language obtain in speech genres that require 
a standard form, for example, many kinds of business documents, military commands, verbal signals in 
industry, and so on’. 
311 Cf. Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Speech Genres’, 64: ‘Style enters as one element into the generic unity of 
the utterance’. 
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Navia argues that the classical Cynic was versatile, on the one hand a raging 
misanthrope with a deeply held antipathy to social norms, on the other a consummate 
conversational performer and discursive bricoleur, a ‘busybody’ forever engaging in 
conversation in the marketplace, arguing, asking embarrassing questions, acting out a 
critical social and sociable function, that of the provocateur and pest.312 Rhetorical 
philosophers enact their logos, their critique, in a paideia of civil loci; their quarrelsome 
and misanthropic discourses act to protect an argumentative public sphere, enhancing those 
civil places conducive to robust public exchanges.  
As the Phaedrus reminds us, Socrates’ chosen element for the exposition of his 
philosophy is not the otium of a rural retreat but the negotium of the marketplace, the 
sensuousness of the gymnasium, the density of urban spaces. In The Concept of Irony, 
Kierkegaard suggests that Socrates is a paradoxical persona, a perpetual disharmony of 
inner and outer, an ideal and a caricature, man and god, sage and figure of fun.313 These 
paradoxes inhabit the classical philosopher as a socially involved rhetor, Kierkegaard 
arguing that ‘situation was immensely important to Socrates’. Socrates is both a vital and 
secretive presence in, while mystically floating over, the marvellous, multicoloured variety 
of an exuberant Athenian democracy, and indicating a ‘duplexity of existence’.314  
In the early Platonic dialogues, suggests Kierkegaard, Socrates is very much part 
of an emerging mood of inquiry, an epistemological crisis, an enthusiastic participant in 
the salutary rivalry and comparative assessment of different philosophical modes of life 
and thought.315 Socrates’ fixed point is not a ‘true centre’ but a unity of potential forms, 
an ubique et nusquam, an everywhere and nowhere, a fullness that is not a positivity, a 
sociality without identity.316 Sophisticated and urbane, Socrates is also electrified by the 
stimuli of collective existence, sensing the presence of ideas in everything, his 
                                                 
312 Navia, Classical Cynicism, 24. 
313 Kierkegaard, Søren, The Concept of Irony, With continual reference to Socrates, trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1989, 12, 13. 
314 Kierkegaard, 16. 
315 Kierkegaard, 16. 
316 Kierkegaard, 51-2: ‘The fullness in (Socrates) … is neither the fullness in immediacy as such nor the 
fullness acquired through reflection’, it is a ‘vitality  which continually feeds (a) sickness … it does not unfurl 
into the fullness of beauty’.  
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philosophical metaphors routinely dwelling on the carnivalesque lower stratum of life: 
food, drink, shoemakers, tanners, shepherds, pack asses.317  
Socrates is the rhetorical philosopher as sustained artifice and naïve delight, a 
philosopher for the ages, an average and unremarkable man, venerable and young at heart: 
‘the more ignorant one is by nature, the more capacity for knowledge. Each new insight 
makes a much deeper, livelier impression … (hence) the spirit of invention of young minds’ 
(MO 89). 
            Derrida draws attention to Socrates' equivocal social and mythic functions in 
ancient Greece, his pharmakological structure (poison and remedy) of which Plato’s 
dialogues are in some ways the complex effect. The Socratic pharmakon petrifies and 
vivifies, anaesthetises and sensitises, appeases and anguishes. Socrates is a benumbing 
‘stingray’ but also an ‘animal that needles’, temporarily embodying the role of Cynical 
provocateur, at other times, a Sophistic magician.318 He is like Diotima’s textured portrait 
of Eros in The Symposium, a fearsome sorcerer and magician, a sophist, a being, a medium, 
‘that no “logic” can confine within a noncontradictory definition’.319 For Schlegel, the 
infinitely evasive Socratic persona exhibits a representational unity of styles. Socrates 
reveals traits that emanate from the Sophistic age and its effort to explore and maximise 
perspective and opinion, assuming that a diversity of knowledges enhances and is enhanced 
by sociabilities, intricate relationships.  
Schlegel’s Socratic irony is the problematic of thought as communication, its absolute 
indifference/commitment, its surpassing individuality and sympathetic sociability: 
Socratic irony is the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation. 
It is equally impossible to feign or divulge it…. In this sort of irony everything 
should be playful and serious, guilelessly open and deeply hidden. It originates in 
the union of savoir vivre and scientific spirit, in the conjunction of a perfectly 
instinctive and a perfectly conscious philosophy. It contains and arouses a feeling 
of indissoluble antagonism between … the impossibility and necessity of complete 
communication (CF 42). 
 
                                                 
317 Kierkegaard, 17 
318  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 119, n.52. 
319  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 117. 
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For the Jena Romantics, irony is not an intentional mode of representation, evasive, 
isolated, and elitist; rather it is a critical condition, a duplex existence. Romantic irony, on 
the Socratic model, is an expression, in Spinoza’s sense of the term, of the relative unity of 
a rhetorical imaginary, which requires the interaction of intellect and imagination, an ethic 
of generosity to phenomena and a critical pathos of distance. Irony maximises the attributes 
of thought, its possible moods and sensibilities, cathecting representation’s possible 
qualifications and contingent modes to the infinite and unconditioned.320  
         For the Jena Romantics, it is representation’s kairos, its sprightly moment of 
communicative energy and intuitive immediacy, its fungible relations, that make it 
expressive and exceeding: ‘As a temporary condition skepticism is logical insurrection; as 
a system it is anarchy’ (AF 97).321 
         Evanescent moods and the forcefulness of a style, a nuance, a jeu d'esprit – for the 
Jena Romantics these often invisible critical energies are the sine qua non of a philosophy 
that sublimates negativity and finitude, renewing itself as embedded practice, a heightened 
conventionalism subversive of axiomatics and a priorisms: 
Why is an entry for the ridiculous always missing in those fashionable catalogues of all 
possible principles of morality? Perhaps because this principle is generally valid only in 
practice? (AF 320) 
 
Socrates knows many temporary qualifications; he plays the roles of Cynic, Skeptic, and 
Sophist in order to fight reification. He is the ridiculous satyr and buffo, arguing that 
philosophy is not the hierarchical subordination of form to determined content, but the 
excess of paradox, the deformity of philosophical beauty, the low comedy of the 
sublime.322  
                                                 
320 Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics in On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, 
Correspondence, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, Dover Publications New York, NY, 1955, Prop. XXIV, 260: The more 
we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.  
321  Pierre Macherey, indebted to a philosopheme of Spinoza elaborated by Deleuze, argues for the 
exceeding dynamic of expression: ‘The logic of expression is basically a logic of power, one might even say 
a logic of life or a logic of movement, essentially different from the traditional logics of representation that, 
in their quest for static identity, are constantly threatened by negativity, and therefore dependent on a 
transcendent principle’. See Pierre Macherey, ‘The Encounter with Spinoza’, in Paul Patton, ed., Deleuze: A 
Critical Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, 146-7. 
322 See Nightingale, 190: 'By portraying (the rhetoricians) as lovers, as flatterers, as cooks, Plato.... uses a 
number of recognizable comic topoi to bolster his own critique of Athens. Clearly, Plato is not correcting or 
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          For the Frühromantiks, theory, an intuited unity of idioms and critical powers, is a 
structuration of feeling in relation to the infinite. Socrates in The Symposium responds to 
Aristophanes' witty, yet pathos-imbued, fantasy of hermaphroditic re-unification with his 
own call, at the close of an exhausting festival of rhetorical explorations of Eros, for a 
uniting of the comic and the tragic. For the Frühromantik philosophy of history, the 
complex of forces within the Sophistic age suggests that theory can only be a tendency, a 
paideia of impulses and forces, rather than a system or faculty: ‘an intellectual intuition is 
the categorical imperative of any theory’ (AF 76).  
 Socrates' sense of communicative incompletion, and the aporias of epistemological 
inquiry in Plato’s early dialogues, recall the vital interplay of philosophical inclinations 
contributing to the discursive health of the Hellenistic world: the strong Skeptical strain in 
ancient Greek philosophy dating from the aphorisms and riddles of Heraclitus, the quasi-
satirical paradoxes of Zeno, the worldly fullness of the Sophists, the obscene performances 
of the Cynics. Modern philosophy will need to recover the sense of philosophy as a shading 
of possible qualifications, a variety of moods, all of which restrain a shallow universalism:  
I’m disappointed in not finding in Kant’s family tree of basic concepts the category 
‘almost’.... in the mind of natural skeptics it colours all other concepts and intuitions 
(CF 80) 
 
The sociable, role-playing tendency of classical thought always found principles of 
difference, and multiple inflections, within itself. This is why a rhetorical ethos for the 
Frühromantiks is to be kairological, a differentiated interiority through time, always on the 
verge of becoming its opposite, and such, ironically, is a deliberative ideal: ‘Most thoughts 
are only the profiles of thoughts. They have to be turned around and synthesised with their 
antipodes’ (AF 39). Never itself, never purely content, allowing itself to become a function 
of narrative, situation, theme, topic, classical discourse develops into a self-parodying 
principle: ‘The founders of the art of tragedy found their material and their prototypes in 
the epic. Just as the epic developed parody within itself, so did the masters who invented 
                                                 
parodying comedy but rather harnessing its “voice of criticism”'. For the importance of the scenography of 
Roman Old Comedy to the rhetorical delineation of character in Cicero’s speeches, such as portraying the 
accused as a foolish old man or senex, or the female accused as a lying strumpet, see Joseph J. Hughes, ‘Inter 
tribunal et scaenam: Comedy and Rhetoric in Rome’, in William J. Domnik, ed., Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric 
in Society and Literature, Routledge, New York, 1997. 183-97.  
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tragedy delight in the invention of satyrical plays.’323 Rhetoric, as Heraclitus 
demonstrated, must turn the world upside down to recover sense and meaning. 
 
      Communication as a Medium 
 
          Contrary to conventional perceptions of the rhetor as a silky, manipulative orator 
with a preconceived agenda, the Jena Romantic philosophy of history would recover the 
potential of a material or higher rhetoric which demands thought’s dynamic 
expressiveness, its varied powers of communication. Schlegel conceives of the rhetorical 
intellectual as fragmented, articulated, dialogised, a function of the necessity and 
impossibility of communication, the paralogic of the communicative imperative: 
If in communicating a thought, one fluctuates between absolute comprehension and 
absolute incomprehension, then this process might already be termed a 
philosophical friendship. For it’s no different with ourselves. Is the life of a thinking 
human being anything else than a continuous inner symphilosophy? (Blütenstaub, 
2).324 
 
The rhetorical intellectual is a distributive praxis rather than an imperious ego, a plurality 
of performances, a system of talents, an assemblage of ethoi. Like Socrates and other 
conceptual personae, the Frühromantik intellectual would like to be an immanent medium 
of historical forces, a node of collective desires, a stimulus of diverse interactions and 
collaborations:  
Real sympathy concerns itself with furthering the freedom of others, not with the 
satisfaction of animal pleasures (AF 86). 
 
No occupation is so human as one that simply supplements, joins, fosters (I 53). 
 
        The critical ego is communicated, given political and discursive substance, through a 
history that is dynamic and exceeding, in the service of no single world view or ideology: 
The thinking of a religious person is etymological; it traces all concepts back to the 
original intuition, to whatever is characteristic (I 78). 
  
                                                 
323  Dialogue on Poetry, 62.  
324  This is the second of four fragments by Friedrich Schlegel included in Novalis’s collection of fragments, 
Blütenstaub (Pollen), published by the Schlegel brothers in the Athenaeum, 1798. 
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philosophy – which always must organize and disorganize itself anew – into its 
living, fundamental forces, and trace these back to their origins (AF 304). 
 
The rhetoricised philosopher incorporates history as instinct, potential, a plurality of forms 
of life. From the history of discourses and ideas it would derive a joyous ethic of 
relationship and cosmopolitanism rather than an emerging national tradition or superior 
world view. As we’ve glimpsed, this may involve a counter-traditional momentum, a 
reversal of what is taken to be social and ethical progress, such as the revival of a Paganism 
and animism as the possibilities of a tolerant natural and popular religion in a gloomy 
monotheistic age: 
Nothing is more indispensable for true religious feeling than an intermediary – 
which connects us to the godhead.... The more independent the human being 
becomes, the more the quantity of the intermediary is diminished, the more the 
quality is refined – and his relations to it become more diverse and more cultivated 
– fetishes – stars – animals –heroes – idols – gods – one God-man. 
One soon sees how relative these choices are and one is driven ... to the idea – that 
the essence of religion does not in fact depend on the nature of the mediator, but 
consists purely in the way he is regarded, in the relations that exist with him (MO 
73). 
 
 The evaluative criteria of a disorganized and renewed philosophy is a question of 
its vital forces and the expressive power of its attributes, its potential for a higher 
sociability: ‘Philosophers who aren’t opposed to each other are usually joined only by 
sympathy, not by symphilosophy’ (AF 112). Symphilosophy is philosophy’s plane of 
immanent self-evaluation, its scenography, in which the tragedy, comedy, and nightmare 
of history, its diverse characteristics and their present possibilities, can be assessed against 
the grain of supremacist ideologies and historically derived partisanships: 
Catholicism is naive Christianity, Protestantism sentimental Christianity.  
The latter, besides the merit of its polemical revolutionary services, has ... given 
birth to philology, one of the essentials for a universal and progressive religion. 
Only Protestantism is perhaps still somewhat lacking in urbanity (AF 231). 
 
Opposed to Symphilosophy are relationships between disciplinary practitioners that are 
born of tacit class affiliations, fidelity to a canon of texts, or a certain ‘thin’ or triumphalist 
universalism, an immoderate agreement about the rational power to judge and proclaim. 
One can admit a certain pragmatic association with other intellectuals if one, like a 
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philosophe, is engaged in considering ‘what man is’, measuring humanity, devising 
formulae, quanta, sharing a vocabulary of abstract generalities, engaging in a contract to 
denude the world of its complex forces for the sake of a predicative logic. Such is the 
sympathy of people who share a common institutional authority and work within confined 
disciplinary parameters. 
In contrast, the communicated ego of the copiously cultivated, polytheistically disposed 
thinker emanates from a potentiated antiquity:  
Universality is the successive satiation of all forms and substances. Universality can 
attain harmony only through the conjunction of poetry and philosophy.... the Universal 
Spirit ... is a genuine polytheist and bears within himself all Olympus (AF 451). 
     
 
In Symphilosophy, polytheism’s mixed chronotopes and plural genealogies reassert 
themselves in critical representation. The profundity of Paganism’s sensuous naïveté, 
which translates thought back into its cultural materials, becomes an exigency of the 
coming philosophy: 
… we wouldn’t think much of an uncritical transcendental philosophy that doesn’t 
represent the producer along with the product and contain at the same time within the 
system of transcendental thoughts a description of transcendental thinking (AF 238). 
 
For Frühromanticism, the classical text, deeply affected by a rhetorical milieu and 
pluralising polytheistic tendencies, is never a singular work or a function of intention. The 
classical text cannot be crudely historicised; it is a palimpsest and the possibility of a 
project. As Walter Benjamin desired, the critic would no longer be the epiphenomenon of 
Representation and History, but create arts of self out of a fragmented sense of tradition, a 
potentiated classicism. 
         The Athenaeum will devote considerable attention to the critical import of a 
fragmentation of the classical Greek and Roman worlds: 
Many of the works of the ancients have become fragments. Many modern works 
are fragments as soon as they are written (AF 24) 
 
… feeling for fragments and projects is the transcendental element of the historical 
spirit (AF 22). 
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In order to imbue the public sphere with an enabling historicity, the Frühromantiks 
acknowledge the classical past as individual, adverting to the alterity of its sensibility. For 
the individual rhetorical flourishes of classical texts engender classicism’s propaedeutic 
power, its creative canonicity:  ‘a real feeling for the Romans is much rarer than for the 
Greeks.... For one can have a feeling for nations too, for historical as well as moral 
individuals, and not simply for practical genres, arts, and sciences’ (CF 46).  
 By capturing the rhetorically characteristic dimension of classical authors, the past 
is realised as a discursive resource, a practical possibility, and a vital non-normative ethic 
for future discourse. As individuated, asystematic, and prone to extension and 
immoderation, classical works expand the boundaries of sense and reference.  
The historical critic can argue, on the basis of the classical 'niveau', for a 
genealogical recognition of what is now slighted or ignored according to narratives of 
aesthetic progress: ‘Ludovico ... began to talk of (an historically derived) system of false 
poetry that he wanted to present.... (which) he thought as peculiar and instructive as it was 
amusing and grotesque’.325 The romantic critic seeks in classical forms certain subaltern 
historical tendencies that are capable of revitalisation: 
 ... the historian is a prophet facing backwards (AF 80).   
 
Derrida will return to this subaltern historiography, after the Jena circle, after Benjamin, 
reiterating that ‘logos remains potency, potentiality, and is not yet the transparent language 
of knowledge’.326  
Ancient thought is a work in progress, without artificial disciplinary divisions, 
subtended by a paideia of material themes: 
... the great practical abstraction is what makes the ancients – among whom this was an 
instinct – actually ancients (AF 121). 
 
Ancient works can be decomposed into tendencies, forces, and mannerisms that inform 
and transcend the single work. Benjamin in ‘The Concept of Criticism’ suggests that the 
                                                 
325  Dialogue on Poetry, 59. 
326  ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 115. Cf. Benjamin’s famous image evoking the angel of history whose ‘face is 
turned towards the past’ in ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations, edited by Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, New York, 1969, 257-8. 
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Frühromantiks conceived of classical art not as ideal, but as ruin, limitation, evanescence, 
a ‘fleeting figure’ that can only be made ‘eternal’ through criticism, refracted and 
redeployed.327 History for the Jena Romantics is no longer to be a given, for ‘the subject 
of history is the realization of all of it that is practically necessary’ (AF 90), an ethos, a 
subtle opportunism. 
 One will, then, need to think of romanticism, this ‘progressive, universal poetry’, 
as a union of an open historical sense and interested sentiment, both enchanted mimesis 
and acute reflexivity: 
Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. It ... should mix and fuse poetry 
and prose ... poeticise wit and fill and saturate the forms of art with every kind of 
good, solid matter for instruction, and animate them with the pulsations of 
humour.... It can so lose itself in what it describes that one might believe it exists 
only to characterize poetical individuals of all sorts; and yet there is ... no form so 
fit for expressing the entire spirit of an author.... it opens up an infinitely increasing 
classicism.... Romantic poetry is ... what ... sociability, friendship and love are in 
life.... The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming (AF 116, my 
italics)  
 
Romanticism, for Schlegel and Novalis, is not simply a phenomenology of becoming, it is 
suspicious of lyrical enthusiasm and the vagueness of poetic transcendentalism, 
particularly the restlessness of the Sturm und Drang movement, its immature embrace of 
the unconditional and measureless, its indecorous ideology of progress through poetic 
expressivism. Benjamin suggests that for the Frühromantiks it is never a question of 
progress into a void, a ‘vague advance in writing ever better-poetry’, but of a ‘continually 
more comprehensive unfolding and enhancement of poetic forms’. The futurity of 
Romanticism is not, as Benjamin points out, what is understood by the modern term 
‘progress’, it is an ‘infinite process of fulfilment’ through the mediation of history.328 
 Rhetoric, as an historically imbued ethic of representation, combines ‘absolute 
tolerance with absolute rigor’ (CF 123). Rhetoric is not a function of a paternal History or 
identity, like Aristotle it loses itself in its heterogeneous grasp of individuated cultural 
materials, topics, genres, tropes, it is history’s bricolage and flanerie. Rhetoric realises the 
                                                 
327  Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism’, 182. 
328  ‘Concept of Criticism’, 168. 
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potential of circumstance, it suggests a multifarious and conflicted experience of 
institutions and authorities, it discerns the lacunae in official versions of history, renewing 
experience as an immanent power. Rhetoric a radiant personality, a unity of forces, a 
transcendental critical power, the law of plurality, the sense within chaos: 
From the study of transcendental poetry a tropology can be anticipated - which 
comprehends the laws of the symbolic construction of the transcendental world (LF 
1, 42). 
 
Rhetoric engages our imagination and active desires but also offers ‘solid materials’ for 
instruction and attention, provoking a continual movement between territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation: 
... a large class of anecdotes are those which show a human trait in a strange, striking 
way.... we ... have two main classes, descriptive and poetic anecdotes. The former 
employ our cognitive capacity, the latter our capacity for desire’ (LF II, 12). 
 
The rhetoricised classical text cultivates both cognitive and imaginative faculties, 
potentiates both creative and prudent sensibilities, it realises the historico-philosophical 
disposition of Frühromanticism. 
 
   Rhetorical Reading 
 
When the Frühromantiks conceive of the ‘niveau’ (CF 36) of classical texts, they 
think not of unified and bounded works but rhetorically fragmented discourses that demand 
imaginative and flexible reading practices. Romanticism’s ‘productive’ concept of reading, 
derived from an individuated conception of classical discourse, will discern and articulate 
the ‘interested’, immoderately sentimental, the sub-generic elements of a text. 
Romanticism reads classicism as a self-affection, not orthodoxy: ‘to live classically and to 
realize antiquity practically within oneself is the summit and goal of philology. Is this 
possible without any kind of cynicism?’ (AF 147) To read classicism romantically, 
philologically, is to interrupt its seeming arguments, to become attuned to the pictorialism 
of tropes, the situated digressions of figurae, the thematic resonances and representational 
potential of a characterisation or mannerism. A Romantic rhetorical reading practice is 
materialist, philological, alternatively passive and active, alert to the grainy texture of the 
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moment and the broader historical and hermeneutic questions of discursive tendency and 
subtending stylistic unity: 
… compelling brevity and digressive fullness, reproducing even the inexplicable 
features of the individual it delineates: these are the essential characteristics of the 
historical style. The historical style is distinguished by... the selection of the most 
significant, weighty, and precious words; by a nobly outlined... articulated periodic 
structure like that of Thucydides... superb joviality of tone and colour after the manner 
of Caesar; but particularly by that innate and exalted cultivation of Tacitus, which 
poetizes, civilizes, and philosophizes the dry facts of pure empiricism’ (AF 217). 
 
 A rhetorical reading discerns the mien and generalist cultivation of the classical 
text, whether it be the political theory and public sphere scenography of Thucydides, the 
robust anecdotes of a Caesar or the Witz, the interpenetration of genre in Tacitus, a formally 
nuanced sententiousness that is critically superior to modern pretences towards objectivity: 
 ... to characterize nations and ages, to delineate the noble nobly, is the real talent of the 
poetical Tacitus. In historical portraits, the critical Suetonius is a greater master (AF 
166).  
 
The classical text is a hybrid, tensile, an indeterminate oscillation of form and content, with 
a strong mimetic relationship to the methodologies and perspectives circulating in its 
milieu. Thucydides portrayed the catastrophes of the Peloponnesian war but he also 
communicated a Sophistic methodological interest in representing set piece dialogues on 
political and moral topics, his texts dilated, acculturated by this rhetorical/political 
imperative. Tacitus documented the Julio-Claudian emperors, but he also asserted 
republican dignity in an autocratic age, his language pithy, incisive, rhetorically 
resourceful, and reliant on the language of satire. Hence the classical text is a fractured 
poetics, rich in a sub-generic tropes, mythemes, and methodological suggestions, and 
supra-generic, related to the vibrancy and curiosity of the age. The classical texts, as 
individuation and unity, open the question of reading as theory and its resistance. 
The classical text is enjoined to communicate to a broad audience rather than a 
specialised field, in appealing to a broad imaginary it exceeds itself to produce ‘a work on 
the art of living’ (AF 225), an ethos and paideia. The classical text suggests comparative 
critical methods, cross-generic investigations, an economy of urbane tendencies, creative 
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emulations, cross-fertilisations, depropriating the reified conception of the individual 
expression or genius: 
Just as the novel colours all of modern poetry, so satire colours and, as it were, sets the 
tone for all Roman poetry, yes, even the whole of Roman literature. This 
poetry...remained throughout all its changes a classic universal poetry, a social poetry 
emanating from, and created for, the center of the cultivated world. In order to have a 
feeling for what is most urbane, original, and beautiful in the prose of a Cicero, Caesar, 
or Suetonius, one has to have loved and understood Horatian satires for a long time. 
They are the eternal wellsprings of urbanity. (AF 146) 
 
Roman urbanity and satire are the thought-feelings of the age, encompassing and 
transcending individual volition, political sectarianism, and doctrinaire ethical positions. 
The rhetorical sensus communis is irreducible to the work, the individual idea or belief: 
The fondness of … Roman poets for difficult and unpoetical themes is really a 
result of their grand conception that all things are subject matter for poetry, though 
this was … by no means a conscious artistic intention, but an historical tendency 
of their works…. Behind the confusion of all the artistic genres … there lies the 
demand that there should only be One poetry and one Philosophy (AF 239, my 
italics). 
 
Rhetoric, of a higher kind, is the genius of an age, a renewable possibility of acculturation 
that would enable singularities to communicate, Epicurus to respect Seneca: 
… the individual great figures are less isolated among the Greeks and Romans. They 
had fewer geniuses but more brilliance.... All of antiquity is a genius, the only genius 
that could without exaggeration be called absolutely great, unique, and unattainable (AF 
248),  
 
Even the Stoics considered urbanity a virtue (CF 42).  
 
 Rhetoric’s teasing habitus of possible activities and positionings, its transformative 
insertion of intellectuals, legal advocates, and politicians into a performative chronotope, 
a labile public dialogue, a paideia of situations, suggests the potential of the era for 
reinvention, self-artistry, making anew. For instance there is Cicero, that ‘virtuoso of 
urbanity who wanted to be an orator, and, yes, even a philosopher, and who could have 
been a brilliant … man of letters, and polyhistorian of old Roman virtue and old Roman 
festivity’ (AF 152). 
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 Rhetoric is not only what was, but could have been, and may come again, 
suggesting energies and nuances that fall through the net of critical and aesthetic 
representation. In the next chapter, I discuss how the Frühromantik philosophy of history 
enabled an aesthetics that was not a poetics, a concept of literary history as a texture of 
tendencies, sub and super generic. Returning to the oft debated issue of whether philosophy 
and literature can be demarcated, given their common modes of representation, I argue 
from a Jena Romantic perspective, that the question is not merely epistemological but 
historical and relational, that a future criticism awaits literature and aesthetics as resonating 
materialist rhetorics, relational forms.  
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Chapter Eight: Jena Romanticism: Aesthetics, Philosophy, Politics 
 
 
The Athenaeum’s aesthetics offer intriguing possibilities for a critical philosophy 
and cosmopolitan politics. The Athenaeum’s desideratum is for a Romantic tendency in 
literature and art, which in the late eighteenth century it discovers in the novel, as derived 
from the mixed form of the Roman. The Romantic novel is a rhetorically varied aesthetic 
form, a colouration and tonality, a representational energy, rather than an identifiable genre 
or neo-classical rule. Friedrich Schlegel, in his Dialogue on Poetry, published in the 1800 
volume of the Athenaeum, theorises the novel as renewing the hybrid forms and eclectic 
tastes of earlier milieux, indexing florid public cultures such as the Elizabethan era of 
Shakespeare. 
The novelistic work, according to the Dialogue on Poetry, is the function of a 
communicative imperative, stimulated by a fluid theatrical situation, a scenography of 
desires, which it refracts as a fragmented, carnivalesque ‘free form’. Romantic art is 
situated and vigorously discursive, enthusiasm and irony. The Romantic aesthetic evokes 
multiple chronotopes, rather than a formal or conceptual identity. Romanticism is never 
the sum of its external parts or an epiphenomenon of historical experience; it demands a 
critical mode sensitive to its varied elements. I argue that Romanticism reciprocally 
determines literary theory as historical, philosophical, and political. 
The Frühromantik aesthetic echoes with the potential of a philosophy that can realise its 
critical and creative capacities, translating the empirical differences and historicity of 
human nature into philosophical forms. The Frühromantiks vehemently disagree with a 
post-Kantian philosophy that arrogates to itself the role of a master discipline, a higher 
epistemology, the science of science, a propaedeutic of unified experience and universal 
reason. Their preferred philosophy is in media res, heuristic, inconsistent, intuitive and 
paradoxical. I essay some suggestions about the Frühromantik political sensibility as a 
projection of a pluralist historical sense and vigorous cosmopolitanism, a political mode 
genealogical and incomplete. I conclude by discussing the impact of the Athenaeum on the 
early methodological writings of Walter Benjamin that desire a philosophy of history as 
the propaedeutic for a transformative political awareness. 
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Romanticism and the Modern 
 
According to Schlegel and Novalis’s historical philosophy of rhetoricised cultures, 
an aesthetic form necessarily communicates far more than it may intend or explicitly 
announce. A rhetorical form entails complex cultural interactions, a surplus of formal 
possibilities, and the overwhelming power of informing genealogies. Rhetorical form is the 
momentum of a discursive tendency, and the effect of a subtending cultural genius, in 
Pagan terms, a museology. Rhetoric encourages bi-focal critical attentions, recursive or 
‘cyclical’ evocations of the producer as well as the product. Rhetorical discourses therefore 
encourage cultural-materialist reading practices, a disciplined genealogical formalism: 
Art is based on knowledge, and the discipline of art is its history. It is an essential 
quality of all art to follow closely what has already been formed.329 
 
Aesthetic criticism, however, is (to use Walter Benjamin's term) a ‘progredibility’, a 
becoming and enrichment. It does not codify genres according to preconceived schema of 
historical evolution; it is not a Herderian historicism with its notion of distinct and organic 
cultures. 
Critical taxonomy is rigorous and genealogically sensitive, so that it might be enchanted, 
that is, theoretical: 
… a theory of genres is just what we lack. And what else can it be but a 
classification which at the same time would be a history and theory of literature?330 
 
A theory of romantic literature should advocate a revivification of classical forms, not 
prescriptively, as the pure archetypes for imitation recommended by Goethe, but as ‘sure 
tools’, those formal elements that can be variously combined, those symbolic media that 
promise collaboration, research, creative discussion, an intensification of symphilosophy, 
a deepening sense of the scenography of history.331 Frühromanticism is not the Modern, 
                                                 
329 Friedrich Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, in The Athenaeum, 1800, 60. 
330 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 76. Such a statement would seem to anticipate and inform Bakhtin’s 
critical approach, his historicisation of the novel’s carnivalesque dialogism and polyphony antipathetical to 
a coercive social-realist theory of the role of literature in society. 
331 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 74, 77. 
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its current fashions, the vagaries of public opinion, the belletristic nature of passing critical 
and aesthetic debates, an assumption of the historical advancement of ethics and tastes. 
One will never pin down Romanticism, it cannot be confined to a single genre, an available 
modality of taste, a belief system; it is as little self-identical as the aesthetic and 
philosophical forms it elaborates.332 Romanticism ‘tends towards antiquity’ in spirit and 
in kind: ‘Romantic is not so much a literary genre as an element of poetry which may be 
more or less dominant or recessive, but never entirely absent’.333 
The Romantic critic should not, in the manner of Winckelmann, seek out the harmony and 
sublime nobility of Greek antiquity as a reflection of the simple nature and comfortable 
sensuousness of a pre-Christian era. The plangent tendencies and subaltern elements of 
Romanticism refrain from inaugurating a standard for imitation or an uplifting poetics. 
Domineering and infiltrating, Romanticism is an excessive health, the effects of pathology, 
and a fatal predisposition: ‘Just as our literature began with the novel, so the Greek began 
with the epic and dissolved in it’.334 Romanticism is the divine sickness of a Socrates, an 
immoderation, the exceeding dynamic of expression, the irreversible decadence of a 
‘fragmented’ classicism. Romantic art and critique are ‘interested’, rather than tranquil; 
dislocated from history and tradition, Romanticism is the dynamis, the amoral power of 
representation that Aristotle could not contain, the ruins of history, dwelling in the 
remaining fragments of coherent world-views, speaking the collapse of nostalgia, the 
impossibility of recovering a golden-age. 
‘I detest the novel as far as it wants to be a separate genre.’335 So says Antonio in 
his ‘Letter on the Novel’, one of many forceful presentations on the history and theory of 
                                                 
332 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 100. Antonio speaking: ‘please do not immediately assume that the 
Romantic and the Modern are entirely identical for me. I consider them approximately as different as the 
paintings of Raphael and Correggio are from the etchings which are fashionable now’. 
333 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 101. See also Kathleen M Wheeler, German Aesthetic and Literary 
Criticism: The Romantic ironists and Goethe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 4, discussing the 
philological excitement among the Frühromantiks about the Roman. ‘Roman, then, did not have a genre 
meaning, as, for example, ‘novel’ does; rather, it indicated a tendency in modern literature away from 
classical styles and towards prose … encompassing a wide range of content and styles as well as genre, a 
Mischgedicht. As a tendency, the word Roman included not only Romane and Novellen, but also the plays of 
Shakespeare, medieval Romances, and the writings of Cervantes, Dante, and others’ (4). 
334 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 101. 
335 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 101. 
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Romantic art forms in the Dialogue on Poetry. Throughout the Dialogue, the emergence 
of the novel in the eighteenth century is connected to a wealth of precedents, one of which 
is the tendency of popular genres, in their adaptability and performativity, to develop 
hybridity and self-parody, to exceed their initial purpose.336 For the Athenaeum, the 
novel’s pre-history determines it as a succession of enthusiasm and irony, moral sentiment 
and sensuous arabesque. The novel echoes with the Catholicity, the overstimulation of ripe 
or decadent cultures, whose ‘discontinuous form’, in Benjamin’s terms, can no longer be 
traced to any original inspiration or monotheistic prescription. 
Antonio, in his ‘Letter on the Novel’ is adamant that no aesthetics based on the formal 
externals of the genre, such as a neo-Aristotelian poetics of plot and coherent narrative, 
will ever come to terms with the novel’s mien, which can only be elaborated by a patient 
genealogical rendering of the form’s historical emergence. The novel, for the 
Frühromantiks, is not the function of a bourgeois public sphere demanding realist 
particularism, moral independence, private experience, and plain common sense in their 
aesthetic discourse.337 Rather the novel, a determination of the longue durée of the 
Roman, evolves from a complex paideia. It emerges from a baroque fatality, the fractured 
immanence of a polytheistic ethos. 
The preparation for a Romanticised novel, a free form, begins with the maturation 
of poetry in the Renaissance. According to the historical scheme of the ‘Letter on the 
Novel’, the centre of poetry slowly ‘devolves’ from the ‘perfection’ and ‘beauty’ of the 
                                                 
336 Here Jena Romanticism can be seen as anticipating Bakhtin's notion of 'novelness': see Katerina Clark 
and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
and London, 1984, 275-77. 
337  Antonio would not have been enamoured of Ian Watt’s locus classicus in his history of the novel which 
assimilates the rise of the eighteenth century novel (Henry Fielding et al) to a mediocre bourgeois public 
sphere, now demanding a less historically derivative, ornately conventional, and learned aesthetic, in favour 
of particularism and realism:  
'It would appear, then, that the function of language is much more largely referential in the novel 
than in other literary forms; that the genre itself works by exhaustive presentation rather than by 
elegant concentration. This fact would no doubt explain why … many … great novelists … often 
write gracelessly … with downright vulgarity; and why the novel has less need of historical and 
literary commentary than other genres' (31). 'The novel’s conventions make much smaller demands 
on the audience than do most literary conventions … this explains why … the novel … most closely 
satisfies (the audience’s) wishes for a close correspondence between life and art’ (33-4).  
See Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth UK, 1968 (first published 1957). The novel, argues Antonio, is not a paradigm shift; its 
hybridity and low elements fulfil its highest possibility as a discursive tendency. 
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lyrical Petrarch, who, in Neo-Platonic fashion, idealised the beautiful Laura as the one true 
source of his love, thereby inaugurating a devotional language of true feeling for the courtly 
aristocracy. By contrast the embedded narratives and picaresque stories of Boccaccio 
prosaicised and hybridised the romance form. Boccaccio, pace Petrarch, prefers to console 
‘all charming women’ with his joyful grace and sociable jest rather than to worship one. 
Boccaccio disseminates his seed; his amorousness is an allegory for his ‘inexhaustible’ 
source of peculiar and elaborate stories. Moving from an historical hermeneutics, to 
considerations that are sub-generic, that is, grammatical and philological, Antonio notes 
that Boccaccio’s expressiveness and ‘excellent periodic structure’ raised the narrative 
language of conversation to a solid foundation for the prose of the novel, while establishing 
the gay tone of the Italian Romance.338 
For the Jena Romantics the pre-history of the novel is extensive, absorptive, as the 
mixed tone of the Romance, I would argue, resonates with the sociable anonymity and 
picaresque storytelling of The One Thousand and One Nights as it entered and became 
popular and influential in European literary and cultural history.339 The novel in a sense 
inverts teleological Judeo-Christian history; it is a peripatetic Paganism, a function of many 
narrative urges.  The Romantic tendency resonates with the Witz that knows no 
determinative origin  (Novalis - ‘who can have invented Witz’), a popular religiosity that 
in its iconography and fetishism opens up worlds of discourse, moving from pathos to 
bathos, interspersing the sacred and the sensuous. 
A form originally meant for public reading, owing its vitality to oral traditions, the 
Italian Romance changes tone according to the communicative demands of its situation, 
popularising miraculous stories of old and changing their tenor into the grotesque with a 
touch of ‘sociable Witz’ and ‘intellectual spice’.340 
The story-telling power of the Romance form is in media res, inessential, flexible, 
stimulated, an exteriority, a communicative drive. The Romance form is infinitely 
                                                 
338 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 68. 
339 Cf. Peter L. Caracciolo, ed., The Arabian Nights in English Literature, Macmillan, London, 1988, 
'Introduction: "Such a store house of ingenious fiction and of splendid imagery"', p.12. Cf. Eva Sallis, 
Sheherazade Through the Looking Glass: The Metamorphosis of The Thousand and One Nights, Curzon, 
Surrey, 1999. 
340 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 69. 
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translatable; it impresses itself on popular memory and enables the cachet of the novel, its 
popular niche as a loose, conversational, form combining high sentiment and low comedy. 
Walter Benjamin, in an essay called ‘The Storyteller’ (1936) argues that the Romanticised 
story-telling Antonio has in mind derives not from the delicacies of aristocratic feeling but 
from the ‘milieu of work’ – the rural (the Arcadian idyll, grotesque folk tale, and travestied 
pastoral of Cervantes), the maritime (the picaresque travel tale and its utopian offshoots), 
and the urban (the social and psychological novel), an ‘artisan form of communication’. 
Storytelling, for Benjamin, does not aim to convey the pure essence of the thing, 
like information or a report, rather it ‘sinks the thing into the life of the storyteller’.341 
Representing, in detail, situational features of his own experience and conversations with 
others, the storyteller makes his own experience that of those who are listening to the tale. 
However, while still conveying the accreted wisdom of a life and the fullness of a milieu, 
the novel’s portrayal of the solitary individual ‘gives evidence of the profound perplexity 
of the living’, Benjamin exampling the eponymous hero of Don Quixote. For Benjamin the 
novel’s emerging pathos of distance refers us back to Plato’s Socrates in The Symposium, 
sober and speculative in the midst of intoxication and revelry, desiring a comic-tragic 
sensibility.342 Romanticism and its preferred novelistic tendency reaches back to the 
Sophists and Socrates, it is the irony that revels in a crowd, the loneliness that demands 
company. 
For the Frühromantiks, Romantic storytelling is topical, thematic, mimetic, it 
communicates the fullness of life because it is rhetorically suasive, ‘interested’ rather than 
an ‘objective’ genre such as the epic. A rhetorical form always falls from the grace of pure 
origins, the idealised, inspirational Lauras of this world.343 We have seen how the Stoic 
Seneca failed to simply convey a doctrinal apathethia or elitism because of the abundant 
rhetorical awareness of his pedagogy, its enjoyment of convention, friendly forms of 
                                                 
341 ‘The Storyteller’ in Walter Benjamin Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, Fontana Press, London, 1992, 
91. 
342  Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller’, 87. 
343  One thinks of the rhetorical artifices and self-representations of Philip Sidney’s sonnets, intent on 
meretriciously displaying paradox and intricate figuration as rehearsing their unrequited live for Stella. 
Rhetoric engenders its own ethos, a discursive energy that fractures the sensibility of a text, a feature of 
Renaissance discourse. 
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address, and its desire to cultivate a sensus communis. Just so, the vigorous Italian 
Romance, a felicitous mixture of jest and seriousness, the grotesque and idyllic, failed to 
imitate its classical prototype, the heroism and militarism of the ancient epic. In the hands 
of Ariosto, who ornamented or textured his romances with the rhetorical ‘devices’ of the 
ancients, Romance proceeded on its devolutionary path towards tonal and generic 
fragmentation, a mix of ‘facile narrative and sensuous fantasies’.344 
For Schlegel, the pre-history of the novel shifts its port of call to Spain and the great 
Cervantes, where a rhetorical copia begins to overwhelm generic fidelity ever more 
vividly. Don Quixote enables both fantastic wit and a ‘lavish abundance’ of daring ideas to 
prevail, in the spirit of Cervantes' comic novellas.345 The rhetorical recursiveness or 
‘interestedness’ of the novel begins to assert itself, in and through hybrid sub-genres, a 
textured repast of song, pastoral idyll, romance, parody, and satire. This splintering 
tendency will be fulfilled in Shakespeare’s dramaturgy and its responsiveness to the heady 
milieu of Elizabethan England. 
 
 
 
Shakespeare 
 
… the English only praise Shakespeare’s truth (AF 301) 
 
The simplest and most immediate questions, like Should we criticize Shakespeare’s 
works as art or as nature? .... can’t be considered without the deepest consideration 
and the most erudite history of art (CF 121). 
 
Friedrich Schlegel wanted an historico-formalist approach to displace the psychologism, 
didacticism and utilitarian overtones of English criticism of Shakespeare, inaugurated by 
the rationalism and moralism of Samuel Johnson, his disdain for embellishment, nonsense, 
excess, rhetorical word play. The Frühromantiks, engaged in translating Shakespeare’s 
work, would remove his plays from any association with patriotic insularity or banal 
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conceptions of ‘genius’ and instead theorise the conditioning sociological factors and the 
thematic and linguistic ‘tools’ available to Shakespeare. Shakespeare is to be situated, 
critically socialised, the task of a ‘materialist rhetoric’. 
We learn that for Shakespeare the way was prepared to some degree by the 
‘colourful variety’ of the English theatre. In the Elizabethan milieu scholars, actors, 
noblemen, and court fools worked for the theatre, and the audiences were similarly 
stratified. Glancing back a little farther, this contemporaneous hybridity of tastes and 
dispositions was historically prepared by the recent history of the English theatre, where 
mystery plays from the ‘childhood of drama’, and old English farces, alternated with 
patriotic histories and subjects in every form and manner - indeed generating nothing that 
a serious aesthetician could call ‘art’.346 Schlegel has in mind here the cross-fertilisations 
of miracle story and carnivalesque irreverence, ‘spiced’ with topical themes that 
‘characterised’ the English Miracle Play, a performatively geared, carnivalesque form that 
deviated from the verisimilitude and piety of biblical legends. The Frühromantiks feel that 
Shakespearean dramaturgy needs to be contextualised in terms of its situational tendency, 
its folk concessions, its performative ribaldness, and its earthy, populist syncretism.347 
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347  For an excellent discussion of the carnivalesque aspect of English Miracle and its generic successor 
Morality plays, see Sandra Billington, ‘“Suffer Fools Gladly”: The Fool in Medieval England and the Play 
Mankind', in Paul V.A. Williams, ed., The Fool and the Trickster: Studies in Honour of Enid Welsford, D.S 
Brewer, Roman and Littlefield, Cambridge and Ipswich UK, 1979, 36-54. Billington restores the 
communicative/performative context of the anonymous Morality play Mankind, arguing that ‘amateur cap 
and bell activity was part of popular entertainment in English society as well as in the French’ (36), fool 
activity known in England throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ‘especially during the Christmas 
season’ (44). Just as in the French medieval context, there is ‘a difficulty in distinguishing between sotties, 
farces, and moralités, given that sots or explicit fool-figures ‘could and did perform all three’ (37). In the 
play Mankind, written around 1466 and performed on and around Shrove Tuesday, folk games such as ‘mock 
beheadings’ were used, such travesties of didactic pieties usually centring around the activities of the three 
Vices, often dressed in ‘absurd fashionable costume’ (46). The Vices indeed enacted a choric parabasis, 
corrupting the internal chronotope of the play by stepping out of role, establishing ‘close contact between the 
Vices and the audience’, joking and shouldering their way through the audience on exiting: ‘there is folk play 
- games, dancing and singing - in the behaviour of the Vices’ (47). The interest of a character who is 
simultaneously a celebrated cultural persona (fool, tempter, trickster, clown) travesties emplotment and 
engages the fluidity of the performative situation: ‘Twice Tityvillus calls for silence so that he can tempt 
Mankind, and one can imagine the kind of barracking which might have been going on’ (51). Friedrich 
Schlegel and Novalis’s love for allegory, and their sympathy for the inorganic, mixed, or ‘free form’, are also 
manifested in their advocacy of allegory and Catholic iconography that in carnivalesque settings creates a 
devolution of emplotment in favour of the theatrical contestation of perennial human orientations: as 
Billington argues, ‘it would not be surprising if Mankind’s psychomachia also appeared as a struggle between 
Carnival and Lent’ (52). 
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And then there are structural constraints in the development of English theatre, such 
as a stage not designed for exterior appearance and the ‘monotony of themes’ in historical 
dramas.348 From such a paucity of plot content, from such intellectual mediocrity, came 
an ‘effective’ and ‘thorough’ theatre that ‘directed the writer’s and viewer’s attention to 
the form’. Making a virtue of immanence, the Elizabethan age cultivated a superb sense of 
stagecraft, tempo, intuiting  ‘necessary’ dramatic rhythms of pathos and comedy, kings and 
clowns.349 The sublime artist of an eclectic age, Shakespeare’s romantic élan was also 
inspired by the delicacy and fantastical charms of Edmund Spenser’s poetry, the favourite 
of the ‘elegant set’. Such is his ‘profound thoroughness’, his thick and fiery Witz, with its 
material and refined mien, that Shakespeare transcends the culture that funds his art, and 
floats mysteriously over the vitality of his milieu. The combination of qualities, this 
transcendental immanence, constitutes a ‘romantic basis’ for the modern drama.350 
Shakespeare’s achievement is powerfully singular because the universal dimension 
of his work redeems the fragmentariness of the modern romance form, so much so that the 
Frühromantik critic can consider his dramaturgy the ‘actual center, the core of the 
Romantic imagination’.351 Shakespeare, Cervantes, Italian poetry and medieval romance 
are quintessentially Romantic because they evoke the possibility of a potentialised 
aesthetics, an individuated sensorium of images, stories, grotesques, arabesques, and 
authorial whims. The productive matrix of the Romance form ‘tends towards antiquity’ 
because its blossoming imagination is ‘worthy of adorning the images of the ancient Gods’; 
it explodes into motley stores, mythemes, tableaux.352 Shakespeare dominates 
Romanticism as his identity recedes, initiating the coming of a great Romantic tendency in 
art, the self-ironic and diversely representational, novel form.353 
In Schlegel’s native Germany, the novel is again flourishing as an historical form 
in the classical yet ‘interested’ or sentimental oeuvre of Goethe, who ‘explores the forms 
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of art back to their sources in order to be able to revive and combine them’.354 Schlegel’s 
interpretation of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister evokes its profound contemporary significance: 
Whoever could manage to interpret Goethe’s Meister properly would have 
expressed what is now happening in literature (CF 120). 
 
According to conventional genre considerations, Wilhelm Meister is a Bildungsroman, a 
novel of personal development, a founding text of the German ideal of holistic 
acculturation (Bildung) that stresses, as in Schiller’s formulation, the harmonious role of 
aesthetics in moral and cognitive development. Schlegel’s historical critique would change 
this, even before it gets started. He suggests of Wilhelm Meister that what nominally seems 
to be a novel about an artist’s education and socialisation is ‘surprised by the tendency of 
its genre’, becoming suddenly ‘much larger than its first intention’.355 The novel’s 
adulterously amorous tendency asserts itself, as it distributes its character studies and love 
of mannerism among ‘several persons’ (Schlegel elsewhere refers to the desired critico-
aesthetic work as a ‘a system of talents’). 
The increasingly ‘impoverished’ focus on the narrative of the naïve and jejune 
central protagonist enables a world of relationships to be thoroughly explored. Monofocus 
becomes fetishism, the ‘almost’ of many another text comes into play.356 Overlaying its 
original intention, Schlegel argues that the finite work is overtaken by a stylistic unity, a 
classical niveau, and a ‘theory of education’ in the art of living. This unexpected, horizontal 
cultivation is the real ‘genius of the whole’ of Meister, expressed in authorial ironies and 
salty individual sub-generic moments, introducing, for Romanticism, the interplay of 
classical form and vigorous discourse.357 
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357 Schlegel, Dialogue on Poetry, 112. 
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Romantic art’s urbanity betrays it, its form is ‘conspicuously duplicitous’, a 
bifurcation of form and content visible in the most meaningful Romantic art works, such 
as Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Schlegel suggests that the way Shakespeare ‘transforms a theme’ 
is not unlike Goethe’s treatment of the ideal of a form. Nominally an ostentatious and 
melodramatic revenge-tragedy in the spirit of The Spanish Tragedy, Shakespeare both 
abolished and sublimated the revenge genre in Hamlet, whose narrative of revenge is beset 
by philosophical perplexities, linguistic foolishness and stunning individual episodes, 
ekphrastic tableaux such as the death of Ophelia. Practised in manifold existential and 
political themes, ironic and enthusiastic, Hamlet signposted Shakespeare’s ‘maturity’, it 
portended art as a meditation on arts of living, establishing a propaedeutic for the novel 
form.358 The Romantic tendency is translative or tropological, representing a ‘sentimental 
theme in a fantastic form’, transforming romantic themes like romance and heroism into 
an interest in ‘representative’ or iconographic social characteristics, the noble folly of a 
Don Quixote, the long suffering schlemiel Sancho Panza, the mournful beauty of an 
Ophelia, the immoderate extremes and archetypal pathos of a Hamlet.359 
As a scenography of characters and styles, the dramaturgical novel is responsive to 
the intimate and topical demands of popular audiences, inflected with a refreshingly naive 
quality of ‘confession’ and gay ‘arabesque’. Thomas Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1759-67) 
is a powerful novelistic exemplar for Schlegel, because digression and sub-generic 
embellishments are crucial to its very conceptualisation. Tristram Shandy is a novel whose 
sentimental plot is fragmented by a sociable enthusiasm for stupidity and eccentricity of 
manner: ‘foolishness, you will admit, is the loveliest thing that man can imagine’. Tristram 
Shandy is ‘a brilliant study’, impressing the imagination in its rhetorical dexterity and 
world upside-down sensibility more than realistic emplotment ever could.360 
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The novel conspicuously betrays an ethos; it becomes the ‘confession of a whole 
life’ in many accents, a distribution of singularities, a convergence of extremes, rather than 
a sum of external features. The novel resumes the polytheistic bequest of codifying cultural 
instincts and representative characteristics, a combination of affect, intellect, and 
imagination. Confession is not a portrayal of interior life, however, as putatively embodied 
in Rousseau’s autobiographical Confessions, for Schlegel cheekily suggests this work is a 
great ‘novel’, picaresque and episodic, a communication of the ego rather than a 
straightforward representation of a life.361 
Recalling de Man’s rhetorical reading practices, we can discern here an interest in 
the ‘laws of figural language’, often evoked as a text’s unwitting tendency towards 
dramatisation and intersubjectivity, along the lines of Kant’s ‘squabbling' faculties. De 
Man alerts us to the tendency of a rhetorically sophisticated text to translate from one genre 
to the next, exampling the uncertain oscillation between deistic worship and interpersonal 
eroticism in Rousseau’s Julie (as read by de Man).362 In these terms we can say that 
Schlegelian rhetorical reading does not sterilize or relativise the text, it fragments it for the 
sake of an urbane confession, a sociable duplicity, an insurgence of other idioms and 
creative lines of flight. 
 
 
Philosophy 
 
I now consider the Athenaeum’s argument for philosophy as a rhetorical mode, 
harnessing ‘effective’ discourse practices and critical habits, a heightened or ironic 
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362  See Paul de Man, ‘Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant’, in Aesthetic Ideology, The University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996, 87. See also ‘Allegory (Julie)’ in de Man, Allegories of Reading: 
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conventionalism that realises the possibilities of human nature. It is a question of 
considerable import as to what philosophy actually signifies for the Frühromantiks and 
here I quarrel with the idiom of one of the most important texts on this topic, Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe's The Literary Absolute. 
According to The Literary Absolute, the Athenaeum, inspired by the Idealism of 
Kant that freed morality and epistemology from noumenal constraints, will inaugurate a 
‘properly indefinite program’, a ‘romantic “project”’.363 The Athenaeum sets itself the 
‘task of a completion’, its ‘goal is to have done with partition and division, with the 
separation constitutive of history’, of which the genre divisions of neo-classical poetics and 
the separation in sensibility of the Classical and Modern are the most obvious reflections. 
For the Jena Romantics, Literature, trans-historically considered, will imply a 
‘generativity’ that produces an ‘infinitely new Work’, a sense for the absolute.364 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s thesis is that along with Idealists such as Schelling 
and the young Hegel, the Athenaeum is interested in articulating a matrix or ‘organon’ for 
the Idealistic Subject’s development towards unconditional or infinitised self-knowledge. 
This matrix can only be served by a concept of literature as incomplete, unconditional 
material forever expanding theoretical reflections. This unconditioned (post- and sub-
generic) concept of literature, this ‘literary absolute’, is concerned with ‘production, 
absolutely speaking’. The Athenaeum’s thinking will anticipate Hegel by constituting the 
'ultimate instance and closure of the speculative absolute’, as a ‘literature producing itself 
as it produces its own theory’, an ‘absolute literary operation’.365 Healing the modern 
division between philosophy and aesthetics, Jena Romanticism, the lonely moral subject 
of modernity and pagan sensuousness, promotes literature as an infinite speculative mien 
and self-engendering ‘auto-critique’. The Athenaeum imbricates the possibility of 
philosophical reflection in the resources of a genealogically imbued literature and vice 
versa. This co-dependence is in fact constitutive of ‘literary theory’: 
In short, we ourselves are implicated in all that determines both literature as auto-
critique and criticism as literature. Our own image comes back to us from the mirror 
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of the literary absolute. And the massive truth flung back at us is that we have not 
left the era of the Subject.366 
 
I have some doubts about any version of Jena Romanticism that, at least in its 
terminology, stresses its conciliatory, that is totalising or ab-solute aims. The language of 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe suggests a symptomatology that understands the Athenaeum 
as primarily an instance of ‘programmatic’ Idealism, another example of a philosopheme 
stretching from Fichte to Hegel that insists on the expansive auto-production of the Subject 
as it incorporates negativity and history towards its ‘absolutisation’, its mastery of history. 
A language of project, program, organon, Subject, both lends necessary dignity to the 
Athenaeum’s philosophical interests and is in danger of reducing the import of their work 
to a function of a philosophical problematic, that of the critical form the transcendental 
subject should take. I think it equally possible to discuss the philosophical desideratum of 
the Frühromantiks as a free form stimulated by popular conventions, contemporary themes, 
and a range of interdisciplinary discourse practices. Philosophy does not resolve historical 
divisions, it asserts itself as an enthusiasm for and irony towards human nature and 
intersubjective relations. It is the possibility, in critical representation, of reflecting on 
habit, memory, disposition. The philosophy of Jena Romanticism confesses its non-
identity; its resonance, as a rhetorical mode, with other languages, idioms, drives. 
In an Athenaeum fragment, Schlegel suggested that just as Cicero had ranked 
philosophies and political discourses according to their material contribution to the orator, 
so too poetry needs a philosophy that does not transform the real into the illusory, deny 
intuition or feeling, or exclude itself from making decisions. The philosophical tendency 
rather is to illustrate how the human spirit impresses itself on all things (AF 168). 
Philosophy is a paradoxical exercise; it can be theoretically centred by its outside, its 
relational characteristics, its confession of the human spirit, or its aestheticism and 
historicity. Philosophy can be translated, historically displaced by a materialist rhetoric to 
exhibit its extremes, its immoderate energies, its modes of conduct at variance with its own 
‘programmatic’ desires.  Philosophy, or the complacency of its practitioners, needs to 
be interrupted, for ‘Nothing is more rarely the subject of philosophy than philosophy itself’ 
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(AF 1). The thematisation of philosophy is situational; it imbricates a philosophy prone to 
a belief in its total comprehension as a complementary praxis within a spectrum of critical 
senses or affectively diverse logoi: 
 
It is a thoughtless and immodest presumption to want to learn something about art from 
philosophy.... philosophy, after all, shouldn’t be able to do more than order the given 
artistic experiences and the existing artistic principles into a science... raise the 
appreciation of art, extend it with the help of a thoroughly learned history of art, and 
create here as well that logical mood which unites absolute tolerance with absolute rigor 
(CF 123). 
 
Philosophy is a mood; as logic and analysis, it introduces a degree of methodological 
consistency, of determined organisation into discourse. In one of its roles, it is the tedious 
architectonic problem of the organon; it calls for patience in this regard. The lumbering yet 
determined philosophical will towards systematics has an admirable regularity about it, a 
stay against dilettantism. Philosophy is a sort of post-lapsarian ennui, an almost solipsistic 
stubbornness that shouldn’t be impatiently scorned; as will and organisation, philosophy 
introduces a disciplined stay against seductive distractions, its quite astonishing will to 
construct and systematise resists the perturbations of life. Philosophy is somewhat 
eccentric, and as such it plays a part in the life world of forms, embedded in inherited 
dispositions and a genealogy of desires: ‘Viewed subjectively, philosophy, like epic poetry, 
always begins in media res’ (AF 84). 
If it’s achieved anything, philosophy has made the valuable though not necessarily 
justifiable assumption of eternal verities, rising above the noise of life, emerging from our 
shadowy cave into a more serene world. In the instance of its own relentless performance, 
philosophy has brought another world of value to us, more ascetic, harder to reach, and one 
can affirm this supra-sensory fiction at many levels other than ontological: ‘Some things 
philosophy must assume for the present and forever, and it may do so because it must’ (AF 
95). Philosophy, the translation, into a language of ideas, of an individual’s sense of probity 
and obligation, can be justified in other than metaphysical terms - its chronotope, its self-
affecting imaginary, is the drawn out meditation on an important theme. Philosophy has 
the cachet of transmitting worthiness and reflective seriousness throughout history: ‘Duty 
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is Kant’s alpha and omega... only out of a sense of duty did he become a great man’ (AF 
10). 
Kant is a representative characteristic of philosophy as a mien, he dramatises a way 
of life, a mode of being that values sober critical habits and shudders at excitations: ‘There 
is a kind of person for whom an enthusiasm for  
boredom represents the beginning of philosophy (AF 52)’.367 One thinks of Kant’s 
provincialism and less than itinerant life and the somewhat febrile philosophical and 
anthropological ambitions that resulted. One could say that his ‘impoverished’ sense of 
adventure and exploration combined with a certain petit-bourgeois conventionalism to 
produce the rigorous, profound Critiques with their salutary attempt to integrate social 
conventions and rather uninspiring examples of ‘taste’ within the sensus communis of a 
practical reason. One can talk of a Kantian thematic ‘thoroughness’ born of experiential 
impoverishment. 
Schlegel restores, by displacing, characterises, by de-essentialising, affirms by 
parodying, the significance and educative possibilities of the Kantian project, all the while 
arguing for a broader philosophical paideia. Spinoza, in turn, suggests the miraculous 
power, the calm chaos of the theoretical attitude: 
 
The piety of philosophers is theory, pure intuition of the divinity, calm and gay in silent 
solitude. Spinoza is the ideal of the species (I 137). 
 
From the contented, abundant gratitude for the infinite attributes of the godhead, comes a 
scientific method, more geometrico, the thrilling power of logical method exercising itself 
against the fanaticism and fear of the Churchmen. Yet there is another Spinoza, a rhetorical 
mode, an epistolary proclivity for friendship, an enthusiasm for topical debate and 
particularised discussion, as exemplified in the scholia to the Ethics. There is a relational 
                                                 
367 Again we draw attention, via Deleuze, to a possible relationship between Humean empiricism, with its 
affective critique of reason, and Jena Romanticism’s interest in a pluralised philosophical ethos: ‘Reason is 
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Subjectivity, an Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin V Boundas, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1989, 30.  
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Spinoza, open to many stimuli, contradictory, emotional, desiring to diminish inhibiting 
fears and increase the power of joy, conatus, within a social framework. 
 
Philosophers still admire only Spinoza’s consistency, just as the English only praise 
Shakespeare’s truth (AF 301).368 
 
Philosophy is a Pascalian wager, a projection into the beyond, a house of cards that 
nevertheless provokes stimulation and recursive reflection; only in its most mediocre 
determinations does it attempt conclusive demonstration. Leibniz’s monad, relating the 
single to the whole, the detailed to the unconditioned, is instanced: ‘Leibniz proposed and 
Wolff proved. Need one say more?’ (AF 82). The monad exemplifies the power of a 
philosophy considered under the aspect of the witty fragment, the suggestive aside: 
‘Leibniz’s whole philosophy consists of a few fragments and projects that are witty’ (AF 
220). So philosophy, in the midst of its most ambitious endeavours, will need to think on 
the kind of sensibilities that have enabled it. It needs to be open to the translative 
sophistication of rhetoric, re-describing itself in genealogical and characteristic terms: 
‘Philosophy is still moving too much in a straight line; it’s not yet cyclical enough’ (AF 
43). 
Philosophy, after all, will always emerge from an ensemble of lived characteristics, 
certain vectors of thought suddenly congealing, an instinct needing discharge. Philosophy, 
like Witz, is not a possession or instrument of a subject. It captures what one might call 
‘prosaic’ structures of feeling and a propaedeutic of problems and themes, but the 
combinations of knowledges and approaches it requires are never present to it: ‘One can 
only become a philosopher, not be one. As soon as one thinks one is a philosopher, one 
stops becoming one’ (AF 54). Philosophy intuits a posteriori, not according to the faculties 
of Kant: ‘An intellectual intuition is the categorical imperative of any theory’ (AF 76). If 
one values philosophy’s methodological character, its desire to subsume phenomena within 
critical systems, never a worthless enterprise in a chaotic and self-absorbed world, that 
evaluation should tend towards agonistic respect, symphilosophy rather than identification. 
                                                 
368 For an interesting discussion of the ‘duplicity’ of Spinoza’s Ethics, the disruption of the axiomatic, 
geometrical ideal of the main body of argument by the expansively suasive annotations, the topical and 
interpersonal tenor of the ‘scholia’, see Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley, 
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In philosophy, one deals not with a master-discipline, but with a trait, a characteristic that 
might occasionally require an eager or cheeky response: ‘Since nowadays philosophy 
criticizes everything... a criticism of philosophy would be nothing more than justifiable 
retaliation’. (AF 56) 
Like all modes of life and discursive traits that transmute themselves into thought, 
sympathy, toleration and gradual redress are needed, no ferocity, no ideological 
partisanship is necessary: ‘My experience with the greatest philosophers is like Plato’s with 
the Spartans. He loved and admired them enormously, but continually complained that they 
always stopped halfway’ (AF 48). One can now arrive at a sense of the differentiated 
cultural contribution of philosophical methods, their relevance as temporary qualifications 
of a critical sensibility that has for instance become too fuzzy, enervated, aestheticised: 
‘Logic.... is ... a coordinated pragmatic science opposed to poetry and to ethics and deriving 
from the demand for a positive truth... and the possibility of a system.’ (AF 91) 
Philosophy is communicated; it is an agonistic structure of competing attitudes, 
none in themselves sufficient for mature reflection. For example, sometimes the dreariness 
of rationalist demonstrations and proofs require a real provocation, a contrapuntal jolt by 
the forces of thetic revelation, the power, the mysterium, of a moral law: 
The categorical styles of the laws of the twelve tablets and the thetical method, where 
we find set down the pure facts of reflection... are still the most appropriate for a studied 
natural philosophy (AF 82). 
 
Structured as a rhetorical bricolage, philosophy can reorganize itself anew, as venerable 
method or the immediacy of intuition, an evolving communicative imperative, an irony 
and sociability. 
 
 
Political Tendencies 
 
Frühromanticism is an educative ideal; it would see aesthetics and philosophy as 
complex suasive modes and self-affections, rather than axiomatic truths. Politically, this is 
significant, for the history of human actions, institutions, and formal creations should never 
become the function of a dominant group: 
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... universal history becomes sophistic as soon as it places anything above the 
communal education of all mankind … as soon as it chooses to take up the cause 
of any particular side of the historical universe (AF 223). 
 
The responsibility of political agency is towards redeeming and realising the many senses 
and critical modes of the past, not simply acting according to the dictates of the present: 
‘The historical tendency of his actions determines the positive morality of the statesman 
and citizen of the world’ (AF 228). 
Rather than regarding the French Revolution as either disaster or emancipation 
according to a conventional spectrum of political ideologies, we should think of its 
turbulence, perhaps, as a crisis of ‘incipient puberty’ (MO 116), as a youthful though 
anarchic spirit requiring diacritical appreciation. Meanwhile, the cultural renaissance in 
Germany, if properly characterised, transcends local boundaries and narrow parochialisms 
in its translatability of character and diverse genealogies: 
…  there are Germans everywhere. The German character is not confined to a particular 
state, any more than the Roman, the Greek or the British. They are general human 
qualities (MO 66). 
 
It is a political responsibility to realise the incompletion of the present as an effect 
of history’s psychosocial atavisms and evolving relational capacities, crude and bathetic as 
they often are. Like Isocrates on the need for pan-Hellenism, one should oppose cultural 
nationalism: 
Germany is probably such a favourite subject for the general essayist because the less 
finished a nation is, the more it is a subject for criticism and not for history (AF 26). 
 
The tendency of art, criticism, and politics should be medial, a realisation of diversity rather 
than an exclusive ideology or a faith in Progress. A certain fetishism and absurdism turn 
out to be the most mature of political dispositions. 
 
 
Benjamin:  A Post-Romantic Methodology 
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I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of Walter Benjamin’s early work, in 
particular his attempt to align philosophical reasoning and an anti-fascist politics with the 
historicity and immanence of representation, as a paideia and ethos. In the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ to Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (1923), Benjamin suggests that 
philosophical writing must continually confront the question of representation. While 
philosophy seeks to assume the quality of a doctrine, it ‘does not lie within the power of 
mere thought to assume such a form’.369 As the Frühromantiks had argued, so for 
Benjamin philosophy, as representation, becomes immersed in historical and formal 
considerations because of its ‘duplicity’, its ingrained tension between universal content 
and localised form, logos and mytheme, concept and image. 
To put it another way, Benjamin suggests that philosophical doctrine can always be 
historically ‘codified’; despite its own leanings towards pure  
referentiality, philosophy cannot be reified into a pure didactic content, a universal 
axiomatics. The more mathematics attempts the total elimination of the problem of 
representation, ‘as does every didactic system’, the more conclusively does it renounce that 
area of truth towards which ‘language is directed’.370 It is representation, tendency, 
disposition, thetic intuition, wherein truth lies. 
If philosophy is to be true to the discursive tendencies that have conditioned it, then 
the exercise of form must be accorded ‘due importance’.371 The explicit ‘exercise’ of a 
form has imposed itself upon all epochs that have recognised the ‘essentiality of truth in 
the form of a propaedeutic’. Benjamin cites, as an example of a form whose tendency is 
propaedeutic cultivation, the theological ‘treatise’. The treatise is discursive; the absence 
of an uninterrupted, purposeful structure is its ‘primary characteristic’.372 The treatise 
dispenses with the coercive proof of mathematics, its structure is therefore more 
expansively suasive, its method is ‘essentially representation’, and representation is 
digression: ‘Method is a digression’.  The treatise is recursive; it returns in a roundabout 
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way to its original object and discerns different levels of meaning. It ‘tirelessly’ makes new 
beginnings.373 Benjamin evokes the treatise as stimulated, communicative, a flexible free 
form, in media res. The treatise’s only element of an intention is ‘educative’ rather than 
didactic, an ideal of authoritative quotation and mimetic emulation, and this mimesis 
depropriates and hybridises its form. 
Digressive representational forms produce a ‘mosaic’ of images and thought 
‘fragments’. 374 Truth-content, that truth towards which language is directed, is only to be 
grasped polymathically, ‘through immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter’. 
The ‘truth … remains an indivisible unity … an encyclopaedic accumulation of items of 
knowledge.375 Truth is a prosaic kernel of sub-generic elements and individual traits, it 
communicates a complex tendency that makes the ‘reader pause and reflect’.376 
Knowledge, on the other hand, is merely the desire to appropriate – ‘knowledge is 
possession’.377 Knowledge is univocal, it is the concept as a spontaneous product of the 
intellect and its egoism, and so it arouses enthusiasm, fanaticism, dogmatism. Truth, which 
is not conceptual, is synergetic with aesthetic considerations of rhythm and cycle; it is 
bodied forth in the ‘dance of represented ideas’. The ‘ideas’ are ‘simply given to be 
reflected upon’; they are sophisticated discourse practices and thematic constructions, not 
for the cognitively sluggish.378 Truth is never a dialectic of subject and object within a 
unified experience; it is textured, relative, infinitely qualified. 
Philosophy, argues Benjamin, cannot master aesthetics; philosophy merely borrows 
from and is supplemented by aesthetic forms and comportments. Truth flows out from 
acculturated intuitions, it is ‘devoid of all intention’, it is a quality of sensibility, an 
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exteriority to itself, and a propaedeutic for evolving discussions. 379 Therefore the concept 
of philosophical style suggests an ‘art of interruption in contrast to the chain of deduction’, 
persuasion and communication as opposed to logical exclusivity, and the ‘repetition of 
themes in contrast to shallow universalism’. Philosophy is a form whose recursive 
‘thoroughness’ follows from its intensified conventionalism and rhetorical imperatives.380 
Knowledge is possessive and ‘didactic’, seeking a continuum of epistemic 
advancement and mapping out its ethics by reacting against alternatives. Truth to the 
contrary is ‘restorative’ of situated possibilities; it is a Witz, scenography. Benjamin, 
theorising against cognitive progress, argues that even philosophical systems whose 
cognitional element has long since lost any claim to scientific truth ‘still possess 
contemporary relevance’ for a hermeneutics of philosophical themes and heuristic 
methodologies. Leibniz’s monadology is exampled.381  Like the Athenaeum, Benjamin 
would translate philosophical systems into their worldly characteristics. A prescription for 
an interruptive, interventionist, translative historicity still resounds twenty years later in 
Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’: 
… every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own 
concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably (V). 
 
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really 
was' (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of 
danger. (VI)382 
 
The idea is best explained, says Benjamin, as the ‘representation of the context, within 
which the unique and extreme stands alongside its counterpart', the ‘sense’ imbued, the 
typical, the thematic. Ideas are like Witz, they only come to life ‘when extremes are 
assembled around them’.383 Ideas in no way correspond to the average, or to a ‘certain set 
of rules’, a conventional poetics, an imitable standard, a logic of identity. Benjamin’s idea 
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of the idea would seem to be rhetorically anti-normative, figural, individual, interested in 
the higher sympathy of a stylistics. The survival of ideas depends on a search for that which 
is exemplary, ‘even if this exemplary character can only be admitted in respect of the 
merest fragment’. Ideas emerge ‘immanently’, from the praxical quality of the work, its 
sympathy with the grainy materials and the sub-cultural varieties of form and tendency. A 
politics is implicit in this historiography: 
The nature of this sadness stands out more clearly if one asks with whom the 
adherents of historicism actually empathize. The answer is inevitable: with the 
victor. A historical materialist … regards it as his task to brush history against the 
grain. (VII)384 
 
The philosophical theory of ideas in art does not evolve in response to external 
comparison of genre or doctrine, but in ‘the development of the formal language of the 
work itself’; it does not produce a totalising mythology or national aestheticism.385 
Genuine contemplation is a representation of ideas in which their ‘individuality is 
preserved’.386 In the ‘Prologue’ Benjamin evokes representation and the language of ideas 
as a continual movement between an access of fragmentation and singularity, and a sense 
for what is thematically valuable and representative; a language immediate and historically 
replete. Such is Benjamin’s conception of origins (Ursprung). To discern the origins of a 
work of art is to avoid historicist classification and psychologism. The term origin in the 
terminology of ideas is not genetic; it is not intended to describe the process by which the 
existent came into being. The rhythm of origins is available only to a ‘dual insight’, a 
representational process of restoration and re-establishment on the one hand, and a 
stimulated sense for the individuated and fragmentary, for something ‘imperfect and 
incomplete’.387  
 Benjamin’s historical materialism, cultivating both paideia and immanent ethos, is 
alert to the totalitarian construction of an ‘homogenous, empty time’, without difference, 
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without the possibility of another, confronting niveau, another historical standard. Fighting 
against the progressivist ‘universal history’, the repressions of historicism, the historical 
materialist grasps the ‘constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier 
one', establishing the present as the ‘time of the now’ shot through with the material 
tendencies of the past, the chips of ‘Messianic time’.388 In the next chapter I argue that 
Nietzsche assumed the Frühromantik possibility of a counter-historical untimeliness, a 
differential historicity, as a weapon against modernity, the insidious development of 
positivism and insular disciplinarity. The rhetorical mode of the intellectual, the imperative 
of their communication and qualification, reaches crisis levels in Nietzsche’s early 
writings. 
  
                                                 
388 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, XVII, XVIII A, XVIII B. For an interesting discussion 
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188 
 
 
Chapter Nine: Nietzsche, Reprising a ‘Productive Culture’ 
 
 
Nietzsche argues for a rhetorically vibrant culture in three essays in his Untimely 
Meditations (1873-1876). In this chapter, I discuss his ‘untimely’ contemplations upon the 
‘uses and abuses of history’, and his dramatic contrast of two representative cultural 
personae, the philistine David Strauss and Arthur Schopenhauer, the classical philosopher 
who unites life and thought, critical distance with engaged sociability. I argue that 
Nietzsche reactivates rhetoric’s dialogue with itself, the attempt within rhetorical theory to 
distinguish its potential as a civic propaedeutic from a pernicious, formalist, and 
opportunistic rhetoric, an applied art and improvised politics.  
The distinction between rhetoric as a speculative philosophy and utilitarian organon 
arises throughout the history of rhetorical thought. It can be found, for instance, in the self-
critical movement of Cicero’s oeuvre from technical rhetorical treatises to open-ended, 
theoretical dialogues.389 It is a reflex that can be discerned in Friedrich Schlegel’s 
denunciation of certain forms of sophistry while simultaneously embracing urbane, 
                                                 
389 See Cicero, De Oratore Books I-II, trans. E.W. Sutton, Harvard University Press, Suffolk UK, 1996, 
1.2.5, p.5, where Cicero denounces the ‘crude essays’ of his youth, critiquing the narrow practical focus of 
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rhetors from those concerned with the state’s true health. See Vickers, 154. Nietzsche’s contrast of the 
sycophantic Strauss and the civic minded Schopenhauer relives this ancient and never entirely solidified, 
demarcation. 
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reflexive critical representation, a ‘materialist rhetoric’. De Man sums up a rhetoric fearful 
of itself: 
At crucial moments in the history of philosophy (Nietzsche being one of them), 
rhetoric becomes the ground for the furthest reaching dialectical speculations 
conceivable to the mind; on the other hand, as it appears in textbooks that have 
undergone little change from Quintilian to the present, it is the humble and not-
quite-respectable handmaiden of the fraudulent grammar used in oratory.390 
 
Rhetoric, throughout its history as a philosophy of representation, recognises itself as 
pharmakon, poison and cure, the possibility of and gravest threat to epistemology and self-
knowledge.  
Rhetoric’s diacritical tensions are never more in evidence than in Nietzsche’s 
typological contrast, over different essays of his Untimely Meditations, between the 
philosophers David Strauss and Arthur Schopenhauer. In Strauss, Nietzsche encounters a 
fraudulent philosophical grammar, subservient to the powerful, glib, improvising, callow, 
opportunistic, boastful, bland, modish, nugatory. Strauss is Nietzsche’s figure of a 
corrupted, atomised, and insincere intellectual culture. Strauss's near contemporary 
Schopenhauer, however, figures the exemplary discursive power of which the rhetor is 
capable, creative, in excess of all norms, embodying the fullness of life and the paradoxes 
and perplexities of truth.  
While Strauss is a figure of a positivistic modernity, arrogant enough to believe 
itself objective, its methods axiomatic and universal, Schopenhauer limns untimely 
possibilities, the recovery of other histories. Schopenhauer desires a sensus communis, a 
vital, pluralist culture capable of realising a variety of forces, individual contributions, and 
self-reinventions. Through Schopenhauer, Nietzsche reprises the genius of a rhetorical 
public culture, a productive element or ‘phusis’ for the intellectual. Schopenhauer is 
Nietzsche’s classically derived model of the philosopher rhetor, a diacritical type, civic 
hero and wandering stranger, speculative thinker and performative bricoleur. The 
allegorical power of Schopenhauer, whose representative character is far more important 
to Nietzsche than his philosophical ideas or empirical person, indicates an historiographical 
problematic that stimulated Nietzsche’s thought after The Birth of Tragedy (1872). As Paul 
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Redding argues, Nietzsche’s thought continually mediates a Romantic vitalism and critique 
of ‘thin’ reason with a ‘critical and yet affirmative relationship to Enlightenment thought’, 
sympathetic to rationalist investigations of the historical origins of cultural phenomena.391  
One can suggest that for Nietzsche rhetoric in all its discontinuous elements offers 
a relative unity of considerations, a niveau of evaluation, a conversation between Romantic 
dynamism and a critical philosophy of history. Rhetoric communicates the ego as both 
dynamic and prudent; it portrays thought’s historically duplex paideia, its need for a public 
ethos of address, methodological probity, rational enquiry and rigorous self-criticism. 
Rhetoric also lends the critical subject dynamic historicity, and an excess of discursive 
possibilities, knowledges immediate, intuited, situated, qualifying the subject in ways 
inimical to rationalist abstractions. In Nietzsche’s thought, rhetoric communicates ego and 
world, problematising the intellectual as a social and historical being. 
Some measure of Nietzsche’s regret about the absence, in his early writings, of a 
communicative imperative can be gleaned from his self-critical prologue to the second 
edition of The Birth of Tragedy (first published 1872, prologue in the second edition 1886): 
To say it once again: today I find it an impossible book – badly written, clumsy, and 
embarrassing, its images frenzied and confused ... uneven in pace, lacking in any 
desire for logical purity, so sure of its convictions that it is above any need for proof, 
and even suspicious of the propriety of proof...an arrogant and fanatical book that 
wished from the start to exclude the profanum vulgus of the 'educated' even more 
than the 'people'.392 
 
 Nietzsche’s lingering embarrassment is over his neglect, in the first Birth of Tragedy, of 
formal offices of public propriety, reasoning, and accountability. Nietzsche acknowledges 
the distasteful aspects of his sovereign decision to do away with prudence, circumspection, 
that centripetal ‘mediocrity’ of execution that allows for the translation of one’s discourse 
into a variety of idiolects and perspectives. In 1886 a rueful Nietzsche now speaks, a 
philosopher of representation who has long theorised mature, deliberative rhetorical arts; 
advocated self-disciplining through disputation, detailed philological decompositions of 
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language; discussed methodologies that vary perspective and promote a peripatetic 
philosophical life of multifarious experiences; suggested the important role of good taste 
and delicate judgment in philosophical evaluation.393 Nietzsche, by 1886, has come around 
to enjoining an ethos of address, the enriching possibilities of communicating to oneself 
and others.  
Nietzsche’s untimely prophet Zarathustra is also a rhetor, a persona of overlapping 
dispositions like the Sophists, Cynics, and Socrates. Zarathustra is the sage and recluse, 
prophesying self-overcoming and transvaluation – though after his descent from the 
mountain he will find his discursive matrix in public spaces, always willing to engage his 
fellow citizens in debate, to exhort, and to perform himself as an allegorical example of the 
peripatetic philosophical life.  
One can account for Nietzsche’s increasing concern for discourse as an 
intersubjective art by considering a transformation in his philosophy of history as it pertains 
to the aesthetics and philosophy of the ancient Greeks. One can describe Nietzsche’s 
historical trajectory as a shift from essentialism to rhetorical potentiation. The Nietzsche 
of 1886 has perhaps come to discover that the drama of Greek antiquity cannot so easily 
be recovered as authentically existential, a Dionysian revelation of the suffering and 
mystery of existence, dialectically ‘redeemed’ by an aesthetic attitude, the illumination of 
tragic suffering through the simplicity and individuating clarity of Apollonian imagery. For 
the strident, polemical young Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy, neither the audience nor 
the tragic chorus motivated fifth century BCE tragedy, which he conceived as the historical 
expression of the mystery, revelation, and existential suffering of the Dionysian cults.394 
By The Gay Science (1882), however, Nietzsche argues for a criterion of 
superficiality to be brought to bear on the interpretation of ancient Greek drama. The 
                                                 
393 See Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’, third essay, section 12, 119, in On The Genealogy of 
Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, New York, 1989: ‘“objectivity” – the latter 
understood … as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to 
employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge’. 
394 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 4, 26: ‘The Apolline Greeks [were] unable to conceal from 
themselves … their entire existence, with all its beauty and moderation, was based on a veiled substratum of 
suffering and knowledge’ (the italics are mine). Nietzsche then asks a question he would attempt to answer 
in later works: ‘What sort of artistic genre would it be that took as its foundation the concept of the spectator, 
and whose actual form was the “spectator as such”' (37). The objective correlative of an aesthetic disdain for 
any separation between art and experience is a suspicion of rhetoric: ‘For the true poet the metaphor is not a 
rhetorical figure but a representative image that really hovers before him in place of a concept’ (42).  
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mature Nietzsche, in a vigorously anti-Aristotelian mood, now seeks to restore Greek 
theatrical form to its contemporary audience and their insatiable demands for oratorical 
eloquence and virtuoso rhetorical display: 
The Greeks (or at least the Athenians) liked to hear people speak well. Nothing 
distinguishes them so thoroughly from non-Greeks as this truly greedy craving. 
Even of passion on stage they demanded that it should speak well, and they endured 
the unnaturalness of dramatic verse with rapture... The Greeks went far, very far in 
this respect - alarmingly far ... they made the stage as narrow as possible and denied 
themselves any effects by means of deep backgrounds ... they also deprived passion 
itself of any deep background and dictated to it a law of beautiful speeches. Indeed, 
they did everything to counteract the elementary effect of images that might arouse 
fear and pity - for they did not want fear and pity. The Athenian went to the theatre 
in order to hear beautiful speeches. And beautiful speeches were what concerned 
Sophocles: pardon this heresy!395 
 
Nietzsche’s new found rhetoricism reminds us of Friedrich Schlegel’s development 
from an idealistic Hellenophile theorising the authentic, undiluted archetypes of ancient 
Greek genres, to a political theorist seeking out the critical and communicative potential of 
an ironically fragmented classicism. For Nietzsche, too, Greek drama is depropriated, its 
scenography, its pure foreground, is one of possible forms, tones, and characteristics, 
displacing its historical anchoring in morality, psychology, and emplotment. 
      One can anticipate, in Nietzsche’s emerging historiographical emphasis on Greek 
drama’s exteriority, its diffuse formal desires, Benjamin’s interpretation of the German 
baroque mourning play caught up in its own superficies, its figural tendencies, its linguistic 
immanence. 
For the mature Nietzsche, Greek aesthetics is more homologous with a motley 
Paganism, a luscious exuberance of itinerant gods and enjoyable mythemes. In 
Frühromantik terms, Nietzsche’s reconsidered classicism is a diverse stimulus to modern 
criticism, a topology of affective positions: 
Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop 
courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in 
forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were 
superficial - out of profundity. And is not this precisely what we are again coming 
                                                 
395 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (first published 1882, second edition 1887), trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, fragment 80 of Book 2. Future references to The Gay Science 
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back to.... Are we not, precisely in this respect, Greeks? Adorers of forms, of tones, 
of words?  And therefore – artists? (GS, preface, 4) 
 
Rescinding his earlier dismissiveness about the audiences of Greek tragedy, Nietzsche 
assumes the role of an enthusiastic and acculturated spectator, appreciating a kairological 
or qualified aesthetic sensibility: quixotic traits, supple tempos, rhythms, digressions. 
Criticism is now an ‘untimely’ spectator of the classical world, demanding, like 
contemporary audiences, the travestying of self-contained works in favour of a 
combination of qualities and rhetorical play. Nietzsche’s aesthetics and philosophy of 
history now call for a critical constellation of past and present. 
   We turn to Nietzsche’s philosophy of history. In an early essay, one of his four 
‘untimely meditations’, ‘The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ (1874), 
Nietzsche suggests that historical scholarship and intellectual disciplines more generally 
have become the 'enemy of the necessary'. Put bluntly, we ‘lack the things we need’ from 
the  ‘scholarly’ type, the disciplinarised intellect.396 In historiographical terms, the rage for 
positivism and empiricism has created a kind of undirected bustling and agitation, an 
unfocussed idling in the garden of history, a dilettantish curiosity that seems in no way to 
impinge upon sensibility. Because it lacks the venerable piety and social focus of former 
communal and legendary histories, ‘the habit of scholarship continues without it and rotates 
in egoistic self-satisfaction around its own axis’ (75). 
Historical sense has been confused with epistemology, with a project of mastering 
history through knowledge of its 'content', generating the illusion of a 'scientific' 
historiography (67). Such a historiography no longer serves 'life' and its activities, its 
particular drives and intersubjective engagements; rather the illusion of 'objectivity' can 
only extenuate the self-seeking, the 'base and cowardly action' (59). Rankean historicism, 
for Nietzsche, is coterminous with the institutional production of history as a piecemeal 
‘encyclopaedic’ erudition and recherché empiricism. Nineteenth-century historiography 
projects a dystopic future, that of a protected critical niche that can afford, in its salubrious 
surrounds, to turn away from pressing social imperatives. 
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Nineteenth-century institutionalised historiography has become epistemology, 
seeking to possess its object as a confirmation of its own industriousness. Nineteenth-
century scholarly historicism, predicated on an ‘objective’ recovery of the past, has become 
incapable of realising history as a stimulus to be imitated and enacted in myriad ways: ‘the 
soul of historiography lies in the great stimuli that a man of power derives from it ... as 
imitable and possible for a second time’ (70). 
A mythological age, a Pagan age, was admirably self-affecting; its gift to itself was 
enduring and vivifying naturalistic fictions, those muses and gods whose legendary deeds 
inspired an active mimetic economy. Yet risks are run by mythological ages, which are 
incapable of distinguishing between a monumentalised past and a mythical fiction, given 
that precisely ‘the same stimuli’ can be derived from one as from the other, running the 
risk of a national aestheticism, a myth of origins, a quest for purity (70). 
Fanaticism and foolhardiness can be bred by a culture’s simplistic identification 
with the ‘seductive similarities’ of a mythicised past, driven by the demagogic power of 
egoists and visionary scoundrels, not to mention the reactive weakness of the impotent and 
indolent (71). Assessing the cultural contribution of a typology of historical modes, 
Nietzsche argues that historical narratives should be tempered and enthusiastic, celebratory 
of their inheritance while alert to the transformative power of historical enquiry:  
[one needs] the possession of a powerful instinct for sensing when it is necessary 
to feel historically and when unhistorically. This, precisely, is the proposition the 
reader is invited to meditate upon: the unhistorical and historical are necessary in 
equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture (63). 
 
Nietzsche broadens his critique to include the baleful uniformity of Germany’s 
system of 'universal education', where the significance of history has been reduced to 
general propositions, to a mélange of 'effects' or events without any imaginative 
investments in the rich and strange societies that produced them. By transposition, modern 
culture has become simply ‘knowledge of culture’, with an idea of and feeling for culture 
but incapable of emanating ‘true cultural achievement’ (78). Culture itself, suffering from 
a thin, universalist education, has become a 'walking encyclopaedia', ‘dyspeptic’ and 
dissipated (79). 
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Nietzsche laments an indiscriminate historicism which contains no possibilities for 
meaningful self-affection, for particularising an essentially unfamiliar past and 
reconstituting it as an imaginative counter-history to present cultural norms. For Nietzsche, 
historiographical representation has lost a chronotope of social need that might reclaim a 
history that has become exiguous. 
Nietzsche takes stock of this dire state of affairs and recommends a 'critical history' 
that can translate historical data into specific engagements and expressions of desire. The 
historical sense of occupying one moment in the midst of different and inassimilable 
possibilities, rather than straddling a linear and progressive historical time as its 'universal 
protagonist', should be reclaimed by a critical historiography. Critical history will trample 
partiality and piety, deploying symbolic forms that are at once creative, destructive, 
polemical, and interrogative, as well as restorative of difference and alterity. Like Novalis, 
Nietzsche’s critical historian continually reinvents his or her ‘relationship’ to the past, 
sometimes acting as its generous medium, sometimes fetishising it, sometimes seeking to 
destroy its falsification as auratic ‘tradition’. The unity of history is not a given, but a 
relative constellation of elements in the critical imagination. 
Critical history is that 'untimely' idea whose focus oscillates between historical 
inquiry and contemporary methodological applications. Critical history feels the 
imperative of its milieu, it can easily segue from broad narration to anecdote, dramatisation, 
pithy commentary, it colours its investigations with the genius of an urbane and 
sophisticated culture. Nietzsche’s critical history reprises Democritus, demanding 
intellectual forms evocative of environmental awareness, an antidote to the inertia of an 
institutional habitus.  
       It shouldn’t be thought that Nietzsche’s critique of the insularity of German academia 
comes from a purely Romantic position, reviving folk cultures and accusing the scientific 
hubris of post-Rankean historiography of being inorganic, a false universalism, uprooted 
from national tradition and collective memory. Rather, Nietzsche, in this same essay, 
reverses the nineteenth-century trend towards anti-intellectual Romantic nationalism and 
instead offers a wide-ranging critique of the German cultural malaise in the Bismarck era. 
Nietzsche imbricates the impoverishment of scholarly ideals with the tediousness 
of cultural expression in ‘modernity’. He suggests that an absence of communicative media 
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in modern Germany means that profound and subtle thinking can find no points of contact, 
no realm of discussion and collaboration, even agonistically charged or parodic, by which 
it might be nourished and disseminated. 
It would be insufficient to evoke Nietzsche’s response to scientific history as a call 
for 'vitalism', for a shift of cognitive emphasis from the object of knowledge to the 
experiential hermeneutics of an initiated subject, in the manner of Dilthey. Frankly put, the 
subjectivity or ‘inwardness’ that would seem to elevate the credentials of modern 
humanity, according to Hegel, bores Nietzsche. The same undifferentiated, complacently 
content-based 'universal education’ that has severed the vital link between the self and its 
past has also damaged the capacity of German subjectivity to communicate its putative 
profundity in effective ways. Thought has lost its capacity for joyous appearance, 
performative publicity, and the ability to articulate itself as worldly types, distinct 
mannerisms, conceptual personae. 
Comparisons between gauche nineteenth-century Germans and the urbane 
duplexity of the Romans are unfavourable to the former: 
I ask whether it would be possible to represent our contemporary men of letters, 
popular figures, officials, or politicians as Romans; it simply would not work, 
because they are not human beings but only ... abstractions made concrete. If they 
possess a character of their own it is buried so deep it cannot get out into the light 
of day (85-6, my italics). 
 
Increasingly in the nineteenth century, the Germans, Nietzsche argues, have rejected any 
sense of the unifying power of style out of a misplaced faith in their complex interiority 
and spiritual depths. Their Francophobic objection to styles of appearance and address has 
left them looking shabby, weak in personality. The German distaste for supercilious French 
‘convention’ in favour of a rough-hewn naturalness has left them with a culture lacking a 
sensus communis. 
In a later essay, an untimely meditation upon Schopenhauer, Nietzsche gestures 
towards the ‘suppleness and courtly charm of good French writers’, the effects of a neo-
classical culture instructed in form and decorum.397 In German cities everything is 
‘colourless, worn out, badly copied, negligent’. Haste and a rage for ‘ease and comfort’ 
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dominate the cultural landscape.398 Nietzsche is willing to accept some of the German 
claims to a deeper soul, as Novalis and Schlegel praised the possibilities of the German 
character while decrying the lack of actual Germans. For the problem is the loss of 
mannerism, the absence of Renaissance virtu on Castiglione’s model, an ethos combining 
gallant adventurousness and dash with urbane wit and good taste. 
Germany rejects its eighteenth-century tendencies towards theoretical synthesis and 
historical eclecticism, in favour of immediate opportunism, the right of the victor. 
Celebrating their post Franco-Prussian war victory, the Germans correlate military 
superiority with cultural supremacy and autarky, the ‘sense of form is rejected without the 
slightest misgiving – for we possess the sense of the content: for the Germans are, after all, 
celebrated for their profound inwardness’.399 
Determining oneself as ‘content’, as a unique soul, can leave one without relational 
bearings, a sad lack of feeling for other cultures, an incomprehension of any era other than 
one’s own, an inability to celebrate interesting characters and the cultural geographies to 
which they belong. A nascent German suprematism means a philistine incapacity for an 
‘untimely’ rapport with the past, turning one’s back on a pre-nationalist Germany whose 
intellectual curiosity could have provided for a sociably ‘effective’ and communicative 
culture: 
… the foreigner will still be to some extent justified in maintaining that our interior 
is too feeble and disorganized to produce an outward effect and endow itself with a 
form. The interior of the Germans can be receptive to an exceptional degree: 
serious, powerful, profound, and perhaps even richer than that of other nations; but 
as a whole it remains weak because all these beautiful threads are not wound 
together into a powerful knot.400 
 
We might say that the gaze of the other, in the manner of the eighteenth-century 
novel (Montesquieu’s Persian Letters) and utopian fiction, is turned back on latter day 
Germany, revealing only nakedness where there would be new clothing.401 In both their 
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scholarship and cultural assertiveness, the Germans lack rhetorical resourcefulness, they 
are incapable of collaborating around the value of the familiar and typological. Lacking 
what we could refer to as a Shaftesburian delight in popular conventions, the Germans 
don’t even desire to compose inspired variations on 'commonplace themes' and 'everyday 
melodies'. Nietzsche’s contemporary Germans lack urbanity, and Witz, they cannot elevate 
the familiar trait, the eccentric but loved mannerism to the level of a comprehensive 
‘symbol’, a ‘world’ in Novalis’ terms of profundity, power, and beauty. Only an artistic 
facility and creative vision, combined with a mimetic inclination, a ‘loving absorption in 
the empirical data’, enables the critical capacity to further develop a given type, to translate 
history into a world of representative characteristics.402 
The German spirit quests and dreams, but just as Friedrich Schlegel and later 
Benjamin realised, a rhetorically thorough and effective culture allows for translatability 
and exceeding expression: 
If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest 
exertion of the vigour of the present.... you will know the quality of a mind when it 
is obliged to express something universal or to repeat something universally known: 
the genuine historian must possess the power to ... express the universal so simply 
and profoundly that the simplicity is lost in the profundity and the profundity in the 
simplicity.403  
 
In a chiastic desire that evokes the transformative conventionalism of Presocratic 
anthropology, Nietzsche suggests that the breach between inner and outer, self-referential 
desire and social sense, must ‘again vanish under the hammer-blows of necessity.... the 
abolition [in Germany] of the antithesis of form and content, inwardness and 
convention’.404  
A culture that is stimulated by superficies, that feels the contagious pleasure and 
interest of what is exterior to its own measure, doctrine, and system, can be called 
rhetorical. It has the affirmative power, the insouciance, to refuse moralistic ‘depth’, to 
create through its resourceful historicity many nodes of interest, many ways of escaping 
the onerous causality of the past in the present: ‘these ... Greeks – during the period of their 
                                                 
402 Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', 92-3. 
403 Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', 94. 
404 Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life', 82. 
199 
 
greatest strength – kept a tenacious hold on their unhistorical sense’. The Greeks, for 
Nietzsche in 1874, now signify a cultural genius, a plangent urbanity, and the ‘unity of 
artistic style in all the expressions of a people’. 405 If the ‘rank analytical impulse’ is to 
make the present into a homogenous desert, otiose neutrality, the communicative ethos of 
the untimely historical critic draws a sustaining illusion around itself, a certain madness 
and folly, a sense of ‘hope-filled striving’ that fragments linear time and creates new 
desires.406  
            
Strauss, Confessing Philistinism 
 
In an earlier essay in Untimely Meditations, ‘David Strauss, the confessor and the 
writer’ (1873) Nietzsche developed an interpretative prism through which to examine the 
pallidness of German culture and the stylistic banality of modernity. Here Nietzsche 
dissects the all-encompassing influence of modern bourgeois philistinism and transitory 
linguistic fashions in Strauss’s supposedly 'progressive' and enlightened The Old Faith and 
the New: A Confession (1872), which argued for a reconciliation of religious theism with 
a modern, scientific world view. Nietzsche’s Strauss is the danger of a narrow, technical 
rhetoric, he is the Sophist servile to higher powers, the rhetoric that confirms a social order, 
than normalises rather than transforms. 
Nietzsche’s counter-historical lament is now familiar. Theorising against the 
complacency of the times, Nietzsche describes the recent military victory of Prussia against 
France as representing a ‘great danger’, that of rank materialism and an oppressive 
narrowing of cultural life and critical discussion.407 There can be no question of a 
corresponding victory of German culture, ‘for the simple reason that French culture 
continues to exist as heretofore, and we are dependent upon it as heretofore.’408 The 
putative unification of German culture cannot obscure the perennial worth of the French, 
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who ‘possess a real and productive culture’, whereas in Germany, where a ‘chaotic jumble 
of styles' reigns, there is a complete lack of a ‘productive and stylistically secure culture’ 
(6-7). 
German culture has become pseudo culture, the trappings of culture, knowledge of 
culture, the half-formed but unrealised idea of culture, that is, philistine culture. The 
contemporary philistine erects boundaries, is reactive, and lacks genuine enthusiasm, while 
the German spirit is preserved only in dreams, in the fragments of history, as it searches, 
inquires, and refuses identity or completion: ‘For it seeks, this German spirit!’ (9). The 
philistine feigns cultivation but is thoroughly imbued with the bourgeois spirit of common 
utility: all they would ‘know of an artist is that by which he is suited for their domestic 
service’.  
A certain heteronomy or inflection of the forms of the wider society – its civil, 
educational, and political spheres – upon intellectual grammars, is inevitable. In modernity, 
however, the hegemonic constraints of the banal utilitarian Now dominate as Nietzsche 
argued in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’: 
All modern philosophising is political and official, limited by governments, churches, 
academies, customs, and the cowardice of men to the appearance of scholarship (85). 
 
David Strauss, a would-be philosopher and historian, is perhaps the summa of these 
limitations for Nietzsche. Here is a thinker who grovels ‘before the realities of present-day 
Germany’ with a ‘shameless philistine optimism’. Strauss regards things, and here the 
caricature is particularly telling, sub specie bienni, under the aspect of two years, that is, 
according to the latest trends or the desires of his paymasters, public opinion (27). The 
cognate of cultural myopia and self-satisfaction is a crude epistemological realism 
everywhere, which Strauss cravenly ‘flatters’ (27). The linguistic pronoun ‘we’ which 
Strauss chooses to deploy in his philosophising is no less offensive, reflecting a ‘philistine 
chieftain’ mobilising jejune sentiments (27).  
  While supposedly bravely propounding atheism, Strauss’s seemingly controversial 
thesis about the triumph of a scientistic Zeitgeist is kept within ‘definite limits’, indicated 
by the softening effect of a terminology of ‘faith’, as indicated in his work’s title. Indeed 
if Strauss did overstep certain discursive limits, as Schopenhauer does ‘with almost every 
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sentence’, this ‘philistine chieftain’ would be deserted ‘as precipitately as he is now 
followed’ (39). 
Nietzsche’s point is that Strauss has an audience to flatter, the modern ‘scientific 
man’ who is now in a ‘frantic hurry’ in Germany, as though science were a factory, as 
though the mind can labour on industrial time and then relax and read the newspaper, the 
attitude of all those institutionally ensconced ‘quarter philosophers’ that Nietzsche 
condemns. The scientific man ‘goes through all the business of life ... with the half-
consciousness or the repellent need for entertainment characteristic of the exhausted 
worker’ (35). Meanwhile academic scholarship, with its narrowed purview, is hardly to be 
distinguished from ‘farmers who want to increase the tiny property they have inherited’ 
(36). 
With such pinched ambitions and narrow aims determining the Zeitgeist, it is 
unsurprising, Nietzsche suggests, that Strauss’s work is a ‘casual, only half-listening 
accommodation with philosophy and culture’, always conceding to a public desire for 
diversion at any price (36). Like the learned classes he inhabits and appeases, Strauss lacks 
genuine experience; his judgments are bookish, at bottom ‘merely the sort found in 
newspapers’, belletristic, a miscellany of opinion, an ‘accommodation to linguistic usage’, 
a ‘ceaseless drip of the same locutions and the same words’ (36, 37, 41, 49). Nietzsche 
embarks on a rhetorical assessment of the relationship between styles of enunciation and 
cultural health, suggesting that Strauss is the characteristic expression of a linguistic 
habitus where ‘platitudes, commonplaces and hackneyed and feeble language are the rule, 
and badness and corruption received as stimulating exceptions’ (50).409 The problem is the 
erosion, in the modern German school and university system, of a propaedeutic of 
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conversational exercises, a Sophistic discursive confidence and combination of 
knowledges. Nietzsche argues that the current grammatical and linguistic imperatives of 
German speech, as inculcated by its education system, are mechanical, with its enforced 
Latin exercises or its promoted models of ‘astonishingly crude’ French writers, a taint on 
German culture, that is spoiling its young.410 
Such is the absence of genuine historical models, of a robust philology of the 
representational forms of other times, that Strauss is compelled to believe that the ‘new and 
modern’ are the same thing.411 Strauss complies with the philistine demand that from time 
to time a ‘new metaphor must make an appearance’, be it that of the stock exchange, the 
steam-engine, or the telegraph.412 Nietzsche’s critical task is to counter-theorise another, 
classically inspired linguistic matrix which affects the intellectual from within rather than 
offering more and mere technique, as in bland figurative ornaments, cheap metaphors, a 
certain gloss on banality. 
Nietzsche feels that part of the problem for the mature Strauss is that his intellectual 
career has vacillated since his early Hegelianism, which at least gave his ideas a respectable 
lineage and a number of important themes and topics with which he could engage. 
Accommodating himself to the powers that be, the law of utility, Strauss’s ear has become 
dulled, sadly now deaf to the ‘subtle and mighty laws of sound’ under whose rule every 
writer lives ‘who has been strictly trained to follow good models’, like the classically 
minded French for example.413 Modernity is the sad loss of a classical niveau, a delicate 
historicity. 
For Nietzsche, nothing condemns the complacency and self-satisfaction of his 
contemporaries more than their half-niggardly, half-thoughtless, ‘undemandingness’ in 
regard to teachers and educators.414 In classical times, following Nietzsche’s train of 
thought, one demanded to be rhetorically educated, to ‘hear’ many accents, to be instructed 
in a paideia of arts, to sense many forces teeming within the one discourse as it reorganised 
itself anew, to have many stimulating models of discursive instruction. 
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Nietzsche subjects Strauss’s callow rhetoric to a broader assessment, arguing that 
his bad writing is softened by the fact that in Germany it is very difficult to become even a 
mediocre and tolerable writer, let alone ‘a good one’. For a ‘natural basis’, an ‘artistic 
evaluation, treatment, and cultivation of oral speech’, is lacking.415 Germany lacks a 
unifying public culture. The current miscellany of verbal idiolects, ‘salon conversation', 
‘sermon’, ‘parliamentary oratory’, do not communicate with each other, their languages do 
not overlap in public life, indicating that public speech has, in Germany, not yet attained 
to a national style or even to the desire for a style.416 Germany is ill equipped to provide 
such a Bildung, a synaesthesia of language and image, logos and mytheme. ‘We modern 
men’, argues Nietzsche, appear wretched in comparison with the Greeks and Romans, who 
possessed a ‘serious understanding’ of the tasks of education. 
Strauss’s jumble of styles, his appalling yet fashionable modern German, proves 
resistant to creative adaptation, to what Benjamin will refer to as ‘progredibility’, an inter-
relation of forms. Unlike Kant and Schopenhauer’s diction, the confusion and illogicality 
of Strauss’s style is uninformed by the ‘grandeur and simplicity’ of the classical, and is 
therefore untranslatable into exacting languages like Latin. Strauss's pseudo-style is 
ominously ahistorical, doomed to be ephemeral, lacking the resonant publicity of a 
vigorous manner. Nietzsche suggests that it is only from a prudential basis, the productive 
classical dictions with their ‘firmly established’ grammar and orthography, that one finds 
those ‘ancient yet ever new languages’ in which thought finds expression.417 Strauss is the 
ego that cannot be communicated, the banal and callow I. 
 
Schopenhauer: An Educating Philosopher 
 
‘That Schopenhauer can offer us a model is certain.’418 
 
At the close of his essay ‘On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life’, Nietzsche had 
discussed the rich polysemy of the Greek phusis, the culture whose principle of 
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development encouraged ‘unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will’.419 Nietzsche 
suggests that in Greek culture the intellectual needs to compose with many different forces, 
never neglecting the power of appearance. Thought needs to be represented as an art of 
life, a particular modification of desire, and a generous orientation towards the world rather 
than a self-enclosed doctrine. Echoing Friedrich Schlegel’s portrait of Socrates as 
centrifugal (ironic) and centripetal (sociable), Nietzsche argues that ‘man should have a 
center and ... that he should also have a periphery’.420  
Nietzsche's desired philosophical model is tendentious and holistic, a vigorous 
ethos and pluralised paideia. The ‘educating philosopher’ of whom Nietzsche dreams 
embodies a strong personality, a ‘central force’, but the philosopher would know how to 
prevent this central force from ‘acting destructively on other forces’. The educational 
‘task’, the higher social calculus or rhetorical attitude of the educational philosopher, would 
be to rejoin a phusis, a texture of relationships, to ‘mould the whole man' into a living 
‘planetary system’ with ‘higher laws of motion’.421 
One profits from a philosopher, argues Nietzsche, as long as he can be an individual, 
an example. Such an example must be provided in a sensorium of appearances, in the 
‘outward life’ and not merely in books. The philosophers of Greece are therefore 
exemplary in that they taught through their bearing, through what they wore and ate, in 
their morals. Their pedagogy was both simple in appearance yet radically suggestive, a 
profound superficiality. Such was the performative tendency of classical philosophy, that 
the peripheral characteristics of ancient pedagogues were more valuable than what they 
said, let alone in what they wrote, their conceptual ‘content’ a secondary concern in many 
ways.422 The idea, as a post-romantic Benjamin reminds us, is imbued with peripheries, 
extremes, and the accidental features of a genre. 
Nietzsche wishes to discover a philosopher who might raise us above the 
insufficiencies of the age and teach us to be ‘simple and honest' in thought and life, to be 
‘untimely ... in the profoundest sense’.423 Schopenhauer attained no lustrous philosophical 
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reputation in his lifetime; it is the unresolved example of his life and relationship to the 
world, not any secure position in the canon of thought, that instructs us now.  
In the complex personae of Arthur Schopenhauer Nietzsche discovers a ‘classical’ 
philosopher, a rich educational ‘model’, the ‘sounding of many voices in one nature’ rather 
than system, abstraction, mere ‘content’. In Schopenhauer Nietzsche finds not simply the 
‘remote heights of a genius’ but a ‘fellow sufferer’ for thought, an imperfect ‘all too human 
nature’ and this brings us closer to him in a ‘human sense’.424 For Schopenhauer is not 
simply a solitary figure, to be educated by him is to rediscover the power of mien and 
gesture. As Nietzsche affirms in his unpublished early essay on the Greek philosophical 
demeanour, there ‘is a steely necessity which binds a philosopher to a genuine culture’.425 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical love of paideia, of the robust, multifarious situation of 
discourse, is a powerful rejoinder to the philistine’s need for an agreeable, pacified 
audience. 
 Schopenhauer is an anti-type to the corporatised scholar and professorial 
philosopher, a thinker who ‘strove to be independent of state and society- this is his 
example, the model that he provides - to begin with the most superficial things’.426 To begin 
to flesh out the ‘productive’ example of Schopenhauer requires illuminating  the tension 
between the form and content of his philosophy, Netizsche’s feisty and yearning 
Schopenhauer is some distance from the philosopher, in The World as Will and Idea 
(1818,1844) suspicious of the will and representation. Nietzsche is interested in what 
philosophy can protect, a fiduciary relationship to critical thought in defiance of the 
insidious narrowing of discourse by society, government, religion, public opinion, and the 
subservient scholarly castes: 
philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the 
inward cave, the labyrinth of the heart: and that annoys the tyrants.427 
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Yet in this self-imposed concealment of the philosopher, in the resourceful interior spaces 
of untimely thinking, lurks a ‘great danger’, the heteronomous demands of one’s time, a 
power that will not be resisted. Those people in every age who fled ‘inward’ for their 
freedom also have to ‘live outwardly, become visible, let themselves be seen’. They are 
united with humanity through ‘countless ties’ of residence, education, country, chance, and 
the importunity of others. They know, these free spirited solitaries, that they continually 
seem other than what they think. While they might desire nothing but truth and honesty 
they are encompassed by an entangling net of misunderstandings; covered in a cloud of 
false opinions, approximations, half-admissions; incapable of preventing erroneous 
interpretations from gathering about their actions.428 The social is the threat of the 
inauthentic, but there is a more constructive response to its demands. 
Melancholy, resentment, withdrawal, even a desire for revenge awaits solitary 
thinkers in their enforced concealment and ‘compelled restraint’.429 Isolation and despair 
for the truth pose great and remorseless dangers for them, prone throughout history to 
disintegrate under the weight of skepticism and gloom. Nietzsche suggests that they will 
perish who cannot deal with the torment of silence and dissimulation, such as Heinrich von 
Kleist who died of ‘not being loved’, from the grief of uncommonness430. The value of 
Schopenhauer as an educational ‘example’, then, is his capacity to absorb, to introject the 
pressures and importunities upon his interior life, and then to produce a holistic model or 
‘persona’ to inspire kindred souls: 
Schopenhauer ... leads us from the depths of sceptical gloom ... up to the heights of 
tragic contemplation, to the nocturnal sky and its stars extended endlessly above 
us.... His greatness lies in having set up before him a picture of life as a whole, in 
order to interpret it as a whole.431 
 
Schopenhauer pursued this picture theatrically, like a perplexed Hamlet ‘pursues his ghost’, 
permitting and enacting doubt, brooding, contradiction. Like Hamlet, Schopenhauer was 
not monomaniacal, teleological, he saw that the tenor of a philosophical life is to be both 
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tragic and comic, to express complex attributes, to exceed the dichotomies of conformity 
or martyrdom. Schopenhauer does not simply ignore or perish of the profane world, he 
elevates it through allegory, iconography; he is stimulated into paradox and narrative 
mobility, Catholic and polytheistic. Thus, Schopenhauer communicated himself: 
this is the picture of all life, and learn from it the meaning of your own life. And the 
reverse: only read your own life and comprehend from it the hieroglyphics of 
universal life.432 
 
Nietzsche revives a fallacious but highly creative Western myth of origins, a fascination 
with the legendary polysemy of the Egyptian hieroglyph, comprehended before its 
decoding in the nineteenth century as a magic pictorial language, oracular, guilelessly open 
and deeply hidden. 
My reading of Schopenhauer's persona (as suggestive sign, trope, ethos, within a 
classical genealogy of such communicators) would affirm Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
insightful remarks on the significance of Nietzsche’s rhetorical studies of the early 1870s 
for his critical trajectory. In ‘The Detour’, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that Nietzsche’s turn to 
rhetoric made it impossible for him to continue to speak the genetic language of The Birth 
of Tragedy. Now aware of language as rhetorical and representational, a continuing 
transposition and translation of cultured characteristics, mannerisms, habits, and 
competitive struggles into abstract and philosophical idioms, Nietzsche, argues Lacoue-
Labarthe, was no longer able to posit ‘any originarity’ to representation, be it music, 
interiority, or Dionysian mythology. ‘Rhetoric’, says Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘ends up 
contaminating a whole belief’, allowing philosophy to be re-described and evaluated 
according to relational criteria and unintended purposes.433  
Nietzsche’s sympathy for hieroglyphics and allegory, for semiological strategies of 
displacement, argues for Lacoue-Labarthe’s suggestion that Nietzsche, once won over to 
rhetoric, no longer deployed the term ‘symbol’ after The Birth of Tragedy as a ‘sign of 
truth’, an identity of signifier and originary meaning, intention and essence. Moreover, 
from the time of the ‘Course on Rhetoric’, Nietzsche’s lectures at Basle, the kinship of the 
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actor with the orator is enthusiastically affirmed, suggesting that for Nietzsche 
Schopenhauer is the philosopher as polyseme, rhetor/mime/performer.434 A 
communicating classical intellectual, Schopenhauer did not allow the uniqueness of his 
being to become an ‘uncommunicating atom, an icy rock’, remaining fruitful and capable 
of ‘propagating himself’.435 
Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer refers us to questions of social agency, his 
uncompromising cultural commitments evoked in him a strange and ‘extremely dangerous’ 
dualism. Schopenhauer was a feisty thinker who felt with an incomparable intensity and 
certainty that genius moved within him, giving him the strength to challenge humanity, to 
proclaim a genuinely revolutionary thinking.436 Yet this ‘pugnacious’ character also felt a 
‘burning longing’ for sainthood, a beatific desire, a sense for the unconditioned, for 
cosmological harmony. In Nietzsche’s terms, the critical Witz that allows Schopenhauer to 
see further and more clearly than others also allows a vision of the reconciliation of 
knowledge with being, an insight into the domain of peace and denial of the will.437  
Nietzsche’s point is that it is not Schopenhauer’s retiring nature or pessimistic 
philosophy of will that lead him to strive against his age. Schopenhauer wished to 
determine the significance of his age anew, to embody the function of ‘lawgiver’, to be the 
measure, stamp, and weight of things (144). Transmuting the importunities of his times, 
Schopenhauer, the exemplary philosopher, plays a kairological role, methodically 
comparing his own age with others and ‘deliberately’ under-assessing it, qualifying 
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himself, overcoming the present in himself by the ‘picture’ he gives of the totality of life, 
rendering modernity unremarkable (145). 
Schopenhauer, however, was not a thinker like Empedocles whose verdict on life 
and the value of existence says so much because he lived ‘in the midst of the most 
exuberant vitality of Greek culture’ (145). Empedocles, co-habiting with a conflux of 
intellectual forces, rationalist and magical, was able to affirm existence and posit the 
dialectical nature of the whole, the conflict of Love and Strife, to argue philosophical ideas 
in a poetic form. The modern thinker such as Schopenhauer is alienated, grotesque, 
questing and incomplete, unable to fluidly occupy the discursive positions at the disposal 
of the classical intellectual. This constitutes the danger of the untimely philosopher; he 
would be the reformer of life, the saint, and also judge. The philosopher figures the 
incompatibility of enthusiasm and irony, revealing an immense ‘struggle within’(145). 
The modern thinker suffers from unfulfilment and wants to be shown life’s 
copiousness again, ‘true, red-blooded, healthy life’, so that he may then pronounce his 
judgment on it. The modern thinker must reclaim what is lost; he should be a living human 
being if he is to be a just judge (145). For this reason, despite Schopenhauer’s seemingly 
‘negative’ disregard for the German state and German philistine cultural life, it is precisely 
the untimely philosophers who are the ‘mightiest promoters of life’, and they are driven to 
extremes of love and hate by such longing. From out of their own exhausted age the modern 
philosopher longs for a culture, for a transfigured phusis, a hybrid of natural impulse and 
acculturated energies (145). The modern thinker would reprise the ‘glorious conditions’ of 
the classical intellectual who was able to really live for such a task, oppressed by none of 
the petty necessities of life, disdainful of ‘posts and honours’ (182).  
Schopenhauer is not one of the ‘timid and uncertain folk’, he possesses something 
of the ‘old arrogance’ of ancient thinkers, who thought ‘logically’ and correctly estimated 
the scope and quality of their argument because of the ‘formal disputations they used to 
practise’ (189). Schopenhauer is knowingly performative, but he is also a stern example 
for others, inexorable, he ‘maximises’ sense, affective interpretation, his disease is also his 
health. Only after embodying the critical function of pharmakon, banished yet salvific for 
his age, did Schopenhauer behold the genius in himself, a genius capable of justifying ‘life 
as such’ (146). Not the flatterer of modern life Strauss, but the contretemps philosopher 
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Schopenhauer is capable of ‘redeeming existence’, disentangling the ‘seriousness of 
philosophy from the seriousness of a newspaper’ (146-7). Schopenhauer is someone who 
is always ‘too much in the shadow’ in terms of their age and personal disposition, yet 
capable of imagining a transformative physis, a new sum of human relationships, a more 
vivid chronotope, ardently wishing to ‘see close at hand the sunshine that one lacks!’ (160). 
Schopenhauer is tragi-comic, embodying pessimism of the intellect (logos) yes, yet also a 
cheerfulness of orientation (ethos), a desire to engage this life, to imbue it with other forms 
and tones.  
‘Schopenhauerean man’, as Nietzsche puts it, is a mixed type; his legacy is the 
‘fundamental idea of culture’. As a medium of intricate relationships, Schopenhauerean 
man distributes to each one of us a number of overlapping role-playing assignments: ‘to 
promote the production of the philosopher, the artist, and the saint within us and without 
us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature’ (160). In other words, culture, as a 
distribution of talents, allows us to realise our artistic potential and sense of the whole, to 
enact rational calm, exuberant artistic creativity, and a vision of peace, to encourage the 
contagious effect of these moods in others, limning a ‘teleology of man that extends beyond 
the welfare of a state’ (148). 
Schopenhauer was not merely a great thinker, but a ‘real human being’. His thought 
is not the empty time of a doctrine but the situationally pregnant, fissiparous time of 
‘character’. As a rounded human being and rich exemplar of a philosophical life, 
Schopenhauer pursued many elective affinities, found many philosophical ‘friends’, and 
allowed himself to mediate multiple predilections and forms, which Nietzsche attributes to 
the diversely self-affecting power of polymathic desire. In a precedent established in 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Schopenhauer engaged in philosophy as a 
civilised human being, in media res.438 Dedicated to the cultivation of historical themes, 
he forbore like the Greeks before him any attempt to ‘re-invent the elements of philosophy 
and science’, he was ‘free of any kind of autochthonous conceit’.439 
Schopenhauer sensed the genius not only in himself but also in the dexterity and 
classicism of Goethe, and through a process of ‘two fold reflection’ was ‘wise to all 
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scholarly goals and cultures from the ground up’.440 Even when he was suffused with a 
‘saintly’ desire to judge existence and pronounce on its nullity, Schopenhauer was capable 
of tactics and bricolage, deploying the Kantian philosophy as an ‘extra-ordinary rhetorical 
instrument’, and making use of Buddhist and Christian mythology as a ‘colouring’ and 
‘means of expression’. For Schopenhauer, there were ‘countless hieroglyphics’ with which 
to express his philosophical outlook. No self-importance, no pretence to self-determination 
was necessary; he incorporated the genii of many ages.441 Schopenhauer, the philosopher 
rhetor, is a representational drive, he engages a plurality of cultural conventions, yet is 
capable of transfiguring current values, and legislating new critical trajectories. 
In the next chapter I discuss Nietzsche’s theory of an agonal civil society, and the 
importance of a rhetorical ‘ethicity’ to Nietzsche’s evocation of a qualified philosophy 
formed within representation and chronotope. 
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Chapter 10: Nietzsche and the Traces of Sophistry 
 
 
So far I’ve discussed a subtle yet far reaching shift in Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
history and representation, as he comes to appreciate rhetoric as a broad paideia and 
ambivalent mien, the dilemma of the intellectual as a communicator, someone who spurns, 
derides, rejects, embraces, and suffers for the sake of their culture. Nietzsche embraces 
rhetoric’s temporality and contingency, that renews, by relating, thought to its outside. As 
my tenth chapter suggests, for the mature Nietzsche rhetoric unveils a purposefulness 
without teleological purpose, an economy of forces that suggests a supple intellectual ethic 
or ethicity, a critical movement between centre and periphery.  
      I argue that Nietzsche, in his early writings on Greek philosophy and its competitive 
civil society, and his slightly later lecture series and theories about rhetoric, reactivates the 
complex configuration, the diffuse legend of the Sophist. Nietzsche, like the Frühromantiks 
before him, evokes the Sophists and their multiple traits as the genius of an urbane, artistic 
culture. Nietzsche invokes rhetoric as a flexible disposition, a political passion and 
competitive intensity, a civilian art, an ethic of pluralism, a necessary discursive discipline, 
prudent and playful. 
 
Political Passions 
 
In an early, posthumously published essay entitled 'The Greek State', Nietzsche 
enthuses about the Greek polis as a competitive stimulus for political discourse. History, 
Nietzsche avers, knows of no second instance of the political passions of the Greeks for 
their state, with only the Renaissance city-states even approaching such an energetic public 
culture.442 In the Athenian polis of the Periclean age, Nietzsche posits a public sphere of 
robust interactions and rapid suasive counterplay, a combative to and thro, parry and thrust. 
Nietzsche’s polis is a florid culture display, with a broad audience demanding oratorical 
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skills and expansive discursive modes rather than dispassionate bureaucracy or politically 
expedient platitudes.  
Nietzsche idealises the communicative sphere of the Athenian polis because it was 
not stunted by the narrow agendas of ideologues and technocrats, but disorganised and 
renewed by multifarious communications, representations highlighting the portrayer and 
evoking detail, individual circumstances. In the Athenian polis, Nietzsche discovers a 
constantly invigorated imaginary community whose opinions are fluidly reshaped by 
persuasions that can capture momentary exigencies, languages that mediate a gamut of 
opinions, rather than the normative clichés of institutional powers.443 
      In another unpublished disquisition upon the particularity of Greek discourse, 
‘Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks’ (1872), Nietzsche theorises the 
communicative subtleties of the Athenian polis as the obverse of the powerful 
individualised character of ancient Greek thought. He finds critical personality in the 
‘marvellously idealised philosophical company’ represented by ancient Greek ‘masters’ 
such as Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, 
Democritus, and Socrates. This convivial company of thinkers may differ in doctrine, but 
they have in common an absence of ‘conventionality’, for in ‘their day there was no 
philosophic or academic professionalism’.  
The thinking and character of these men stood in a relationship ‘characterized by 
strictest necessity’, their thought was a characteristic 'edge', an orientation to the world, a 
form of performance and display.444 While bound to the appearances demanded by social 
participation, there was no stultifying conventions, no consensual language to stifle such 
thinkers, able to develop their own form through all its metamorphoses to its ‘subtlest and 
greatest possibilities’.445 Here, in an early Nietzsche essay, we encounter a torsion typical 
of his thought, the idea that theoretical profundity and critical reflexivity issues from the 
derring-do, the bravado of a diverse praxis, from the relationship to the popolo that Novalis 
exhorted. 
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In ‘The History of Greek Eloquence’ (1873), Nietzsche suggests that discourse in 
antiquity found its provenance in the 'immoderate' presumption of the rhetor and the stylist 
that they could change their audience’s opinion about things, and hence the effect of things 
upon men. Gorgias claimed that through speech (logos) his listeners would transmute their 
hatred for Helen of Troy into sympathy, that by speech he would ‘remove hate from a 
woman’.446 Despite these sophisticated oratorical ambitions, this revelling in the power of 
artifice and novelty, argues Nietzsche, the orator imagines rhetorical skill as enhancing 
social intercourse, as cultivating discursive territories. The orator seeks renown, he wants 
to display his ability to a knowledgeable, rhetorically educated audience, ergo there is no 
simple ‘intention to deceive’.447 Rhetoric, the problem of relationship and exteriority, is 
always the possibility of a philosophical reflex, a movement from immanent praxis to 
social consideration. 
Nietzsche argues that what we might call the chutzpah of the Sophists and self-
confidence of later rhetoricians ideally presupposes a highly educated and rhetorically 
informed ‘republican’ audience that would like discourse to achieve its aims by ‘elegant 
means’. An extensively educated audience of this sort demands that discourse display not 
merely ‘content’ but formal innovation and acculturated modes of engagement, an ethos of 
address.448 Nietzsche’s rhetor inherits different genealogies, he exhibits the philosophical 
desire to communicate vividly to a world to which he feels bound, simultaneously 
experiencing the performative desire to be guileful, to both sublimate and abolish all known 
genres of discourse.  
Nietzsche’s belief that a communicative imperative subtilised discourse is exampled in 
his exuberant short essay, ‘Homer's Contest’ (1872). Here Nietzsche discusses the 
pervasively competitive or agonistic artistic and political culture of post-Homeric 
Greece. He configures the agonistic orientation of Greek thought with the multivalent 
ethics of ancient Greek polytheism, its evocation of the formative power of violence and 
desire. 
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Nietzsche begins by informing us that in the Homeric world, salvation from 
internecine violence and cruelty, from the disastrous consequences of avarice and lust, is 
sought in the formalisation of combat and contestation, channelling the combative exertion 
and victorious achievement towards civic ends, the enhancement of sociability, collective 
affects. Nietzsche evidences Hesiod's Theogeny, which makes it quite clear that Greek law 
has developed from murder, from the will of the victor in war, as in the bloody victory of 
the Olympian gods over the Titans.449 Anticipating his later genealogical method, 
Nietzsche suggests that those abilities which are terrifying and considered inhuman, those 
wholly natural urges, may even be the ‘fertile soil’ out of which, alone, humanity can grow 
through the impulse to create and transform, through deed and work.450 
The function of the sacred in polytheism, suggests Nietzsche, is to acknowledge the 
strife caused by and pleasure of victory, to typify the manifold cravings, antagonisms and 
competitive urges that spur one to act and create. Nietzsche here invokes Hesiod's 
genealogical mode of affective interpretation, his equivocal source of moral behaviour, 
Eris, jealousy, envy, rivalry, and emulatory desire. As we have seen in Hesiod’s 
genealogical Theogeny, Eris is a baleful, terrifying chthonic god, a creature of night, 
inciting war and strife among men. However, in Hesiod’s ethically prescriptive Works  
and Days, jealousy and envy spur neighbourly rivalry, the healthy desire to compete with 
and emulate their achievements, the 'genius' or motivating impulse of technology and the 
arts. Nothing distinguishes the Greek world from our moralistic age, Nietzsche argues, so 
much as the ‘colouring’, the duplex tonality of individual ethical concepts such as Eris. 
These qualities, these qualifications of sensibility dear to the Greeks, suffer no adverse 
judgment; they are considered the gift of a beneficent godhead, a mysterious power of 
uncertain origin, a function of many narratives.451 
Eris is the exalted genius of productive contestation in ancient Greek ethics, for 
even the gods rival each other and envy and seek retribution against the human who has 
excelled above all others, as in the story of Athene and Arachne. Under a monotheistic 
order of representational idealism such visceral cravings and unruly passions can only be 
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interiorised as a personal responsibility and fault of the will in need of extirpation. In 
polytheism with its theatricalised gods, erotic and competitive passions are spiritualised as 
a social necessity and healthy source of agonistic conduct. Hence, in the realm of civil 
society, the greater and more sublime a Greek is, argues Nietzsche, the ‘brighter the flame 
of ambition that flares out of him’, aching to consume everybody who runs on the same 
course.452 
Competition never annihilates opposition, though, for there is a conviction in the 
ancient Greek world, permeating its polytheism and civic ethics, that the contest is 
necessary to preserve the health of the pantheon or the state: Nietzsche delights in the 
original meaning of ostracism suggesting the banishment of he or she who would be the 
best, beyond relationship. The contest is perennial, the eternal source of life for the Hellenic 
state, a means of stimulation to further activity, augmenting a diversity of purposes and 
usages.453  
Following Nietzsche’s line of argument, I would suggest that the individual 
towering above the rest is constant anathema to Greek philosophy, refuted by the pluralism 
of the Sophist’s dissoi logoi and their development of an eristic spirit of inventing counter-
arguments; one suspects such a spirit in the ludic paradoxes of Zeno, travestying the 
normative assumptions of common concepts. For Nietzsche, the ‘genius’ of the Greeks is 
pluralist and socialised, hostile to the modern idea of the  ‘exclusiveness’ and autonomy of 
genius. Hellenistic genealogy and sociality presupposes centrifugal and centripetal forces, 
that in the natural order of things there are always several geniuses who ‘spur each other 
to action, even as they hold each other within the limits of measure’, inspiring relational 
enthusiasm and transformative desires.454 We are reminded of Protagoras’s idea of the law 
as a pattern to be imitated and innovated upon, a social convention rather than definitive 
commandment. 
Nietzsche suggests that the aspiring Greek pupil’s ambitions will be moderated by 
a channelling of his or her energies into sociable goals, a desire, through excellence and 
skill, to contribute to the fame and achievements of one’s society. While competing with 
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others in athletic contests, the youth thinks of the glory of his native town.  Out of a 
tremendous rivalry do the Sophists, whom Nietzsche refers to as ‘the highest teachers of 
antiquity’, meet and outdo each other in the development of performative argumentative 
skills, polymathic understanding, and ceremonial magnificence. Only by revelling in the 
sensuous skin of a great public theatre, Nietzsche intimates, did the Sophists come to 
ironise truth. Their skepticism, their questioning of all hierarchies of knowledge, all 
absolute truth, was perhaps only the means to a positivity of feeling, the differential 
realisation of human nature.    
This fold, this reflex of the Sophistic competitor, also engaged the tragedians and 
poets, who reached new and sublime heights by contributing, in competitive performance, 
to their respective genres; great masters such as Pindar and Simonides excelled each other 
as they stood side by side, mistrustful and jealous. In a significant move, an elaboration of 
a counter-normative philosophy of history, Nietzsche extends this agonistic tendency to 
Plato's artistic dialogues, which he analyses as a complex effect of Plato’s close emulation 
and rivalry with dramatic, poetic, and mythological genres.  
In a reading redolent of the Frühromantik analysis, Nietzsche suggests that the 
special artistic significance of Plato’s dialogues, is the result of a contest with the ‘art of 
the orators, the sophists, and the dramatists of his time’. Nietzsche evokes the internal 
scenography of Plato, who wanted to stand above his predecessors, to celebrate both 
victory over his rivals and the formal excellence of his writings. He, Plato, wishes to say, 
look I too can do what my great rivals can do, and I can do it better than they. No Protagoras 
has invented myths as beautiful as mine, no dramatist such a rhetorically vivid and 
captivating whole as my Symposium, no orator has created orations like those in my 
Gorgias. Now, however, I repudiate all this entirely and condemn all imitative art. Only 
the contest made me a poet, a sophist, an orator.455  
       Nietzsche’s prosopopoeia, his dramatisation of Plato’s complex combination of 
mimetic desire and hubris, articulates the abyss of considerations, the economy of forces, 
the demand to rhetorically communicate opens up: ‘What a problem opens up before us 
when we inquire into the relationship of the contest to the conception of the work of art!’456 
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Plato’s sublime art is bound by a steely resolve to his culture and its wealth of 
expository discourses. Nietzsche’s Plato is stimulated, communicated, exteriorised, 
constituted within representational forms that are deftly reinvented, and ambivalently 
repudiated.457 At his moment of glorious achievement, having finally purified ideas and 
rigorously established a universal methodology, Plato will nevertheless look back with 
pride to his acting out of personae, his mimetic talents, the abundant copiousness of his 
discourse, and his enrichment of genre. The intellectual become rhetorical is the exceeding 
dynamic of multiple and contradictory attributes; transcending any isolated and now passé 
school of thought, they enact a constellation of historical form and present critical interests. 
Indeed Nietzsche’s Platonic anti-Platonism suggests a critical ethic that seeks 
meditative themes, rich materials, in the problem of winning over an audience. Nietzsche 
argues as much in Daybreak (1881): 
The Scylla and Charybdis of the speaker. - How difficult it was in Athens to speak 
in such a way as to win one’s hearers for one’s cause without repelling them through 
the form in which one spoke or drawing them away from one’s cause with it!458 
(DB 268) 
 
Rhetoric, long associated with vested interests, demagogic fanaticism, enables us to 
mediate the polarities, the Scylla and Charybdis of callow content and empty affectation.  
Rhetoric, an effect of many demands, those of audience and cultural moment, suggests to 
Nietzsche a transvaluation of values, a critique of modernity’s hegemonic conceptual 
generalities.  
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An historical awareness of the ethos of the rhetor reveals our fabled common sense, 
our proud claims to realism and objectivity, as extreme, unbalanced, indelicate, egoistic, 
lacking in subtle experience: 
… knowledge, joy, pain - all are names for extreme states: the milder, middle 
degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, 
and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny. (DB 115) 
 
Rhetoric, as a situated art, realises nuanced dispositions, a sense for the almost and 
incomplete, an awareness of the importance of varied paideia, affective ethos to our 
mental life. Rhetoric provides Nietzsche with a counterpoint to egoistic self-
satisfaction, indeed it can be surmised as a noble and subtle discourse among 
creative equals, typical of the Greeks as a ‘nation of artists’.459  
 
If the opinion of a participatory and acculturated audience might be impressed 
towards new possibilities, if, in the age of the Sophists, the language of the sciences and 
history was amenable to a fluidity of reinvention, a tempo presto, this power of 
transvaluation should not be ascribed to mythic laziness or a degenerative relativism, 
according to Nietzsche. If in the Greek world 'all that was solid melts into air', Berman’s 
famous phrase (adapting Marx) for a vertiginous modernism,460 then it was only because 
the Greeks as a whole worked at developing provocative forms of persuasion, evaluating 
eristic play as a sensible cultural practice.461 Nietzsche’s Greeks are the genius of the 
Presocratics and Sophists, their heightened conventionalism, the attempt in their discourse 
practices and perspectival exercises to expand logics of sense and create new generic foci.  
The Sophists, says Nietzsche, typify the paradox at the heart of rhetoric’s 
educational propaedeutic. On the one hand, in their vision of argumentative maximisation 
the Sophists posed a limitless expansion of the doxa, the possibility of an episteme 
continually absorbing new perspectives and critical extremes. On the other hand, the 
Sophists, establishing polymathy as a critical mien, are also responsible for concentrating 
intellectual ‘powers of the highest rank’. Only thus were the Sophists able to establish a 
‘higher’ level of education that demanded a subtle combination of knowledges and mental 
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capacities.462 Embodying a heteroglossia of senses, centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, 
one can bring the Sophistic legacy into contact with the life of critique, assessing the 
Sophists as a critical possibility, a necessary variety of proclivities. 
While admiring the discontinuous elements of the first generation Sophists, 
Nietzsche also elaborates the sheer particularism of the rhetorical training programme that 
emerged in the age of the second Sophistic, as conducive to a range of critical capacities, 
theoretical and practical; a fully evolved rhetorical paideia includes training in stylistics, 
declamation, study of the ancients as models, philological, practical-juridical, and 
dialectical exercises, as well as an introduction to extemporizing.463 Because these diverse 
skills nurtured the manifold talents and critical nuances required by the vigorous 
egalitarianism of a republican society, it is not surprising, Nietzsche suggests, that the 
sociably effective and generically productive communicative culture engendered by the 
pedagogy of the Sophists proved historically contagious, ‘blossoming forth’ again and 
again throughout Greek and then Roman antiquity.464 Rhetoric stimulates a history that 
does not reproduce identity; it cultivates sensibility while preparing for the transformative 
power of individual action. 
We should keep in mind, argues Nietzsche, that if rhetorical pedagogy and practice 
proved historically irrepressible in the classical world, it is because rhetoric does not 
impose a consensual thought-object according to programmatic intentions, but propagates 
discursive forms capable of reaching a wide audience. In Daybreak, Nietzsche notes that 
antiquity was less than thrilled by the referential function of ideas. It is ‘characteristic’ of 
the ‘mankind of antiquity’ to prefer formal play, ‘the simple construction and the inventive 
elaboration and variation of a single motif or of a few motifs’ (DB 245). 
 Nietzsche hopes that the restoration of rhetoric’s communicative imperative will 
cast doubt on the Enlightenment fantasy of a pure, ‘autochthonous’ language of concepts: 
It is not enough to prove something, one has also to seduce or elevate people to it. 
That is why the man of knowledge should learn how to speak his wisdom: and often 
in such a way that it sounds like folly! (DB 330) 
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To communicate is paradoxical; it requires cunning, but also charisma, (mock) heroic 
qualities. To communicate effectively is to acknowledge that representation must not only 
project new and interesting ideas, but also return, cyclically, genealogically, to its 
formative ‘senses’, its material element; that it must acknowledge itself as folly, obscenity, 
absurdity, a carnivalesque power of renewal. Truth is also masquerade and game; it knows 
many chronotopes.  
Rebuking thin universalism, Nietzsche suggests that to communicate one must be a 
Sophist, prudent, initiated in customs and mores: 
In itself truth is no power at all - whatever its flatterers of the Enlightenment may 
be accustomed to say to the contrary! It has, rather, to draw power over to its side, 
or go over to the side of power, or it will perish again and again! This has been 
proved ... more than sufficiently! (DB 535) 
 
Rhetoric is discourse in media res. It must have the malleability, the adaptation to desire 
and belief, typical of syncretic popular religions. Sociability is the orientation of thought: 
Are warmth and enthusiasm not needed if a thing of thought is to have justice done 
to it - and that precisely is seeing! As though you are able to traffic with things of 
thought any differently from the way you do with men! (DB 539) 
 
 Rhetoric signifies the journey that thought must take, buffeted by rocky outposts 
and tempted by divergent paths. Despite its concentration of powers, its commitment, its 
urge to act, communicative representation finds itself generous to exteriority, alive to 
detail, meandering: 
Thinker’s digressions. - With many thinkers, the course of their thought is rigorous 
and inexorably bold ... while in detail they are gentle and flexible; with benevolent 
hesitation they circle around a thing ten times, though in the end they resume their 
rigorous path. (DB 530) 
 
Thought is centre and periphery, disciplined deliberation and idyll. The communicated ego 
is an ethicity on many levels: 
Indeed, to throw aside for a while that which one now has, and to dream oneself a child, 
beggar, fool - can from now on occasionally give us pleasure. (DB 531)  
 
We have a duty of care towards ourselves, and that is to realise our own fruitfulness, 
to ‘benefit that which is coming to be within us’, which is greater than we are, and which 
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must be disseminated into the world. Nietzsche’s philosopher preserves a relationship of 
‘pregnancy’ to every bringing forth, and this ought to ‘blow to the winds all presumptuous 
talk of “willing” and “creating”’, the hubris of the sovereign ego. For as ‘intermediaries’, 
as fertile texts, as a propaedeutic for the future, we watch over and care for ourselves ‘to 
the benefit of all’ (DB 552). The rhetor is a prophet facing outward.  
 
Logography 
 
The rapid expansion and consolidation of logography in Athens during the 4th 
century BCE provides Nietzsche, in ‘The History of Greek Eloquence’, with a model of 
how an immanent and disseminating genealogy of representation, an excitable quickening 
of discourse, can provide the paradoxical conditions for sober analysis, a leisured 
articulation of forms. Nietzsche discusses the renown of the logographers, the rhetorically 
trained speechwriters who wrote speeches for defendants forced to represent themselves 
under the adversarial juridical laws of Athenian democracy. 
While presented orally and for a specific case, the more exemplary speeches of 
notable logographers such as Lysias and Demosthenes soon captured the wider literate and 
legally discerning public’s imagination as ‘clever accomplishments’. This had indeed been 
the case since Gorgias’s widely celebrated and circulated written speech, the Defence of 
Palamades, which simultaneously functioned as a propaedeutic for inventive legal 
arguments and probabilistic reasoning.465   
Acknowledging, to borrow Roland Barthes’ parlance, the death or insignificance of 
the empirical subject of these speeches, the logographer began to prepare his 
‘communications’, in Nietzsche’s terms, with an eye for style, technical achievement, and 
a desire to contribute to the theoretical stocks of logography as an important social art. The 
logographer, responsive to the appetite of a broad audience, sought to contribute not only 
to political oratory but artistic discourse, in competition with their fellow practitioners.466 
Logography, for Nietzsche, is a desire for overlapping personae; it is not the autochthonous 
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conceit of a particular discipline but a system of many talents, resonating with many 
accents and traces of discourse. 
The text of the logographer, in Nietzsche’s genealogy, becomes foreground, a 
spectator to itself, and in its circulation as a written text it is eagerly translated by its diverse 
audience into a panoply of characteristics and mannerisms. Suffused with the pressurised 
chronotope of public performance and interaction, Nietzsche’s point is that the kairological 
logographical text offers its reader leisure and lapidary analytical techniques. We are 
reminded that the spicy Witz and whimsy of the novel suggested to the Frühromantiks a 
paradoxically mature artistic form, critical materials for a materialist rhetoric. Nietzsche 
imagines Isocrates, a former logographer, and a pedagogue, a man of practice become 
theorist in his later life (a common trajectory for the rhetor), ‘sipping in sentence after 
sentence with lingering eye and ear’. The rhetorically practised reader is someone who 
‘imbibes a work like a delicious wine, following every detail of the author’s art’, a person 
who ‘still has time’ and ‘misses nothing’.467 Rhetoric fragments and individuates, in order 
to restore and comprehend. 
Arguing for the intellectual as urbane spectator, a sophisticated lover of discursive 
foreground, Nietzsche feels that the ‘active, the passionate, the suffering person is not a 
reader’.468 For Nietzsche, the circuitous path of the logographical text, its depropriation, 
follows Democritus’s genealogy of social formation, where a symbolic form expands from 
a technique serving immediate environmental exigencies to a rich medium, an aesthetic 
appreciation of rhythm and style.  
For Nietzsche, the ‘superficial’ orientation of rhetorical form sediments into a 
power of critical appreciation and profound contemplation. I quote his idea of the ‘three 
tasks for which educators are required’ in 'Twilight of the Idols': 
One must learn to see, one must learn to think, one must learn to speak and write: 
the goal in all three is a noble culture. Learning to see - accustoming the eye to 
calmness, to patience, to letting all things come up to it; postponing judgement.... 
not to react at once to a stimulus, but to gain control of all the inhibiting, excluding 
instincts – to be able to suspend decision. All un-spirituality, all vulgar 
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commonness, depend on the inability to resist a stimulus.... the famous modern 
‘objectivity’ is bad taste, is ignoble par excellence.469 
 
Rhetorical training, which concentrates the power of eye and ear, generates patience and 
deliberative discipline. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s communicative imperative also 
records the role of vivid instincts and proximate sense in critical judgment – the role of 
tastes, smells (the importance of nose as a figure of intuition), a language very much 
immanent to the excessive possibilities of what Nietzsche, in paralogical fashion, calls 
‘life’.470  
To love the foreground of forms, tones, and surfaces is a disposition not only to 
ironic spectatorship, but to engage with a vigorous sense of usage, unintended effect, cachet 
and context. Nietzsche is angry in ‘The Twilight of the Idols’ that priggish morality with 
its codes and strictures condemns for its own sake, without regard for the ‘concerns, 
considerations, and contrivances of life’. The morality of the bigot and prig lacks any feel 
for the 'enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms’.471 
One needs to dispense with a determinate or code morality in favour of an anthropology 
alert to a dynamic economy of valences and needs. 
Nietzsche enjoys a Pagan flourish, pointing out that a human being is a piece of 
fatum, not self-willed but caught up in a fatal vortex, ‘one necessity more for all that is yet 
to come and to be’.472 Therefore to ask humanity to be a given, a single dimension, to be 
virtuous, to be ‘man’, is precisely to negate the complex purposes of this world. But we 
immoralists, says Nietzsche, make room in our hearts ‘for every kind of understanding, 
comprehending, and approving ... we make it a point of honour to be affirmers’.473  We 
know a higher economy of functions, we know ‘how to utilize’ the holy witlessness of the 
priest, finding an advantage ‘even in the disgusting species of the prigs, the priests, the 
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virtuous’.474 Nietzsche, like his romantic forebears, will articulate a rhetoricised, 
‘untimely’ philosophy, of diverse habits, purposes, and sensibilities divorced from origin 
and essence. 
 
Nietzsche's Rhetoric 
 
Let us now examine the texts of Nietzsche’s lectures on rhetoric in more detail, 
arguing for a joyfully contradictory, unstable evocation, complex sociology and image of 
excess. In his lectures, 'A Description of Ancient Rhetoric', given 1872-3 at the University 
of Basel, Nietzsche attempts to defend the concept of rhetoric from its current ill repute, 
compounded by a modern usage that is often dilettantish or crudely empiricist.475  
Nietzsche returns to an anthropological refrain, arguing that modernity has a much more 
highly developed idea of what is true in and of itself, whereas rhetoric arises among a 
people whose life-world is full of mythical images, a people yet to experience the 
unqualified need of historical accuracy.476 Yet such naïveté has its strenuous demands. 
Nietzsche argues that what the populaces of antiquity did need was persuasive skill and 
liberal arts more generally, given that they would rather be persuaded than instructed, for 
rhetoric is an ‘essentially republican art’.477  
Rhetoric, in its broadness, stimulates a popolo; on the other hand it is the mature art 
of a pluralist culture, encouraging unusual opinions and perspectives, and a pleasure in 
their counterplay. Rhetoric reconciles aesthetic tolerance and rigor, it the ‘highest spiritual 
activity’ of the ‘well-educated political man’.478 Rhetoric allows for competing political 
desires, it can be a spirit of dialogue and commonality in the Greeks, or the more Roman 
idea of the commanding dominance, the seductive powers of an individual personality. 
Here Nietzsche revives a Sophistic paradox, that of Gorgias, who famously praised the 
audience’s capacity to be deceived and enchanted by aesthetic fictions as the condition of 
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a liberal ethics.479 Rhetoric is not an irenics or universal morality, it requires power, 
violence, partisanship, ‘interestedness’ as its very conditions.480  
Nietzsche evidences Plato’s Socrates as a conceptual persona who conveys the twin 
imperatives of instructing an audience academically, and at other times being ‘rhetorical in 
a popular fashion’, deploying mythic fictions, urbane, eristic, always negotiating opinion, 
sensitive to situation.481 Nietzsche identifies a similar tension in Cicero’s Topics, which 
‘goes beyond’ its instructive goal of being a topology of argumentative tropes, becoming 
simultaneously philosophical and reflective, a liminal text (15). In rhetorical discourses the 
controlling, intentional instinct converses with inventive abundance, is tempted by the 
positional possibilities gifted it by an urbane culture. 
Nietzsche also discusses the Cicero of the De Oratore, who advances the idea that 
the characteristic style is the proper domain of the art of the orator, but who also argues 
that rhetoric is a ‘free, plastic’ art form. We can note this ambivalence, argues Nietzsche, 
and say that the true orator speaks forth from the ethos of the persons or things represented 
by him, becoming absorbed by the force and power of a perspective, or genre of utterance. 
Sophocles is Nietzsche’s representative of a re-presentational ethos, of a rhetorically 
‘characteristic’ style that states a cause with the utmost potency, where all the ‘speakers’, 
the contesting characters of his play, maximise the power of their discourses to such an 
extent that they convince us of his or her cause as just and best (37). The most sophisticated 
of future philosophies can only hope to recapture our formerly naïve susceptibility to an 
aesthetically powerful ethos. 
Rhetoric subtends ancient Greek cultural production because its complex 
disposition and sociable élan prove far superior to a form that emanates from a mundane 
ego or monological system. What is ‘remarkable’ about oratorical forms, argues Nietzsche, 
is that their artistic love of form and tone, combined with their prudent and inclusive respect 
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for cultural differences, actually ‘discovers’ more challenging arguments and 
psychological nuances, sees further, than the most aggressive ego, the most passional, 
agitated ‘genius’, ever could. Nietzsche in these lectures accordingly prefers the 
Aristotelian notion of rhetoric as a dynamis, a power of discovery, a faculty or ability, 
rather than an ancillary technique, a technê (9). Rhetoric is a simulacrum, it can never 
possess the identity of a single art, it is the paradox of the commonplace, the convention, 
as invention and transformation. 
Nietzsche argues that the orator who is merely competent and intelligible goes 
unloved by an audience demanding artistry. Nietzsche chooses a mixed metaphor to depict 
the rhetorical copia recommended by Cicero in De Oratore, later a favourite theme of 
Renaissance disquisitions upon eloquence. The ideal of the orator, Nietzsche feels, is 
analogous to the prosperous house that not only fulfils essential needs but provides 
abundant decorative items for admiration: rhetoric is a sound structural basis for discourse 
and a theatre for play; a combination of the necessary and the aesthetically expansive (39).  
Nietzsche also admires the vivid physiognomic depiction of rhetoric in the usually 
sober and sardonic Tacitus, who compares rhetorical discourse in his Dialogue on Orators 
to someone who is not only not ill, but overflowing with strength, heartiness, and 
vigorousness, where healthy blood ‘riots over the muscles’ (41). We should keep in mind 
that the Nietzsche who deliquesces, in his discussion of rhetoric, from historical description 
and a comparative typology of tropes to imagistic absorption is perhaps the example of the 
ideal rhetorical tendency, a co-habitation of elegance and sufficiency, theory and its 
resistance. Rhetoric, internalising its mixed imperatives, encourages a 'prudent relation 
between the sincere and the artistic' (37).  
In order to translate themes into the domain of culture, to ‘dramaturgically project’ 
and play immanent variations, the rhetor will embellish topics according to the ‘laws of 
beauty’. This means enhancing important traits, eliminating what is less noble, invigorating 
discourse with ‘representative’ characteristics in Frühromantik parlance. This is what 
Nietzsche calls the 'transfiguration of what is typical', rhetoric as acculturated translation, 
instruction become ethos (43). Rhetoric is the parody of dialectics, it does not begin with 
an I, it is thematically and aesthetically practised: ‘what is typical in rhetoric restricts the 
beautiful, and the beautiful restricts what is typical’ (39). A higher rhetorical awareness 
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continues to subtly re-position philosophical enunciation according to multiple genii, given 
that in a public appearance one must handle one’s verbal weapons both suitably and 
beautifully, one must win elegantly and not just be victorious. The orator must be 
reasonable and sincere, but not coarsely natural, not a populist. Certainly it is necessary to 
be superior in freedom, dignity, to formally innovate and excel (37).  
Rhetorical discourse is liminal, it ‘plays at the boundary of the aesthetic and moral’; 
it is serious discourse and aesthetic cultivation, for any one-sidedness destroys the 
outcome. In rhetorical discourse aesthetic fascination joins moral confidence, saint and 
artist meet, one distributes oneself as a plurality of roles (39). Rhetoric is a 'middle-faculty' 
that engages in particularising representation through the generalist capacity to translate 
powerful characteristics, intuitive immediacies and human relationships into acculturated 
representative domains.482  
 
The rhythmic origins of rhetoric 
 
It is a false contrast, Nietzsche tells us, to ascribe popular metaphors to 
embarrassment or stupidity and educated rhetorical tropes to artfulness and aesthetic 
delight. Rhetoric is not the symbolic capital of a social class, a critique dating from Plato; 
it is a genealogy of moods and social needs. Nietzsche argues according to a now familiar 
semiological history, that metaphor is a 'forced' reaction to a missing synonym; it is a 
transferential initiation of a new discursive domain rather than a naïveté or mere luxury.483 
At its most sophisticated and elusive, rhetoric, as with Schopenhauer, feels the need for a 
more vital culture, for stronger collaboration and sympathy. 
In ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’ (1873), Nietzsche will again warn 
against cultural forgetfulness when it comes to language-acquirement. Nietzsche renders a 
powerful analytical account of the acculturation of language, the passage from a semiotic 
that conveys specific impressions and imperatives to a heightened aesthetic sensibility and 
theoretical pluralism.484 Nietzsche suggests that language is the vestige of a series of 
                                                 
482 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’ (1873), in Nietzsche on Rhetoric and 
Language, 252. 
483 Nietzsche, ‘Description of Ancient Rhetoric’, 53. 
484 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’, 246-57. 
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metaphorical phases whereby a nerve-stimulus is translated into an image, then a sound, 
then a figure, and finally into abstractions and schemata, the more familiar and 
intellectually deadening languages of conceptual truth.  
Nietzsche's remedy for the indelicacy of conceptual language depends on a kind of 
anamnesis, the collective memory that any concept or type presupposes a vast number of 
dissimilar entities and actions that have been rendered equivalent by reference to an 
outstanding characteristic.485 Nietzsche charges us to remember that language generically 
represents not truths but the most prominent characteristic of a communicative situation, 
whether it be an impulse, a mood, an opinion, or the character of a people, all of which at 
different times and for different purposes needed to find utterance. Each time we enunciate, 
says Nietzsche, there is an overlapping of spheres, a transference of a vivid impression, a 
technological sensitivity to form and number, a translation of human relationships to a 
more abstract status.486 Nietzsche’s intensive analysis fragments and decomposes language 
in order to restore its collective possibility, its extensive imaginary. 
Language is inherently rhetorical, says Nietzsche, in the sense that it transposes and 
formalises communicative situations, bearing the traces of purposive, but not crudely 
teleological, relational acts and gestures. Language, qua rhetoric, embodies for Nietzsche 
the ‘remarkable paradox’ that something can be ‘purposeful without a consciousness’, the 
essence of an ‘instinct’.487 Language is the problem of extensive and plural nodes of 
agency, a ‘purposefulness’ that lacks an originating ‘consciousness’, that belies a 
monotheism of intelligent design.488 
It is a question then of a philosophy which is not programmatic, not ruled by any 
single measure, or architectonic drive.  Nietzsche suggests in The Gay Science (1882, then 
1887) that subtlety and strength of consciousness are proportionate or related to a man’s 
(or animal’s) capacity for communication, that consciousness has developed only under 
the pressure of the need for communication, an effect of an acculturation which is 
                                                 
485 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’, 249, and Nietzsche, ‘Lectures on Ancient 
Rhetoric’, 57. 
486 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense’, 248,9. 
487 Nietzsche, ‘On the Origin of Language’ (1869-70), 211. 
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competitive, theatrical, formal.489 Far from a marker of progress, for Nietzsche, rational 
apodictics and empirical faith in ideas both threaten the erasure of the sociability of 
language, the long held idea that language is a ‘mien, a pressure, a gesture’.490  
For Nietzsche, interiority is subtilised, delicately acculturated, precisely where a 
play of appearances, rather than settled ideas, could still contribute to the philosophical and 
political domain. Nietzsche suggests that when philosophy became a matter of public 
competition in Greece, in the third century BCE, many philosophers wished to theatricalise 
their own happiness in order to torment advocates of different principles. However, in the 
act of seeming happy, in the act of maximising their own philosophical beliefs through 
acting and public display, mental life was vivified and transformed, these philosophers 
were ‘bound in the long run to become happy!’ This was the fate of those rhetor-
philosophers the Cynics for example (DB 367). One could also mention Seneca whose 
exuberant sociability and capacity for friendship overwhelms a programmatic isolationism. 
It must at least be a possibility in a Nietzschean ethic for logos to segue into ethos, for the 
centre to be transformed by its peripheries. 
Certainly the relationship between ethics and cultural life was significant for the 
mature Nietzsche’s interest in cultural personae or ‘types’. Here my discussion seeks to 
further Gilles Deleuze’s powerful analysis of the role of typologies in Nietzsche’s work, 
Nietzsche and Philosophy  (1962). Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s typologies 
(philosopher, priest, saint, redeemer) seek to recover the habitus of thought and value, the 
ways of being and modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate.491 The type is a 
representative character within a broader scenography, like Schopenhauer and Plato they 
open up worlds of philosophical considerations, a passage beyond self-sufficient ideas. 
Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s typologies allow for both a critique of the values 
of values, and the positive element of a creation. Typological critique loves the foreground 
of culture, it displaces cognitive pretence by analyses of sense, mien, gesture, 
characteristic, always relishing thought’s role in a theatre of the absurd. Deleuze suggests 
                                                 
489  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, 
no.354, 298. 
490 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, no. 354, 299. 
491  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, the Athlone Press, London, 1983, 1. 
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that Nietzsche’s typological criticism no longer judges phenomena from a moralistic or 
rational perspective, rather seeking out the ‘sense’ of a phenomenon in terms of the 
different forces that have appropriated it.492  
It is a question of illuminating the situation of a discourse and orientation as it struggles 
with, or rhythmically complements, other forces in a given time and region of the earth; 
a rejection of the idea as determined ‘content’ and therefore subject to judicial 
condemnation. Contrasting Nietzsche’s thought to Kant and Hegel, Deleuze stresses that 
thinking for Nietzsche is neither an innate rational faculty, the exercise of an 
authoritative reason, nor the pan-historical vision of a teleological subjectivity, a 
Hegelianism.493  
Types are never self-sufficient entities. An a priori faculty of mind cannot grasp 
them, they teasingly elude the possessive grasp of empirical objectivity, and they are not a 
datum, neither utilitarian nor average. Simultaneously biological, psychical, historical, 
social, and political, the type provokes a symptomology and semiology, an alertness to the 
interplay of cultural forces it reflects and the example or ‘model’ for discursive practices 
that it offers us.494  
One thinks of Nietzsche’s ‘Schopenhauerean man’, whose suffering was 
symptomatic of the deficiencies of a particular space and time, German philistinism and 
nineteenth-century positivism. Schopenhauer’s vigorous extremes (polemicist and saint, 
pugnacious and reclusive, in a love/hate relationship with his culture) were a sign or 
‘hieroglyph’ pointing towards the future prospects of an embodied and richly contradictory 
philosophical mien.495 One thinks of the type as a Sophistic figure, consolidating and 
transfiguring certain themes, an indeterminate sign that asks us to reflect in subtle 
evaluative terms on its ethical and social legacy, the many purposes it has bequeathed, 
beyond any initial origin or intention. 
Deleuze argues that Nietzsche’s preferred mode of typological critique has no 
feeling for dichotomies of truth and error: rather it immanently describes, encourages a 
multiplicity of senses and affective dispositions as its nodes of analysis. Rather than asking 
                                                 
492 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 2, 3. 
493 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 108. 
494 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 115. 
495  Benjamin’s analysis in his ‘ Epistemo-critical Prologue’ of philosophical ‘ideas’ as mediating 
‘extremes’, as opposed to the utilitarian generalities of the concept, would seem to have some affinity with 
Nietzsche’s re-presentation of the ‘type’ as preferable to a disembodied idea or bloodless abstraction. 
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whether something is good or evil, a typological axiology asks whether something is 
‘interesting’ or ‘boring’, whether it serves ‘life’ or is moribund, healthy or sick, fertile or 
arid. Deleuze cites Nietzsche’s genealogical understanding of religion and religiosity as an 
example of an assemblage of senses and types that has served many forces.496 Often cited 
as a nihilistic atheist, polemical anti-Christian and proto-Nazi anti-Semite, Deleuze’s 
Nietzsche is, to the contrary, an affirmative pluralist. As typologist and genealogist, 
sensitive to praxical qualities, Nietzsche is capable of praising the persona of the saint for 
encouraging reverential affects, enriching feelings of wonder and awe; or suggesting that 
religious practices such as prayer encourage necessary disciplines and affective 
continuities, the cultural value of stillness, tranquillity, and meditation.497  
One might add that this typological Nietzsche sympathetically portrays the gentle 
sensibility and anti-legalistic symbolicity of Jesus, whom he characterises as the Redeemer 
type, one might say both abolishing and renewing the genre. The Redeemer type is the 
gentle prophet who, afraid of the tyranny of determinate content, the partiality and violence 
of moral law, would transform himself into suggestive sign, luminous icon, allegory, trait, 
a model for sympathetic relational forms rather than cruel and inexorable code moralities. 
The Redeemer type is an intermediary, realises human potential. He is the unifying 
sympathy of a style. The Redeemer type encourages an imaginative social calculus, a sense 
of paradox, wise foolishness, the god in man. 
Antithetical to all purity and monoculturalism, the Redeemer type opens onto 
exteriority, otherness. He inherits and transmits diverse performative models; he is an 
eclectic historicity. The Redeemer type is like the Buddha who attempts to lead even the 
most ‘spiritual interests’ back to the person, the Redeemer's gentle customs, disciplines, 
and possibilities of self questioning reinvent Buddhism’s total absence of militarism.498  
                                                 
496 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 4. 
497 See ‘The Gay Science’ sec. 128. 
498 ‘The Antichrist’ in The Portable Nietzsche, 588. Later Nietzsche articulates the Redeemer type as a 
cultural possibility whose transmission and unresolved possibilities pose genuine questions to modernity: 
‘What concerns me is the psychological type of the Redeemer.... Not the truth concerning what he did, what 
he said, how he really died; but the question of whether his type can still be exhibited at all, whether it has 
been “transmitted”’ (600). Like Novalis and Schlegel before him, Nietzsche imagines a counter-history to 
sectarianism, monoculturalism, and petty bigotry.  
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Nietzsche has a Socratic love of situation, and encourages a duplexity of existence. 
It is incomprehensible to Nietzsche to make a ‘hero’ and offer an ecclesiastical history of 
the Redeemer type, for he or she is a sublime ‘idiot’ in Dostoevsky’s sense of the term, 
naive and indiscriminate in his infinite love, with no definitive role to play in any actual 
time or place.499 The Redeemer type is a symbolist par excellence who stands outside all 
religion, all cult concepts, all history, all natural science, all knowledge, all politics, all 
books, all art; in-finite ‘his “knowledge” is pure foolishness’.500 
 
Masks and Signs 
 
       For Nietzsche, the ability to value the complex practices and overlapping chronotopes 
of the type is the sine qua non of a genuinely historical spirit, the promise of a cosmopolitan 
intellectual outlook. The type is praxical, fluid, an assemblage of senses and qualities, never 
coercive, rather indicating rhythms of identification and critical distance. It is always a 
question, in a leisured tempo, of selecting and combining the qualities of the type, and 
translating them into one’s own sphere of concerns. The type is material for an interested 
and situated rather than positivist critical mien. Reflecting upon his philosophical life in 
‘Ecce Homo’ (1889), Nietzsche will talk of an interplay of exhilaration and cautious 
concealment in his communications through the medium of the type: 
I caught hold of two famous and as yet undiagnosed types, as one catches hold of 
an opportunity, in order to say something, in order to have at hand a few more 
formulas, signs, means of language.…  Plato employed Socrates in this fashion.501 
 
Nietzsche masks himself, provides himself with supple resources, transfiguring those 
‘healthy states’, those evanescent moments of cheerful sensibility, into ‘spiritual form and 
distance’; for ‘this art of transfiguration is philosophy’ (GS, preface, sec. 3). Philosophy 
will no longer know itself or its purpose in history, it is no longer a temporal event but an 
economy of character, a propagation of desire. 
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501  Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Ecco Homo’, in On the Genealogy of Morals: Ecco Homo, trans. Walter 
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Like Plato, who had mixed feelings towards his audience and artistic 
contemporaries at the height of his contestative and formal powers, Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of the Übermensch still has need of the ‘company’ of types in order to disorganise and 
renew his powers of representation. Like Socrates, the philosopher needs company in order 
‘to embrace his solitude more tenderly’ (DB 566). In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), 
Nietzsche will affirmatively associate himself with a subaltern genealogy, a nonetheless 
‘productive’ historical tendency, the emergence of a pan-European ‘type’. Empathising 
with this slowly emerging, ductile persona emerging from the remaining fragments of 
cosmopolitanism in European life, Nietzsche seeks to recover the immoderate health, the 
vital sickness of the ‘hybrid European’ as a counter valuation to petty nationalisms.  
In many ways an ‘ugly plebeian’ and badly ‘costumed’ actor, capricious and 
rootless, the hybrid European will nevertheless ripen during an age preparing for the 
‘carnival in the grand style’, an age of genre mixing and role playing. Only the hybrid 
European, the ‘good European’, is capable of reaching the ‘transcendental’ heights of 
‘absolute nonsense’. The material realisation of a multi-layered historical current, the 
hybrid European promises to depropriate and travesty all that is pure and essential, a trait 
that the ugly nineteenth century is more likely to treat as degeneration, bastardisation. The 
‘European’ is not merely a cultivated entity, but one of ‘God’s buffoons’, a parodist of 
world history. And it is precisely in this laughter, feels Nietzsche, that we ‘may still have 
a future’.502 As artist and mime, as the naïve dreamer of a pluralist culture, one imbricates 
oneself in history, transposes one's longing and nostalgia into a potential ethos. 
Deleuze draws attention to Nietzsche’s argument for Greek tragedy and drama 
more generally as an ‘amoral’ semiology, a study of the interest of extreme psychic states, 
their contribution to the interactive theatre of existence, free from the jurisprudence of 
consequences.503 Typological interest wants a mise en scène, historically and ethically it 
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seeks out occasions for the irruption of diverse critical forces, without the moral 
opprobrium or utilitarian philistinism of causal analysis.  
Against the tyranny of the true: In Daybreak Nietzsche argues that even if we were 
mad enough to consider all our opinions true, we should still not want them to exist alone, 
for truth must be able ‘to struggle and have opponents, and one must be able to find relief 
from it from time to time in untruth’, enjoy surrendering to play, deception. It is enough 
that truth has great power as a temporary condition, an energising of some aspects of our 
being, an interruption of our inertia. It is enough that truth is a particular force, a subaltern 
tendency (DB 507). If truth plays a particular role in an economy of needs, then we should 
also realise that evil spirits have done the most to advance humanity, as a centrifugal power. 
Like the Sophists, by means of violating pieties, by inventing new moralities, so called evil 
spirits and heretics have re-awakened again and again the sense of comparison, of 
contradiction, the pleasure of the new and untried, forcing us to ‘pit opinion against 
opinion, model against model’ (GS, Book 1, no.4). 
Nietzsche feels that a genealogy of needs enables philosophical leisure, a taste for 
the interstitial space between one opinion and another, a spectatorial and readerly 
enjoyment, a rhetorical dilation and transfiguration of crude content. One should realise, 
argues Nietzsche, that moralities too are only ‘a sign-language of the emotions’ (BGE no. 
187). The sign language of the type may belong to a time and region yet it is always capable 
of being deterritorialised and recomposed, for the sake of new beginnings. 
Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche is training attention on the complex forces that 
have educated critique. Deleuze too wants a new ‘image’ of thought that takes into account 
the differential formation of critical insight. Thought, says Deleuze, requires a stimulating 
paideia in the Greek sense of learning through multiple situations (forum, gymnasium, 
palaestra).504  
This image of thought should not only have a generosity towards historical forms, 
it will celebrate those practices and assumptions that have disciplined and restrained our 
urges, producing us as subjects. I quote Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil: 
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Protracted unfreedom of spirit, mistrustful constraint in the communicability of ideas, 
the discipline thinkers imposed on themselves to think within an ecclesiastical or courtly 
rule or under Aristotelian presuppositions, the protracted spiritual will to interpret all 
events according to a Christian scheme ... all these violent, arbitrary, severe, gruesome 
and antirational things have shown themselves to be the means by which the European 
spirit was disciplined in its strength, ruthless curiosity and subtle flexibility (BGE sec. 
188). 
 
The type enhances the element of thought in all its complexity. Deleuze argues that thought 
must inhabit extremes, it must allow itself to be intensified by harsh and intemperate 
geographies of the spirit, summits, caves, labyrinths, tropical zones; it must have its midday 
and its midnight of solitary self-affirmation and liminal turning-points; thought must 
become dance, play, artifice, be able to communicate and conceal at once. Philosophy is 
reserve and surplus, restraint and excess, a detailed and open-ended historical tendency and 
a power of creatively transmuting passive concepts, of acting as artist, physician, and 
legislator, as mime, actor, therapist, lover, hermit.505  
       In the next chapter I discuss the stimulating influence of an historical rhetoric on 
Hannah Arendt’s theory of political agency as liminal and medial. 
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Chapter 11:  Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Representation 
 
 
… authoritative discourse … demands our unconditional allegiance…. It is indissolubly 
fused with its authority – with political power, an institution, a person…. One cannot divide 
it up – agree with one part, accept but not completely another part, reject utterly a third 
part…. A playing with distances, with fusion and dissolution, with approach and retreat, is 
not here possible…. it cannot enter into hybrid constructions…. there is no space around it 
to play in, no contradictory emotions – it is not surrounded by an agitated and cacophonous 
dialogic life …506 
(Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination) 
 
...the public realm, as the common world, like every in-between, relates and separates men 
at the same time.507  
 (Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition) 
 
With these words Hannah Arendt issued a vibrant challenge to the  ‘unworldliness’ 
she felt had pervaded late industrial capitalism, establishing the conditions for the rise of 
totalitarianism in the twentieth century. In The Human Condition (1958), she 
metaphorically suggests that the common world we share is manifested in the spaces 
between us, akin to a table that both relates and separates us, gathers us together and yet 
prevents us falling over each other.508  Arendt’s thinking on the need to maintain a shared 
‘world’ in the face of coercive systems of thought continues to stimulate and provoke 
political theory.  
In this chapter I explore Arendt’s interest in two forms of representation that 
promote worldly thinking. I discuss her fascination with what Deleuze and Guattari have 
termed ‘conceptual personae’. These are characters and personalities who immerse 
themselves and their ideas in the abundance and inconsistencies of life. Conceptual 
personae ‘figure’ thought as disposition, sensibility, a mode of existence rather than an 
authoritative ideology. Arendt’s conceptual personae convey to political theory a 
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heterodox methodology, a fragmented interest in the paradoxes of a vigorous public ethos, 
sincere and artistic.  
Arendt’s critical imaginary is eclectic, traversing space and time, drawing on 
literary and cinematic representations, decomposing and renewing the elements of political 
thought in search of thought-figures. Here I touch on Gotthold Lessing, Rosa Luxemburg, 
and Charlie Chaplin, all of whom illuminate representative political characteristics, nodes 
of critical interest. I suggest that Arendt is influenced by a post-romantic philosopheme, 
which holds that only the most challenging modes of representation and vigorously 
performative types are capable of restoring political thought to a broad context, a milieu, a 
mood, a social animus. 
I also discuss Arendt’s interest in the heuristic power of narrative. Arendt’s 
favoured thought-figures or public-intellectual ‘characters’ are necessarily created by 
narrative representation, in biography, story telling, anecdote, and vignette. Here I expand 
on what Julia Kristeva, in her recent Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative (2001), has called 
the ‘public wisdom’ and ‘exemplary’ moments Arendt hoped narration, as a unification of 
theory and individual action, would yield. I explore Kristeva’s suggestive comment that 
for Arendt it is through narrative that ‘essentially political thought is realized’.509 Arendt’s 
personae preserve mythical diversity, they are a function of many narratives and affective 
possibilities, they present ideas as non-authoritative, contradictory, a copia of tactics 
immanent to the theatre of political struggle.  
Finally I discuss Arendt’s methodological affinities with another Jewish intellectual 
and exile, Walter Benjamin. I draw parallels between Arendt’s conceptual-personae and 
Benjamin essays like ‘Fate and Character’, where the interest of character is bound by 
necessity to narrated action, critiquing the politically dangerous, totalising tendencies of 
moralistic and psychological analyses, their logics of identity. I argue that Arendt, like 
Benjamin, was intent on ‘blasting’ open the homogeneous time of liberal and Marxist 
historicisms. I suggest that Arendt agreed with Benjamin that a new historical imaginary 
needed to be opposed to the nineteenth century’s positivist and ideological obsessions. 
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Arendt: The Political and the Social 
 
The recent posthumous resurgence of critical interest in Arendt’s broad conception 
of political theory has unsettled the dismissive critique which charged her with an elitist 
nostalgia for the politics of ancient Greece, a nostalgia which seems to have engendered a 
fatal divorce between the ‘political’ and the ‘social’ in her thinking. I take it for granted 
that Arendt’s consistent desire to separate ‘politics’ from ‘social’ issues such as wealth 
redistribution, equal access to education, housing, desegregation of schooling, the feminist 
desire to make the experiences of the private realm a political theme, and other issues left-
liberal politics hold dear, is untenable, insensitive, and naive.510  
However, I think it is worth trying to comprehend why, in works like The Human 
Condition (1958) and On Revolution (1963), Arendt went to such pains to delimit a distinct 
arena of experiential possibilities and inspirational activity called the ‘political’, from 
social needs and grievances. Such an inquiry should not simply rely on her philhellenism 
as an explanatory crux, though Arendt’s genealogy of politically vibrant societies is 
important in this respect. For Arendt, political discourse inherits certain persuasive arts and 
oratorical personae, and because of its complex historicity, the health of a polity is 
irreducible to the ideologies of the left or the right. Arendtian politics is rhetorical in the 
sense of Nietzsche’s non-instrumentalist theory of the classical oratorical tradition. Politics 
is a complex disposition that plays at the borderline of the artistic and the sincere, it is an 
ethos born of multifarious experiences and perspectival forms. Arendt feels that, 
historically, a rhetorically sensitive politics attracts liminal sensibilities, thinkers and 
activists skeptical and sanguine; worldly, socially engaged outsider figures who transcend 
all given identities and modes of belonging. 
A guiding principle in Arendt’s political thought, I suggest, is her desire that the 
many superficies of political action and communication should be preserved from the 
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instrumental designs of the state and public opinion. Arendt argues in Men in Dark Times, 
in a dictum that will require considerable teasing out, that ‘the world and the people who 
inhabit it are not the same’.511 Politics, as a worldly orientation, should not be identified 
with any program, shibboleth, or mass movement, it is un-timely, a being apart, heeding 
no absolutes. 
Arendt resumes Nietzsche’s critical role of the formalist spectator, arguing that for 
the sake of a vital political culture one must assume that there are no political truths behind 
appearances, no Subject or historical process of which politics is the mere manifestation 
and instrument.512 For Arendt, politics has always relied on the simple enjoyment of 
togetherness and the joy of a wealth of appearances. For Arendt the Athenian polis is not a 
self-sufficient origin, a golden age of political participation, but a theatre of discursive 
forms of interest in the present, where political significations are under-determined by 
instrumental ends. Arendt’s political arena potentiates an abundance of activities and 
practices; in Friedrich Schlegel’s terms, the polis mediates and distributes, it gifts to the 
present ‘all that is practically necessary’ for a pluralist politics.513 
In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt discusses the ancient Athenian polis as a 
public assembly where propertied and intellectual equals can debate issues of moment. 
Arendt’s model political space suggests an interaction of orator and demanding audience, 
an inherent unpredictability. In the polis, particular perspectives must publicise themselves 
as themes of universal concern by charismatic persuasion and compromise, combative élan 
and careful deliberation. Political languages, faced with a broad and knowledgeable 
audience, recursively translate their arguments into practical characteristics – thematic 
recursiveness and subtle variations are required, shallow platitudes and convenient 
generalizations repulse. Discourse reciprocates with the aesthetic appreciation of different 
tempos - dilatory metaphors, extravagant embellishments and the immediate power of 
sudden transfiguration, the shock of the new, are all celebrated as virtuoso political forms.  
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perceptual diversity’ (33). 
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The polis is a convivial being-together, an interplay of unity and difference, a space 
in-between fixed viewpoints, different in kind from an organic, closed, essentialised 
community.514 In the polis, the decision-making process is not yet disciplined along party 
and factional lines, according to vested interests. Arendt, in a Nietzschean vein, imagines 
a fluid mode of governance that is yet to be functionalised as mere administration, 
economy, or ‘housekeeping’.515  
By inheriting the agonistic realm of the ancient tribal agora, the public meeting 
space, the civic polis is a space of appearance where the logos in its very performance can 
effect ‘action’, where speech and action are considered coeval and coequal.516 The polis 
echoes with a lineage of renowned oratorical performers; its political oratory resumes the 
charismatic position of the epic hero and rhetor, a speaker of words and doer of deeds, such 
as Achilles or Odysseus. Like the agora, the tribal assembly so frequently theatricalised in 
Homer’s epics, the polis illuminates rhetorical performance as a heroic ‘act’, a space in 
which ‘men’ as linguistic beings ‘can distinguish themselves’, like brave warriors on a 
battlefield or athletes in a contest.517 The logos is an ‘active’ and formally productive 
power, a communicatively ‘effective’ semiology in the Frühromantik sense, because it 
functions in a shared collective space with overlapping discourses, a public forum yet to 
be rent by disciplinary and utilitarian modes of knowledge production.518 
                                                 
514 In The Human Condition, Arendt describes as ‘a simple historical fact’ that the foundation of the 
Athenian polis was preceded by the destruction of all social units resting on kinship (24). Arendt, in a theme 
that resonates throughout her work, allies the ‘social’ motivation of politics with tyranny and absolutism, 
necessitating a division of political and social space: ‘In Greek self-understanding, to force people to 
violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life 
outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers’ 
(26-7, my italics).  
515 Arendt, The Human Condition, 45. 
516 Arendt, The Human Condition, 26. Arendt argues that in the polis only two complementary activities 
would be necessary and present for what Aristotle calls the bios politikos (the political life), namely action 
(praxis) and speech (lexis). These two capacities ‘belong together’, because words do not simply ‘express’ 
great thoughts, they have their own dignity, intervening in this world and teaching understanding. In these 
terms, the epic hero is a ‘rhetor’, a ‘speaker of words and doer of deeds’ (Iliad ix. 443) (25). 
517 Arendt, The Human Condition, 25, n. 7. Here Arendt follows Nietzsche in anchoring the linguistic agent 
in an active agonistic realm, where poets, tragedians and philosophers overlap in their discourse practices. 
518  Although in some senses a tabula rasa, a public sphere cleansed of tribal hatreds and domestic 
patriarchy, Arendt, in addition to her emphasis on the heroic epic rhetor, emphasises the polis’s resumption 
of the Presocratic belief that speech and action belonged together. We should note, then, that Arendt’s polis 
has its idiosyncratic genealogies, a sediment of duplex epic heroism (Odysseus) and active or praxical 
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In the polis, language is illuminated as phenomenon and sense, as action (praxis), 
deed, gesture, mien.  Speech (logos) constitutes a political ‘way of life’, in which 
speechifying and not violence or command ‘makes sense’, where the ‘central concern’ of 
all citizens was to talk with each other, and where every politician was called a ‘rhetor’, 
accorded the dignity of a generalist and polymath.519 Yet if public, suasive speech is 
homologous to a phenomenally accessible activity (praxis), activity itself is only 
illuminated through the representational power of language (logos). Arendt argues that the 
stature of Achilles is only discernible if one understands him simultaneously as a ‘doer of 
great deeds and speaker of great words’. He is not simply an epic hero judged on his 
military conquests, but someone whose mien and discourse can be immortalized. Achilles 
is a model of conduct, an inspiration for future generations.520  
Arendt invokes the Athenian politician Pericles, who understood that the 
‘innermost meaning of the acted deed and the spoken word is independent of victory and 
defeat’. Unlike empirical human behaviour that needs to be judged by moral standards such 
as motives, aims, and consequences, politically effective action can only be judged ‘by the 
criterion of greatness’.521 Pericles, like the dramatist-historian Thucydides, knew full well 
he had broken with ‘normal standards for everyday behaviour’ when he promoted the glory 
of Athens as a testament, an ‘everlasting remembrance’ of its deeds, capable of reinventing 
the significance of death and loss.522  
The political oratory of the polis is a foreground or scenography of forces and 
desires, the specific meaning of each deed ‘can only lie in the performance itself’ and 
neither in its empirical motivation nor its achievement. The polis is there to ‘inspire men 
to dare the extraordinary’, interested in a spectrum of ‘psychological qualities’ that are 
‘characteristic of different types of persons’. The polis collectivizes the power of 
                                                 
philosophising (Thales, Heraclitus), a space that allows equally for the trickster figure and the inexorable 
convictions and loyalties of the philosopher. 
519 Arendt, The Human Condition, 26, 27 n. 9. 
520 Arendt, The Human Condition, 25. 
521 Arendt, The Human Condition, 205. 
522 Arendt, The Human Condition, 206. Arendtian political discourse is a rhetorical unity of the 
magical/metamorphic and the prudential. 
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individuality, it wants both recursive themes and potent individual examples, it is unmoved 
by watery ideals.523  
 
Natality 
 
The relationship of language to praxis in Arendt’s polis is chiasmic. Both terms 
cross over each other and affect the standards by which each is judged. Action is 
representation, representation is action. Ideas are translated into worldly practices, worldly 
practices become exemplary ideals; representation requires phenomenal power, 
phenomenal power, representation. In The Human Condition Arendt theorises the 
possibility of ‘natality’ in politics, activities that engender the ‘birth’ of new trajectories. 
Arendt is interested in actions, linguistic and phenomenal, which do more than attain 
limited ends; enacting a work of ‘world-constitution’ rather than a finite teleological 
labour, a utilitarian technique. As Dana Villa suggests, Arendt here leans heavily on the 
Aristotelian distinction in the Nichomechean Ethics between poesis, instrumental labour, 
and praxis, a work or purposefulness without ultimate end, a unique activity that consumes 
itself in the act, enhancing a convivial sense of being with others.524  
The subtending condition of action and speech, that which imbricates their 
functioning, argues Arendt, is human plurality, which has the twofold ‘character of equality 
and distinction’. A pluralist political society needs creative equals, people who understand 
one another and yet are distinct from each other, requiring speech and action to make 
themselves understood. Discourse, as Democritus then Nietzsche reminds us, is a net of 
needful communications between equals, whose evolutionary tendency is to enable diverse 
spheres of activity, the communication of singularities.525  
                                                 
523 Arendt, The Human Condition, 206. 
524 Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, 45. Villa describes Arendt’s version of politics as a ‘radically anti-
teleological stance’, 49. 
525 Arendt, The Human Condition, 175-6. Consider Arendt’s distaste for the bourgeois 
celebration/mystification of ‘genius’, the modern age’s obsession with the ‘unique signature of each artist’. 
In a labouring or productivist society, a subtle meta-language about creativity is lacking. Turning to aesthetics 
out of exhaustion, a philistine age is preoccupied with those features by which an artist ‘transcends ... skill 
and workmanship’ as well as ‘all other products of human hands’ (210). This borderline ‘idolatry’ of genius, 
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Arendt avers that only in a space of togetherness and interaction does political 
language have a ‘power’ to continually enrich the public realm with new ‘appearances’ and 
human ‘artifacts’. The ‘natal’ power of word and deed ‘actualizes’ the human condition of 
plurality, that is, ‘of living as a distinct and unique being among equals’.526  With word and 
deed we insert ourselves into the human world, like ‘a second birth’.527 Action and speech 
are closely related because the primordial, specifically human act must contain a response 
to the question asked of all ‘newcomers’, ‘who are you?' Unaccompanied by words, by 
suggestive signs, by performance and tonal inflection, the deed will only be apprehended 
in its ‘brute physical appearance’. Action unaccompanied by speech is not really ‘action’, 
for in that case ‘there would no longer be an actor’, and the ‘actor’ is only possible if he is 
at the same time the speaker of words, bringing us back to the paradox of Witz, as singular 
performance and collective context.528 
To act, in and through language, is a moment of simple courage, it is to ‘show who 
you are’, to give yourself phenomenal relief, to give oneself the ‘unique shape of the body 
and sound of the voice’, it is to display one’s thought in one’s life. On the other hand a 
complex self-representation is involved, one acts oneself, repositions oneself, exalting in 
the diacritical power of performance.529 Therefore to act and display oneself is not so much 
a ‘form of achievement’, a sop to the ego, as the communal revelation, over time and 
innumerous performances, of a ‘specific character’, constituted within representation.530 
Arendt argues that, once intercepted by an historical process of interpretation, the 
‘author or producer’ does not in essence determine the significance and effects of activity. 
The ‘disclosure’, the unfolding significance of an action, can almost never be achieved as 
a ‘willful purpose’. The ‘who’ illuminated through action is more like a daimon, a genius 
                                                 
this mystification of the sociable conditions of creativity and praxis, ignores the ‘elementary fact’ that the 
essence of ‘who’ somebody is cannot be reified ‘by himself’, genius is a typological quality, it presupposes 
skill and craft (211). For a philosophy of communicating singularities, or ‘literary communism’, see Jean-
Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor and Lisa Garbus, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1991, 19: ‘This consciousness – or this communication - is ecstasy: which is to say that 
such a consciousness is never mine, but to the contrary, I only have it in and through community’.  
526 Arendt, The Human Condition, 178. 
527 Arendt, The Human Condition, 176. 
528 Arendt, The Human Condition, 178-9. 
529 Arendt, The Human Condition, 178. 
530 Arendt, The Human Condition, 180. 
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that accompanies one throughout one’s life, while remaining ‘hidden from the person 
himself’. Upon entry into the shared world of the public, the phenomenal disclosure of 
performance and gesture allows interception, translation, interpretation, fragmentation and 
recomposition.531 The ‘revelatory’ quality of speech and action ‘comes to the fore where 
people are with others and neither for nor against them - that is, in sheer human 
togetherness’, a discursive foreground emancipated of judgment and sentimentality.532    
Arendt’s inheritance of the many chronotopes of the rhetorical tradition is indicated. 
Politics as word and action is both the energetic deeds and glorious acts of youth and the 
mature, leisured interpretative art and cultivated propaedeutic of the retired orator and 
teacher, who can assess stylistic felicities and interesting oratorical personalities regardless 
of their empirical being or ideologies. Arendt recalls the classical doxography that 
relentlessly interrogated the ‘who’, the thinker revealed through phenomenal attributes and 
performative display; those thought-figures immortalised for their ‘characteristic’ 
orientation to the world, their ethos. Natality requires genealogy, representation, the 
protection of personae and plurality.533 
Arendt’s commitment to the forms of political discourse helps us to explain her 
strong opposition to a politics anchored in sentimentalism, a discourse of foundations. The 
political ideal of popular sovereignty, as manifested in the idea of the ‘will of the people’ 
or ‘public opinion’, held few attractions for Arendt. She ascribed both the bourgeois 
instrumentalisation of politics for class imperatives, and revolutionary populism, to the 
overweening ‘social’ values that overwhelmed politics from the late eighteenth century, 
preparing the ground for totalitarianism. If the private greed of the bourgeoisie scorns the 
manifest institutions of democratic politics, the French Revolution stands equally accused 
of engendering a ‘boundless sentiment’ that sought to overwhelm difference and 
institutional forms. 
                                                 
531 Arendt, The Human Condition, 179. 
532 Arendt, The Human Condition, 180. 
533 Arendt argues for the ‘togetherness’ of the polis diacritically, as both a chronotope of phenomenal variety 
and sensuous appreciation, and a political space requiring coercive power and unifying fictions: ‘Without 
action to bring into the play of the world the new beginning of which each man is capable, “there is nothing 
new under the sun”; without speech to materialize and memorialize ... “there is no remembrance” ... the 
enduring permanence of a human artifact.... And without power, the space of appearance brought forth 
through action and speech will fade away’ (204). 
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In Robespierre, Arendt in On Revolution (1963) finds an antipode to the urbanity 
of the political rhetor. Here she discusses the French Revolution’s fatal attempt to embody 
Rousseau’s theory of political power as emanating from a volonté générale or popular will. 
Arendt argues that the social exigency of poverty and ‘biological need’, the pressing issue 
of hunger, radicalised Robespierre’s mentality. He became overwhelmed by compassion 
for the poor and hatred towards the aristocracy, as well as immensely suspicious of the 
dispassionate legalism of the bourgeois constitutionalists. Politics as the instrument of the 
‘compassionate zeal’ of popular sentiment, Arendt feels, will tend to consume the in-
between communicative mechanisms of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise. 
Robespierre’s intense enthusiasm for redressing inequalities ended up by plangently 
overwhelming the continuity and stability of institutions and procedural forms. Terror is 
unleashed when politics attempts to found itself on a unified voluntarism and 
sentimentality, ignoring the political necessity of a variety of personae and the plural 
interests of civil society. Arendt suggests that Robespierre engaged in a grotesque mimesis 
of bourgeois aspirations, which desire to subvert representative institutions, from the 
moment that his paranoia was able to detect only hidden hypocrisy and secret social 
alliances in constitutional liberalism.534 
As a critical response to the overpowering role of unified sentiment in political 
movements, whether it be bourgeois greed or revolutionary compassion, Arendt discusses 
the articulations of narrative, the dilations of representation, as a mature form of political 
expression. In the polyphony of drama and the calm interest of narrative in the fate of 
character, Arendt draws on what Kristeva has called the ‘exemplary’ power of narratology 
to disclose the political ‘who’ from multiple perspectives. As Kristeva argues, Arendt  
rehabilitates a mode of political understanding that gives ‘privileged status to a revelation 
of social mechanisms’, of the orientation of affect, intellect, and imagination to the 
world.535     
                                                 
534 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin, Suffolk UK, 1963, 86-90. 
535 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative, 8, 17, 39. Arendtian narrative evokes both mature 
typological assessment and a generous appreciation of the fluidity and vicissitudes of political agency: ‘The 
art of narrative resides in the ability to condense the action into an exemplary moment, to extract it from the 
continuous flow of time, and reveal a who.... it [narrative signification] launches an infinite act of 
interpretation’ (17-18). 
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In an adventurous discussion of the Grand Inquisitor scene in Dostoevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov, Arendt wonders, in On Revolution, whether Jesus’ compassion and 
love, with its desire to transcend the generalisations of law and judgment through the 
redemptive appreciation of human singularity, can ever found political institutions. In 
Arendt’s reading, Jesus’ sublime lack of ‘worldliness’ condemns him, like Robespierre, to 
inarticulateness, unwilling to offer demonstrative reasons in response to the Grand 
Inquisitor’s anguished interrogation of the political effectiveness of infinite love and 
forgiveness. Jesus’ answer, which is to disarm the Inquisitor with a beatific kiss, is, in its 
own way, overwhelming. Jesus is Nietzsche’s acultural Redeemer type; he lacks the 
specifically political quality of deliberation, a discursiveness translatable into worldly 
qualities. Arendt likens Jesus in this respect to the completely innocent ‘natural’ man, Billy 
Budd in Melville’s eponymous tale. Here, the ‘selfless’ being of pure sentiment and 
innocent idealism is reduced to a violent inarticulateness, an ‘instinctive’ act of murderous 
violence, the culmination of his inability to comprehend, absorb, and respond to a variety 
of stimuli, to reinvent and renew himself. Innocence and naïveté lack the ‘pathos of 
distance’, they cannot communicate their needs, translate themselves within a political 
theatre of diversity and difference – they pose the threat of the self-identical, the noun as 
opposed to rhetoric’s articulated grammar: 
Jesus’ silence in the 'Grand Inquisitor' and Billy Budd’s stammer indicate … their 
incapacity (or unwillingness) for all kinds of predicative or argumentative speech, 
in which someone talks to somebody about something that is of interest to both 
because it inter-est, it is between them.536  
 
By contrast, in a series of essays entitled The Jew as Pariah, Arendt turns to the 
ambiguous figure of Charlie Chaplin as a critical response to the threat of an 
‘overwhelming’ inarticulateness. Unlike Jesus and Billy Budd, Charlie Chaplin 
performatively ‘allegorises’ the ‘incompatibility' of general laws and individual misdeeds. 
A combination of impudence, cunning, naïveté, and fearfulness, Chaplin’s ‘little Yid’ 
character, trickster and schlemiel, was the most ‘popular’ of contemporary figures. On the 
one hand a guileless visual comic, Chaplin’s ‘type’ inherits the ‘hidden tradition’ of the 
                                                 
536 Arendt, On Revolution, 86-90. 
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Jewish pariah figure, their ‘humanity, humour, and disinterested intelligence’. Chaplin, 
with his ‘gypsy’ insouciance and mobility and ‘clearly Jewish traits’ of caution and 
vulnerability, figures the exemplary political ‘interest’ of various cultural milieux, qualities 
of political formation usually invisible to political theory. 537  
The mixed chronotope of the Chaplinesque figure is constituted in vaudevillian 
theatricality and picaresque narrative, in scenography rather than sentimentality. The 
Chaplinesque figure is untimely, promissory: ‘It is true that in “dark times” the warmth 
which is the pariah’s substitute for light exerts a great fascination upon all those who are 
… ashamed of the world as it is’.538 Pariah figures exert a political influence and 
inspirational model outside conventional ideological co-ordinates, they confront all 
organised political movements and doctrinaire schools of thought with their pharmakon or 
internal other, their need for provocateurs and dreamers. 
Through hybrid figures and multiple genealogies, Arendt suggests that there is no 
foundation to politics, which demands many narratives and thematic materials. For Arendt, 
the absolutism of populist politics, born with the emergence of mass working-class 
movements in the French Revolution, supplants the recognition of a myriad of interests 
and perspectives, those institutions that provide  ‘worldly spaces between men’. The 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, argues Arendt, witness a disastrous recrudescence of 
Robespierre’s sentimentalisation of politics, the unacknowledged affective subtext of 
Marx’s ‘scientific’ universalism. Sentimentalism and its ideological correlatives diminish 
respect for institutions and their procedural forms, creating an absolutist metaphysic of 
direct and violent action against the putatively ‘unrepresentative’ institutions of law and 
politics and the continuities of memory and the legal symbolism that they preserve.539  
Arendt pours scorn on Marx’s subjection of the liberationist promise of spontaneous 
political uprisings, such as the Paris Commune of 1870, to naturalised, scientifically 
                                                 
537 See Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, ed. Ron H. 
Feldman, Grove Press Inc., New York, 1978, 65-82. 
538 Nietzsche, Men in Dark Times, 16. 
539 Arendt, On Revolution, 86-7. Cf. Karl Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' (1843) in Robert C. Tucker, ed. 
The Marx-Engels Reader, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 24-51, which suggests that Enlightenment 
liberal freedoms are illusory, are merely formal and empty, since the real movement of history is the way 
capitalist commercial society ('egoistic man') denies the release of man's species-powers. 
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predictive laws of class conflict and social necessity. Marx, like Robespierre, is indicted 
for his disregard for ‘surface’ parliamentary and juridical institutions and the rule of law, 
which require a subtle evaluation of their usage and purpose rather than being conceived 
as epiphenomena of bourgeois hegemony. The totalitarian animus, Arendt suggests, is to 
be found whenever a distancing respect is lost for the manifest ‘visibility’ and plurality of 
social conditions and the characteristic ‘who’, the public actors (juridical and executive) 
whose recognition forms the basis for political persuasion and argumentation.540 
Politics needs a sense for the portrayer as well as the portrayed; it must renounce 
all claims to objectivity or unified foundations.  
One of the features of Nazi anti-Semitism that made it an ideological tool for total 
domination, Arendt argues, is that it was no longer to be considered an arguable or 
experiential matter, but a pervasive metaphysical reality requiring counter-action on a 
global scale.541 An insidious and always meta-physical evil, the ‘Jew’s’ ‘apparent’ 
differential public-political manifestation as bourgeois expropriator or socialist agitator 
was always a ruse in Hitler’s paranoid imaginary, a mere façade hiding a trans-national 
social conspiracy of Jewish world domination.  
All seeming disagreement and signs of difference in public life, the topology of 
appearances, were mystified by the Nazis, converted into a genetic logic of natural, social, 
and psychological sources. A vocabulary of deviance, degeneration, and decadence negates 
the empirical visibility of political/ideological difference; a political vocabulary with its 
institutional vestiges of agonistic respect for other political agents is replaced by monolithic 
‘social’ values, a claim to the general will, a racist essentialism, a paranoid victimology; 
now the totalitarian regime no longer feels any need to ‘refute opposing arguments’, 
preferring death to persuasion, and terror to conviction.542  
Arendt explains Hitler’s steadfast refusal to nominate the form of government his 
regime embodied, as a means of generating a conception of power that does not rely on 
                                                 
540 Arendt’s thinking seems influenced by Nietzsche’s call in ‘Twilight of the Idols’ for a ‘spiritualisation 
of enmity’, a mode of ‘agonistic respect’ in the political theorist William Connolly’s terms. 
541 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951, 362.  
542 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 312. 
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verifiable or arguable forms. Only the indeterminate and unarguable ‘will’ of the Führer, 
reciprocal with the aspirations of the German people, would be allowed to underscore 
political power in the third Reich. The mystical legitimacy of Hitler, moreover, was further 
removed from the sphere of rational argument by the gnomic repetition that he was always 
right and always would be right, that the test of what he had done would only be revealed 
in centuries to come, once again removing political decision from the ‘visible’ experience 
of his contemporaries into the untestable discourse of the visionary and prophet.543 
Even the party program of National Socialism itself, as an articulated and ‘visible’ 
reference point, was tacitly ignored in Germany in the 1930s, in a shift from a party-
political program to the metaphysical destiny of the ‘movement’. What ‘totalitarianism’ 
wishes to dispense with, says Arendt, is ‘common sense’, which has its pre-condition in 
institutional continuities, legal precedent, civic association, and the memory of plurality. 
To establish a reign of terror, the positive laws of constitutional government, with their 
ratified boundaries and established channels of communication between people, are 
nullified, replaced by unarguable laws of nature and history, a consequence of Robespierre. 
In Nazism, organic and Manichean models of Aryan community and racial conflict 
supplant those legal and political vocabularies which preserve a field of guaranteed modes 
of relationship and separation in the realm of human affairs.544  
For Arendt, the recovery of a form of ‘common sense’ that combined a rational 
predilection for deliberative argumentation with an appreciation of a phenomenal variety 
of performative characters was an urgent task. Arendt did not turn to any available critical 
position, such as liberalism, to achieve her critical goals, but to people, as conceptual 
personae, at once unique and characteristic. It is conceptual personae who illuminate, as a 
medium of signs, as assumed role, the impoverished politics of modernity. It is conceptual 
personae who figure possibilities repressed, ignored, misunderstood, denied. 
 
Worldly Types, Narrative Figures: Men in Dark Times 
 
                                                 
543 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 383. 
544 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 465. 
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In a book of essays on the relationship between intellectuals and the public sphere, 
Men in Dark Times (1970), Arendt turns her critical gaze to those worldly literary critics, 
philosophers, and political activists who can satisfy her demand for an open, vigorous 
temperament that inserts itself into the world, offering a unity of life and thought, ideas and 
phenomena, heeding no retreat into truth, orthodoxy, convention. The full significance of 
these ‘men in dark times’, these figures shrouded by the obtuseness of modern positivism, 
will, however, only be revealed through the retrospective form of historical narrative, 
interspersed with biographical fragments, a montage of anecdotes. Like the fool figure in 
comedy, these characters stand in the foreground of the stage, chatting amiably and openly 
with the critic as spectator, yet within their superficiality inheres a profound wisdom and 
an abundance of critical resources. 
With proleptic gusto, Arendt warns readers of Men in Dark Times that if they are 
on the lookout for mouthpieces of the Zeitgeist, for exponents of History as a unified era, 
then they will look into this book in vain. For we now occupy a benighted public realm that 
no longer illuminates ‘the affairs of men’ by providing a space of appearances in which 
they can show, in word and deed, ‘who they are and what they can do’. Speech no longer 
‘discloses’ what is of worldly inter-est, of in-between value, but ‘sweeps’ intuition and 
sense  ‘under the carpet’. By double-speak and moral exhortations, official discourse, under 
the pretext of transparency, ‘degrade(s) all truth to meaningless triviality’.545 
Arendt argues that as in Sartre’s La Nausée, everything publicly recognized, those 
people who generate publicity, are among the salauds. Everything existent has an opaque, 
meaningless ‘thereness’ that spreads obfuscation and inspires only ‘disgust’ (viii). The 
natal, fertile power of the ‘who’, the fluid recursive effect of an interpretative community 
of acculturated, interactive equals has been displaced, in dark times, by a lack in public life 
of credibility and conviction; a lack that is the ironic, but by no means accidental, product 
of an age that serenely boasts of  its capacity to know the ‘truth’.  
In a more qualified sense than one can attribute to Heidegger’s pessimistic 
existential modernism, Arendt feels that in these times ‘the light of the public obscures 
                                                 
545 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, preface, viii. Arendt’s complaint resounds with Nietzsche’s earlier attack 
on the philistine public sphere of which Richard Strauss was an embodiment. 
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everything’ (ix). In such a world, great individuals retreat and a ‘demonstrable loss’ takes 
place, that ‘specific and usually irreplaceable in-between which should have formed 
between this individual and his fellow men’ (4-5). Modernity lacks a communicative 
imperative, a stylistic genius, and a vital and productive public culture. 
Arendt’s Nietzschean lament for the ‘untimely’ thinker shunted into obscurity by 
modern philistinism draws on Benjamin’s historiographical ideas for redress. For even in 
dark times, Arendt feels, ‘we have the right to expect some illumination’, which might well 
comes less from ‘theories and concepts’ than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak 
light that ‘some men and women’ in their lives and works will ‘kindle under almost all 
circumstances’ and shed over the time span given them on earth (ix). The theoretical 
supposition of Arendt’s narratology and typology follows Nietzsche and Benjamin in 
questioning the ‘relevance of the Western tradition as a whole’, the impossibility of a 
humanist continuation of the past, the disastrous faith of the nineteenth century in material 
and moral progress, Capitalist or Marxist (190).546 
Tradition, as ‘transmissible truth’, can no longer transform its putative truths into 
wisdom, that is, into an experientially informed propaedeutic for new knowledges. 
Tradition now lacks the ‘characteristics’ that it could acquire only through ‘universal 
recognition of its validity’; it is no longer informed by a sensus communis. Arendt, in her 
essay on Benjamin (famous as the introduction to Illuminations), praises his 
historiography. Benjamin was indebted to the ‘genius’ of Kafka and like him sacrificed an 
historicist faith in history as a continuum of discernible truths for the ‘sake of clinging to 
the transmissibility’ of certain forms and temperaments (196).  
For Kafkaesque Benjamin, what was now transmissible, what could now 
illuminate, was not an authoritative history, a continuous tradition, but the ‘piecemeal’ 
representation or ‘citability’ of the past, its fragmentation and redemption. Historical 
‘citability’ deprives the present of its peace of mind, the ‘mindless peace of complacency’; 
it is a ‘destructive power’ that wants to cleanse, to tear out of context, to destroy, like 
                                                 
546 Arendt takes Benjamin’s side in his disagreement with Gershom Scholem, arguing that what Scholem (a 
humanist and Zionist) ‘did not understand was that such a return to and continuation of the past was the very 
thing which the “morality of his insights” ... was bound to rule out for Benjamin’ (191). 
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‘robbers by the road side’ (193). It is the violence and illumination of rhetorical Witz, a 
menstruum universale. 
             Arendt favours a vigorous, ‘interested’ historiography because it has a ‘double 
function’, interrupting the flow of conventional narrative presentation in favour of 
fragmentation and singularity, while at the same time ‘concentrating’ within itself that 
which is presented, focusing attention on the elevated characteristic, enabling, in the 
present, a language of critical communication rather than chronicle or documentation (193-
4). Benjamin’s historiography breaks the spell of tradition in order to cut out, preserve, and 
transmit things ‘rich and strange’, corals and pearls, an abundance of potential discourse 
forms and critical gestures which had previously been handed down monolithically, ‘in one 
solid piece' (196). Benjaminian historiography is an ‘ambiguity of gesture’, destroying in 
order to preserve, fragmenting in order to concentrate knowledge, discovering that the 
process of decay is at the same time a ‘process of crystallisation’ that remains ‘immune to 
the elements’, that restores and protects (206).547 
Arendt’s project in Men in Dark Times is to both disperse a complacent historicist 
construction of the relation of a thinker to his/her historical time, often grounds for 
dismissiveness or totalising judgment; and to concentrate attention on their 
representative political characteristics, on their social qualities, for which ‘piecemeal’ 
episodic narrative, not linear History, is Arendt’s chosen form. 
 
Lessing 
 
Arendt’s search for a discourse of illumination arrives at one of eighteenth-century 
Germany’s premier literary, artistic and cultural critics, Gotthold Lessing. Lessing’s 
worldliness, as Arendt evokes it, was not a straightforward sympathy for his country’s 
empirical inhabitants and their traditions, a cultural nationalism; nor can his life-span be 
typified by pragmatic careerism, vying for posts, honours, and status. In Arendt's view, 
Lessing never felt at home in the world ‘as it then existed’ and reciprocally the German 
                                                 
547 In terms redolent of Frühromanticism, the realisation of the past as fragmented is both a deliberate critical 
intervention for Benjamin, and a result of the ‘chemical’ tendencies and grotesque sickness of the times, 
hence never a purely voluntarist act: ‘the break in tradition which took place at the beginning of this century 
[the twentieth] had already relieved him of this task of destruction and he only needed to bend down ... to 
select his precious fragments from the pile of debris’ (200). Benjamin’s ‘genius’ is not isolated but 
historically and politically illuminating, a daimon in a Socratic sense, in excess of his self-knowledge. 
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public were unprepared for him and never honoured him in his lifetime. Still, lacking any 
natural concord with his times, Lessing, after his own fashion, remained ‘committed’ to 
the world. Lessing’s attitude towards the world was neither positive nor negative but 
radically critical, indeed ‘completely revolutionary’ in respect to the public realm of his 
time, unprepared as it was for his rhetorical vim and vigour, his combination of irony and 
enthusiasm (5).548 
Lessing was a strange creature, Arendt points out, in looking beyond the immaturity 
of the nascent German public sphere. Somewhat of a recluse, his attitude nevertheless 
remained ‘indebted to the world’, refused to leave the solid ground of the world, and never 
went to the ‘extreme’ of sentimental utopianism or escapism or political aestheticism. 
Lessing’s ‘revolutionary temper’ was of a different order to Robespierre’s turbulent 
idealism, for though a partisan of sorts he ‘clung to concrete details’ with an exaggerated 
care (5). It was Lessing’s insight, and a difficult one for contemporary Germans to grasp, 
that ‘justice has little to do with objectivity in the ordinary sense’. What Lessing never lost 
sight of, despite the truth-claims of others, was the real relationship to the world of the 
things or men he attacked or praised (5-6). Lessing, I would argue, offers Arendt a Socratic 
critical praxis, where no phenomenon or detail was too humble a departure to meditate on 
ethics and human relationships. He is Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer, bound with grim 
determination to his situation while limning, through his example, the possibility of a better 
world. 
Lessing, says Arendt, was a spectator to the world, yet interested rather than 
objective. Indeed he broke ranks with classical decorum and generic closure, having scant 
regard for the Goethean desideratum for the ‘perfection’ of the work of art in itself. Nor 
was Lessing enamoured with Herder’s impressionistic desire for an organic and lyrical art, 
an affective force that moves the soul (6). Like Aristotle, Lessing was concerned with the 
effect of an action upon a spectator, positioning himself as someone ‘who represents the 
world’, arguing for his spectatorship as a middle faculty, illuminating the worldly space 
                                                 
548 One can compare the witty Lessing’s reception by a German public used to platitude and homiletic to 
Martin Luther’s dumbfoundedness at Erasmus’s verbal equivocations and ironic sensibility. Arendt positions 
the retention of a rhetorical disposition as a revolutionary possibility in an age becoming progressively blind 
to the critical possibilities of ethos and paideia.  
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which comes into being between the artist or writer and his fellow men. Significantly for 
Arendt’s own methodology, Lessing’s critical and aesthetic mien is neither an external 
formalism nor a psychologistic hermeneutics.549 
Lessing experienced the world tragi-comically, in ‘anger and laughter’. He was 
capable of many affect-imbued interpretations, the anger that exposes hypocrisy and cant, 
and the convivial, pleasurable laughter that binds one to reality, its eccentricities, its 
differences, its enchanting wealth of types. Lessing was unable and unwilling to judge a 
work of art ‘in itself’, as an autochthonous conceit, independently of its effects on the 
world. Explaining the sources of ‘tragic pleasure’, Lessing strikingly recalls the Greek 
doctrines of the passions, which valued the anger that reveals and exposes the world and 
the laughter that offers reconciliation with its absurdities. Unlike ‘hope’ which overleaps 
reality, and the fear which ‘shrinks back from it’, anger and laughter transmit ‘reality’ to 
the soul, they are passions in media res. Reflecting on Lessing’s legacy of emotional 
realism, Arendt argues that for similar reasons the reflexivity of shame and proud 
conviction of honour can be reckoned ‘political concepts’.550   
Arendt’s Lessing embodies Friedrich Schlegel’s call for a ‘higher’ polemical sense, 
sociable rather than ad hominem. Lessing’s praxis was one of attacking and defending 
according to criteria such as how a matter in question was being judged by the public, 
regardless of whether it was true or false. Indeed Lessing would understand and judge 
everything in terms of its ‘position in the world at any given time’ (8). In these terms, 
Lessing defended the role of Christianity, in all its complex relational ‘senses’ or usages, 
for example as an affective counterweight to a triumphant rationalism, or as the necessity 
of mystery and passion in a rapidly disenchanted age. For love of a world of temporal 
rhythms and characteristic differences, Lessing felt the necessity of preserving traditional 
beliefs in the face of those Enlightenment polemicists who would triumphantly ‘trample it 
underfoot’. Yet he would recoil in horror when a narrow-minded scholastic theologian 
                                                 
549 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative: ‘Arendt proposes a way of articulating [narration] in a way 
that differs, in its originality, from both the formalist theories of narrativity and the theories of Paul Ricoeur’ 
(15). 
550 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 6. 
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attempted crudely to ‘prove’ the ontology of God to him: he wanted no coercion, no tyranny 
of certainty (8). 
The tendency of an untimely, dissonant thinker like Lessing is continually to exist 
at the margins of the ludic and sincere, irony and enthusiasm. Out of sympathy for the 
oppressed, Lessing in Nathan der Weise boldly and provocatively identifies the plight of 
humanity with the Jew who, with dignity, asserts that ‘he is a man’ (18). Gadfly, irritant, 
sophisticated provocateur, role player, Lessing’s abrasive distaste for tawdry sentiment will 
nevertheless conceal a powerful desire to recover the naïveté and intuitive sympathy of the 
child who exists so comfortably within the marvelous superficies of this world and keenly 
feels its stimuli (18). I should again remark that Arendt’s Lessing embodies a narratological 
topos that exercises Nietzsche, which cathects aesthetic sophistication with a responsibility 
to society. 
Lessing’s thought is ‘essentially polemical’ precisely because it anticipates 
dialogue with others and ‘stimulates’ them to thought, a Witz that seeks to vitalize human 
relationships and discover worlds of discourse (10). Lessing’s vigilant partiality, in this 
sense, has ‘nothing to do with subjectivity’; it is a partisanship pregnant with the energy, 
madness, and texture of the world (29). According to Arendt, Lessing’s famous critical 
desideratum of Selbstdenken, independent thinking, is no rationalism or rarified elitism, 
‘by no means an activity pertaining to a closed, integrated, organically grown and 
cultivated individual’. Rather, Lessing celebrates his own self-contradictions and 
inconsistencies – incapable of fixing his identity in the world by means of a ‘consistent 
system’ or school of thought, the inorganic or chemical Lessing ‘scattered into the world 
... nothing but fermenta cognitionis’ (8).  
             Lessing’s fermenting critical stimuli were intrinsically related to his capacity for 
critical modesty, immanent delicacies. I think Arendt’s Lessing belongs to a long tradition 
dating from Zeno and the Sophists to Nietzsche, whose corrosive paralogisms co-existed 
with an enlarged common sense, a philosophy of complex assent. Lessing’s polymathic 
love for worldly detail, suggests Arendt, was the inverse form of his farsightedness and 
prophetic capacities. He figures paradox and the social ‘sense’ of paradox.  
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Lessing saw clearly that ‘those who attempt to dominate thinking by reasoning and 
... compelling argumentation’ will prove more dangerous to freedom than orthodoxy and 
faith and the sensibilities they preserve (8). In love with a form of inquiry Plato was never 
entirely able to repress or subordinate, a counter-modern Lessing preferred doxa to alethia, 
a spectrum of opinion to truth (29).551 As would Nietzsche he rejoiced that he might gain 
some respite from his mental powers, that his truths, once uttered, were immediately 
transformed into merely one opinion, contested, ‘reduced to one subject of discourse 
among others’, transposed into other themes and critical purposes, re-positioned, divorced 
from origins.552 
Once again, however, there is another Lessing whose desire for a world reborn 
makes him suffer. I would argue that here Arendt’s Lessing is positioned as a tortured 
interlocutor to one of Dostoevsky’s sublime and beatific ‘idiot’ figures. I think he is a 
cynical Ivan remonstrating with Alyosha’s tranquil faith, bothered by the tenacity of 
doctrinal beliefs. Through the mask of Lessing, Arendt can release herself from the rigours 
of political theory, can ask questions innocent, foolish, naive, and yet profound. Would any 
doctrine, no matter how convincingly proved, be worth so much as a single friendship 
between two men? This is poignant; any bar to friendship would have been rejected by 
Lessing’s ‘untrammeled and unerring conscience’.553  
Out of a capacity for friendship, which was not beyond anguish and wonder, 
Lessing’s discourse resounded with the echoes of ‘many voices’, of answers desired but 
found wanting. Lessing was incapable of monologism, of authorial certainty, like Seneca 
he was incapable of  ‘sovereign independence’, of a dispassionate retreat into his own self, 
which could only mean the dire loss of friendship and dialogue. Lessing’s creative 
independence of thought belied that he never could right the lack of a world between 
people; a world in which innate intuitions and qualities of sensibility could ‘become visible 
                                                 
551 One may comprehend Lessing’s surreptitious anti-Platonism as an aspect of his ‘untimeliness’ in an age 
soon to give itself over to ideo-centric obsessions, moral, epistemological, and ideological. Lessing’s Pagan 
inclinations are clear in Arendt’s evocation; he (Lessing) was content to belong to the race of ‘limited gods’ 
as he occasionally called men, Men In Dark Times, 26. 
552 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 27. 
553 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 29. 
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and audible’, could illuminate the public arena and transmit themselves to mature critical 
thinking.554 
Perturbed, Lessing’s thought and his life were inter-related to the last. He died not 
so much of loneliness, but for love of a world he envisaged but could not attain; for tones, 
desires, critical sympathies, representational energies he proved incapable in that era of 
effectively communicating. Polemical to the point of contentiousness, Lessing could no 
more endure loneliness than the excessive closeness of brotherliness that obliterated all 
distinction. He wanted to be ‘friend to many men’ but no man’s brother.555 His fate was 
that of in-betweenness, an ethos, a vigorous critical course that needed rest points, idylls 
of friendly intercourse, play, light-heartedness. 
Arendt’s extraordinary thought-figure, a sign of her many sided critical desires, 
Gotthold Lessing, is evoked though a tragic narrative, the pharmakon expelled by an age 
which never discovered him as its saviour.556 The meaning of a committed action, a life of 
vigorous relational activities, is best revealed, thinks Arendt, in a story which does not 
master anything once and for all but keeps the meaning of thought-events alive in an ‘ever 
recurrent narration’, a narration that involves us all in it and survives us as an allegory of a 
cultural situation.557 As Kristeva argues, Arendt’s narrative figures are represented within 
a network of human relations; they are destined for a political inter-esse, as sign, role, 
method, perspective, rather than a ‘truth’ or morality. Inveighing against mere chronicle or 
empiricism, Arendt, says Kristeva, ‘calls upon theatrical gestural action as the modus 
operandi of optimal narration’.558 Narrative becomes drama, an allegory of a cultural 
situation; the unity of a sentimental plot is fragmented into potentiated critical 
characteristics. 
  Arendt suggests that no philosophy, no analysis, no aphorism, be it ever so 
profound, can compare in intensity and richness of meaning with a ‘properly narrated 
                                                 
554 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 10. 
555 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 30. 
556 I again draw attention to Benjamin’s ‘Fate and Character’ essay in his Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Schocken Books, New York, 1986, which argues for 
the interest of a character in terms of its role within a narrated action and immanent context. 
557 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 21. 
558 Kristeva, Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative, 18. 
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story’.559 Arendt feels that it is not the eighteenth century’s sanguine humanism, 
polymathy, and freethinking tradition that stands between Lessing and us, but the 
nineteenth century’s ‘obsession’ with totalising historical schemes and its concomitant 
‘commitment to ideology’. Creatures of the nineteenth century yet, we are not Lessing but 
his opponents, relying on history and ‘coercive logic’ as ‘crutches’, sectarian instruments, 
platitudes (8). 
In Bakhtinian terms, we can say that Arendt finds in Lessing a larger than life figure, 
his writings a joyous, Gargantuan dissemination of creative seed, a carnivalesque 
celebration of death and rebirth, a journey of the open and unformed, a defiance of the 
seductions of classical closure in thought and life. Arendt’s Lessing anticipates Bakhtin, 
another untimely thinker, who had a lifelong dislike of ever being agreed with, a fear of his 
thought being canonized and monumentalized.560  
 In Rosa Luxemburg, Arendt portrays another peripatetic character who crystallises 
a ‘thick’ sense of historical time in contradistinction to the ideological obsessions of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
Rosa Luxemburg 
 
If Lessing was a transcendent, heroic model of the contradictory public intellectual, 
the twentieth century’s gift, Rosa Luxemburg, will signify other possibilities of political 
representation for Arendt. Luxemburg’s portrait will require an overlapping representation 
of her life, thought, and acculturation. She is best revealed, Arendt suggests, through bio-
graphy, her life a writing and textual movement.  
Arendt’s Luxemburg demands a digressive narrative form that combines thorough 
documentation, a heavy layer of annotations, and a generous ‘splash’ of quotations, the 
‘citability’ of the vignette and bon mot.  Bio-graphy, the writing, the semiological 
                                                 
559 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 22. 
560 See Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. And London, 1984, 4-5, 347. 
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transposition of a life into many spheres of critical interest, refracts the ‘colourless light’ 
of historical time through the ‘prism of a great character’, so that a complete unity of life 
and thought is achieved (33).  
Against the backdrop of Hegel and Marx’s confident philosophies of historical 
evolution, Arendt asks an uncertain retrospective question of Luxemburg’s biography: 
‘Will history look different if seen through the prism of her life and work?’ From the 
perspective of the critical-spectator interested in the fate of character, can it be that the 
failure of Luxemburg’s efforts ‘as far as official recognition is concerned’ is somehow 
connected with the dismal failure of revolution in the twentieth century? What ‘unofficial’ 
illumination does her life and thought cast? What marginal historical elements does she 
crystallise and what continuums of history does the writing of her life ‘blast open’ in a 
Benjaminian sense? What unforeseen galaxies of critical interest are opened up by a 
narrated evocation of her character (34)?  
Materialist and Idealistic philosophies of history share a common failure to 
Arendt’s way of thinking, they fail to capture those ‘personal reactions’, those ‘gut 
feelings’, which, though ‘seldom publicly admitted’, are among the ‘small, mosaic-like 
pieces that fall into place in the large riddle of history’. The aftermath to the murder of 
Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, became the ‘watershed’ between two eras in Germany, the 
post-war revolution and the Weimar Republic, and the point of no return for the German 
Left. Those on the Left who had drifted to a disintegrating Communist Party found 
themselves unable to return and revitalise the ranks of the Socialists they believed had 
orchestrated her murder (36). Moreover, upon publication of her letters, the ‘Legend’ of a 
humane, feisty and courageous Rosa Luxemburg would inspire a burgeoning and 
amorphous ‘New Left’ tired of old ideological politics (37). 
Diffuse legend, local cult figure, the ‘Rosa myth’ is the dreaming of a place and a 
state of mind, a nascent possibility, the overcoming of conventional cognitive frameworks. 
Arendt’s metaphorics tease us with a pluralist Paganism of scattered narratives that might 
one day assert themselves against the oppressive monotheism, the coercive logics still 
subsisting from the nineteenth century (36). For Luxemburg is somewhat of a mobile 
trickster figure requiring the digression and discontinuity of genealogy rather than the unity 
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of History, authoritative tradition. Like all figures of genuine, joyful, sad, loving humanity, 
Luxemburg was never a ‘believer’, never used politics as a ‘substitute for religion’. She 
possessed a subtlety in judgment of people that withheld her from ideological orthodoxies 
(44). 
Arendt’s Luxemburg is a purveyor of Nietzsche’s ‘small deviant acts’, she signals 
an economy of forces. Through reported observations Arendt anecdotalises Luxemburg’s 
mordant wit, through evocative mise en scène her generous excoriation of mere subjective 
desires, as on the occasion at an international congress she translated an ‘eloquent’ speech 
attacking her misguided passions into ‘an equally telling German’ for the audience. In a 
mediocre and benighted age, orators must recognise each other across the desultory shards 
of mere personal belief, invest in another, higher plane of evaluation (44). An outsider, a 
Polish Jew in a country she always disliked, Luxemburg was  ‘always out of step’. Even 
the suffragette movement that could have personally benefited her aspirations provoked 
intuitive ‘distaste’, and to it she might have been tempted to reply ‘Vive la petite différence 
(37, 44). We can argue that for Arendt the outsider Rosa Luxemburg embodies Benjamin’s 
monadic ‘ideas’ of the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, which reveal worlds through the 
accumulated representation, the ‘mediation’ of extremes, antithetical to the averageness 
and utilitarian functioning of conceptual abstractions and metanarratives. 
A re-telling of Luxemburg’s life will reveal her attachment to a milieu which had 
‘lost all public relevance’ by the nineteen twenties and has now completely disappeared. 
This milieu consisted of Jews from middle-class families whose cultural background was 
German, whose political formation was Russian, and whose moral standards in both private 
and public life were ‘uniquely their own’. This group ‘stood outside all social ranks’, 
Jewish or non-Jewish, and hence had no conventional prejudices whatsoever, having 
developed a splendid universal humanity, a code of honour that attracted non-Jews to them 
in numbers, channelling their desires into the Bolshevik movement (40-41). 
Luxemburg’s childhood was a ‘hidden equalizer’, she grew up amongst people who 
treated one another as equals and possessed a ‘naive contempt’ for social and ethnic 
distinctions. Luxemburg, even in the pathos of her marginality, would always bespeak the 
‘authentic morality’ of this hybrid ‘European’ milieu (42). Luxemburg unwittingly 
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expressed the values of her background in her ‘moral taste’, her instinctive abhorrence of 
nationalist patriotism and racist imperialism, stemming from a ‘movable’ sense of home, a 
diasporic sensibility that did ‘not coincide with any “fatherland”’ (41). Her revolutionary 
spirit was less ideologically motivated than innocently stubborn, a constant friction with 
society that considered social prejudice unbearable on ‘moral grounds’, offensive to her 
sense of justice and freedom, helping her to engage with the ‘destinies of the world’ (50-
51). Luxemburg renews Nietzsche’s untimely stance against petty nationalism, she is, as 
Arendt puts it, ‘one of those whom Nietzsche called “good Europeans”'. Those, like 
Luxemburg, who loved the humanist tendencies of European culture were the ‘only ones 
to have a presentiment of the disastrous consequences ahead’, the enormous force of 
nationalist feeling in a decaying body politic (40-43). Imbued with the subaltern and 
fragmented currents of history, Luxemburg, like Lessing, is the prophet facing backward.  
 
Intuition as Theory 
 
It was this energetic and capricious moral temperament that led Luxemburg’s 
thinking beyond the theoretical narrowness of Marxist dialectics, the cause of her political 
exile. Untamed by party disciplines and orthodox Marxist theory, Luxemburg was open to 
a kind of heterological empiricism, a discerning ‘realism’: ‘What mattered most in her 
view’, Arendt feels, ‘was reality, in all its wonderful and all its frightful aspects, even more 
than the revolution itself' (39).  
Luxemburg realised that capitalism showed no signs of collapsing under the weight 
of its economic contradictions. Opposing the Marxist-Leninist dictum that in the origins of 
capitalist expropriation lie the internal seeds, the innate laws of its destruction, Luxemburg 
in The Accumulation of Capital pointed to the exploitation of pre-capitalist sectors in the 
West, and, upon their exhaustion, the imperialist search for new markets and the 
exploitation of a third world proletariat (44). 
Anguished by the presence of power and suffering in this world, Luxemburg’s 
naïveté was also her sophistication. Out of love for a world of differences, she resisted 
Marx’s theoretical originarity, the notion of capitalist accumulation as ‘original sin’, a 
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single directing event, a myth of origins (39). In so doing Luxemburg ‘illuminated’ the 
Eurocentric, passive idea of historical time as one of Marxism’s stultifying orthodoxies. 
Her ideas were rejected by Lenin, who branded her deviant, heretical. Lenin critiqued her 
as non-Marxist, yet who today ‘would deny’ that her description of African suffering 
‘belonged in a book on imperialism’ (40). Arendt admires Luxemburg as a fluid, 
polymathic thinker whose tendency was always towards an overlapping of discourses and 
critical interests; she might equally have been, circumstances permitting, an historian, 
economist, botanist, zoologist, mathematician (38). 
Luxemburg, a cultivated generalist, saw no totality in capitalism, no ‘closed 
economy’, but fragmented constellations of power and those exploited on the margins (40). 
The story of her discarding by Marxist theory illuminates the reactionary and elitist traits 
of the Bolsheviks, she pits model against model, unveils the true colouration of an ideology. 
Have not events proved her right, asks Arendt? Did she not foresee the ‘moral collapse’ of 
the Soviet Union due to a political culture of zealous ideologues and professional Marxists 
rather than people ‘schooled’ in public life, the ‘broadest democracy’ and public opinion 
(54)? Didn’t she understand, in a lesson she learnt from the historical example of the 
cyclical terrors of the French Revolution, that a deformed revolution is much worse than 
none at all? Luxemburg realised that the aridity of a cultural disposition will always 
translate itself into a disastrous politics, no matter the righteousness of its cause or the 
momentous social question it attempts to solve (53-4). 
For Arendt, Luxemburg’s story, her life and thinking, is material for contemplative 
times, after the terror of concentration camps and the menace of metanarratives. Arendt 
hopes that her (re)writing of Luxemburg’s cultural impact will lead to a ‘belated 
recognition’ of who she was and what she did. An icon and unique example for the political 
possibilities of democratic aspirations, moral realism, and worldly milieux, Luxemburg 
might now find her place in the ‘education of political scientists’ in the West (55-56). 
Luxemburg’s abundant capacity for unorthodox critical engagements, her rhetorical copia 
if you will, suggest for Arendt a propaedeutic for political thought and struggle outside 
conventional disciplines, obtuse ideologies, isolated doctrines.  
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Thinking across history, about and through and around figures like Lessing and 
Luxemburg, Arendt evokes the possibility of fragmentary narrations and genealogies 
which bring into piquant focus discontinuous and complex forms of sensibility and the 
crucial, yet often neglected, role of cultural histories in the formation of political agency. 
Through diacritical narrative, sad and humorous scenographies, Arendt creates a fluid and 
rich sense of historical time, pregnant with repressed historical tendencies (the 
cosmopolitan European, the Jewish and Gypsy pariah) by which the critical seek release 
from any one form of identity. 
 
The Revolutionary Power of Political Sociability 
 
In this concluding section, I argue that Arendt’s political ‘untimeliness’, her 
transhistorical breadth and genealogical pluralism, renews a romantic predilection for 
liminal political sensibilities continually affected and repositioned by an open conversation 
with history; imbued with temperaments and historical currents that transcend available 
modes of identity and belonging.561 Arendt’s idealised mode of political agency is the 
transfiguration of situation, bound to and floating above the swirls and rapids of public 
discourse. 
In On Revolution, Arendt, in republican mode, argues that the positive content of 
freedom is an enabling mode of togetherness that invokes ‘participation in public affairs 
and admission to the public realm’.562 Political participation does not so much consolidate 
as transform the animus of a collective cause. Arendt is enamoured of the American 
Revolution’s transfiguration of its initial civic grievance, the argument for ‘no taxation 
without representation’, into a revolutionary possibility, the foundation of a new republican 
body politic and a declaration of inalienable human rights. The crucible of this 
                                                 
561 This section is based on an article I wrote evoking Arendt’s political thought as a forerunner to 
contemporary debates about historiography and the Holocaust. See Ned Curthoys ‘The Politics of Holocaust 
Representation: The Worldly Typologies of Hannah Arendt’, Arena Journal, New Series, no. 16, 2000/1, 49-
74. 
562 Arendt, On Revolution, 32. 
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radicalisation of purpose in the leading revolutionary figures was the enchanting and 
seductive experience of participatory freedoms: 
... the speech-making and decision-taking, the oratory and the business, the thinking 
and the persuading, and the actual doing which proved necessary to drive this claim 
to its logical conclusion: independent government and the foundation of a new body 
politic.563 
 
The politician as rhetor and public actor is labile, his/her mien and desire 
transformed through the mixed elements of communication and performance. Arendt 
argues that the enthusiasm of the eighteenth-century American republic for its constitution 
was owing to a theatre of pragmatic deliberation and compromise that was coupled with 
the exhilarating emergence of the charismatic individual onto the stage of public life.  
Arendt’s political subject seeks to enhance a political culture through individual example, 
oratorical renown. 
Arendt, sidestepping distinctions of ideology, rediscovers the participatory power 
of America’s constitutional assemblies in the revolutionary councils and Soviets that 
emerged in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Germany in the wake of the First World 
War. While operating as spontaneously formed grass-roots organisations in which equality 
of participation was guaranteed, Arendt observes that factory councils and the Russian 
Soviets nevertheless gave rise to an elite of individuals whose political virtues were not in 
themselves of working-class or ‘social’ origins. The mobile political agency formed 
through these councils revivifies Arendt’s genealogy of ‘realists’, who belong among 
equals, but are outsiders, without a geographical or class-based ‘home’. Engendered in the 
communicative crucible of that ‘incessant talk’ which alone saves political organisations 
from the ‘futility’ of instrumentality, these political leaders revealed active political virtues 
such as ‘personal integrity’, an enlarged capacity for ‘judgment’, and ‘physical courage’.564  
Far from the mundane, if successful, qualities of the manager or administrator, the 
party-political hack, or the autocratic centralist, Arendt romanticises the failed 
revolutionary as the natal ‘who’ disclosed by political action, a kind of self-consuming 
                                                 
563 Arendt, On Revolution, 34. 
564 Arendt, On Revolution, 274. 
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Byronic hero. These rarified political beings, as opposed to private citizens with their 
economic motivations, their social needs and prejudices, are born of the public realm, of 
the ‘light which exhibits each deed enacted within its boundaries, in the very visibility to 
which it exposes all those who enter it’.565 They are a mixed type, a hybrid of constitutional 
conservatism and aesthetic imagination.  
The importance of a participatory and egalitarian milieu continued to influence 
Arendt’s political enquiries. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt decried the 
bourgeois attempt, dating from the nineteenth century, to collapse political power into 
privileged ‘social’ networks, assuming an identity of political, economic, and social power. 
Significantly, such a possibility gained ground in the bourgeoisie’s experience of 
imperialist adventurism, racism, and lawless expropriation and exploitation in the 
nineteenth-century ‘scramble for Africa’. A milieu antithetical to authentic political 
participation, Arendt argues that the colonial ventures of the European bourgeoisie 
suggested the possibility of similarly anti-democratic exploits in the metropolitan centre. 
Periphery becomes centre, exploitation on the margins, imperialist peregrinations, 
crystallise into instrumentalist characteristics, a desire to subordinate and control home 
populations.566 As the analysis of Luxemburg disclosed, seemingly minor cultural traits are 
the driving force of history. Modes of governance emerge from a paideia of contexts. 
In The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt develops a Nietzschean analysis of 
representative types, and the milieux they figure, as the condition of totalitarian rule. To 
do its bidding, totalitarianism will seek to co-ordinate two quite different types or personae, 
both ardent followers of the Führer’s capricious will and visionary propaganda: the 
fanatical idealist and adventurous bohemian; the youthful storm trooper, or the Nazi leader 
like Goebbels. The idealist and bohemian hate the mediocre norms and duties of bourgeois 
society and search for the heroic, nihilistic, and exhilarating. 
Yet totalitarianism, unable to simply extinguish prior mores and natural human 
sympathies all at once, also makes use of the narrow-minded philistine who organises the 
bureaucratic machines of domination and extermination, the Adolf Eichmanns. The 
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566 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1951, 336. 
267 
 
philistine is capable of even greater crimes than so-called professional criminals, provided 
only that these crimes are well organised and ‘assumed the appearance’ of routine jobs. It 
was for the philistine, dominated by private imperatives, that a sanitised language of ‘final 
solutions’ and ‘special measures’ was created to dissimulate hellish violence as a routine 
bureaucratic task.567 
Arendt ‘s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) is a 
remarkable study of totalitarianism as the aberrance of individuals and the exemplary 
dangers of a diminished civil society.568 This book was initially published in a series of 
reports for the New Yorker journal on the 1961 Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann for ‘crimes 
against the Jewish People’. What intrigues Arendt is not Adolf Eichmann the empirical 
individual, but Eichmann the hybrid persona of totalitarianism, the anti-type to the 
‘political’ ‘who’ with all their capacities for novelty, spontaneity, pathetic distance and 
communicative élan.  
Arendt’s method of evocation is narratological, biographical – even Eichmann’s 
trial will be reported through vignettes and episodes, a ‘splash of quotations’ illuminating 
a stunningly unimaginative and depoliticised personality, the outcome of modernity’s 
innermost tendencies, not simply its abortion.  
           An upwardly mobile, career focussed ‘parvenu’, a petit-bourgeois disaffected with 
a society that shunned his mediocre status, Eichmann’s motivations for joining the S.S. 
‘typically’ lacked the conviction of a public interest or common cause. Eichmann is a 
version of Arendt’s atomised ‘mass man’, a philistine dominated by the instrumentalism 
of private initiative, whose only worldly attachments are to power and success as embodied 
in an adventurously expansionist state.569 The philistine narrowness of Eichmann, deprived 
of urbane social interaction and its pluralist recognitions, lends itself to a kind of semiotic 
solipsism, a complete inability to utter ‘a single sentence that is not a cliché’ or ‘stock 
phrase’.570 
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In the philosophically stern terminology of Arendt, Eichmann’s aphasia, his 
inability to ‘speak’, is closely connected with his inability to ‘think’, which means to think 
from the standpoint of somebody else. Living in a circumscribed imaginary of normatively 
sanctioned symbolic manoeuvres, Eichmann continues even under heated courtroom 
interrogation and powerful testaments to incredible suffering, to be ‘safeguarded’ against 
the words and presence of others, against ‘reality as such’.571 Imbricating Eichmann’s 
solipsism with his epoch, Arendt argues that he remained impervious to suffering for 
particular reasons.  
Eichmann’s conscience spoke with a ‘respectable voice’, that of  ‘respectable 
society’, as he noted the zeal and eagerness with which ‘good society’ everywhere reacted 
as he did to the Nazi crimes. Thus the transformation of Eichmann into a criminal of 
unprecedented proportions is enabled by that incremental destruction of legality and 
inversion of social ethics that creates a ‘world-upside down’, a ‘total moral collapse in 
respectable European society’, from which the unimaginative philistine can establish no 
critical distance.572 Here we have, in nuce, Arendt’s methodological response to modernity, 
an analysis of the linguistic subject in its reaction to the breakdown of perspective and 
communication in a completely de-politicised society. 
In her observance of Eichmann during his trial, Arendt felt that she also caught a 
glimpse of some ‘idealist’ traits. Eichmann’s use of self ‘elating’ clichés such as his 
grandiloquent end of war claim that he would ‘jump into his grave laughing’ about the 
murder of the Jews being on his conscience, was a boast only apparently contradicted by 
his self-important statement in the Jerusalem court that he would ‘gladly hang himself in 
public as a warning example for all anti-Semites on this earth’; or by his great respect for 
the Zionist leader of the Hungarian Jewish Council Rudolf Kastner, a fellow ‘idealist’ 
willing to sacrifice people and resources for the sake of an idea, the preservation of the best 
‘biological material’. Arendt’s Eichmann is a terrifying doppelgänger of the political 
rhetor, lacking both a ‘realistic’ prudence and a communicative ability to transpose 
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received signs into other idioms. He is utter mediocrity and deluded fantasist, unable to 
mediate these dangerous extremes. 
Arendt argues that the most disturbing aspect of evil is that incrementally, and 
without purposive intent, it can spread like a ‘fungus’ and lay waste to civilised life: ‘It 
was the most banal motives – a consciousness of duty and powerful self-identification as 
an honest job-holder – not especially wicked ones (like sadism or the wish to humiliate or 
the will to power) which made Eichmann such a frightful evil-doer’.573 Arendt’s (in)famous 
conception of ‘evil’ is a decisive shift from theological considerations of radical evil, to a 
theory of dispositions, a comparative assessment of types, a Nietzschean mourning for the 
loss in modernity of thinking’s communicative imperative.  
Arendt’s modernity is dystopian. For all its totalising claims to the truth of history, 
for all its thin universalism, it has lost a feeling for situation, for nuance, for the middle 
degrees between binary extremes and logics of identity. Rhetoric as realism and untimely 
prophecy, as micro-critique and philosophy of history, offers Arendt a critical propaedeutic 
from which to displace hegemonic norms. 
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presentation under the extremely different circumstances of defeat. 
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Conclusion 
 
I originally wanted to entitle this thesis ‘Rethinking Formalism: Refractions of 
Classical Rhetoric in Literary, Cultural and Political Theory’, as my purpose has been to 
rethink the cultural politics of deconstructive formalism. In doing so I’ve adopted a critical 
strategy similar to other thinkers in this thesis. I’ve asked questions about recent critical 
theory as a discursive mien in conversation with other historical theories of critical 
representation. I’ve tried to deploy an historiographical principle of Friedrich Schlegel and 
later Nietzsche’s, that all schools of thought can, after the dust settles, be characterised as 
sensibility, ethos, enacted within a spectrum of forces. John Guillory’s sophisticated 
assessment of deManian deconstruction, influential in recent debates, is one such attempt 
to comment on the historical significance of deconstruction and rhetorical reading, its bid 
for power within an institutional habitus. As regards Paul de Man, Guillory revives the 
alarmist tone of Frank Lentricchia’s’ After the New Criticism.574 This powerful polemic 
suspected de Man and his ‘New Critic’ confrères of a reworked aestheticism that sought, 
by elaborating a privileged textual universe, to close down political and ethical argument; 
formalism as closure, a linguistic turning away from the harshness of reality. 
Guillory’s charge is equally momentous, accusing de Man’s dry, technical 
methodology of displacing rhetoric as an historically situated discourse with an important 
social function. This is a serious accusation, because all discourses carry a certain relational 
charge, a structure of feeling that can be adapted and renewed through history. Discourses 
are the materials of history; they speak of collective affects, of culture and sub-culture, 
conservatism and revolution. This thesis has suggested that to characterise the history of 
ideas requires nuance; like Nietzsche we need to be aware that acculturation has always 
required both violent discipline and small deviant acts. Discourse requires counterpoints, 
other powers against which to exert itself. In this sense even seemingly extreme 
perspectives have a certain performative ‘sense’ about them, they play a role within a rich 
tapestry of habits, memories, effects. The Sophists and their legacy of differential senses, 
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have taught us that there can be a lot of commitment in artistry, and Nietzsche reminds us 
that it is not conformity or averageness that binds us to a culture. 
Which is as much to say that the deconstructive revival of rhetoric does pose the 
problem of discourse, but as paradoxical, as a combination of imperatives. More 
specifically, deconstruction wanted to revive the paradoxes of immanent reading, to release 
the emancipatory power of deferring hermeneutic assumptions about intention and will. 
This is not a turn against history; it is the problem and possibilisation of historical 
discourse, of thinking historically in the present. Il n’y a pas de hors-texte, there is no 
outside to the text, is Derrida’s famous dictum. It has the traces of an Husserlian epochê, a 
phenomenological suspension of what we take to be a settled concern, something exterior 
to and immune from our own activities, affective interpretations, historical becoming. 
Indeed, one might argue that Derrida’s provocation to the guts of the way we understand 
is a moment of speculative joy, not a definitive program for thought.  Derrida’s textuality 
offers a temporary skepticism that foresees, at the end of certainty, the recovery of the 
positive role of feeling, material practices, and communicative forms in the history of ideas. 
I have argued in this thesis that the universal solvent of critique fragments in order to 
recompose historical sense and critical paideia.  
The Frühromantiks thought a recursive emphasis on representation would imbricate 
thought and world, communicate ideas. I have discussed the importance, for Derrida, of 
repositioning Plato’s role in the history of ideas, a non-Platonic Plato. If we discuss Derrida 
within the historicity of rhetoric, as a discourse of displacement and renewal, we’re tempted 
to think that Derrida, like his romantic forebears, wanted to recover the genius of a culture, 
not only the centre of thought but its peripheries, its zones of contact with its putative 
outside. Derrida’s Plato is not a unity, the sum of his experiences or intentional acts, but 
this critical gesture is not designed to sterilize or relativise his intellectual labours. Plato 
elaborates his thought through the mask of Socrates, through mythic fiction, genealogy, 
and rhetorical performance. Derrida augments a discourse of communicative restraint, 
arguing that Plato speaks according to ‘necessity’, of circumstance, available modes of 
representation, and discourse practices. For Derrida, to read Plato immanently, without 
prior assumptions as to his ‘ideas’, is to engage with that in his logos which is still virtual, 
potential. 
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Immanent reading wants worldliness rather than insulated logics, it wants 
dissemination, relations, a pharmakological situation or dilemma for thought.  Immanent 
reading is interested in the redemptive power of particulars, sub-generic energies, qualities 
invisible to historicisms, whose claimed realism is only a mask for schematism, the 
presumption of progress, the denial of multiple genealogies. Derrida made this point early 
in his oeuvre. In ‘Violence and Metaphysics’, Derrida suggested that for there to be 
discourse there must be character and orientation, a certain violence, a force of 
signification, impression, that gathers power to it.575  Derrida suggests that Levinas’s 
supposedly irenic ethics of the other materialises itself as a discourse of phonocentrism, 
just as it retains the ‘traces’, a Derridean theme, of a Judaic monotheistic theology of 
alterity and divine power. Out of necessity, logos has its mythemes, its narratives and 
imaginaries; it communicates other idioms, it is open to historical interpretation.  
A discourse is not a simple act of will, it is in excess of itself, it is dynamically 
expressive in Spinoza’s sense and holistic, monadological in a Leibnizian sense. Derridean 
deconstruction always wanted representation to open up worlds of discourse, subaltern 
attributes, and other histories. An essay called ‘Genesis and Structure’ in Writing and 
Difference said as much, its flavour is Arendtian. Natality, unpredictability, creativity in 
history comes, ironically, from structural considerations, from a meditation on theme, 
convention. Form is history as possibility. Derrida’s claim to deconstruction as a ‘method’ 
might have qualified deconstruction as a prudent and deliberative critical discipline. But 
Derrida is also a Sophist and conceptual persona, engaged with but settling on no territory, 
a medium of new births. 
De Man too, reveals the paralogic of immanent method, this thesis has suggested 
that his rhetoric mediates rigorous attention and expansive desires. De Man spurned 
traditional History and its poetics like the Frühromantiks and Benjamin before him. The 
genealogy I have illuminated draws attention to de Man’s semiology, which performs itself 
as rigorous technique but also seeks out a signification that only communicates and creates 
interesting themes once intention is suspended. Accused of a dystopian modernism, there 
are traces in de Man’s non-referential rhetoricism of the prelapsarian Adamic naming that 
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inspired Benjamin’s weak messianism. De Man is like Nietzsche, he loves the hybrid 
chronotope of rhetoric, he wants the false totality of the work or book as an historical datum 
to segue into various rhetorical modes, the necessarily rich historicity of representation.  
I have intimated that de Man wanted to potentiate forms, that rhetoric is historically 
a discourse of possibility, a sense for the almost and unresolved. We should now be aware 
that the critique of originarity or genetic directives was targeted not at truth as such, but 
hermeneutic and periodising critical philosophies that resisted the translatability of the text, 
its plurality of characteristics. De Man wanted to be the lacuna of intellectual history, the 
‘gap’ in critical pedagogies, a constellation, rather than identity, of past and present, a 
paedeia of critical purposes. His rhetoric is discourse as ethos and paideia, intensive 
reflection, extensive feeling.  
I think a restored contextual appreciation of the rhetorical ethos of de Man and 
Derrida, irreducible to methodological claims, might enable a closer conversation between 
the theory and historiography of rhetoric. Once revitalised as a broad discourse, rhetoric 
might help critical representation respond to a Frühromantik demand, that criticism should 
have a positive element of a creation, a fluid economy of usages, which is only possible if 
divorced from any single locus or genetic determinism. In the interstitial umbrella of 
rhetoric this thesis has articulated, I would like Deconstruction to converse with 
pragmatism, for a praxical discourse to converse with critical genealogy, urbane 
conversation to encounter untimeliness.  
I think that conceiving of rhetoric as a sensibility and acculturated tendency, that 
has seized hold of artistic and philosophical personalities, opens our interpretative 
horizons, allowing us to move beyond disciplinary lassitude and analyse, without 
reification, the influence of rhetoric on literary history, political practice and political 
theory. Rhetoric brings power into focus, but it is also a peripheral vision, a sense for the 
subaltern tendency. As a broad propaedeutic of culture, rhetoric can re-energise cultural 
studies as a heightened conventionalism, alert to the overlapping of discourses, the 
interpenetration of genres. It is time to welcome rhetoric, to learn from this stranger in our 
midst. 
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